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Analytical Studies

Commitments from the G7 Statement, Okinawa, July 21, 2000:
The G7/G8 Commitments Report 2000

Dr. Ella Kokotsis, Professor John Kirton, and Diana Juricevic
G8 Research Group
http://www.g8.utoronto.ca
Revised July 3, 2001

The 2000 G7/G8 Summit held in Okinawa, Japan, proved to be a most productive meeting, judged by the number and range of identifiable, specific, future-oriented commitments issued by the leaders in their concluding comprehensive G7 and G8 communiqués.

Together the five documents issued by the leaders at Okinawa offered 169 such commitments.

Of these, 12 came in the G7 communiqué, 97 in the G8 communiqué, 54 in the G8's separate Okinawa Charter on Global Information Society, and 6 in the G8 Statement on Regional Issues. The fifth document issued by the leaders, the G8 Statement on the Korean peninsula, contained no commitments.

The commitments were distributed across 18 issue areas, as follows:

G7 Communique: 12
International Financial Architecture 3
Enhanced HIPC Initiative 4
Abuse of Global Financial System 3
Nuclear Safety/Ukraine 2
 
G8 Communique 97
World Economy 1
Information/Communications Technology 3
Development 15
Debt 5
Health 15
Trade 4
Cultural Diversity 2
Crime and Drugs 18
Ageing 6
Biotechnology/Food Safety 3
Human Genome/Environment 11
Conflict Prevention 3
Disarmament, Nonproliferation, Arms Control 7
Terrorism 4
 
Okinawa Charter on Global Information Society 54
Introduction 1
Seizing Digital Opportunities 14
Bridging the Digital Divide 11
The Way Forward 7
Fostering Policy, Regulatory and Network Readiness 6
Improving Connectivity and Access, Lowering Cost 7
Building Human Capacity 5
Encouraging Participation in Global ECommerce Nets 3
 
G8 Statement on Regional Issues 6
Middle East Peace Process 2
Balkans 2
Africa 2

The number of commitments by issue area in the two main G7 and G8 communiqués suggests that the Okinawa Summit had as its main focus and legacy cooperative achievements in the areas of crime and drugs, development, and health (particularly infectious disease). Combining the last two areas, it was thus genuinely a development-oriented summit.

The 54 commitments in the Okinawa Charter on Global Information Society, especially when combined with the three ICT commitments in the G8 communiqué, suggest it was also the first G7 “digital summit.” Yet the heavy emphasis in this separate charter on “Bridging the Digital Divide,” led by the 11 commitments specifically under this heading, suggests that development was a primary focus and one well integrated into and supported by the second major theme.

The 14 commitments in the G8 communiqué on conflict prevention, disarmament, nonproliferation, arms control, and terrorism, together with the six commitments in the Statement on Regional Security, suggest that the Okinawa was also genuinely a political-security summit, with its total of 20 commitments in this realm. Its commitments on regional security embraced equally the three regions of the Middle East, the Balkans, and Africa. Perhaps due to the sensitivities of Japan's regional neighbours, no commitments were made on the Korean peninsula, either in these documents or in the separate statement issued on this subject.

It is difficult to assess whether the 2000 Okinawa G7/G8 Summit was more productive than G7/G8 summits in earlier years, as a similarly comprehensive assessment of commitments has not been conducted for those earlier years. However, a partial estimate is available by comparing those issue areas where commitment data in the main G7 and G8 communiqués, produced by the same methodology, do exist. This information exists in earlier work by Ella Kokotsis, detailed in Keeping International Commitments: Compliance, Credibility, and the G7, 1988–1995 (Garland Publishing, New York, 1999). This work has shown that the summits from 1989 to 1995 produced a yearly average of 4.8 commitments on climate change, 2.1 in biodiversity, 1.6 on developing country debt (from 1988 to 1995), and 3.5 on assistance to Russia (from 1990 to 1995). A comparison of similar issue areas at Okinawa suggests that the G7/G8 in 2000 was considerably more productive on developing country debt, much less productive on assistance to Russia (whose economy was then doing relatively well), and somewhat less productive on climate change and biodiversity. This confirms the development focus of Okinawa. Given the variable pattern and limited number of issue areas for comparison, it is not possible to offer even a suggestion about how productive Okinawa was overall compared to summits of previous years.

Appendices A, B, C, and D list the precise commitments identified. The method and coding instructions for identifying individual commitments are available on the G8 Information Centre at http://www.g8.utoronto.ca. Note that commitments that contain subheadings with further commitments are counted separately, with one number assigned to the main heading and separate number for each of the individual commitments listed below.

Ranking Commitments by Ambition-Significance

In order to secure a more refined understanding of how productive the Okinawa Summit was a decisional forum in the particular sense of cooperation, as measured by specific future-oriented commitments, it is important to assess not only the overall number, but also the ambition and significance of each individual commitment the Summit generated.

Led by Diana Juricevic, the G8 Research Group is devising a scale to rank commitments according to their level of ambition-significance. Outlined below is the evolving framework for ranking commitments according to their level of ambition-significance. An ambitious commitment is one that clearly identifies a goal, clearly identifies measures to attain that goal, and clearly identifies a target date at which time that goal is to be completed. A significant commitment is one that is timely, novel, and has appropriate scope. A commitment that is both “ambitious” and “significant” satisfies the above six criteria. The ambition-significance ranking is scored out of a possible six points corresponding to the six criteria. A score of 6 entails both a high level of ambition and a high level of significance. A score of 3 entails a high level of ambition but has no level of significance. A score of 0 entails no level of ambition and no level of significance.

The coding manual for assessing the ambition-significance of each individual commitment is presented immediately below.

A. Ambition

1.      Does the commitment identify a goal?

Yes = 1 point

No = 0 points

2.      Does the commitment identify measures to attain the goal?

Yes = 1 point

No = 0 points

3.      Does the commitment identify a target date at which time the goal is to be completed?

Yes = 1 point

No = 0 points

B. Significance

4.      Timeliness*

Is the purpose of the commitment to respond to a current crisis?

Is the purpose of the commitment to prevent/address a future crisis/issue?

(1 point)

5.      Scope*

Is the commitment directed only at G8 countries?

Is the commitment directed at countries outside G8 membership?

(1 point)

6.      Novelty*

Is the commitment referring to an issue that was addressed in previous summits?

Is the commitment referring to an issue that has not been addressed in previous summits?

(1 point)

* Note that the scoring criteria for (4), (5), and (6) is specific to the particular commitment to be ranked. Take the issue of scope, for example: at times, it is appropriate for a particular commitment to be directed only at G8 countries (in this case, a score of 0 would be allocated), while at other times it is appropriate for the commitment to be directed outside G8 membership (in this case, a score of 1 would be allocated). Every effort has been taken by the Research G8 Group to minimize the measurement error associated with this ranking process, including the implementation of a two-stage verification process to ensure that, if there is a bias in the ranking, this bias is applied consistently across all commitments and across all issue areas.

Taken together, these criteria suggest that each individual commitment, and through normal or weighted averages an entire summit, can be judged as follows:

Ambition-Significance Ranking

0 = No Ambition, No Significance

1 = Low Ambition, No Significance

2 = Moderate Ambition, No Significance

3 = High Ambition, No Significance

4 = High Ambition, Low Significance

5 = High Ambition, Moderate Significance

6 = High Ambition, High Significance

Before applying this framework to the entire set of 169 commitments, it must be noted that ranking commitments by ambition-significance is an arduous task involving several methodological challenges. In this exercise, the G8 Research Group is attempting to quantify an essentially qualitative enterprise. Every effort has been made to reduce the level of measurement error and simultaneity bias. Nevertheless, these two problems still exist. As a result, there tends to be a systematic overstatement of the level of ambition-significance for each commitment as well as a systematic overstatement of the level of compliance. Given the fact that the G8 Research Group has been examining this issue from a political science perspective and not from an economics perspective, no regressions have been employed and the corresponding economic techniques to correct for simultaneity bias have not been used.

With these caveats, the ambition-significance framework specified above has been applied, on a trial basis, to the 12 commitments in the G7 Communiqué and to the 97 commitments in the G8 Communiqué, as noted above. For this exercise, however, the individual subcommitments listed above have been amalgamated into a single commitment, thus reducing the overall number of commitments from 109 (12+97) to 82 (12+70). (This comes from the consolidation in the G8 Communiqué of commitments in development from 15 to 8, health from 15 to 4, crime and drugs from 18 to 14, and aging from 6 to 1.).

The results are listed immediately below.


Commitments Ranked by Ambition-Significance: G7 Communiqué 2000

 

Goal

Measure

Target Date

Novelty/

Timeliness

Scope

Content

Total


International Financial Architecture

7

1

0

0

0

1

0

2

8(a)

1

0

0

0

1

0

2

8(b)

1

1

0

0

1

1

4


HIPC

20(a)

1

0

0

0

1

1

3

20(b)

1

1

0

0

0

0

2

22

1

1

0

0

1

1

4

23

1

0

0

1

0

0

2


Global Financial System

26(a)

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

26(b)

1

1

0

1

0

1

4

26(c)

1

0

0

1

0

1

3


Nuclear Safety

29

1

1

0

0

0

0

2

30

1

1

0

0

0

0

2

Commitments Ranked by Ambition-Significance: G8 Communiqué 2000

 

Goal

Measure

Target Date

Novelty/

Timeliness

Scope

Content

Total

(score=6)


World Economy

9

1

0

0

0

0

0

1


Information and Communications Technology

11

1

0

0

1

0

0

2

12(a)

1

1

0

1

0

0

3

12(b)

1

1

1

1

1

0

5


Development

13

1

0

1

1

0

0

3

15

1

0

0

1

1

0

3

17

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

19

1

1

1

1

1

1

6

20(a)

1

1

0

1

0

0

3

20(b)

1

0

1

1

0

0

3

20(c)

1

1

1

0

1

1

5

20(d)

1

1

0

0

0

0

2


Debt

24(a)

1

0

0

0

1

0

2

24(b)

1

1

0

0

1

0

3

24(c)

1

1

1

0

1

1

5

24(d)

1

1

0

0

0

0

2

25

1

0

0

1

0

0

2


Health

29

1

1

1

1

1

1

6

30

1

1

1

1

1

1

6

31(a)

1

1

1

1

0

0

4

31(b)

1

0

1

1

1

1

5


Trade

35

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

36(a)

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

36(b)

1

0

1

0

1

0

3

38

1

0

0

0

0

0

1


Cultural Diversity

41

1

1

0

1

0

1

4

42

1

1

1

1

0

1

5


Crime and Drugs

43(a)

1

1

1

1

0

1

5

43(b)

1

0

1

0

1

0

3

43(c)

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

44

1

1

0

0

0

0

2

45(a)

1

0

0

1

0

0

2

45(b)

1

0

0

0

1

0

2

45(c)

1

0

0

1

0

0

2

45(d)

1

1

1

1

0

0

4

46

1

0

0

1

0

0

2

47(a)

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

47(b)

1

0

0

0

1

0

2

47(c)

1

1

0

0

0

0

2

49

1

0

0

1

0

0

2

50

1

0

0

0

0

0

1


Aging

52

1

1

0

1

0

1

4


Life science

55

1

0

0

1

1

0

3

58

1

1

0

1

0

1

4

59

1

0

0

1

1

0

3


Human Genome

62(a)

1

0

0

1

0

0

2

62(b)

1

0

0

1

0

0

2

63

1

0

0

1

1

0

3

64

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

65(a)

1

0

1

1

0

0

3

65(b)

1

1

1

1

0

0

4

66

1

0

0

0

1

0

2

67

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

68

1

1

1

0

0

0

3

69(a)

1

0

0

0

1

0

2

69(b)

1

0

0

0

0

0

1


Conflict Prevention

73(a)

1

0

0

1

0

0

2

73(b)

1

1

0

1

1

0

4

73(c)

1

0

0

1

0

0

2


Arms Control

74(a)

1

1

0

0

0

0

2

74(b)

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

77(a)

1

1

1

1

0

0

4

77(b)

1

0

0

0

1

0

2

78(a)

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

78(b)

1

1

0

0

0

0

2

78(c)

1

0

1

1

0

1

4


Terrorism

79(a)

1

0

0

1

0

0

2

79(b)

1

1

0

1

0

0

3

80

1

1

0

0

0

0

2

81

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

The average scores, arranged by issue area, by communiqué, and overall, are listed immediately below.


The 2000 Okinawa G7/G8 Commitments Ranked by Average Ambition-Significance

G7 Communiqué
International Financial Architecture 2.67
HIPC 2.75
Global Financial System 2.67
Nuclear Safety 2.00
Average by Equally Weighted Issue Area 2.52
Average by Individual Commitments (N12) 2.6

G8 Communiqué
World Economy 1.00
Information and Communications Technology 3.33
Development 3.25
Debt 2.80
Health 5.25
Trade 1.50
Cultural Diversity 4.50
Crime and Drugs 2.21
Aging 4.00
Life Science 3.33
Human Genome 2.18
Conflict Prevention 2.67
Arms Control 2.29
Terrorism 2.00
Average by Equally-Weighted Issue Area 2.88
Average by Individual Commitments (N70) 2.69
Average of G7+G8 by Equally Weighted Issue Areas (N18) 2.80
Average of G7+G8 by Individual Commitments (N82) 2.67

These figures indicate that the Okinawa Summit, with an average score of 2.8 by equally weighted issue areas and 2.69 by individual commitments, came close to the midpoint of the scale of 0–6 for assessing the ambition-significance of a summit's commitments. These scores are consistent with qualitative judgements, issued at the immediate conclusion of the Summit, that Okinawa was a summit of “solid achievement” (Kirton 2000).

It is notable that both the G7 and G8 Summits score in this midpoint range. While the G8 scores slightly higher on the measure of equally weighted issue areas, the variation is sufficiently slight to make interpretations based on this difference hazardous. The pattern does suggest, however, that the presence of Russia may marginally help and at a minimum does not harm G7/G8 performance (although the different set of issue areas dealt with in each forum is the critical factor). This suggestion is reinforced by a direct comparison of G7 versus G8 in those issue areas (the G7's HIPC versus the G8's debt, the G7's nuclear safety versus the G8's arms control) that are to some degree similar. By this standard only the G8's low score on world economy supports the case for caution in allowing Russia more of a place in the G7's economic/financial domain.

As suggested by the table below (which combines the G7 and G8 issues areas in a single scaled ranked by their ambition-significance score), there is a wide variation by issue area in the performance of the Summit.


G7/G8 2000 Issue Areas Ranked by Ambition-Significance of Commitments

Health 5.25
Cultural Diversity 4.50
Aging 4.00
Information and Communications Technology 3.33
Life Science 3.33
Development 3.25
Debt 2.80
Average by Equally Weighted Issue Areas 2.80

HIPC (G7)
2.75
Conflict Prevention 2.67
International Financial Architecture (G7) 2.67
Global Financial System (G7) 2.67
Average by Individual Commitments 2.67

Arms Control
2.29
Crime and Drugs 2.21
Human Genome 2.18
Terrorism 2.00
Nuclear Safety (G7) 2.00
Trade 1.50
World Economy 1.00

There are several striking patterns in this data. First, issue areas from the G8 rather than the G7 tend to dominate the list. In fact, no issue area from the G7 ranked above the overall average by equally weighted issue areas. This suggests that the innovative dynamism of the G7/G8 system has passed decisively from the G7 to the G8.

Second, the highest scoring issue areas are those that are relatively new to the G7/G8 agenda, and in at least one case (cultural diversity) are entirely new. Leading the list are health, cultural diversity, aging, information and communications technology, and life science, followed by development, debt, and HIPC. This suggests that Okinawa was indeed a development summit, as its producers had planned. But in some ways the competing theme of information technology in the end took precedence (especially if one adds the results of the commitments in the separate Okinawa Charter on Information Technology that is not included in this analysis). Even more importantly, Okinawa was marked by its domestic intrusiveness, through its ambitious and significant commitment in areas long the preserve of domestic politics, and ones where often state-provincial and local governments as well as national ones have significant responsibilities. Above all, Okinawa should be remembered by this calculus as a social policy summit.

This premium on innovation is also evident in the political-security domain. Here conflict prevention ranks first as the most ambitious-significant issue area. More venerable subjects, even those featured at recent summits, such as arms control, crime and drugs, terrorism, and nuclear safety, rank well down on the list. (The regional security commitments issued in a separate declaration are not included in this analysis). The low ranking of nuclear safety is somewhat of a surprise, given how large the 1999 criticality accident at Tokaimura loomed in Japanese political life.

Also noteworthy is the low ranking for those issue areas where the G7/G8 summits, and especially Japanese-hosted G7 summits, have traditionally excelled. Trade stands out, with a very low score that confirms the harsh judgement of informed observers about the Okinawa Summit's performance in this domain (Bayne 2001, Ullrich 2001). Moreover the low score for world economy, delivered by a G8 that was about to go into sharply slower growth in the coming months, and at a summit hosted in a long stagnant Japan suggests that complacency rather than prescience and prevention was the dominant approach.

At first glance, this overall pattern lends support to those who criticize the summit for its episodic focus on an ever-changing array of issues, rather than praise it for its persistent iteration on the most difficult but central issues in the world (Bayne 1999). Yet the solid scores on development, debt and HIPC, and the international financial architecture and the global financial system belie this criticism, and suggest a good balance between the new and the old. While Okinawa was thus at its most productive as an agenda-setting summit for the new century, it also “hung in there” (Bayne 2000) to make progress on some persistent problems left over from the old one.

References

Bayne, Nicholas. 2001. “The G7 and Multilateral Trade Liberalisation: Past Performance, Future Challenges,” in John Kirton and George von Furstenberg, New Directions in Global Economic Governance: Managing Globalisation in the Twenty-First Century, Ashgate, Aldershot, UK.

Bayne, Nicholas. 2000. Hanging In There. Ashgate, Aldershot, UK.

Bayne, Nicholas. 1999. “Continuity and Leadership in an Age of Globalisation,” in Michael Hodges, John Kirton, and Joseph Daniels, editors, The G8's Role in the New Millennium, Ashgate, Aldershot, UK.

Kirton, John. 2000. “Preliminary Personal Assessment of the Kyushu-Okinawa Summit, July 23, 2000.”

Para 8: "We are determined to strengthen our efforts on the implementation of international codes and standards, including through their incorporation in IMF surveillance".

Para 8: "To adapt to the globalization of capital markets, we attach priority to early progress in achieving a streamlined, incentive-based structure for IMF lending as set out by our Finance Ministers".

Progress of the Enhanced HIPC Initiative

Para 20: "We agree to strengthen our efforts to help them prepare and come forward for debt relief, by asking our Ministers to make early contact with the countries in conflict to encourage them to create the right conditions to participate in the HIPC Initiative."

Para 20: "We will work together to ensure that as many countries as possible reach their Decision Points, in line with the targets set in Cologne, giving due consideration to the progress of economic reforms and the need to ensure that the benefits of debt relief are targeted to assist the poor and most vulnerable".

Para 22: "We reaffirm our commitment to provide 100% debt reduction of ODA claims, and newly commit to 100% debt reduction of eligible commercial claims. We welcome the announcement made by some non-G7 countries that they too will provide 100% debt relief, and we urge other donors to follow suit".

Para 23: "We reaffirm our commitment to make available as quickly as possible the resources we have pledged (to the HIPC Trust Fund). In this context, we recognize the importance of fair burden sharing among creditors."

Actions Against Abuse of the Global Financial System

Para 26: Re: Money Laundering: "We are ready to give our advice and provide, where appropriate, our technical assistance to jurisdictions that commit to making improvements to their regimes".

Para 26: Re: Money Laundering: "We are prepared to act together, when required and appropriate, to implement coordinated counter-measures against those NCCTs that do not take steps to reform their systems appropriately, including the possibility to condition or restrict financial transactions with those jurisdictions and to condition or restrict support from IFIs to them".

Para 26: Re: Offshore Financial Centres: "We will take steps to encourage jurisdictions to make the necessary changes and provide technical assistance where appropriate. Where jurisdictions fail to meet certain standards and are not committed to enhancing their level of compliance with international standards, we will also take measures to protect the international financial system from the effects of these failures".

Nuclear Safety/Ukraine

Para 29: "We reaffirm our commitment made at the Cologne Summit to continue our support for the Shelter Implementation Plan (SIP). We welcome the results of the Pledging Conference in July to ensure full implementation of the SIP."

Para 30: "We affirm our commitment in line with the Memorandum of Understanding to assist the Ukraine in the preparation and implementation of energy projects based on least cost principles".

Appendix B: Commitments from the G8 Leaders Communiqué

World Economy

Para 9: "We must renew our unwavering commitment to structural change in our own economies, including greater competition and more adaptable labour markets, underpinned by appropriate macro-economic policies".

Information and Communications Technology (IT)

Para 11: "Acting in concert, we will maximize the benefits of IT and ensure that they are spread to those at present with limited access."

Para 12: "In support of these goals, we commit ourselves to pursuing the aims and ambitions set out in the Okinawa Charter on Global Information Society."

Para 12: "We will set up a Digital Opportunities Task Force (dot force), which will be asked to report to our next meeting its findings and recommendations on global action to bridge the international information and knowledge divide".

Development

Para 13: "We commit ourselves to the agreed international development goals, including the overarching objective of reducing the share of the world's population living in extreme poverty to half its 1990 level by 2015."

Para 15: "We will work with developing countries to put in place policies, programs and institutions that offer people a fair chance to better to their lives….and will work in the UN and other for a to further reduce poverty, especially in LDCs".

Para 17: "Trade and investment are critical to promoting sustainable economic growth and reducing poverty. We commit ourselves to put a higher priority on trade-related capacity-building activities".

Para 19: "We are committed to mobilizing the instruments and resources of the international community to support and reinforce the efforts of these countries to combat and overcome these challenges, with particular priority on promoting equitable distribution of the benefits of growth through sound social policies, including health and education. To this end, we have agreed to:

Para 20: "We commit ourselves to strengthening the effectiveness of our ODA in support of countries' own efforts to tackle poverty, including through national strategies for poverty reduction".

Para 20: "We will take a long-term approach favouring those countries where governments have demonstrated a commitment to improve the well-being of their people through accountable and transparent management of resources devoted to development."

Para 20: "To achieve increased effectiveness of ODA, we resolve to untie our aid to the LDCs on the basis of progress made in the OECD to date and a fair burden-sharing mechanism that we will agree with our OECD partners. We believe that this agreement should come into effect on 1 January 2002".

Para 20: "We will also seek to demonstrate to the public that well-targeted ODA get results, and on that basis will strive to give increased priority to such assistance".

Debt

Para 24: "We agree to strengthen our efforts to help them (HIPICs) prepare and come forward for debt relief, by asking our Ministers to make early contact with the countries in conflict to encourage them to create the right conditions to participate in the HIPC initiative."

Para 24: "We will work together to ensure that as many countries as possible reach their Decision Points, in line with the targets set in Cologne, giving due consideration to the progress of economic reforms and the need to ensure that the benefits of debt relief are targeted to assist the poor and most vulnerable."

Para 24: "We will work expeditiously together with HIPCs and the IFIs to realize the expectation that 20 countries will reach the Decision Point within the framework of the Enhanced HIPC initiative by the end of this year."

Para 24: "We for our part will promote more responsible lending and borrowing practices to ensure that HIPCs will not again be burdened by unsupportable debt."

Para 25: "We reaffirm our commitment to make available as quickly as possible the resources we have pledged in the spirit of fair burden sharing".

Health

Para 29: "We therefore commit ourselves to working in strengthened partnership with governments, the World Health Organization (WHO) and other international organizations, industry (notably pharmaceutical companies), academic institutions, NGOs and other relevant actors in civil society to deliver three critical UN targets:

Para 30: "In order to achieve this ambitious agenda, our partnership must aim to cover:

Para 31: "We will convene a conference in the autumn this year in Japan to deliver agreement on a new strategy to harness our commitments."

Para 31: "We will take stock of progress at the Genoa Summit next year and will work with the UN to organize a conference in 2001 focusing on strategies to facilitate access to AIDS treatment and care."

Para 34: "We therefore commit ourselves to strengthen efforts bilaterally and together with the international organizations and private sector donors to achieve the goals of universal primary education by 2015 and gender equality in schooling by 2005."

Trade

Para 35: "We commit ourselves to playing a leading role by strengthening our support to developing country members for capacity building in line with their individual needs".

Para 36: "We are firmly committed to a new round of WTO trade negotiations with an ambitious, balanced and inclusive agenda, reflecting the interests of all WTO members".

Para 36: "We agree to intensify our close and fruitful cooperation in order to try together with other WTO members to launch such a round during the course of this year."

Para 38: "We therefore welcome the progress made on China's accession to the WTO and support the efforts of other applicants toward early accession."

Cultural Diversity

Para 41: "We shall strive to promote the digitalization of cultural heritage through, for example, fostering international links between national museum systems, with a view to enhancing public access."

Para 42: "We encourage competent authorities to promote exchange of students, teachers, researchers and administrators with the goal of doubling the rate of mobility over the next ten years."

Crime and Drugs

Para 43: "We reaffirm our support for the adoption by the end of 2000 of the UN Transnational Organized Crime Convention and three related Protocols on firearms, smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons for the establishment of an effective legal framework against transnational organized crime (TOC)."

Para 43: "We appreciate the work undertaken by the Lyon Group in the fight against TOC, and request them to report back to our next meeting".

Para 43: "We also endorse the results of the Moscow G8 Ministerial Conference on Combating Transnational Organized Crime".

Para 44: "We will promote dialogue with industry, including at the joint Berlin meeting in October"

Para 45: "We remain committed to reducing demand in our own countries, and to countering the threat from the production and trafficking of illicit drugs globally".

Para 45: "We will work with other countries, the UN system and other groups to reduce both supply and demand."

Para 45: "We will support regional initiatives to end narcotics production and trafficking."

Para 45: "We are also committed to strengthen international cooperation to:

Para 46: "We hereby declare our commitment to take all necessary national and international action to effectively combat financial crime, in line with international standards".

Para 47: "We renew our commitment to combat corruption through increased transparency"

Para 47: "We call for the ratification and effective implementation of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention by all signatory parties".

Para 47: "We will prepare for the launch of negotiations in the UN on a new instrument again corruption, and instruct the Lyon Group to pursue work on this issue."

Para 49: "We must assist in capacity-building efforts in the more vulnerable jurisdictions to strengthen their criminal justice systems."

Para 50: "We reaffirm the need for effective cooperation among competent authorities and for measures to be taken in cooperation with civil society."

Aging

Para 52: "The central challenge is to promote a culture that values the experience and knowledge that come with age. To this end, we will:

Life Science

Biotechnology/Food Safety

Para 55: "We are committed to continued efforts to make systems responsive to the growing public awareness of food safety issues, the potential risks associated with food, the accelerating pace of developments in biotechnology, and the increasing cross-border movement of food and agricultural products."

Para 58: "We will work to strengthen our support for their capacity building to harness the potentials of biotechnology, and encourage research and development as well as data and information sharing in technologies, including those that address global food security, health, nutritional and environmental challenges and are adapted to specific conditions in these countries."

Para 59: "We will explore, in consultation with international organizations and interested bodies including scientific academies, the way to integrate the best scientific knowledge available into the global process of consensus-building on biotechnology and other aspects of food and crop safety."

Human Genome

Para 62: "We call for the further rapid release of all raw fundamental data on human DNA sequences as such".

Para 62: "We also emphasize the importance of pursuing the post genome-sequence research on the basis of multilateral collaboration."

Para 63: "We encourage further efforts in relevant international fora to achieve broad harmonization of patenting policies of biotechnological inventions."

Para 64: "We also welcome the conclusion of the Cartagena Protocol on Biodiversity, and encourage the parties concerned to work for its early entry into force".

Para 65: "We will endeavor will all our partners to prepare a future-oriented agenda for Rio+10 in 2002"

Para 65: "We are determined to achieve a successful outcome at the Sixth Conference of the Parties to the FCCC (COP6), in order to achieve the goals of the Kyoto Protocol through undertaking strong domestic actions and supplemental flexibility mechanisms."

Para 66: "We therefore call on all stakeholders to identify the barriers and solutions to elevating the level of renewable energy supply and distribution in developing countries."

Para 67: "We attach particular importance to projects that help indigenous and local communities. We will also examine how best we can combat illegal logging, including export and procurement practices."

Para 68: "We reaffirm our commitment to develop common environmental guidelines, drawing on relevant MDB experience, for export credit agencies by the 2001 G8 Summit. We will co-operate to reinvigorate and intensify our work to fulfil the Cologne mandate."

Para 69: "We will jointly cooperate with the IMO to improve maritime safety".

Para 69: "We endorse efforts by the IMO to strengthen safety standards, in particular, the ships carrying dangerous or polluting cargo, and to verify implementation and enforcement of the application of international standards by flag States."

Conflict Prevention

Para 73: " We commit ourselves to work for their implementation particularly with respect to economic development and conflict prevent, children in conflict, and international civilian police."

Para 73: "We therefore call for an international conference, whose results shall be submitted to the UN, building on the UN Security Council Resolution 1306 and inter alia the "Kimberley" process launched by the Government of South Africa, to consider practical approaches to breaking the link between the illicit trade in diamonds and armed conflict, including consideration of an international agreement on certification for rough diamonds."

Para 73: "We i

nvite the international community to exercise restraint in conventional arms exports, and are committed to work jointly to this end".

Disarmament, Non-proliferation and Arms Control

Para 74: "We are determined to implement the conclusions reached at this Conference, including the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the immediate commencement and the conclusion within five years of negotiations for the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty."

Para 74: "We remain committed to promoting universal adherence to and compliance with the NPT."

Para 77: "Our goal for the next Summit is to develop an international financing plan for plutonium management and disposition based on detailed project plan, and a multilateral framework to coordinate this cooperation."

Para 77: "We will expand our cooperation to other interested countries in order to gain the widest possible international support, and will explore the potential for both public and private funding."

Para 78: "We strongly support the important work of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and will consider the proposal for a Global Monitoring System".

Para 78: "We will work to increase the level of international contributions to the Russian chemical weapons destruction programme".

Para 78: "We commit ourselves to work with others to conclude the negotiations on the Verification Protocol to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention as early as possible in 2001".

Terrorism

Para 79: "We call for the urgent strengthening of international cooperation, in particular in exchanges of counter-terrorism information, improving measures against the financing of terrorist activities, and working together to bring terrorists to justice."

Para 79: "We call for all states to become parties to the twelve international counter-terrorism conventions to enhance international cooperation against terrorism."

Para 80: "We will continue to raise this (concern at the increased number of terrorist acts) in our bilateral contacts, carefully monitor developments and maintain close cooperation between us".

Para 81: "We call for full implementation of the UNSCR 1267".

Appendix C: Commitments from the Okinawa Charter on Global Information Society, Okinawa, July 22, 2000

We will exercise our leadership in advancing government efforts to foster an appropriate policy and regulatory environment to stimulate competition and innovation, ensure economic and financial stability, advance stakeholder collaboration to optimise global networks, fight abuses that undermine the integrity of the network, bridge the digital divide, invest in people, and promote global access and participation.

Seizing Digital Opportunities

In order to maximise the social and economic benefits of the Information Society, we agree on the following key principles and approaches and commend them to others:

Continue to promote competition in and open markets for the provision of information technology and telecommunications products and services, including non-discriminatory and cost-oriented interconnection for basic telecommunications;

Protection of intellectual property rights for IT-related technology is vital to promoting IT-related innovations, competition and diffusion of new technology; we welcome the joint work already underway among intellectual property authorities and further encourage our experts to discuss future direction in this area;

Governments' renewed commitment to using software in full compliance with intellectual property rights protection is also important;

A number of services, including telecommunications, transportation, and package delivery are critical to the information society and economy and improving their efficiency will maximise benefits; customs and other trade-related procedures are also important to foster an IT-friendly environment;

Facilitate cross-border e-commerce by promoting further liberalisation and improvement in networks and related services and procedures in the context of a strong World Trade Organisation (WTO) framework, continued work on e-commerce in the WTO and other international fora, and application of existing WTO trade disciplines to e-commerce;

Consistent approaches to taxation of e-commerce based on the conventional principles, including neutrality, equity and simplicity, and other key elements agreed in the work of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD);

Continuing the practice of not imposing customs duties on electronic transmissions, pending the review at the next WTO Ministerial Conference;

Promotion of market-driven standards including, for example, interoperable technical standards;

Promote consumer trust in the electronic marketplace consistent with OECD guidelines and provide equivalent consumer protection in the online world as in the offline world, including through effective self-regulatory initiatives such as online codes of conduct, trustmarks and other reliability programmes, and explore options to alleviate the difficulties faced by consumers in cross-border disputes, including use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms;

Development of effective and meaningful privacy protection for consumers, as well as protection of privacy in processing personal data, while safeguarding the free flow of information, and;

Further development and effective functioning of electronic authentication, electronic signature, cryptography, and other means to ensure security and certainty of transactions.

G8 co-operation within the framework of the Lyon Group on Transnational Organised Crime will be enhanced.

We will further promote dialogue with industry, building on the success of the recent G8 Paris Conference "A Government/Industry Dialogue on Safety and Confidence in Cyberspace".

We will continue to engage industry and other stakeholders to protect critical information infrastructures.

Bridging the Digital Divide

We reaffirm our commitment to the efforts underway to formulate and implement a coherent strategy to address this issue. We also welcome the increasing recognition on the part of industry and civil society of the need to bridge the divide. Mobilising their expertise and resources is an indispensable element of our response to this challenge.

We will continue to pursue an effective partnership between government and civil societies responsive to the rapid pace of technological and market developments.

A key component of our strategy must be the continued drive toward universal and affordable access. We will continue to:

Foster market conditions conducive to the provision of affordable communications services;

Explore other complementary means, including access through publicly available facilities;

Give priority to improving network access, especially in underserved urban, rural and remote areas;

Pay particular attention to the needs and constraints of the socially under-privileged, people with disabilities, and older persons and actively pursue measures to facilitate their access and use;

Encourage further development of "user-friendly", "barrier-free" technologies, including mobile access to the Internet, as well as greater utilisation of free and publicly available contents in a way which respects intellectual property rights.

We are committed to provide all our citizens with an opportunity to nurture IT literacy and skills through education, lifelong learning and training.

We will continue to work toward this ambitious goal by getting schools, classrooms and libraries online and teachers skilled in IT and multimedia resources.

Measures aiming to offer support and incentives for small-to-medium-sized enterprises and the self-employed to get online and use the Internet effectively will also be pursued.

We will also encourage the use of IT to offer innovative lifelong learning opportunities, particularly to those who otherwise could not access education and training.

The Way Forward

We will also work to see that developing countries can, in partnership with other stakeholders, be provided with financial, technical and policy input in order to create a better environment for, and use of, IT.

We agree to establish a Digital Opportunity Taskforce (dot force) with a view to integrating our efforts into a broader international approach. This high-level Taskforce, in close consultation with other partners and in a manner responsive to the needs of developing countries, will:

Actively facilitate discussions with developing countries, international organisations and other stakeholders to promote international co-operation with a view to fostering policy, regulatory and network readiness; improving connectivity, increasing access and lowering cost; building human capacity; and encouraging participation in global e-commerce networks;

Encourage the G8's own efforts to co-operate on IT-related pilot programmes and projects;

Promote closer policy dialogue among partners and work to raise global public awareness of the challenges and opportunities;

Examine inputs from the private sector and other interested groups such as the Global Digital Divide Initiative's contributions;

Report its findings and activities to our personal representatives before our next meeting in Genoa.

In pursuit of these objectives, the dot force will look for ways to take concrete steps on the priorities identified below:

Fostering policy, regulatory and network readiness by:

Supporting policy advice and local capacity building, to promote a pro-competitive, flexible and socially inclusive policy and regulatory environment;

Facilitating the sharing of experience between developing countries and other partners;

Encouraging more effective and greater utilisation of IT in development efforts encompassing such broad areas as poverty reduction, education, public health, and culture;

Promoting good governance, including exploration of new methods of inclusive policy development;

Supporting efforts of MDBs and other international organisations to pool intellectual and financial resources in the context of co-operation programmes such as InfoDev;

Improving connectivity, increasing access and lowering cost:

Mobilising resources to improve information and communications infrastructure, with a particular emphasis on a "partnership" approach involving governments, international organisations, the private sector, and NGOs;

Working on ways to reduce the cost of connectivity for developing countries;

Supporting community access programmes;

Encouraging research and development on technology and applications adapted to specific requirements in developing countries;

Improving interoperability of networks, services, and applications;

Encouraging the production of locally relevant and informative content including in the development of the content in various mother tongues.

Building human capacity:

Focusing on basic education as well as increased opportunities for life-long learning, with a particular emphasis on development of IT skills;

Assisting the development of a pool of trained professionals in IT and other relevant policy areas and regulatory matters;

Developing innovative approaches to extend the traditional reach of technical assistance, including distance learning and community-based training;

Networking of public institutions and communities, including schools, research centres and universities.

Encouraging participation in global e-commerce networks:

Assessing and increasing e-commerce readiness and use, through provision of advice to start-up businesses in developing countries, and through mobilisation of resources to help businesses to use IT to improve their efficiency and access to new markets.

Ensuring that the "rules of the game" as they are emerging are consistent with development efforts, and building developing country capacity to play a constructive role in determining these rules.

Appendix D: Commitments from G8 Statement on Regional Issues, Okinawa, July 21, 2000

Middle East Peace Process

  1. We confirm our commitment to assist in the implementation of a peace agreement, and invite the international community to participate in the efforts to help the parties implement such an agreement when it is reached.

  2. It is the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon to ensure the return of its effective authority to maintain peace and security in southern Lebanon. Being aware that attaining these goals will also depend on the government's ability to meet the infrastructure and development needs of this region, we are committed to supporting its efforts to this end.

    Balkans

  3. We will meet our financial commitments, and urge countries in the region to intensify their efforts for reform.

  4. We reaffirm our commitment to the full implementation of the UNSCR 1244 and underline our support for the efforts made by the UN, the EU, KFOR and the OSCE.

    Africa

  5. We stress that the rule of law, good governance and democracy are indispensable elements to achieve that goal. We reaffirm our strong commitment to help.

  6. We also reaffirm our commitment to support Africa's quest for peace and stability.
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