

Compliance Report
2000 Okinawa
Disarmament/Non-Proliferation/Arms Control

Commitment

Para. 74: “We are determined to implement the conclusions reached at this Conference, including the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the immediate commencement and the conclusion within five years of negotiations for the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty. We remain committed to promoting universal adherence to and compliance with the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT).”

Assessment

Country	Lack of Compliance -1	Work in Progress 0	Full Compliance +1
Britain			+1
Canada			+1
France			+1
Germany			+1
Italy			+1
Japan			+1
Russia			+1
United States		0	
Overall			+1

The treaty’s International Monitoring System detects any nuclear explosion in the atmosphere, underwater, underground, or anywhere on the earth. Each will continuously transmit data back to the International Data Centre in Vienna for collation, analysis, and interpretation. The system is overseen by the CTBT Organization, which essentially monitors compliance to the provisions of the treaty.

When a country ratifies the treaty, it indicates that its domestic law has been altered to be consistent with the provisions of the treaty and, furthermore, that the country has set up monitoring systems.

With regard to the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), when a state declares fissile materials excess, that state commits to refrain from using these materials as weapons.

Britain

Britain officially ratified the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in April 1998 (following its 1996 signing of the treaty). It currently possesses 12 monitoring facilities in the International Monitoring System. These are one seismic auxiliary station, four radionuclide stations, one radionuclide laboratory, two hydro-acoustic stations, and four infrasound stations. The monitoring system is under international observation. Britain has made efforts to maintain its various monitoring systems, thereby demonstrating its commitment to the entry-into-force of the CTBT.

Britain has also established nuclear-weapon-free zones and stopped producing fissile material for use in nuclear weapons.

In 2000, Britain has contributed £12 million to the destruction of Russia's chemical weapons arsenal and £70 million to plutonium disposal. It reaffirmed its commitment to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to the elimination of nuclear weapons. This is evident through its commitment to the obligations of the NPT, which involves reducing the size of its nuclear deterrent, restructuring its forces, including British nuclear weapons in international negotiations, ensuring greater transparency about nuclear and fissile material stockpiles, placing fissile material under international safeguards, and verifying the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, Britain has demonstrated not to retain concealed stocks of fissile material outside international supervision of the Atomic Energy Authority. Britain has committed to the Strategic Defence Review (which aims to produce an initial report of defence fissile material production through declassification and historical accounting).

In regard to the FMCT, Britain is regarded to have a sophisticated nuclear material accounting system and, thus, can release more information regarding its stocks, as well as declare material in excess (although it has released some information at this point). Currently, Britain does have some fissile material under safeguards (under the International Atomic Energy Agency).

Canada

Canada officially ratified the CTBT in December 1998 (following its 1996 signing of the treaty). Canada currently possesses 16 monitoring facilities in the International Monitoring System (IMS): three seismic primary stations, six seismic auxiliary stations, four radionuclide stations, one radionuclide laboratory, one hydro-acoustic station, and one infrasound station. The monitoring system is under international observation. Canada has made efforts to maintain its

various monitoring systems, thereby demonstrating its commitment to the entry-into-force of the CTBT.

Canada is also one of the first signatories of the treaty and has continued to take a leading role in the entry-into-force of the treaty. Canada continues to support the conveying of an annual conference regarding the CTBT (which would examine the extent to which the requirement for the treaty's entry-into-force has been met and consider what measures might be taken to accelerate the ratification process). Canada has also encouraged the U.S. to ratify the treaty early (as "a world accustomed to U.S. leadership can only be disturbed by a lack of US support for the treaty").

Canada has also reaffirmed its commitment to the provisions of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (which bans the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices). Canada stated that it has and will continue to work toward nuclear non-proliferation objectives in FMCT negotiations. Canada also reaffirms the objectives laid out in the document titled *Elements of an Approach to Dealing with Stocks of Fissile Materials for Nuclear Weapons or Other Nuclear Explosive Devices*, which it presented to other member states for consideration in 1999. In the meantime, Canada is promoting an immediate and universal moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

France

France officially ratified the CTBT in April 1998 (following its 1996 signing of the treaty). France currently possesses 15 IMS facilities: one seismic primary station, two seismic auxiliary stations, six radionuclide stations, one radionuclide laboratory, two hydro-acoustic stations, and five infrasound stations. The monitoring system is under international observation. France has made efforts to maintain its various monitoring systems, thereby demonstrating its commitment to the entry-into-force of the CTBT.

France has officially reaffirmed its commitment to the entry-into-force of the CTBT. France also draws attention to the fact that it was one of the first signatories of the treaty and has continued to take unilateral initiatives to reduce a limited amount of nuclear forces (i.e., its nuclear forces "have been maintained at a level of strict sufficiency" and some of its testing centres have been closed).

In regard to the FMCT, France has been regarded to have a sophisticated nuclear material accounting system and can thus release more information regarding its stocks, as well as declare material in excess.

Germany

Germany officially ratified the CTBT in August 1998 (following its 1996 signing of the treaty). Germany currently possesses four IMS facilities. These are one seismic primary station, one radionuclide station, and two infrasound stations.

Together with its partners in the EU, the German government is endeavouring to speed up the CTBT ratification process with a view to the swift entry-into-force of the treaty and has called upon all countries that have not yet signed and ratified to do so. It particularly urges India and Pakistan, both of which have yet to accede to and ratify the treaty despite calls for them to do so from the Security Council of the United Nations in Resolution 1172 following their nuclear tests in May 1998.

An implementing law was adopted in 1998 to implement the treaty in Germany. On the treaty's entry-into-force, the Federal Foreign Office will assume the role of the National Authority, which is to serve as the national focal point for liaison with the Treaty Organization and with other state parties.

Italy

Italy officially ratified the CTBT in February 1999 (following its 1996 signing of the treaty). Italy possesses two monitoring facilities: one seismic auxiliary station and one radionuclide laboratory.

Japan

Japan officially ratified the CTBT in July 1997 (following its 1996 signing of the treaty). Japan currently possesses 10 IMS facilities. These are one seismic primary station, five seismic auxiliary stations, two radionuclide stations, one radionuclide laboratory, and one infrasound station. The monitoring system is under international observation. Japan has made efforts to maintain its various monitoring systems, thereby demonstrating its commitment to the entry-into-force of the CTBT.

Following the 2000 Summit, Japan submitted to the First Committee of the UN General Assembly a new draft resolution entitled, "A Path to the Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons." The path consists of measures that must be dealt with immediately, including the early entry-into-force of the CTBT before 2003 and the immediate commencement of the negotiations on the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, as early as possible, before 2005.

Japan has also continued to urge the countries that have not yet ratified or signed the treaty to ratify the CTBT early. It has stated that it will continue to promote actively and effectively the early entry-into-force of the CTBT, thereby taking a leading role. This is evident through the letters and high-level missions sent by Japan to countries that are required to ratify the treaty.

Japan has acknowledged and commended recent countries that have ratified the treaty, especially Chile and Bangladesh. Japan has also offered to increase its assistance to Pakistan by enhancing the annual US\$500 million assistance (provided Pakistan was ready to ratify the CTBT). Japan has made serious recommendations to Pakistan that it sign the treaty as early as possible.

Japan reaffirmed its commitment to the ratification of the treaty as it has been the only country in the world to have suffered the tragedy of atomic bombings and has a serious interest in the CTBT.

Japan's 2000 diplomatic blue book reaffirms Japan's commitment to the early entry into force of the CTBT. Japan has pressured the U.S. to ratify the treaty to ensure the efficient proliferation of the entry-into-force process. Japan also re-established its commitment to the early commencement of the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty negotiations as a concrete step toward the progress of negotiations and disarmament.

Russia

Russia officially ratified the CTBT in June 2000 (following its 1996 signing of the treaty). The ratification was pushed by President Vladimir Putin, who desired to obtain an advantage over the United States, which has failed to ratify the treaty as yet. Furthermore, it is in the best interests of Russia to ratify the treaty considering the financial implications of another arms race (as opposed to a system that promotes disarmament and arms control).

Russia currently possesses 24 facilities in the International Monitoring System. These are six seismic primary stations, 13 seismic auxiliary stations, eight radionuclide stations, one radionuclide laboratory, and four infrasound station. The monitoring system is under international observation. Russia has made efforts to maintain its various monitoring systems, thereby demonstrating its commitment to the entry-into-force of the CTBT.

In 2000, Russia committed to the Joint Statement on the Principles of Strategic Stability. The statement called for a reduction in the current number of nuclear arsenals, the preservation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, the continued commitment of START II Treaty, and the control of the spread of missiles and missile technology. The purpose of the statement was to supplement the Missile Technology Control Regime (which integrated Russia's proposal for a global monitoring system and the U.S.-initiated missile code of conduct). The statement also affirmed

commitment to the initiation of a joint U.S.-Russian centre for exchange. Finally, the statement reaffirmed Russia's commitment to the CTBT.

In regard to the FMCT, Russia has made efforts to organize a nuclear material accounting system in order to release more information regarding its stocks, as well as declare material in excess, although Canada has indicated that this area still requires improvement.

United States

The U.S. signed the CTBT in 1996, but has failed to ratify the treaty as of yet.

The U.S. currently possesses 39 monitoring facilities in the International Monitoring System: five seismic primary stations, 12 seismic auxiliary stations, 11 radionuclide stations, one radionuclide laboratory, two hydro-acoustic station, and eight infrasound stations. The monitoring system is under international observation. The U.S. has made efforts to maintain its various monitoring systems, thereby demonstrating some commitment to the entry-into-force of the CTBT.

The U.S. has been criticized by the international community and member states for its failure to ratify the CBTB. Essentially, the Senate has prevented the U.S. government from fulfilling its requirements as a signatory to the treaty by refusing to allow (via a vote on the policy) the U.S. government (including the executive) to ratify the treaty.

A resolution in the House of Representatives was introduced on January 3, 2001, by Representative Lynn Woolsey and her co-sponsors. The resolution essentially recognized the security interests of the United States in furthering complete nuclear disarmament. It has been referred to the House Committee on International Relations and is being deliberated by the relevant committees and sub-committees. In the past, such bills have failed as a result of the lack of necessary votes by the Senate for the bill to become law. The result of this bill, in the 107th session of Congress, will help determine the extent to which the U.S. executive pursues nuclear non-proliferation and the CTBT.

Nevertheless, the new Bush administration, which has opposed the ratification of the treaty, may pose even further problems. Bush has dismissed the treaty's provisions as unverifiable and unenforceable; secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld, in addition, indicates that the CTBT would restrain the U.S. from developing a new generation of nuclear weapons (i.e., defence missile shield). The administration has been urged to ratify the treaty (mainly because the effect of not ratifying would perpetuate nuclear weaponry development by problematic countries such as Pakistan, India, and China).

In regard to the FMCT, the U.S. has been regarded to have a sophisticated nuclear material accounting system and can thus release more information regarding its stocks, as well as declare material in excess (although the U.S. has released some information at this point). Currently, the U.S. does have fissile material under safeguards.

Note: A further challenge faced by G8 countries is to encourage the ratification of the treaty by other compulsory countries, including India, Pakistan, and China. Japan and other G8 members have contributed financially and diplomatically to the process, as it is necessary for the international implementation of the treaty. Nevertheless, in order for full implementation to occur, other member states must contribute to a greater extent.

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