

The 2001 G8 Compliance Report

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1. Overview

It makes little sense for the leaders of G7/G8 countries to invest their time, reputations, and other resources to generate collective commitments at their annual summits, or for citizens to take these commitments seriously, if the institution's members do not comply with them in the following year. By these standards, the Japanese-hosted Okinawa G7/G8 Summit of July 21–23, 2001, was the most credible G7/G8 summit ever held. It provides a very high benchmark for the forthcoming Italian-hosted Genoa Summit on July 20–22, 2001.

G7/G8 members complied with the priority commitments made on the 12 major issue areas of the Okinawa Summit during the following ten months 81.4% of the time (see Table A). This is on a scale where 100% equals perfect compliance and –100% shows all members doing the opposite of what they had pledged.

As Table B shows, this 81.4% compliance record compares very favourably with the 39% compliance record with the priority commitments of the 1999 Cologne Summit (as measured by the average of equally weighted countries). It also compares very impressively with the 45% compliance record of the 1998 Birmingham Summit, the 27% of Denver 1997, and the 36% of Lyon 1996. Whereas the four summits prior to Okinawa yielded an average compliance score of 37%, Okinawa itself soared to register an 80% —with two months left for members to comply still further with its outstanding commitments. Okinawa's exceptional status is confirmed by compliance studies from 1988 to 1995, which yielded scores of 43% for the United States and Canada on their “sustainable development” and to “aid to Russia” commitments. It is also confirmed by the score of 32% (using different methodology) for the compliance of all members with all the economic and energy commitments made at the summits from 1975 to 1988.

Compliance with Okinawa's priority commitments was particularly high in the issue areas of information technology, health, and trade, where the Summit secured a perfect score.

The highest complying members were Germany and Britain, the immediately prior hosts, which each had a perfect compliance score. They were followed by France with 92%; Italy with 89%, Canada with 83%, Japan with 82%, the United States with 67%, and the newest G8 member, Russia, with only 14%.

Table A: Summary Scores

Issue Area	Canada	France	Germany	Italy	Japan	United States	United Kingdom	Russia	Average Score by Issue Area
1. World Economy	+1	+1	+1	N/A	+1	+1	+1	0	.86
2. ICT	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	1.0
3. Health	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	N/A	1.0
4. Trade	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	N/A	1.0
5. Cultural Diversity	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	0	.63
6. Crime and Drugs	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	.88
7. Aging	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	N/A	.86
8. Biotech	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	.75
9. Human Genome	+1	+1	+1	N/A	N/A	0	+1	N/A	.80
10. Conflict Prevention	+1	+1	+1	0	0	+1	+1	0	.63
11. Arms Control	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	.88
12. Terrorism	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	+1	+1	N/A	.40
Average Score by Country	.83	.92	1.0	.89	.82	.67	1.0	.14	1) .808 2) .784 3) .814

Notes:

(i) N/A indicates that information is not available and no compliance score has been awarded.

(ii) TBD indicates that information is forthcoming.

(iii) Development was separated into two sections: (a) debt, and (b) health. Compliance with debt commitments was assessed at the institutional level and examines the extent to which the IMO and World Bank complied with the directives issued to them by the G8 at Okinawa. See attached Development Compliance Report.

1. Overall Average (based on 86 individual scores): 81.4%
2. Overall Average Compliance Score by Country: 80.4%
3. Overall Average Compliance Score by Issue Area: 78.1%

Note: Slight variation due to differential equalization weightings.

Note: Compliance Calculations by Country and Issue Area

The average score by issue area is the average of all countries' compliance scores for that issue. The average score by country is the average of all issue area compliance scores for a given country. Where information on a country's compliance score for a given issue area was not available, the symbol "N/A" appears in the respective column and no score is awarded. Countries were excluded from the averages if the symbol "N/A" appears in the respective column (e.g., no score was awarded to Italy in issue no. 1, "World Economy." Hence Italy is excluded from the average score by issue area result of 0.85 for issue no. 1. Also, Italy's average score by country excludes issue no. 1 from the result of 0.89.

2. Okinawa Compared to the 1996–2000 "Globalization Era"

The outstandingly high compliance rate with the Okinawa commitments can be seen through a more direct comparison with the compliance record of the G7/G8 in the preceding five years. This was the time when the G7/G8, starting at its 1996 Lyon Summit, directly and consciously addressed the process of "globalization." It is also the time when the G8 Research Group began its annual compliance studies.

Compliance by Country

The following tables report the results, by country, of the compliance of G8 members with their priority commitments at the Summit from Lyon 1996 to Okinawa 2000 (with compliance assessed through to May 2001).

Table B: G8 Compliance Assessments by Country, 1996–2001a

	1996–1997b	1997–1998c	1998–1999d	1999–2000e	2000–2001f
France	+0.26	0	+0.25	+0.34	+0.92
United States	+0.42	+0.34	+0.6	+0.5	+0.67
United Kingdom	+0.42	+0.5	+0.75	+0.5	+1.0
Germany	+0.58	+0.17	+0.25	+0.17	+1.0
Japan	+0.21	+0.50	+0.2	+0.67	+0.82
Italy	+0.16	+0.50	+0.67	+0.34	+0.89
Canada	+0.47	+0.17	+0.5	+0.67	+0.83
Russia	N/A	0	+0.34	+0.17	+0.14
European Union	N/A	N/A	N/A	+0.17	N/A
Average	+0.36	+0.27	+0.45	+0.39	+0.80

Notes:

a: Scores are an equally weighted average of a country's compliance to commitments made at the summit.

b: Applies to 19 priority issues, embracing the economic, transnational and political security domains.

c: Applies to six priority issues, embracing the economic, transnational and political security domains.

d: Applies to seven priority issues, embracing the economic, transnational and political security domains (illegal trafficking of human beings).

e: Applies to six priority issues, embracing economic, transnational and political security domains (terrorism).

f: Applies to 12 priority issues, embracing economic, transnational and political security domains (conflict prevention, arms control, terrorism).

Table C: Compliance Scores by Country

	1996–2001 Average	1988–1995	1975–1989
United Kingdom	+63%	N/A	+41.3%
Canada	+53%	+53%	+40.9%
United States	+51%	+34%	+24.6%
Italy	+51%	N/A	+27.4%
Japan	+48%	N/A	+26.2%
<i>Average of G8</i>	<i>+45%</i>	<i>+43%</i>	<i>+30.7%</i>
Germany	+43%	N/A	+34.6%
France	+35%	N/A	+24.0%
Russia	+22%	N/A	N/A

During the first half decade of the “globalization era” (1996–2001), the average compliance score was 45%. This is slightly higher than the 43% for the 1988–1995 period identified by Kokotsis for the U.S. and Canada alone on four issues areas (Kokotsis 1999). It is notably higher than the 31% discovered by von Furstenberg and Daniels (1992) for all members on all commitments for the 1975–1989 period. (They found the 1975–1988 average of the U.S. and Canada alone to be 33%). This data thus confirms the portrait offered by Kokotsis on the basis of much more limited evidence. It also suggests that the post cold war years — begun with the Gorbachev letter to the G7 at Paris 1989 — have made the Summits more credible than they were before.

In some ways, this data for the first half decade of the “globalization era” (1996–2001) confirms the pattern of compliance by country first identified by von Furstenberg and Daniels for the initial 1975–1989 period. Britain continues to rank first on compliance, followed closely by second-place Canada. France continues to rank near or at the bottom.

But there are some notable changes. Most strikingly, the United States has risen from second last in 1975–1989 to a strong third-highest in 1996–2001. This is consistent with the higher scores Kokotsis found for the U.S. on four issue areas for the period 1988–1995 (Kokotsis 1999). Italy has risen somewhat in the ranking and substantially in the percentage score. Moreover the newest G8 member, Russia comes in last place. This is perhaps due to the slow process of socializing a new member, but more likely due to limitations on the capacity of the Russian government to implement G7/G8 commitments. These often require more adjustment on even a reforming Russia’s part than they do for other G8 members.

The data in Table B, while slender, are inductively suggestive of one possible pattern. In the year leading up to a country hosting a G7/G8 summit, that country will comply with its commitments from the previous year’s summit at a higher level than it did in the immediately earlier year. The prospective new host thus appears to take its G7/G8 responsibility seriously and make the G7/G8 system appear credible, by leading through example, with a higher-than-usual compliance record. (We are indebted to Caroline Konrad for this point.)

Compliance by Issue Area

Even with its much higher overall compliance scores, Okinawa showed considerable variation by subject domain, issue area, and issue. As Table D shows, as against an overall compliance score of 78%, Okinawa scored 81% in the global/transnational domain, 74% in the economic domain, and 64% in the political security domain.

Among individual issues, it received a perfect compliance score in IT, trade, and health. Its lowest scores came in terrorism (40%), conflict prevention (63%), and cultural diversity (63%).

When compared to the 1996–2001 average, or to any individual year within this period, Okinawa had a higher (or an equal) score on virtually every priority commitment measured for 2000–2001. The only areas where it under-performed were macroeconomics and, especially, terrorism

In a longer term comparison, the “globalization era” summits of 1996–2001 had remarkably high compliance in several domains and issue areas. For this half-decade, the average compliance level was 39%, but 59% in the global/transnational domain, 37% in the economic domain, and only 33% in the political-security domain. The increase in compliance for the globalization half-decade was thus driven almost entirely by the global transnational/domain and it in turn was driven by the heavy investment in this domain at Okinawa. Nonetheless, it is clear that the age of social globalization has arrived and that the G8 has moved sharply to mount an approach of socially sensitive governance in response.

Comparisons over a longer period by issue area are possible only in three issue areas. Here it is clear the summit has suffered a sharp decline in its performance in the trade field and, less dramatically, in development assistance/aid. Conversely, in the field of exchange rates, it has experienced a sharp increase, despite the onset of intense financial globalization. While limited data make any conclusions hazardous, this finding does suggest that G7/8 governments are by no means powerless in the face of the most globalized of economic markets, and by no means cowering in self imposed fear from intervention in the belief that they can no longer win.

Table D: G8 Compliance by Issue, 1996–2001

Issue Area	1996– 1997	1997– 1998	1998– 1999	1999– 2000	2000– 2001	Average 1996– 2001
TOTAL (based on average <i>n</i>)	+36.2% (22)	+12.8% (6)	+31.8% (6)	+38.2% (6)	+78.1% (12)	+39.42
Economic Issues						
<i>Average Economic</i>	+39%	+19%	+17%	32%	+74%	+37%
Economic Issues	+0.31	–	–	–	–	+0.31
IFI Reform	+0.29c	–	–	–	–	+0.29
Exchange Rate	–	–	–	0	–	0
Macroeconomics/ World Economy	+1.00	–	–	+1.0	+0.86d	+0.95
Microeconomics	+0.29d	–	–	–	–	+0.29
Employment	–	+0.375e	0f	–	–	+0.19
Aging	–	–	+0.33g	–	+0.86n	+0.60
GIS/ICT	+0.57d	–	–	–	+1.0	+0.79
Trade	+0.29d	–	0.33h	–0.57	+1.0n	+0.26
Development	0d	0	–	–	0	0
Debt of Poorest	–	–	0	+0.86	–	+0.43
Global/Transnational Issues						
<i>Average Global</i>	+34%	+25%	+63%	+0%	+81%	+41%
Transnational General	+0.48	–	–	–	–	+0.48
Environment	+0.14	+0.5e	–	–	–	+0.32
Climate Change	–	–	+1.0j	–	–	+1.0
Nuclear Safety	+0.29	–	–	–	–	+0.29
Health/Disease	–	–	–	–	+1.0n	+1.0
Biotech	–	–	–	–	+0.75	+0.75
Human Genome	–	–	–	–	+0.80	+0.80
Crime	+0.43d	0e	–	0k	+0.88 (includes drugs)	+0.33
Human Trafficking	–	–	+0.25	–	–	+0.25
Cultural Diversity	–	–	–	–	+0.63	+0.63

Political Security Issues						
Average Political–Sec’y	+39%	–06%	–	+100%	+64%	+49%
East/West Relations	+0.80d	–	–	–	–	+0.80
Terrorism	+0.71d	–	–	+1.0	+0.40o	+0.70
Arms Control	+0.29	–	–	–	+0.88	+0.59
Landmines	+0.71	+0.75e	–	–	–	+0.73
Human Rights	+0.71d	–	–	–	–	+0.71
Security Issues	+0.31	–	–	–	–	+0.31
Regional Security	–0.43d	–	–	–	–	–0.43
Asia						
Europe	+0.86m	–	–	–	–	+0.86
Middle East	–0.43d	–	–	–	–	–0.43
Russia	–	–0.86	–	–	–	–0.86
Conflict Prevention	–	–	–	–	0.63	+0.63
Governance Issues						
UN Reform Financing	+0.14	–	–	–	–	+0.14
UN Reform Develop’t	+0.14	–	–	–	–	+0.14

Notes:

a: Data refer to members’ compliance to commitments expressed in the Communiqué, as evaluated immediately prior to the next summit (i.e., 1996–1997 data refer to commitments made at the Lyon Summit in 1996 and assessed on the eve of the 1997 Denver Summit).

b: Unless otherwise indicated, data refer to all G7/G8 countries.

c: Excludes Italy and France.

d: Excludes Italy.

e: Refers to G8 (includes Russia).

f: Refers only to Japan, UK, Russia.

g: Refers only Canada, Germany, U.S.

h: Excludes Germany.

i: Refers to debt of the poorest and the Cologne Debt Initiative.

j: Refers to G8 countries (includes Russia); is average of data for two commitment referring to the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change.

k: Refers specifically to the Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering.

l: Refers only to France, Germany, Japan.

m: Excludes Japan.

n: Excludes Russia.

o: Excludes Germany, Italy, Russia.

Table E: Compliance Scores by Issue, 1975–2001

Issue Area	1996–2001 Average	1988–1996	1975–1989
Total (per average n)	+39%	43% (C+US)	31%
Economic Issues			
Macro/World Economy	+95%		
GIS/IT	+79%		
Aging	+60%		
Debt of the Poorest	+43%	+73% a	
<i>Average of G8 All</i>	+39%		
<i>Average of G8 Economy</i>	+37%		
Economic Issues	+31%		
IFI Reform	+29%		
Microeconomics	+29%		
Trade	+26%		+73%
Employment	+19%		
Development/Aid	0		+27%
Exchange Rate	0		-70%
Demand Composition			+23%
Real GNP Growth			+40%
Fiscal Adjustments			+26%
Interest Rate			+22%
Inflation Rate			+22%
Energy			+66%
Global/Transnational Issues			
Climate Change	+100%	+34% a	
Health/Disease	+100%		
Human Genome	+80%		
Biotech	+75%		
Cultural Diversity	+63%		
<i>Average of G8 on Global/Transnational Issues</i>	+59%		
Transnational General	+48%		
<i>Average of G8</i>	+39%		
Crime	+33%		
Environment	+32%		
Nuclear Safety	+29%		
Human Trafficking	+25%		

Political/Regional Security Issues			
Europe	+86%		
East/West Relations	+80%		
Landmines	+73%		
Human Rights	+71%		
Terrorism	+70%		
Conflict Prevention	+63%		
Arms Control	+59%		
<i>Average of G8</i>	+39%		
<i>Average of G8 on Political/Regional Security</i>	+33%		
Security Issues	+31%		
Asia	-43%		
Middle East	-43%		
Russia	-86%	+81% a	
Governance Issues			
<i>Average of G8</i>	+39%		
<i>Average of G8 on Governance Issues</i>	+14%		
UN Reform Financial	+14%		
UN Reform Development	+14%		

Note:

a: Includes only Canada and the United States.

Source: Ella Kokotsis and Joseph Daniels (1999), "G8 Summits and Compliance," in Michael Hodges, John Kirton, and Joseph Daniels, eds., *The G8's Role in the New Millennium* (Aldershot, Ashgate), pp. 75-94.

3. The Okinawa Compliance Record Corrected for Ambition-significance

This comparison of the Okinawa compliance record with that of the summit in previous years highlights just how exceptionally high Okinawa was. This may well be an accurate reflection of reality. Japan traditionally takes the Summit and its role as host more seriously than virtually any other country. It devoted large sums of money, highest-level political management, and domestic political attention to Okinawa. And the mounting G7/G8 involvement of civil society actors, and their protests at other major international fora, may well have led Japan and its G7/G8 partners to be exceptionally vigilant in keeping the faith with their Okinawa pledges.

Another possibility is that the particular commitments selected by the G8 Research Group in 2000 to monitor compliance against were unusually low in ambition and significance, making it very easy for G8 members to comply and thus generate these uniquely high compliance scores for 2000.

The G8 Research Group explored this possibility in its revised Commitments Study. Here it has ranked each of the Okinawa G7 and G8 Communiqué commitments by its “ambition-significance,” using a scale and method devised by Diana Juricevic. This referent suggests that the particular commitments selected for compliance monitoring were not unusually “easy” commitments to comply with, compared to the other commitments in their respective issue areas.

A second way of checking and controlling for the possibility of easy commitment selection bias is to take the set of selected priority commitments as given, but weight them according to their level of ambition and significance, and use these weights in the compliance analysis. Consider a commitment on trade that has a compliance rate of 100%, but an ambition-significance ranking of only $3/6 = 50\%$. Consider another commitment on the environment that has a compliance rate of 80%, but an ambition-significance ranking of $6/6 = 100\%$. In the previous analysis, the commitment on trade would be deemed more successful than the commitment on the environment because it has a higher compliance score. This compliance score, however, is misleading since it does not take into account how difficult the commitment is to comply with. The difficulty of complying with a commitment is measured through the ambition-significance ranking. Coming back to the example, the trade commitment with an ambition-significance ranking of 50% is much easier to comply with than the environment commitment that has an ambition-significance ranking of 100%. To account for the difficulty of complying, the ambition-significance ranking is used as a weight in the compliance analysis. A given commitment would now have a weighted compliance score that is the product of its original compliance score multiplied by its ambition-significance ranking. In the example, the trade commitment would now have a weighted compliance score of 50% while the environment commitment would have a weighted compliance score of 80%, derived once again by multiplying their original compliance scores by their respective ambition-significance rankings.

As the results in Table F indicate, applying this individual ambition-significance weighting control does reduce substantially Okinawa's overall very high compliance scores. Yet it still leaves Okinawa as the most credible G7/G8 Summit ever. By this weighted ranking, G7/8 members complied with the priority commitments across the 12 major issue areas of the Okinawa Summit during the following ten months 59.2% of the time. This 59.2% compliance record still compares very favourably with the unweighted scores of 39% for Cologne 1999, the 45% for Birmingham 1998, the 27% of Denver 1997, and the 36% of Lyon 1996.

Compliance with Okinawa's priority commitments remained particularly high in the issue area of health where the Summit secured a perfect score. The highest complying members were Germany and Britain, the immediately prior hosts, which each had a compliance score of 72%. They were followed by France, with 66%, Italy with 64%, Canada with 60%, Japan with 59%, the United States with 48% and the newest G8 member Russia, with only 10%.

4. Further Research

These preliminary scores are offered with an invitation for others to challenge, confirm, enrich and supplement them, prior to the release of a final compliance report. Contributions are particularly welcome if they are:

- a. Empirical: Are there additional or alternative data that would adjust the scores?
- b. Methodological: Have the existing data been correctly applied to the first-order, instrumental compliance criteria employed in this study?
- c. Analytical: Is there any systematic bias in the selection of the priority commitments or the 12 issue areas chosen for assessment this year?

The individual scores, and the data and commitments on which they are based, are listed in the appendices below. For additional material see the analytical studies listed at www.g8.utoronto.ca.

Table F: Weighted Summary Scores

Issue Area	Canada	France	Germany	Italy	Japan	United States	United Kingdom	Russia	Weight	Weighted Average Score (by Issue Area)
1. World Economy	+1	+1	+1	N/A	+1	+1	+1	0	0.667	0.57
2. ICT	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0.833	0.83
3. Health	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	N/A	1.00	1.0
4. Trade	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	N/A	0.500	0.5
5. Cultural Diversity	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	0	0.833	0.52
6. Crime and Drugs	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	0.833	0.73
7. Aging	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	N/A	0.667	0.57
8. Biotech	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	0.667	0.50
9. Human Genome	+1	+1	+1	N/A	N/A	0	+1	N/A	0.833	0.67
10. Conflict Prevention	+1	+1	+1	0	0	+1	+1	0	0.667	0.42
11. Arms Control	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	0.667	0.59
12. Terrorism	0	0	N/A	N/A	0	+1	+1	N/A	0.500	0.20
Weight	0.722	0.722	0.722	0.722	0.722	0.722	0.722	0.722	0.722	
Weighted Average Score (by country)	0.60	0.66	0.72	0.64	0.59	0.48	0.72	0.10		1) 0.578 2) 0.564 3) 0.592

Notes:

- (i) N/A indicates that information is not available, and that no compliance score has been awarded
- (ii) TBD indicates that information is forthcoming
- (iii) Development was separated into two sections: (a) debt, and (b) health. Compliance with debt commitments was assessed at the institutional level and examines the extent to which the IMO and World Bank complied with the directives issued to them by the G8 at Okinawa. See attached Development Compliance Report.
- (iv) The weights are calculated using the ambition-significance ranking. A commitment in a given issue area that has a higher ambition-significance ranking has a correspondingly higher weight score. See attached note on compliance for further details.

1. Overall Average (based on 86 individual scores): 57.8%
 2. Overall Average Compliance Score by Country: 56.4%
 3. Overall Average Compliance Score by Issue Area: 59.2%
- Note: Slight variation due to differential equalization weightings

Compliance Calculations by Country and Issue Area

The “average score by issue area” is the average of all countries’ compliance scores for that issue. The “average score by country” is the average of all issue area compliance scores for a given country. Where information on a country’s compliance score for a given issue area was not available, the symbol “N/A” appears in the respective score column and no score is awarded. Countries were excluded from the averages if the symbol “N/A” appears in the respective score column (e.g. No score was awarded to Italy in issue #1, “World Economy”. Hence Italy is excluded from the “average score by issue area” result of 0.57 for issue #1. Also, Italy’s “average score by country” excludes issue #1 from the result of 0.64).

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