

**The Digital Opportunities Task Force:
The G8's Effort to Bridge the Global Digital Divide**

Jeffrey A. Hart
Professor
Department of Political Science
Indiana University
Woodburn Hall 210
Bloomington, IN 47405
Email: hartj@indiana.edu
Web: <http://mypage.iu.edu/~hartj>

Paper originally prepared for a panel on "Explaining G8 Effectiveness" at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, Montreal, Canada, March 17-20, 2004, and revised for a conference on "Security, Prosperity and Freedom: Why America Needs the G8" at Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, June 3-4, 2004. Please do not cite or quote without the written permission of the author.

Abstract

During the past decade, the G-8 countries have discussed a number of issues related to the governance of cyberspace. These issues include (among others): the regulation and taxation of e-commerce, the protection of individual privacy, digital authentication, and the promotion of broadband infrastructure. While these discussions were initiated by the U.S. government, they moved over time in a direction not anticipated by any of the G-8 governments. After the Okinawa Summit, the discussions in the Digital Opportunities Task Force (DOTforce) focused on how to bridge the global digital divide. This paper tracks the history of those deliberations and attempts to explain G-8 policies in this area.

Introduction

The representatives of the major economic powers that comprised the Group of Eight (G8) began to address the problems of coordinating policies regarding the governance of cyberspace in the early 1990s.¹ The governance issues they dealt with initially included, among others, the establishment of norms, principles, and rules regarding the interconnection of computer networks via networks of networks like the Internet, rights of access to those networks, pricing of access, monitoring of network-mediated economic transactions, intellectual property protection, taxation of goods and services delivered via the networks, privacy, security and a variety of other matters thought to affect the confidence of users. Towards the end of the decade, the G8 turned to a new issue: reversing the tendencies toward an increasing “global digital divide” between rich and poor countries. This paper will focus primarily on the last issue, after setting it in historical context.

One of the key questions addressed here is why the G8 turned from the previous set of cyberspace governance issues to consideration of how to bridge the digital divide. I will suggest below that the main reason was the G8’s need to respond to the criticisms by anti-globalization forces that G8 governance was undemocratic and therefore contributed to increased global inequality. For this reason, one important way to evaluate the success of the DOTforce was in terms of its ability to give the G8 a counterargument to the anti-globalization movement’s claims. More important, however, was the attempt by the G8 to transcend its inherently intergovernmental character by including representatives from

¹ I will use G8 to stand for both the Group of Seven (G7) major industrialized countries that met annually at international economic summits from 1974 through 1997 (the United States, Canada, Japan, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy) and the Group of Eight (G8) that began in 1998 with the addition of Russia as the eighth member of the group.

“civil society” in its deliberations on the global digital divide. The DOTforce invented a method called the “multi-stakeholder approach” to do this. Many of the participants in the DOTforce considered this invention to be a success, but only time will tell whether it will spread to other issues under G8 purview.

Historical Context

Although originating in the late 1960s in research begun under the auspices of the U.S. Department of Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA), the Internet emerged in the 1990s as the most important network of networks with the capability, in principle, to interconnect every computer (large or small) on the planet. While the ARPANET was built in the 1970s to interconnect military contractors with one another, it was succeeded first by the NSFNET, which expanded interconnection to university scientists and engineers, and then by the Internet. Commercial interconnection to the Internet began in the late 1980s and soon many businesses had shifted at least some of their activities to cyberspace.²

By the early 1990s, the U.S. government began to ask the rest of the world to adopt policies that it believed would be conducive to the spread of Internet-based commercial activity. This was the Global Information Infrastructure (GII) initiative of the Clinton administration.

One particularly important aspect of the Clinton administration’s GII initiative was the push for policies of minimal restrictions on e-commerce in order to encourage the shift of economic transactions to the Internet. According to one official publication, *The*

² Jeffrey Hart, François Bar and Robert Reed, "The Building of the Internet: Implications for the Future of Broadband Networks", *Telecommunications Policy*, November 1992.

Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, there was a danger of killing off the goose that lays the golden eggs:

Commerce on the Internet could total tens of billions of dollars by the turn of the century. For this potential to be realized fully, governments must adopt a non-regulatory, market-oriented approach to electronic commerce, one that facilitates the emergence of a transparent and predictable legal environment to support global business and commerce. Official decision makers must respect the unique nature of the medium and recognize that widespread competition and increased consumer choice should be the defining features of the new digital marketplace.³

The Clinton administration called on the World Trade Organization (WTO) to declare the Internet a tax-free environment and to request the development of a uniform commercial code for electronic commerce. They asked that there be a WTO effort to make national intellectual property regimes more consistent and enforceable. A series of reports were issued to provide background information for these and other related policy proposals over the next three years.⁴ The U.S. government was largely successful in these policy initiatives, although not without generating considerable controversy.

The Clinton administration also called for a meeting of the information ministers of the G8 in 1995 to be held on February 25-26 in Brussels. The main topic of discussion was the means by which to “encourage and promote the innovation and development of new technologies, including, in particular, the implementation of open, competitive, and world-wide information infrastructures.” The conference concluded with the

³ *Framework for Global Electronic Commerce* (Washington, D.C.: July 1, 1997), p. 2. The document bears the names of both President William Clinton and Vice President Albert Gore.

⁴ Marcia S. Smith, John D. Moteff, Lennard G. Kruger, Glenn J. McLoughlin, and Jeffrey W. Seifert, *Internet: An Overview of Key Technology Policy Areas Affecting Its Use and Growth* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, updated January 21, 2001), p. 12.

identification of a set of pilot projects that would benefit from international cooperation.⁵ These projects were adopted formally and funded by the G8 at the following summit.

At around the same time, a joint symposium of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Vancouver, Canada, addressed “Building the Foundation for the 21st Century.” The APEC-OECD symposium laid the framework for a market-led policy for infrastructure and service development. The OECD followed up in Turku, Finland, in 1997 with a joint government and business conference on the theme of “Dismantling the Barriers to Global Electronic Commerce.” In 1998, the OECD held a ministerial conference in Ottawa on “A Borderless World: Realizing the Potential of Electronic Commerce.”⁶ It was at this conference that the members of the OECD agreed to the Ottawa Taxation Framework Conditions (see below for details). APEC also held follow-up meetings that focused on using the Internet and information technologies to solve problems of economic development. These meetings probably influenced later discussions on bridging the digital divide among the G8.⁷

The World Bank formed a Global Information Infrastructure Commission (GIIC) in February 1995 that has met annually since then. The first full meeting of the GIIC took place in Washington in July 1995. The GIIC was designed to facilitate cooperation between governments and the private sector in order “to foster private sector leadership

⁵ G7 Information Society Conference, Information Society Website, http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/intcoop/g8/i_g8conference.html.

⁶ The official website for the conference is <http://www.ottawaoecdconference.org/>.

⁷ Richard Beaird, “Opening Remarks,” OECD-APEC Forum, Policy Frameworks for the Digital Economy, Honolulu, Hawaii, January 14-17, 2003, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/19/56/2492657.pdf>.

and private-public sector cooperation in the development of information networks and services to advance global economic growth, education and quality of life.”⁸

Internet Governance Issues at the OECD

The OECD began to take up issues connected with the Internet and electronic commerce in the late 1990s. One major effort was connected with the Ottawa Taxation Framework Conditions of 1998. That agreement set out a variety of principles to be followed by OECD governments regarding the taxation of the emerging sector. One of was the idea that taxation should be neutral with respect to conventional and electronic forms of commerce. The other general principals to be followed were: neutrality, efficiency, simplicity, effectiveness, fairness, and flexibility. Follow up work on the Framework was delegated to the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs.⁹

There has been substantial debate within the OECD on direct taxes, such as sales taxes. There a large item of contention is determining taxation rights. Under the OECD Model Tax Convention, such taxes require the concept of a “permanent establishment,” a “fixed place of business through which the business of an enterprise is wholly or partly carried on.”¹⁰ Preliminary discussions determined that a web site is not such a permanent establishment, nor is an Internet Service Provider who hosts the web site.¹¹ Discussion of this issue is still ongoing in the OECD.

⁸ GII Commission Inaugural Meeting, <http://www.giic.org/events/ann1.asp>.

⁹ *Implementation of the Ottawa Taxation Framework Conditions: The 2003 Report* (Paris: OECD, 2003), pp. 11-12. <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/45/19/20499630.pdf>.

¹⁰ OECD, Report to Ministers, *E-Commerce: Implementing the Ottawa Taxation Framework Conditions*, C/MIN (2000) 9, http://www1.oecd.org/subject/mcm/2000/e_comm_ott.pdf.

¹¹ *Ibid*, p. 3.

At the Ottawa meeting in 1998, the OECD ministers reaffirmed “their commitment to the protection of privacy on global networks in to ensure the respect of important rights, build confidence in global networks, and to prevent unnecessary restrictions on trans-border flows of personal data.”¹² They agreed to take the necessary steps to extend the existing OECD Privacy Guidelines (published in 1980) to global networks. Progress in achieving this goal was discussed at the Paris Forum in 1999 and the Emerging Market Economies Forum in Dubai in 2001.

The OECD’s Committee for Information, Computer, and Communications Policy (ICCP) and that Committee’s Working Party on Information Security and Privacy (WPISP) were given the task of formulating an action plan for online privacy protection. They focused on the following subtasks:

- “Encouraging the adoption of privacy policies.
- Encouraging online notification of privacy policies to users.
- Ensuring that enforcement and redress measures are available in cases of noncompliance.
- Promoting user education and awareness about online privacy and the means at their disposal for protecting privacy.
- Encouraging the use of privacy-enhancing technologies.
- Encouraging the use and development of contractual solutions for online trans-border data flows.”¹³

¹² OECD, *Privacy Online: OECD Guidance on Policy and Practice* (Paris: OECD, November 2003), p. 12.

¹³ *Ibid*, p. 13.

Part of what was going on here was an adjustment of earlier policies regarding trans-border flows of personal data.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the European governments had moved in the direction of stronger guarantees for privacy of online personal data than existed in the United States. Accordingly, they placed rather strict limits on trans-border flows of personal data. However, the rapid rise of Internet data traffic and e-commerce resulted in a reconsideration of those earlier decisions. European authorities did not want the EU to be excluded from the benefits of e-commerce because of overly restrictive privacy guarantees. In addition, the U.S. government and many U.S.-based multinational companies strongly urged a relaxation in European privacy guarantees in order to maximize the potential benefits to all of moving to web-based commerce. Therefore, in pursuit of greater international harmonization of privacy policies within the OECD, there was considerable support for greater transparency of national privacy rules and practices.

It quickly became apparent to participants in these discussions that governments were dependent on private firms to implement and enforce privacy guarantees, since most OECD countries had privatized to some extent the ownership of data conduits and personal data storage systems. Accordingly, private firms were invited to participate in OECD policy discussions. As in other areas of global governance, other private sector groups and organizations asserted their rights to participate in discussions of privacy. For example, Marc Rotenberg of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC) presented a plan for integrating “civil society” organizations into OECD discussions of online privacy matters at the Global Forum on Information Systems and Network Security held in Oslo, Norway, in October 2003. Rotenberg stressed the importance of going beyond

government and private business participation in such discussions because of the need to foster consumer trust in global networks in order to realize their potential benefits.¹⁴

A lot of the activity in this area and in the related areas of authentication (electronic signatures) and cyber security has been focused on raising consciousness. A survey of EU businesses done for the European Commission, for example, revealed that 75 percent of companies had no cyber security strategy whatsoever. Spending in this area was very low and most companies had understaffed information technology security offices.¹⁵ Similarly, many governments were struggling to deal effectively with problems of consumer confidence posed by viruses, worms, and spam, often with inadequate resources. It is not surprising, therefore, that international discussions such as those in the OECD would focus on information-sharing and the pooling of costs in dealing with these increasingly global problems.

The Global Digital Divide

The Commerce Department issued a report in 2000 entitled *Falling Through the Net: Toward Digital Inclusion*.¹⁶ This was the first major U.S. governmental effort to study and document inequalities in access to and usage of the Internet across social groups. The report showed a trend of increasing usage of the Internet but also an increasing gap in usage between urban and rural, minority and non-minority groups, and

¹⁴ <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/19/17842138.pdf>.

¹⁵ Pernilla Skantze, "European Cyber Security," presentation for the OECD Global Forum on Information Systems and Network Security, Oslo, Norway, October 2003, <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/53/43/17979495.pdf>.

¹⁶ National Telecommunication and Information Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, *Falling through the Net: Toward Digital Inclusion* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2000), <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/ftn00/contents00.html>.

high and low socio-economic status households. For some variables, such as gender and income, the gap was decreasing. But the key finding was that “noticeable divides still exist between those with different levels of income and education, different racial and ethnic groups, old and young, single and dual-parent families, and those with and without disabilities.”¹⁷

The NTIA report focused mainly on the United States, but it did not take long for similar studies to appear that highlighted international aspects of the digital divide. For example, the World Economic Forum launched its Global Digital Divide Initiative (GDDI) in 2000 “to develop public-private partnerships that would help bridge the gap between those who have ICT access, skills and resources and those who do not.”¹⁸ The International Labor Organization released a study in 2001 arguing that lack of access to information and communication technologies (ICTs) on the part of workers in the developing world denied them access to jobs in the technology sector. The report noted that access to ICTs without appropriate education and training would not be a sufficient response to the growing North-South digital divide.¹⁹ Similar studies were done by the World Bank and special agencies of the United Nations.

¹⁷ *Falling Through the Net*, executive summary.

¹⁸ World Economic Forum, Global Digital Divide Initiative, <http://www.weforum.org/site/homepublic.nsf/Content/Global+Digital+Divide+Initiative>.

¹⁹ International Labor Organization, *World Employment Report 2001: Life at Work in the Information Economy* (Geneva: ILO, 2001).

The Okinawa Charter

At the international economic summit held in Okinawa and Kyushu in June-July 2000, the G8 adopted the *Okinawa Charter on Global Information Society*.²⁰ A draft for this document was prepared for pre-summit discussions with representatives from developing countries at a meeting in Tokyo just before the summit under the sponsorship of Japanese Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori. The Japanese government wanted the G8 to go beyond the scheduled discussions of debt relief in Okinawa summit, partly as a response to the demonstrations against the G8 and the WTO that had taken place in Seattle in 1999.²¹

The Okinawa Charter started by stating that ICTs are “fast becoming a vital engine for the world economy.” It argued that ICTs have the potential to transform economies and societies because of their “power to help individuals and societies use knowledge and ideas.” The Okinawa Charter put forward a principle of inclusion in which “everyone, everywhere should be enabled to participate in and no one should be excluded from the benefits of the global information society.” It stressed the importance of governmental leadership in creating an “appropriate policy and regulatory environment” which included the fostering of competition and innovation in an overall environment of economic and financial stability. It called for “collaboration to optimize global networks, fight abuses that undermine the integrity of the network, bridge the digital divide, invest in people, and promote global access and participation.” The last

²⁰ <http://www.dotforce.org/reports/it1.html>.

²¹ Clay Chandler, “Rich Pay Heed to the Poor as G-8 Summit Opens,” *Washington Post*, July 21, 2000, p. A19.

paragraph of the preamble to the Okinawa Charter reiterated the G8's commitment to bridging the global digital divide.²²

The second section of the Okinawa Charter focused on the need to create the right policy and regulatory environment for ICTs to have a positive impact. The private sector “plays a leading role” but “it is up to governments to create a predictable, transparent, and non-discriminatory policy and regulatory environment...” The document went on to stress the importance of enforcing intellectual property rights and liberalizing international flows, especially e-commerce. It urged taxation policies consistent with those pursued by the OECD, “continuing the practice of not imposing customs duties on electronic transmissions,” and the adoption of interoperable, market-driven standards. Like the OECD efforts described briefly above, the Okinawa Charter identified privacy protection, electronic authentication, and security to be important areas for future discussion.

The remainder of the document reaffirmed the commitment of the G8 to bridging the global digital divide and suggested ways of working with other international organizations and private sector groups to achieve this goal. In the final pages, the Okinawa Charter announced the decision of the G8 to establish a Digital Opportunity Taskforce (DOT Force) to respond to the needs of the developing countries. The Okinawa Charter became the foundational document for a G8 effort that was to begin in 2000 and end in 2003 with the creation of a number of pilot programs, reports, and policy dialogues meant to advance the state of art in applying ICTs to development concerns.

²² *Okinawa Charter on Global Information Society*, <http://www.dotforce.org/reports/it1.html>.

The DOT Force

After the Okinawa Summit, forty three teams from organizations representing governments, the private sector, non-profit organization, and international organizations were assembled to “identify ways in which the digital revolution can benefit all the world’s people, especially the poorest and most marginalized groups.”²³ The first meeting of the DOT Force was held in Tokyo on November 27-28, 2000. The meeting was chaired by Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Yoshiji Nogami. A schedule was established for the preparation of a report prior to the next international economic summit in Genoa. The report, to be finished by May 2001, would be drafted with the help of the World Bank and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). It would deal with the issues discussed in the Okinawa Charter and would be “action-oriented.”²⁴

The report that resulted, *Digital Opportunities for All: Meeting the Challenge*, concluded that “when wisely applied, ICT offer enormous opportunities to narrow social and economic inequalities and support sustainable wealth creation, and thus help to achieve the broader development goals that the international community has set.”²⁵ It proposed four areas for action:

1. fostering policy, regulatory, and network readiness;
2. improving connectivity, increasing access, and lowering costs;
3. building human capacity; and

²³ *Digital Opportunities for All: Meeting the Challenge*, Report of the Digital Opportunity Task Force (DOT Force) including a proposal for a Genoa Plan of Action, May 11, 2001, http://www.dotforce.org/reports/DOT_Force_Report_V_5.0h.html.

²⁴ *First Meeting of the Digital Opportunity Task Force* (dot force) (Summary), November 30, 2000, http://www.library.utoronto.ca/g7/dot_force/summary-nov-00.html.

²⁵ *Digital Opportunities for All*, p. 3.

4. encouraging participation in global e-commerce and other e-Networks.²⁶

The members of the DOT Force went so far as to assert that “the basic right of access to knowledge and information is a prerequisite for modern human development.” The enthusiasm for using ICT as the primary vehicle for this was palpable in the report’s verbiage.

The report went on to discuss and summarize the UN Millennium Declaration and the related Development Goals, which included, among other items, reducing the number of people living in extreme poverty by half between 1990 and 2015. It stressed the potential utility of using ICTs to reduce global inequality but also the need to put “in place the appropriate infrastructure,” which “is a multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder task.” The report referred to the need for governments to work together with non-profit organizations, private firms, and international organizations. The report claimed that the DOT Force was the first G8 initiative to take this idea seriously. This emphasis on multi-stakeholder participation was no doubt partly a response to the criticisms of the so-called “civil society organizations” about their lack of access to decision-making in the G8, the WTO, and the World Bank/IMF systems.

The report did not ignore the difficulties of the tasks it recommended the G8 to undertake. It included discussions of the problem of general skepticism about the potential role of ICTs in development, opposition to using ICTs to enhance transparency and thereby reduce corruption, and the possibility of negative reactions to the effects of ICT diffusion on employment patterns. It called for fresh thinking on these matters and for a search for best practices on a global basis. The report concluded with nine “action

²⁶ *Ibid*, pp. 4-5.

points” that later were called the Genoa Plan of Action. The Plan of Action was fully endorsed by G8 leaders at the Genoa Summit in July 2001.

The G8 was led by Italy in 2001 and Canada in 2002. The governments of the two countries were given the responsibility to facilitate the work of the DOT Force after the Genoa Summit. The DOT Force implementation teams proposed a number of new projects in the following seven areas:

- national e-strategies
- access and connectivity
- human capacity building
- entrepreneurship
- ICTs for health
- local content and applications
- global policy participation

These projects and the subprojects associated with them would continue beyond the life-span of the DOT Force itself, mainly via a hand off to working groups of the newly created UN ICT Task Force (see Appendix II for a listing)..

The DOT Force prepared a final document entitled *Report Card: Digital Opportunities for All* that was published in June 2002 in time for discussion at the G8 summit in Kananaskis.²⁷ This report asserted that the “multi-stakeholder approach of the DOT Force now serves as the model for other global ‘ICT for development’ initiatives

²⁷ Digital Opportunity Task Force, *Report Card: Digital Opportunities for All* (Ottawa: DOT Force, June 2002), http://www.dotforce.org/reports/documents/64/General-Report_e.pdf.

that follow in its footsteps.”²⁸ With the conclusion of the Kananaskis summit the DOT Force officially ceased operations.

Evaluating the Effectiveness of the DOT Force

The DOT Force was certainly effective in terms of the metrics devised by John Kirton to evaluate the overall effectiveness of other G8.²⁹ It generated lots of paper, there were many attendees of meetings, and there were a number of substantial financial commitments on the part of the G8. But its main accomplishment seems to have been experimenting successfully with a different way of operating. Unlike previous G8 initiatives, the DOT Force consciously employed a “multi-stakeholder” approach, in which government officials worked together with representatives of private firms, non-profit organizations, and international organizations to write reports and propose new projects to be funded by a combination of governmental, intergovernmental, and private sources. The fact that the OECD appears to be adopting such an approach in dealing with e-commerce issues is not a coincidence.

It is probably too soon to evaluate the effectiveness of the DOT Force projects, but they at least had the appearance of originality and careful thought that is not always characteristic of development projects. Another hopeful sign was the tempering of the ambitions of a few overly enthusiastic advocates of ICTs and the replacement of unrealistic notions with more realistic ones. A particularly poignant example of this is the Community Access Centers Network (ADEN) sponsored by the French government.

²⁸ Ibid, p. 2.

²⁹ John Kirton, “Evaluating the Effectiveness of the G8,” paper prepared for delivery at the annual meeting of International Studies Association, Montreal, .

ADEN would create shared access points to the Internet in Africa in public locations and with local community associations as partners. To deal with the many interruptions in power and telephone services and the high cost of connectivity in Africa, these access points would employ a technology utilizing short bursts of interconnection for storage of information most likely to be needed at the access point.

Similarly, a passage from the part of the report card summarizing the work of the human capacity team shows how their collective thinking about how to apply e-learning technologies in the developing world influenced (mostly for the good) the technological enthusiasts among them:

The team realizes the need for a more adjusted and differentiated view of the potential associated with the implementation of ICTs in low-income countries. It is also aware of excluding vast majorities from this potential. Meeting these particular needs should enable a more fruitful discussion with critics who perceive the issue – in light of the often overwhelming problems of hunger, water scarcity, and physical threat – as a diversion from basic development needs. It should also, and more importantly, foster sustainable, bottom-up developments and applications that take advantage of basic and enhanced ICTs to improve the living conditions of all citizens.³⁰

The entrepreneurship team was different from the others in asking for \$32 million from the G8 governments to create a DOT Force Entrepreneurial Network (DFEN). The DFEN would focus on financially supporting small- and medium-sized enterprises engaged in ICT activities in the developing world. The DFEN was renamed Enablis in 2002 after it received CAN \$10 million (about US \$6.6 million) in funding from the Canadian government. It is sponsored in addition by three private firms that were involved in the entrepreneurship task force of the DOTforce: Accenture, Hewlett-

³⁰ Ibid, p. 4.

Packard, and Telesystem. Enablis planned to set up a regional office in South African in the fourth quarter of 2003, with two satellite offices in Africa by the end of 2004.³¹

Conclusions

In conclusion, the DOT Force demonstrates the potential effectiveness of the G8, especially relative to other international regimes, in creating solutions to collective problems. The main problem that the DOT Force has solved to date is providing an answer to critics of the tendency of intergovernmental organizations like the G8 to exclude participants from “civil society” – that is, private firms, nongovernmental organizations, and other social groups. As to how the various DOT Force projects will do in bridging the digital divide, only time will tell. Nevertheless, the new collaborative approach is bound to be more successful than the purely intergovernmental approach because it permits the G8 to tap directly some of the best ideas of participants in ICT markets and of potential aid recipients.

³¹ See the Enablis web site at <http://www.enablis.org>.

Appendix I. Composition of the DOTforce

List of members, alternates, contact persons

ITALY

Government

Mr. Vincenzo SCHIOPPA
Diplomatic Advisor to the Minister for
Public Management

Ms. Verena Wessely
Assistant to Mr. Schioppa

Mr. Nicola FAVIA
Senior Economist
Prime Minister's Office,
Department of Economic Affairs

Ms. Claudia OGLIALORO
Senior Economist
Prime Minister's Office,
Department of Economic Affairs

Private Sector

Mr. Vincenzo MONACI
Entrepreneur
Commissioner of Communications
Authority

NPO

Mr. Domenico SINISCALCO
Professor of Economics, University of
Turin
Director, Fondazione Eni Enrico MATTEI

Mr. Federico RICCIO
Researcher and Project Leader
Fondazione Eni Enrico MATTEI

Ms. Alessandra POME
Researcher
Fondazione Eni Enrico MATTEI

CANADA

Government

Mr. V. Peter HARDER
Deputy Minister of Industry

Mr. Richard BOURASSA
Director of International Affairs
E-Commerce Branch, Industry Canada

Mr. Richard SIMPSON
Director General, e-Commerce
Industry Canada

Mr. Tony ZEITOUN
Senior Advisor
Knowledge for Development Initiative
Policy Branch - CIDA

Private Sector

Mr. Charles SIROIS
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Telesystem Ltd.

Mr. Paul LAMONTAGNE
Managing Director
Telesystem Ltd.

NPO

Ms. Maureen O'NEIL
President
International Development Research
Centre (IDRC)

Mr. Richard FUCHS
Director, ICT for Development
International Development Research
Centre (IDRC)

RUSSIA

Government

Mr. Oleg PLAKSIN
Assistant to the Russian Sherpa

Private Sector

Dr. Igor AGAMIRZIAN
Advisor & University Relations Manager,
Microsoft Research Limited

NPO

Mr. Michael YAKUSHEV
Russian Union of Internet Providers

FRANCE

Government

Mr. Alain LE GOURRIEREC
Ambassador, Special Assistant for
Information Society,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Bertrand DE LA CHAPELLE
Head of Mission, New Technologies
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Gilles BREGANT
Secretary General
Mission for Digital Economy
Ministry of Economy, Finance and
Industry

Private Sector

Mr. Thierry BRETON
Chairman and Managing Director,
Thomson Multimedia

Mr. Didier HUCK
Vice President
Research & Innovation,
Product Development & Partnership
Thomson Multimedia

Ms. Isabelle Loupot-Denis
General Manager
Research & Innovation, Partnership
Thomson Multimedia

NPO

Ms. Valerie PEUGEOT
VECAM

Ms. Florence DURAND
VECAM

UNITED STATES

Government

Mr. Kevin J. MARTIN
Special Assistant to the President
National Economic Council, the White
House

Ms. C. Anne PENCE
Special Assistant to the Under Secretary
for Economic, Business and
Agricultural Affairs, Department of State

Mr. Andrew WEINSCHENK
Director for Information Policy,
Economic and Business Bureau,
Department of State

Private Sector

Ms. Carleton FIORINA
Chairman, President & CEO
Hewlett-Packard Co.

Mr. Gary FAZZINO
Vice President, Government & Public
Affairs
Hewlett-Packard Co.

Mr. James F. MOORE
World e-Inclusion Program, Hewlett
Packard Co.
C/o GeoPartners Ventures

NPO

Ms. Zoe BAIRD
President, Markle Foundation

Ms. Julia MOFFETT
Managing Director, Markle Foundation

UNITED KINGDOM

Government

Mr. Richard MANNING
Director-General, Department for
International Development

Mr. David WOOLNOUGH
Assistant to the Director General,
Department for International Development

Mr. Keith YEOMANS
Department for International Development

Private Sector

Mr. Vernon ELLIS
International Chairman, Accenture

Ms. Elizabeth PADMORE
Director, Policy & Corporate Affairs,
Accenture

Dr C P (Kit) Burdess
Policy and Corporate Affairs
Accenture

NPO

Ms. Anuradha VITTACHI
Director, OneWorld International
Foundation

Mr. Peter ARMSTRONG
Director, OneWorld Online

GERMANY

Government

Dr. Eike ROEHLING
Director General for Technology and
Innovation Policy,
New States of the Federal Republic of
Germany,
Federal Ministry of Economics and
Technology

Mr. Michael LEIBRANDT
Deputy Head of Section
Federal Ministry of Economics and
Technology

Mr. Michael RUEGNER
Federal Ministry for Economic
Cooperation and Development

Private Sector

Dr. Friedrich FROESCHL
President and Chief Executive Officer
Siemens Business Services GmbH & Co.
OHG

Mr. Gert E. BIELEFELD
Vice President
Siemens Business Services GmbH & Co.
OHG

NPO

Dr. Joachim VON BRAUN
Director, Center for Development
Research
University of Bonn

Mr. Dietrich MUELLER-FALCKE
Researcher, Center for Development
Research
University of Bonn

JAPAN

Government

Mr. Yoshiji NOGAMI
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Kaoru ISHIKAWA
Deputy Director-General, Economic
Affairs Bureau,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Yasuhisa KAWAMURA
Director, IT Cooperation Division,
Economic Affairs Bureau,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Ms. Yukiko MATSUDA
IT Cooperation Division, Economic Affairs
Bureau,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Masato USUI
IT Cooperation Division, Economic Affairs
Bureau,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,

Mr. Hiroshi Matsumura
Director, International Economic Affairs

Division,
Trade Policy Bureau
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry

Mr. Tetsuo YAMAKAWA
Director, International Policy Division
Ministry of Public Management, Home
Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications

Private Sector

Mr. Taizo NISHIMURO
Chairman, Toshiba Co., Ltd.

Mr. Takashi WATANABE
Group Manager, International Relations,
Industry Cooperation Division, Toshiba
Co., Ltd.

NPO

Prof. Shumpei KUMON
Executive Director, Center for Global
Communications (GLOCOM)

Mr. Izumi AIZU
Center for Global Communications
(GLOCOM)

Mr. Adam PEAKE
Center for Global Communications
(GLOCOM)

EUROPEAN COMMISSION

Mr. Robert VERRUE
Director General, Information Society,

Mr. Paul VERHOEF
Head of Unit, International Affairs, DG
Information Society

BOLIVIA

Mr. Rodrigo Xavier ARCE JOFRE
Project Head, Unidad de Fortalecimiento
Informatico

BRAZIL

Mr. Eduardo Tadao TAKAHASHI
General Coordinator, Information Society
Program Task Force

Mr. Guilherme DE AGUIAR PATRIOTA
Head of Science and Technology
Division,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Dr. Maria Ines BASTOS
International Cooperation Coordinator,
Brazilian Information Society Program

EGYPT

Dr. Raafat Abdelbaky RADWAN
Chairman, Information & Decision
Support Center of the Cabinet of
Ministries (IDSC)

Ms. Effat EL SHOOKY
Vice President
Regional Information Technology and
Software Engineering Center (RITSEC)

INDIA

Mr. Vinay KOHLI
Secretary, Ministry of Information
Technology

INDONESIA

Dr. J.B. KRISTIADI
Deputy Minister for State Administrative
Reforms

Mr. Aizirman DJUSAN
Assistant Deputy Minister for
Administrative Reforms

Mr. John WELLY
Vice Chairman,
Indonesia Telecom Association

SENEGAL

Ms. Ndeye Maimouna DIOP
Technical Advisor
Ministry of Culture and Communication

Mr. Pierre GAGNE
Chief, Policies, Strategies
and Financing Department, BDT

Mr. Tim Kelly
BDT

SOUTH AFRICA

Mr. Andile NGCABA
Director-General
Department of Communications

Mr. Mark SHUTTLEWORTH
Chairman, HBD Management Services

Ms. Ingrid PONI
Office of the Director-General
Department of Communications

Ms. Lyndall SHOPE-MAFOLE
Embassy of South Africa, Paris

OECD

Ms. Sally SHELTON-COLBY
Deputy Secretary-General

Mr. Steve CUTTS
Principal Administrator,
Office of the Deputy Secretary-General

Mr. Brian HAMMOND
Head, Reporting Systems Division
Director for Development Cooperation

Mr. Dimitri YPSILANTI
Principal Administrator,
Directorate for Science, Technology &
Industry

TANZANIA

Eng. August B. KOWERO
Ministry of Communications and
Transport

Mr. David SAWE
Director of Management Information
Systems,
Civil Service Department, President's
Office

Mr. Simbo NTIRO
e-Think Tank Tanzania

UNCTAD

Mr. Jean GURUNLIAN
Director UNCTAD/SITE

UNDP

Mr. Mark MALLOCH-BROWN
Administrator

Mr. Denis GILHOOLY
Senior Advisor to the Administrator,
Director, ICT for Development

ITU

Mr. Roberto BLOIS
Deputy Secretary General

Mr. Hamadoun TOURE
Director, Telecommunications
Development Bureau (BDT)

UN-ECOSOC

Ambassador Martin BELINGA-EBOUTOU
President of ECOSOC

Mr. Sarbuland KHAN
Director, Division for ECOSOC Support

and Coordination, DESA,
United Nations

Mr. Sergei Kombalev
Division for ECOSOC Support and
Coordination, DESA

Mr. Johan SCHOLVINCK
Division for ECOSOC Support and
Coordination, DESA, UN

UNESCO

Mr. Alain MODOUX
Assistant Director-General,
Communication and Information

WORLD BANK

Dr. Mamphela RAMPHELE
Managing Director

Mr. Mohsen KHALIL
Director, Global ICT Department

Mr. Emmanuel FORESTIER
Manager, Policy Division, Global ICT
Department

WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM

Mr Klaus SCHWAB
Founder and President

Mr. Claude SMADJA
Managing Director

Ms. Julianne LEE
Project Manager

GLOBAL BUSINESS DIALOGUE on E-COMMERCE

Dr. Yong-Kyung LEE
Chairman and CEO, Korea Telecom
Freetel

Dr. Joo-Young SONG
Vice-President, Internet Business, Korea
Telecom Freetel

GLOBAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE COMMISSION

Mr. W. Bowman CUTTER
Managing Director, Global Information
Infrastructure Commission(GIIC)

Mr. Robert G. ROGERS
Executive Director, Global Information
Infrastructure Commission

DOT FORCE SECRETARIAT

Mr. Bruno LANVIN (World Bank)
Executive Secretary

Mr. Kerry Stephen McNAMARA (World
Bank)

Mr. Raul ZAMBRANO (UNDP)

Ms. Radhika LAL (UNDP)

OBSERVERS

Tokyo plenary

Mr. Amerendra NARAYAN
Deputy Executive Director
Asia-Pacific Telecommunity (APT)

Mr. Rajiv KUMAR
Senior Economist, Economic Analysis &
Research Division
Asian Development Bank (ADB)

Dr. Emmanuel C. Lallana
Executive Director, e-Asean Task Force

Cape Town Plenary

Ms. Mavis Ampah,
Executive Secretary, African Connection
Secretariat

Siena Plenary

Mr. Duncan PRUETT
International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions

Source: http://www.dotforce.org/reports/DOTForce_membership.html.

Appendix II. New Projects Begun or Supported by DOT Force

Acronym	Name	Nature of Project
OKN	Open Knowledge Network	Sharing of knowledge about economic development and particularly about how to facilitate local content creation for the Internet
DFEN	DOT Force Entrepreneurial Network	Startup funding of SMEs in ICT development in the developing countries (not funded yet?)
ADEN	Community Access Centers Network	French project for community access to the Internet in Africa
CATIA	Catalyzing Access to ICTs in Africa	British project for community access to the Internet in Africa
	Telecenter Infomediary/Help Desk	Africa-based on-line technical help for developing countries in other regions
	Health InterNetwork	Information sharing for health workers and professionals in the developing world (World Health Organization funding proposed)
	CAR Project	Edu-telecenters in Malawi, Kenya, Uganda, and Zambia to educate people about HIV/AIDS
	Twinning Promotion and Facilitation through ICT	Sharing of information about best practices in dealing with the AIDS/HIV pandemic worldwide
IeDRN	International e-Development Resource Network	Information sharing on e-government issues for developing countries
GDOI	Global Digital Opportunities Initiative	Technical assistance to governments of developing countries to improve representation in international ICT policy forums (funded by the Markle Foundation)

Source: http://www.dotforce.org/reports/documents/64/General-Report_e.pdf.