

2002 Final Kananaskis Compliance Report May 2003

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2002 Kananaskis Final Compliance Report

Introduction

In March 2003, the University of Toronto G8 Research Group completed its first interim Compliance Report based on the compliance results of the Kananaskis Summit from June 2002 to January 2003. The University of Toronto G8 Research Group has now made available the final Compliance Report, based on analytic results from the interim report until two weeks prior to the 2003 Evian-les-Bains G8 Summit in France. A summary of the final compliance scores is listed in the table A with an individual analytic assessment by country and issue area below.

Additional care should be given in interpreting the comparative results of the interim versus the final compliance reports as none of the earlier compliance studies provide comparable comparative data on how much compliance comes during the first six months following a summit. Rather, the focus of all prior compliance reports is based on an assessment of the compliance scores for the full year prior to the subsequent summit taking place. In addition, data limitations, particularly for Italy and Russia, made it difficult to produce complete results for some issue areas. In such cases, a lack of data is noted by an “N/A” and the value is withdrawn from the overall assessment.

Since the conclusion of the Kananaskis Summit in June 2002, the G7/G8 have complied with their priority commitments made across 13 major issue areas 35% of the time (see Table A). This average is based on a scale whereby 100% equals perfect compliance, and –100% means that the member governments are either non-compliant or are in fact doing the opposite of what they committed to.¹

These results indicate that the compliance scores following the Kananaskis Summit varied widely by issue area, with commitments focused on international terrorism scoring perfect compliance scores across all Summit countries. Compliance scores were also high in the areas of the Environment (Water, 67%), Africa (Education, 63%), Environment (Sustainable Agriculture, 57%) and Development (ODA, 50%). Conflict prevention, although scoring 60% for the interim report, fell to 38% for the final, but still managed to stay above the overall average. Scores falling below the overall average included Africa — Good Governance, Arms Control and Disarmament and Transnational Crime, each scoring 25%. Lower scores were reflected for Economic Growth (Agricultural Trade, 13%), Africa (Peer Review, 0) and Development (HIPC, 0). Economic Growth (Free Trade) brought in a score of –13%, indicating that not only did the leaders not act to fulfill their priority commitment in this issue area since Kananaskis, but they also did the opposite of what they committed to.

Compliance scores also varied widely by country. The highest complying Summit member across the 13 major issue areas was Canada, the hosting country, with a score of

¹ For a complete compliance methodological explanation, please visit the University of Toronto G8 web site at: www.g8.utoronto.ca/g7/evaluations/methodology/g7c2.htm.

85%. Canada's score is followed by tied scores from France and Britain at 62%. The US follows with a score of 38%, followed by Germany at 15%, Japan at 8% and Russia and Italy tied at -9%.

Although the final compliance scores in overall terms are slightly higher than the interim scores (35% versus 25%), these scores are considerably lower than those of Genoa 2001 (49.5%), Okinawa 2000 (81.4%), Cologne 1999 (39%), Birmingham 1998 (45%) and Lyon 1996 (36%). Only in the post-Denver period in 1997 did the leaders perform more disappointingly when their compliance score hit an overall average of 27%.

A complete assessment of these compliance scores is offered in a draft paper prepared by Ella Kokotsis for the 2003 Pre-Summit Conference in Fontainebleau, France on "Governing Globalization: G8, Public and Corporate Governance."

As with previous compliance reports, this report has been produced as an invitation for others to provide additional or more complete information on country compliance with the results of the 2002 commitments. All stakeholder comments are welcomed and would be considered as part of an analytic reassessment. Please send your feedback to g8info@library.utoronto.ca.

Table: 2002 Kananaskis Final Compliance Scores*

	CDA	FR	GER	ITA	JAP	RUS	UK	U.S.	AVE
Africa, Good Governance	+1	+1	0	-1	0	-1	+1	+1	+0.25
Africa, Peer Review	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
Africa, Education	+1	+1	0	N/A	+1	-1	+1	+1	+0.63
Development – HIPC	+1	0	0	0	-1	+1	+1	0	+0.25
Development – ODA	+1	+1	0	0	0	0	+1	+1	+0.50
Arms Control, Disarmament	0	0	0	0	0	+1	0	+1	+0.25
Conflict Prevention	+1	+1	+1	-1	-1	0	+1	+1	+0.38
Economic Growth, Agricultural Trade	+1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	+0.13
Economic Growth, Free Trade	+1	0	0	0	-1	0	0	-1	-0.13
Environment, Sustainable Agriculture	+1	+1	0	0	+1	N/A	+1	0	+0.57
Environment, Water	+1	+1	0	N/A	+1	0	+1	0	+0.57
Fighting Terrorism	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1.00
Transnational Crime, Corruption	+1	+1	0	0	0	0	0	0	+0.25
Overall Final Country Average	+0.85	+0.62	+0.15	-0.09	0.08	+0.08	+0.62	+0.38	35%

*The average score by issue area is the average of all countries' compliance scores for that issue. The average score by country is the average of all issue area compliance scores for a given country. Where information on a country's compliance score for a given issue area was not available, the symbol "N/A" appears in the respective column and no compliance score is awarded. Countries were excluded from the averages if the symbol "N/A" appears in the respective column.

2002 Kananaskis Final Compliance Report Africa – Good Governance

Commitment:

Expanding capacity-building programmes related to political governance in Africa focusing on the NEPAD priority areas of: improving administrative and civil services, strengthening parliamentary oversight, promoting participatory decision-making, and judicial reform. (31: Africa Action Plan)

Background:

One of the core values underpinning both NEPAD and the Africa Action Plan is that of good governance and its fundamental role in promoting the alleviation of both poverty and conflict. Much of the impetus behind the AAP evolved from the commitment made by African leaders and states to adhere to principles of democracy and good government, and from the G8 states' corresponding resolve to help strengthen African nations in these areas. All of the G8 states emphasize the importance of good governance and the strengthening of civil society in their Africa program literature, but as with the Peer Review mechanism, it is expected that much of the initial impetus and subsequent momentum will come from the African states themselves; the G8 states reaffirm that they will assist those countries that demonstrate a true commitment to good governance and political reform, but less is said about how they will assist in this initial transition. The perceived failure of other African states to respond sharply to the deteriorating situation in Zimbabwe has cast doubt on the 'home-grown' approach and on NEPAD, and in consequence, has in some cases jeopardized the optimism, if not the commitment, of some of the G8 member-states.

Assessment:

Country	Lack of Compliance -1	Work in Progress 0	Full Compliance +1
Britain			+1
Canada			+1
France			+1
Germany		0	
Italy	-1		
Japan		0	
Russia	-1		
United States			+1
Overall			+0.25

Individual Country Compliance Breakdown:

1. *Britain: +1*

While good governance is not listed as one of Britain's key priorities for Africa in the run-up to Evian-le-Bain,² Britain has demonstrated compliance with this commitment through its emphasis on good governance in its development assistance programs. In post-conflict reconstruction in Sierra Leone, Britain has committed 120 million pounds for developmental programs over the next three years and is focusing on an agreement known as the Poverty Reduction Framework Arrangement, comprised of benchmarks pertaining to public administration reform, corruption, financial management and security reforms, which both governments hope to begin meeting by 2003.³ The emphasis on good governance is further seen through the "Campaign for Good Governance" which is part of this bilateral relationship, and which is meant to provide support for "the building of a well-informed and active civil society" through support for salaries in social and security services.⁴

In a joint-document issued with France in February at the close of the Franco-British summit In Le Touquet, the two countries pledged to cooperate on Africa and their implementation of the AAP, stating among other things that they would seek to assist African governments in fighting organized crime and the plundering and illegal exporting of natural resources. Both countries committed to supporting initiatives on greater government and corporate transparency and to prepare a joint study on organized crime in Africa.⁵

Britain is also concerned with government and corporate accountability and transparency as related to resource extraction. At the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002, Blair announced a British initiative designed to encourage transparency in the payment and management of government revenues generated by resource extraction, and hosted an international meeting of governments, industry representatives and civil society actors in February 2003 as part of the run-up to Evian.⁶

While Britain has reiterated its intention to meet its AAP commitments, the situation in Zimbabwe and the weak response from African states has affected the perception of how committed the African members of NEPAD are to the peer review process and to good

² "G8 Africa Action Plan: Towards the 2003 Summit," co-authored by DFID and FCO, November, 2002. www.dfid.gov.uk AND "Report of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) Workshop, 11-12 February 2003," DFID, www.dfid.gov.uk

³ "Press Release: Britain Commits to Partnership for Reconstruction with Sierra Leone," November 13, 2002, www.dfid.gov.uk

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ "Joint Document on Franco-British Cooperation in Africa," Embassy of France, Washington D.C., February 4, 2003, www.info-france-usa.org/news/statmnts/2003/le-touquet0403.asp

⁶ "G8 Africa Action Plan: Towards the 2003 Summit," co-authored by DFID and FCO, November 2003. www.dfid.gov.uk

governance. In a speech in Pretoria in March 2003, Baroness Amos, Blair's APR, commented that the indulgence of bad governance policies could lead to "the danger... that EU and G8 leaders could lose enthusiasm for the collective approach which is at the heart of NEPAD."⁷

2. Canada: +1

Within its development assistance allocation to Africa, Canada has identified the strengthening of African institutions and governance as one of its three priorities (the other two being fostering of economic growth and investing in the people and future of Africa)⁸ and 15% of the \$500-million of the Canada Fund for Africa created after Kananaskis has been earmarked for governance, peace and security issues.⁹

To this end, Canada has pursued compliance by committing \$28-million over three years to improve the competency and efficiency of the public sector of African states, primarily through the Africa Capacity Building Foundation and the Canadian Centre for Management Development. Primary goals include strengthened capacity for civil society participation, better financial management and more accountability. A team from the Africa Capacity Building Foundation visited Canada in early March to meet with CIFA and Canadian Centre for Management Development representatives to discuss initiatives to strengthen the public sector in Africa.

A further \$9-million over three years will be directed towards strengthening African parliamentary government through the African Parliamentary Union. The Canadian Parliamentary Centre is lending its assistance by working with African legislatures and research and public policy organizations, and was part of a consultation held in Accra, Ghana in March designed to study the objectives and shape of the program.¹⁰ A videoconference on parliament and anti-corruption initiatives and a Women's Working Group on Gender (as relating to governance) are in the works and are expected to take shape by June 2003.

Over the three-year period, \$6-million will be spent on forging local and community governance and assisting African municipalities with decentralization programs and the delivery of public services.¹¹ The Local Governance Support Program is being implemented by the Canadian Federation of Municipalities in partnership with a number of African municipal and regional organizations. The first phase of the program involves Tanzania, Ghana, Mali and Mozambique and included a study tour of Canada for African delegates in late May.

⁷ "Setting the Record Straight," Baroness Valerie Amos, National Press Club, Pretoria, South Africa, March 31, 2003, www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000264/index/php

⁸ *Canada Fund for Africa*, Canadian International Development Agency (Ottawa) www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/canadafundforafrica.

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Ibid.

The Canada Fund for Africa is also committed to publicizing NEPAD and its good governance goals in Africa, and through its NEPAD Outreach Fund II, are financing proposals put forward by African organizations with the aim of building awareness, public dialogue and involvement. *Radiobus*, a Senegalese program, has already been approved and partnered with a Canadian organization.

In October 2002, it was announced that Canada will contribute \$2.39 million to promote good governance, along with security and development, in Francophone African countries; a commitment made specifically as a way of supporting the AAP.¹² \$1.09 million over three years will go to Transparency International, an NGO devoted to fighting corruption, allowing it to expand into fourteen Sub-Saharan Francophone countries.¹³ \$850 000 of this amount had been committed in 1999, in the 'first phase' of the funding program.¹⁴

3. France: +1

Although France has committed to implementing the AAP in its entirety, there has not been a significant focus on good governance. France has, however, emphasized the importance of these principles in its overall development assistance priorities. The Inter-Ministerial Committee on International Cooperation and Development (CICID) has, for example, identified infrastructure building as a key area of its commitment to Africa and NEPAD. The French Development Agency hosted a conference in Paris in March devoted to discussing the importance of infrastructure-building for the successful implementation of NEPAD, and identified good governance as one of three key elements of such an initiative.¹⁵ It includes the establishment of political institutions, in line with the needs of the populations and the necessary institutional reforms. This is also related to the Franco-British initiative presented at Johannesburg that favours public-private partnerships as a means of diversifying mechanisms of financing.¹⁶

Moreover, the policies of Coopération internationale et du Développement, an agency of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, include the goal of increased democratization and reinforcement of the state apparatus, decentralization and partnership with civil society.¹⁷ However, specific funds have not been allotted, nor is there a concrete plan as to how to achieve this goal.

¹² "News Release: Canada Supports Good Governance and Security in Francophone Countries in Africa," October 17, 2002. www.acdi-cida.gc.ca

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ "For a Continental Infrastructure Policy," NEPAD Initiative Support Conference, 6-7 March 2003, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.afd.fr/english/pdf/nepad/on-nepad.pdf

¹⁶ Relevé de conclusions du comité interministériel de la Coopération internationale et du développement (CICID) du 11 décembre 2002. www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/ressources/fichiers/cicid_111202.doc

¹⁷ "G8 Africa Action Plan: Towards the 2003 Summit," co-authored by DFID and FCO, November, 2002. www.dfid.gov.uk

In February, France hosted a Franco-African summit in Paris that included 45 African leaders and that prominently included good governance and human rights issues on the agenda.¹⁸ However, France's efforts to promote good governance through the Summit appear to have been diluted by Chirac's decision to invite Robert Mugabe to the Franco-African Summit, which caused a furor in France and Britain.¹⁹

Recently, French delegates participated in a conference hosted by the Coalition of African Jurists in Abuja on the topic of "Law, Justice and Development," which focused on principles of good governance and their implementation.²⁰

4. Germany: +0

While Germany remains committed to the implementation of the AAP, it has made no specific statements on how it intends to adhere to its commitments regarding governance in the months leading up to Evian-le-Bain. It is through the statements of Uschi Eid, Schroeder's APR, that Germany's attempts at compliance with the AAP can best be seen. In a speech given at the High-level Plenary Meeting of the General Assembly of the United Nations to Consider How to Support the New Partnership for Africa's Development in September, in New York, Germany's APR, Ushchi Eid emphasizes that NEPAD must maintain a strict policy and platform, and articulates the German government's concerns over good governance based on events in Zimbabwe, and her disappointment that other African nations failed to react more decisively to these events.²¹ She further suggests that this casts doubt on the resolve of African nations to adhere to the commitments on good governance and reform set out by NEPAD.

In a document responding to the initiative on fighting poverty in Africa presented by the Minister of Minister of Economic Cooperation and Development, Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul, Eid again emphasized the importance of good governance and anti-corruption measures for Africa, and suggested that Europe and Africa both have vested interests in initiatives focused on accountability and good governance.²²

5. Italy: -1

There is little evidence that Italy has complied with this commitment.

¹⁸ "Mugabe's Diplomatic Victory Against Britain Hollow," Zimbabwe Independent, February 28, 2003, www.allafrica.com/stories/200302280224.html

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ "Law, Justice and Development in Africa: A Case for Public-Partnership Approach," Vanguard (Lagos), May 9, 2003, allafrica.com/stories/200305090624.html

²¹ "Presseerklärung des BMZ: Eid beim Afrika-Gipfel der Vereinten Nationen," September 16, 2002, www.uschi-eid.de

²² "Regierungserklärung zur Entwicklungspolitik "Zukunft sichern: globale Armut bekämpfen" am 8. Mai 2003 in der entwicklungspolitischen Debatte im Deutschen Bundestag anlässlich der Regierungserklärung am 8. Mai 2003 in Berlin," Uschi Eid, May 8, 2003, www.bmz.de/presse/redeeid/rede08052003.html

6. Japan: 0

Although Japan has not outlined any new measures for good governance in Africa since Kananaskis, its previous aid programs have explicitly focused on good governance-building programmes with an emphasis on constitutional and judicial reform, civic information and participation and parliamentary reform²³ (all key tenants of the commitment in question). However, much of Japan's Africa-related assistance in the past has been through the TICAD system (Tokyo International Conference on African Development), and TICAD III is scheduled for September 2003.²⁴ It is therefore feasible that in the months closer to TICAD, Japan will formulate a plan for Africa that includes good governance components, for which they have already held the TICAD III Senior Official-level Preparatory Meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in March 2003.

7. Russia: -1

There is little evidence that Russia has complied with this commitment.

8. US: +1

Within its overall development assistance priorities, the US stresses that aid should be directed to countries that have demonstrated sound fiscal responsibility, good governance and democratic practices. Recently, Bush recently announced that he intends to try to extend the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) scheduled to expire in 2008, which cites good governance and democracy as one of its key policy priorities.²⁵ However, considering that AGOA is not due to expire till several years from now, the immediate impact of this extension and its significance for American compliance are unclear. The trade-based AGOA is at the heart of America's policies for Africa and while Bush has stated that good governance is intended to be a consequence of the market benefits offered by AGOA, it is also a prerequisite: "Money from our new Millennium Challenge Account will be directed to nations that encourage economic freedom, root out corruption, and respect the rights of their people. Through the New Partnership for African Development, many leaders across the continent have pledged their governments to these fundamentals [sic] principles."²⁶ Again, what is emphasized is the importance which G8 nations, including the United States, place on positive first steps to be made by the Africans themselves.

USAID, the United States Agency for International Development, has announced that it will increase funding by 53% for democracy and conflict prevention programs in Africa

²³ "Project/Program Summary." www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/ticad2/list98/govern/3_1_6.html

²⁴ "The Philosophy of Japan's Policy Toward Africa." www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/summit/2002/africa-e.pdf

²⁵ "Fact Sheet: US-Sub-Saharan African Trade and Economic Cooperation Forum." January 15, 2003. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030115.html

²⁶ "Remarks to the African Growth and Opportunity Act Summit," President Bush, January 15, 2003, www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/wh/rem/16656.htm

during the 2003 fiscal year, and that it will focus on fighting corruption and post-conflict democratic reconstruction.²⁷ USAID's Anti-Corruption Initiative, designed to be implemented in 2003, will support multiple actors at the regional, country and local levels in achieving better government oversight, public disclosure of assets and the promotion of ethical codes of conduct for governments.²⁸ USAID has already announced that its funding for good governance programs focusing on transparency, the promotion of representative political institutions and the development of civil society will total \$67.8 million in the fiscal year 2004.²⁹

The US Agency for International Development and its Office of Sustainable Development have made good governance a key issue in their Africa Bureau. Their Strategic Framework focuses on the goal of "sustainable democracies built" and a central tenant of their approach is to incorporate good governance and civil society issues into their work in other sectors including environment and health.³⁰ While this strategy has been a cornerstone of the AFR/SD's Strategic Plan 1998-2003 and is thus not new, the emphasis on increasing the dissemination of information on governance into civil society and on incorporating governance issues into other sectoral projects is promising.

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²⁷ "Africa: Building Democracy in Africa" www.usaid.gov/democracy/afr/africa.html

²⁸ "Africa Regional: Program Data Sheet 698-013" www.usaid.gov/country/afr/afr_reg/698-013.html

²⁹ "Africa," excerpted from the Congressional Budget Justification FY 2004, www.usaid.gov/country/afr/

³⁰ "Democracy and Governance Strategic Framework," US Agency for International Development, Office of Sustainable Development, www.afr-sd.org/DemocracyGovernance/DemocracyStrategic.htm

2002 Kananaskis Final Compliance Report Africa – Peer Review

Commitment:

NEPAD maintains that “development is impossible in the absence of true democracy, respect for human rights, peace and good governance.” We agree, and it has been our experience that reliable institutions and governance are a precondition for long-term or large-scale private investment. The task of strengthening institutions and governance is thus both urgent and of paramount importance, and for this reason, we commit to:

Supporting African peer-review arrangements - including by:

- Encouraging cooperation with respect to peer-review practices, modalities and experiences between the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the ECA, including the participation by the ECA in the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) peer-review process where the countries under review so agree; (37: Africa Action Plan)
- Encouraging, where appropriate, substantive information sharing between Africa and its partners with respect to items under peer-review; and,
- Supporting regional organizations in developing tools to facilitate peer-review processes.

Background:

African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)

The NEPAD leaders adopted on 11 June 2002 the *African Peer Review Mechanism* (APRM) as a key element in the attainment of the plan’s objectives.³¹ The basis for the African Peer Review Mechanism is the assessment of the political, economic, and institutional aspects of governance, which is conducted through a range of indicators: [1] Political rights and institutional effectiveness (e.g. the functioning of the legislature, judicial, and executive branches, as well as the non-governmental sector); [2] Economic management (e.g. macroeconomic management, public financial management and accountability, monetary and financial transparency, accounting and auditing systems, and regulatory oversight); and, [3] corporate governance, among others. The results of this process will also inform the G8 leaders’ decisions in developing enhanced partnerships with African states.

³¹ It was also officially adopted by the African Union summit at Durban in July 2002. See "Betting on NEPAD: Peer review" (05 February 2003). www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/article.asp?ART=32089

By means of background, one of the key actors, the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), has endorsed the G8 Africa Action Plan and has made some the Plan's recommendations the centerpiece of its strategy and dialogue with African nations.³² The ECA cooperates on a regular basis with a number of multilateral institutions within and outside the UN system—the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) being one of them.³³ It is, however, impossible to estimate to what extent and whether at all the ECA's cooperation with the OECD and its support for NEPAD has been promoted or furthered by the G8 countries.

Similarly, the **OECD** (in particular through the Development Assistance Committee (DAC)) remains heavily involved in the area of development. **DAC's** periodic reviews of the trade practices and development aid performance of its members (donor states) is taken as the roadmap for the APR Mechanism. To this end, the OECD has cooperated with the New Partnership for Africa's Development since May 2002. It has also co-sponsored a Regional Workshop in Kenya in August 2002, which was also attended by delegates from several G8 member-states (Britain, Canada, Italy, Japan, and the United States).³⁴ There is little, however, by way of direct reference to individual member states that would indicate compliance with the G8 AAP.

The G8 Commitment

This **G8 Kananaskis Summit** commitment is unique in the sense that it emphasises cooperation between non-G8, non-governmental multilateral institutions—the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (**OECD**) and the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa (**ECA**).

Most importantly, it should be noted that the NEPAD African Peer Review Mechanism was scheduled to start in April 2003 after some outstanding questions were resolved at the meeting of the NEPAD Heads of State Implementation Committee.³⁵ It was thus only on March 09 that African leaders launched the African Peer Review Mechanism at the Sixth Summit of the Heads of State and Government Implementation Committee

³² The ECA is intended to provide technical support on NEPAD's proposed operations and has been particularly active on governance issues, including the APR process. "Moving NEPAD from Concept to Implementation" (Opening Statement by K. Y. Amoako, Executive Secretary of the ECA at the Conference of African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development) (Johannesburg, South Africa, 19 October 2002) www.uneca.org/what_is_new_home.htmECA Press Release No. 19/2002.

³³ "Moving NEPAD from Concept to Implementation" (Opening Statement by K. Y. Amoako, Executive Secretary of the ECA at the Conference of African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development) (Johannesburg, South Africa, 19 October 2002). www.uneca.org/what_is_new_home.htm ECA Press Release No. 19/2002

³⁴ "Final List of Participants at the Regional Workshop On Trade Capacity Building Mombasa, Kenya." (26-27 August 2002.) www.oecd.org/pdf/M00031000/M00031818.pdf; www.oecd.org/pdf/M00031000/M00031818.pdf

³⁵ "Senior ECA staff participate in OECD/DAC Peer Review of Canada" (15 January 2003) www.uneca.org/what_is_new_home.htm

(HSGIC) of NEPAD in Abuja (Nigeria).³⁶ However, it should be noted that there were no representatives of the G8 at the Abuja Summit.

A final Communiqué described the mechanism, to which 10 countries immediately acceded,³⁷ as a “system of voluntary self-assessment, constructive peer dialogue and persuasion.” It also set out criteria and indicators of democracy and good governance expected of member countries of the African Union (AU). President Obasanjo, Chairman of the NEPAD Implementation Committee, was asked to set up a Special Committee by the end of March responsible for monitoring compliance with the peer-review requirements.³⁸

Given the context of this *two-level* agreement—among African nations and between the G8 and Africa—delay in the former impedes progress in the latter. Thus, it is most difficult to comply with a commitment that has not even been fully implemented.

While the existence of interaction between the OECD, ECA and NEPAD is manifestly clear, it is difficult to assess the contribution of the G8. The South African Deputy Minister of Finance listed a series of recent “events” that endorsed and accelerated the African Peer Review mechanism and led to a “considerable improvement in the climate for development cooperation”³⁹: the Kananaskis Summit (which unveiled the Africa Action Plan as a response to NEPAD) was but one of these initiatives.⁴⁰ While the commitment is seemingly fulfilled, as evidenced in the ECA-OECD and in particular the ECA-DAC cooperation, it appears to be fulfilled by the ECA and the OECD themselves, not by the G8 countries whose compliance is being assessed.

³⁶ Some 21 African countries, including seven heads of state, were represented at the meeting, which was presided over by Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo and attended by NEPAD's other initiators—Presidents Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Abdelazziz Bouteflika of Algeria, and Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal. (See "AFRICA: Leaders launch voluntary peer-review system," *IRINnews Africa* (March 10, 2003); "Communique issued at end of one-day heads of state summit on Nepad in Nigeria," *SAPA* (March 10, 2003)).

³⁷ These include Nigeria, South Africa, Algeria and Senegal, as well as the Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda, Botswana and Ghana.

³⁸ Some 21 African countries, including seven heads of state, were represented at the meeting, which was presided over by Nigerian President Olusegun Obasanjo and attended by NEPAD's other initiators—Presidents Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Abdelazziz Bouteflika of Algeria, and Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal. (See "AFRICA: Leaders launch voluntary peer-review system," *IRINnews Africa* (March 10, 2003)).

³⁹ He lists the fourth WTO Doha Ministerial Meeting (November 2001), the Monterrey International Conference on Financing for Development (March 2002), the Summit of African Heads of State and Government in Durban (July 2002) where the African Union (AU) was formally launched, the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development (September 2002), the World Bank/IMF meetings in Washington D.C., and the Heads of State Implementation Committee Summit in Abuja, Nigeria (November 2002). "Report of the twenty-first meeting of the Committee on Experts of the Conference of African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development" (Johannesburg, South Africa, 16-18 October 2002) www.uneca.org/conferenceofministers/Report_CM_1_11_FIN.doc

⁴⁰ "Report of the twenty-first meeting of the Committee on Experts of the Conference of African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development" (Johannesburg, South Africa, 16-18 October 2002) www.uneca.org/conferenceofministers/Report_CM_1_11_FIN.doc

General G8-Africa Partnership in the APRM

The NEPAD Steering Committee and the Committee of G8 Africa Personal Representatives (APRs) met in Bamako (Mali) on 14 April 2003 to review the progress made on the G8-Africa partnership and to operationalize the African Peer Review Mechanism. The G8 reiterated its commitment to Africa in broad terms, noting that it will remain the focus of the Evian Summit despite the recent global developments. However, no specific evidence of the G8 commitment to the implementation of the APRM is available.

This could be due to the fact that it is expected that each G8 state will report at the final meeting in Paris (**19-20 May 2003**) on their individual plans and efforts for implementing the G8 Africa Action Plan in preparation for the Evian Summit (1-2 June 2003).⁴¹

Implementation of the African Peer Review Mechanism was also a subject of discussions at the G8 Development Ministers Meeting on 23-24 April 2003 in Paris, at which the Ministers underlined their support for the APRM, welcomed the progress already made by African states, and indicated the importance of relying on the experience of the existing mechanisms at sub-regional level in Africa and the OECD.⁴²

Other Issues Impeding Compliance

The success of the APRM is necessarily contingent on the willingness of the NEPAD signatory-states to implement the G8 AAP (and other similar) recommendations. While the ECA is already working with over 26 African countries in review of performance of good governance through the APR, there remains much "fear...[and] reluctance to move forward on this mechanism." A number of African states expressed concern of the threat to sovereignty,⁴³ as NEPAD's Peer Review is seen to cause "unwanted intrusions in how countries are managed."⁴⁴

⁴¹ "Press Statement on the Meeting of the NEPAD Steering Committee and the G8 Africa Personal Representatives in Bamako, Mali On 14 April 2003." *The NEPAD Website*. www.avmedia.at/cgi-script/csNews/news_upload/LATEST_20NEWS_2edb.PRESSSTATEMENT.pdf

⁴² "G8 Development Ministers Meeting, Paris, 23-24 April 2003: Chairman's Summary." www.g8.fr/evian/english/navigation/news/news_update/g8_developpement_ministers_meeting_paris_23-24_april_2003.html. Also see "Reunion des agences d'aide du G8 sur le Nepad: Conference de presse du Ministre delegue a la Cooperation et a la Francophonie, M. Pierre-Andre Wiltzer." www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/bulletin.asp?liste=20030310.html&submit.x=8&submit.y=9#Chapitre9

⁴³ "Speech by Johnson-Sirleaf." Conference of African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (Johannesburg, South Africa, 19 - 21 October 2002). www.uneca.org/eca_resources/Speeches/2002_speeches/102002speech_Johnson_Sirleaf.htm

⁴⁴ "Moving NEPAD from Concept to Implementation" (Opening Statement by K. Y. Amoako, Executive Secretary of the ECA at the Conference of African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development), Johannesburg, South Africa 19 October 2002. (19 September 2002) www.uneca.org/what_is_new_home.htm

Moreover, institutional changes to the intent and content of NEPAD and its Peer Review Mechanism raised doubts in the West. As the Director of the South African Institute for Security Studies (ISS) noted, President Mbeki simply wanted UNECA to conduct peer review for NEPAD. The difference between that intent and the present structures...reflects the extent of the compromises that had to be made...[T]he effective removal of political and good governance components from NEPAD and its location within the various structures [in the African Union] contradict the original purpose and content of the mechanism as contained within various NEPAD documents and communicated to Africa's development partners.⁴⁵

Moreover, lack of consistency among African governments in implementing the APRM (and NEPAD as a whole) and the unresolved question of Zimbabwe⁴⁶ have increased the negative perception of Africa's commitment to the partnership,⁴⁷ creating a "danger that NEPAD's progress will be badly hindered in all the critical G8 centres."⁴⁸ Some G8 countries have also expressed concern about the role Libya's Muammar Qaddafi is to play in NEPAD.⁴⁹

This is not to deny that progress has already been made among African partners.⁵⁰ Despite "the ups and downs in Africa," the G8 personal representatives have been working with the African leaders since the 2001 Genoa summit to draw up a concrete action plan, and reaffirmed their commitment to the African Action Plan at the end of 2002 in Accra, Ghana. However, officials in Paris also echoed the general sentiment among the G8: "We have to help our African partners by providing concrete responses, but they must make their contribution, too."⁵¹

⁴⁵ For a good overview of the NEPAD APRM, see "Time will tell who will willingly back Nepad peer reviews," *Business Day* (South Africa; April 14, 2003). Also see "Media must trust Africa: Mbeki." *Sunday Times* (Zambia), April 13, 2003.

⁴⁶ British Minister for Africa Valerie Amos also said that the issue of Zimbabwe could see developed nations lose their collective vigour for plans to revive Africa: "The danger is that European Union and the G8... could lose enthusiasm for the collective approach which is at the heart of NEPAD." ("Zimbabwe saga threatens Nepad," *Sapa*, March 31, 2003).

⁴⁷ Ethiopian Prime Minister, Meles Zenawi, quoted in Christine Thompson and Paul Bell "Can NEPAD Quell Afro-Pessimism?" *Business Day* (Johannesburg, April 29 2003).

⁴⁸ Thompson, Christine and Paul Bell "Can NEPAD Quell Afro-Pessimism?" *Business Day* (Johannesburg, April 29 2003).

⁴⁹ "Obasanjo Given Task to Appoint Candidates for Peer Review." *Business Day* (Johannesburg) (March 11, 2003).

⁵⁰ Algeria is in charge of human development (health and education); South Africa of political good governance (settlement of conflicts, security, democracy); Egypt of market access, diversification of production and agriculture; Nigeria is in charge of economic good governance, while Senegal is responsible for infrastructure, energy, environment and new technologies (see "Betting on NEPAD: Peer review" (05 February 2003). www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/article.asp?ART=32089)

⁵¹ "Betting on NEPAD: Peer review" (05 February 2003). www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/article.asp?ART=32089). Also see Press conference given by the Minister Delegate for Cooperation and Francophonie, Pierre-André Wiltzer" (Meeting of the G8 Aid Agencies on NEPAD Paris, 7 March 2003). www.g8.fr/evian/english/navigation/news/previous_news/

African leaders recognize that the onus is on them to affirm their commitment to the APRM *before* the G8 can uphold their part of the bargain. Malawian President Bakili Muluzi has also acknowledged that Africa needs to improve on issues that discourage donors from disbursing aid—such as good governance, good economic policies, and respect for human rights: “What we need now is to put our houses in order if we are to successfully tap aid from the G8 nations including France.” He explained that Peer Review Mechanism proposed by NEPAD is key to this objective.⁵²

As a result, for lack of clear evidence of compliance or lack of completion, all of the countries have been accorded a score of zero. Individual G8 compliance assessments and reports should be presented at the Paris meeting on **May 19-20**.

Assessment:

Country	Lack of Compliance -1	Work in Progress 0	Full Compliance +1
Canada		0	
Britain		0	
France		0	
Germany		0	
Italy		0	
Japan		0	
Russia		0	
United States		0	
Overall		0	

Individual Country Compliance Breakdown:

1. Britain: 0 (information forthcoming)

2. Canada: 0

As early as October 2002, Ambassador Robert Fowler, the Canadian Sherpa at Kananaksis and the Personal Representative for Africa, was the only G8 delegate at the

other_official_statements/meeting_of_the_g8_aid_agencies_on_nepad_press_conference_given_by_the_minister_delegate_for_cooperation_and_francophony_pierre-andre_wiltzer.html

⁵² Ligomeka, Brian. "Africa Needs Western Support, Says President Muluzi." *Malawi Standard* (February 28, 2003). British Minister for Africa, Valerie Amos, also added that "Foreign investors fear that NEPAD won't work. They question whether an African Peer-Review Mechanism can really work if African pressure is so low key and so little heeded, as appears to be the case with Zimbabwe." (See Fabricius, Peter, "Britain committed to helping Africa, official insists," *The Star* (Zambia), April 1, 2003).

Conference of African Ministers of Finance, Planning and Economic Development at which the APRM was discussed at some length.⁵³

More recently, and more demonstratively of Canada's compliance, Canada was the first country in the history of the OECD/DAC to invite outside observers—from the ECA—to join the DAC Peer Review Team.⁵⁴ It is envisaged that this will help ECA as it works with NEPAD to establish and implement the APRM.⁵⁵

3. France: 0

France has remained active in the various OECD forums and was a central participant at the OECD/DAC Forum of Partnership for Development (11-12 December 2002), the final session of which was attended by the leaders of the G8's development agencies.^{56,57}

France sees development in the context of the rule of law, financial transparency, and good governance. Accordingly, it believes that “the innovative and audacious” Peer Review Mechanism, along with the role of the private sector in the financing of development, is essential for the mobilization of political and economic support.⁵⁸

At the France-Africa Summit in Paris (February 2003), Mr Chirac reaffirmed his government's commitment to African development. Pierre-André Wiltzer, Minister Delegate for Cooperation and the Francophonie, “stressed that France is backing the NEPAD initiative because it places the logic of partnership in the limelight and integrates development into a context: respect of the rule of law, financial transparency and good governance.”⁵⁹ He also added that the “very novel and even audacious provision for peer

⁵³ www.uneca.org/eca_resources/Speeches/2002_speeches/10192002CM_AmbassadorRobert.pdf

⁵⁴ As a matter of routine procedure, all members of the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) are asked to periodically submit their development assistance programme to a review by its peers (on the OECD/DAC). This OECD/DAC-ECA peer review team travelled to Canada and Senegal (a development aid recipient selected by Canada for review) and consulted a number of stakeholders (the government executive, parliamentarians, civil society, multilateral and bilateral donors). “Senior ECA staff participate in OECD/DAC Peer Review of Canada” (15 January 2003) www.uneca.org/what_is_new_home.htm

⁵⁵ “Senior ECA staff participate in OECD/DAC Peer Review of Canada” (15 January 2003) www.uneca.org/what_is_new_home.htm

⁵⁶ « Les pratiques d'évaluation des acteurs français du développement et de l'humanitaire » (Forum des partenaires au développement de l'OCDE 11-12 décembre) www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/article.asp?ART=30687

⁵⁷ « Releve de conclusions du Comite Interministeriel de la Cooperation Internationale et du Developpement (CICID) du 11 decembre 2002 » (11 December 2002) www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/ressources/fichiers/cicid_111202.doc

⁵⁸ « Discours d'Ouverture du Ministre Delege a la Cooperation et a la Francophonie, M. Pierre-Andre Wiltzer » (Conference Ministerielle XXieme Sommet Afrique-France, Yaoundé, 4 novembre 2002). www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/bulletin.asp?liste=20021105.html&submit.x=6&submit.y=5#Chapitre4.

⁵⁹ Conférence de presse du Président de la République, M. Jacques Chirac. (*XXIIème conférence des Chefs d'Etats d'Afrique et de France*; Paris, 21 février 2003). www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/article.asp?ART=32619. Also see Paris offers a new partnership (29 January 2003). www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/article.asp?ART=31855

review and the important role assigned to the private sector in the financing of development are elements capable of creating new momentum for mobilizing political and economic decision-makers.”⁶⁰

Following the Summit, Malawian President Bakili Muluzi indicated that “he was impressed by the commitment of the French government towards the development of Africa.” Mr Chirac’s had stressed the need for strengthening state authority in Africa, guaranteeing transparent elections, and developing a culture of peace, adding “that African nations cannot achieve any meaningful social and economic development if developed countries are reluctant to help them.”⁶¹

Furthermore, it was the *Agence française de Développement* (AFD), the French Development Agency, that called the Meeting of the G8 Aid Agencies on NEPAD in March 2003,⁶² which had brought together all of the agencies in the G8 countries specializing in development, the representatives of international development organizations and banks, along with the major agencies in the United Nations system, other bodies attached to NEPAD, and the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. France convened the meeting of donors “in order to accelerate the implementation of NEPAD, by African states.”⁶³

Nonetheless, short of its participation in the OECD/DAC and its general acceptance of the APRM, there is no evidence as of yet of French promotion of ECA-OECD ties.

4. Germany: 0

The German APR Eid strongly commends the peer-review mechanism adopted by the African Union in Durban, as per the NEPAD framework, and explains that the adoption of this mechanism is an important step towards transparency and in creating a belief in reform.⁶⁴ However, she again provides few specifics as to Germany’s role in instituting and encouraging peer-review mechanisms.

⁶⁰“Betting on NEPAD: Peer review” (05 February 2003). www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/article.asp?ART=32089

⁶¹ Ligomeka, Brian. “Africa Needs Western Support, Says President Muluzi.” *Malawi Standard* (February 28, 2003).

⁶² “Press conference given by the Minister Delegate for Cooperation and Francophonie, Pierre-André Wiltzer” (Meeting of the G8 Aid Agencies on NEPAD Paris, 7 March 2003). www.g8.fr/evian/english/navigation/news/previous_news/other_official_statements/meeting_of_the_g8_aid_agencies_on_nepad_press_conference_given_by_the_minister_delegate_for_cooperation_and_francophonie_pierre-andre_wiltzer.html

⁶³ « NEPAD: déclaration du porte-parole du Quai d’Orsay. » (Paris, le 05 mars 2003) www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/article.asp?ART=33602

⁶⁴ Ibid.

5. Italy: 0

There was no evidence of movement in terms of supporting the APRM specifically either at the ECA or at the OECD, although Italy did reaffirm its holistic commitment to the G8 Africa Plan on numerous occasions. For instance, Prime Minister Berlusconi's Personal Representative, Alberto Michellini, criticised the neglect of African issues and of NEPAD as a whole under the Greek Presidency of the EU, indicating that Italy will bring the issue back to the European agenda. He added that Italy represents the "natural interface for Africa" and cooperates with the French Foreign Ministry in joint missions to Africa.⁶⁵

The Italian Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Finance also convened a meeting on harmonization in February 2003, bringing together the leading development agencies (including the DAC/OECD) and a number of developing countries (and some NEPAD participants).⁶⁶

The Italian Undersecretary of State, Alfredo Mantica, on the other hand, pointed to a concern quietly shared by most participants in the programme. The results were not wholly positive, he said, as a number of African states rejected their part of the bargain as envisaged under the G8 Africa Plan—civil and human rights, democracy, and good governance—while expecting the G8 to increase the resources committed to the plan.⁶⁷ The embryonic APRM is seen as faltering and Italy is not showing any enthusiasm in giving it a leap of faith.

6. Japan: 0

Japan received praise by the ECA's Executive Secretary for its endorsement of the G8 Africa Action Plan and the decision to convene a new Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD III) in 2003. Japan's Minister for Foreign Affairs delivered a policy speech at Addis Ababa on 26 August 2002, indicating that Japan "welcomes the decision of African countries to introduce the African Peer Review

⁶⁵ "Commissioni Riunite: III (Affari Esteri e Comunitari) della Camera dei Deputati e 3A (Affari Esteri, Emigrazione) del Senato della Repubblica." (Resoconto stenografico: Dibattito – Audizione; Seduta di mercoledì 12 febbraio 2003). *Ministry of Foreign Affairs*. www.esteri.it/ricerca/index.htm

⁶⁶ See "High-Level Forum on Harmonization" (Rome, 24-25 February 2003). Ministry of Foreign Affairs. www.esteri.it/polestera/cooperaz/mantica.pdf. In addition to the President of Tanzania and high representatives of 26 developing countries, the meeting was also attended by the President of the World Bank, regional development funds, and officials responsible for cooperation in the 22 OSCE member-states. The Forum was concluded with the issuing of the "Rome declaration on harmonization," which defines a program to increase the efficiency of development aid and represents the first international undertaking on this theme between bilateral and multilateral donors and states beneficiaries.

⁶⁷ Clarizia, Cristina. "Mantica: il nostro Paese ha avuto al summit un ruolo fondamentale. Ma gli applausi a Mugabe" (in *Secolo D'Italia*, 5 September 2002) www.esteri.it/attualita/2002/ita/interventi/index.htm,

Mechanism (APRM) in order to ensure the steady implementation of NEPAD,” aided by the OECD experience and Japanese contribution of €100,000.⁶⁸

7. Russia: 0 (information forthcoming)

8. US: 0 (information forthcoming)

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⁶⁸ "Policy Speech by Ms. Yoriko Kawaguchi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan at the United Nations Conference Center" (Addis Ababa, 26 August 2002) www.uneca.org/what_is_new_home.htm

2002 Kananaskis Final Compliance Report Africa – Education

Commitment:

Supporting the development and implementation by African countries of national educational plans that reflect the Dakar goals on Education for All, and encouraging support for those plans – particularly universal primary education – by the international community as an integral part of the national development strategies;

Background:

In April 2000, at the World Education Forum in Dakar, the international community adopted a comprehensive strategy to achieve Education for All (EFA). The Dakar Framework for Action, includes six comprehensive goals:

- Expanding and improving early childhood care and education
- Ensuring that by 2015 all children have access to a complete, free and compulsory primary education of good quality
- Ensuring equitable access to learning and life skills programs
- Achieving 50 per cent improvement in adult literacy by 2015, especially for women
- Eliminating gender disparities in primary and secondary education by 2005, and achieving gender equality in education by 2015
- Improving all aspects of the quality of education⁶⁹

⁶⁹ "Education for All: Meeting our Collective Commitments", *World Education Forum*, www.unesco.org/education/efa/ed_for_all/dakfram_eng.shtml. April 2000, Dakar, Senegal.

Assessment:

Country	Lack of Compliance -1	Work in Progress 0	Full Compliance +1
Canada			+1
Britain			+1
France			+1
Germany		0	
Italy		N/A	
Japan			+1
Russia	-1		
United States			+1
Overall			+0.63

Individual Country Compliance Breakdown⁷⁰:**1. Canada: +1**

Canada has been a strong proponent of the Dakar goals, as demonstrated by the action it has taken in support of these goals as well as the focus it gave to education as the Chair of the 2002 Kananaskis Summit.

Prior to the Summit, in April 2002, the Canadian government introduced its *Action Plan on Basic Education*. This plan echoes the objectives agreed to in Dakar with its focus on three critical goals:

- Ensuring access to, and completion of, free and compulsory primary education by 2015;
- Improving the quality of basic education for learners of all ages; and
- Eliminating gender disparities in primary and secondary education by 2005⁷¹

Under the plan, Canada has committed to sharing specific expertise to strengthen national education strategies in developing countries, particularly in Africa. They will focus on teacher training, learner-centred education approaches, curriculum development, educational governance and management, distance education and information technology.⁷² They will also provide support for developing strategies to achieve gender

⁷⁰ Compliance results for Italy, Russia, Japan and the US are forthcoming.

⁷¹ Canadian International Development Agency, Remarks by Hon. Susan Whelan, Minister of International Cooperation, *Launch of CIDA's Basic Education Action Plan*, www.acdi-cida.gc.ca 24 April 2002

⁷² Ibid.

equality, strengthening HIV/AIDS programming, promoting the respect for human rights and strengthening civil society participation in education reform and management.⁷³

In support of this plan, the Canadian government announced at the Kananaskis Summit that it would double its investment in African education to \$100 million per year by 2005.⁷⁴ The government has indicated that the new investments will focus on a small number of African countries that have demonstrated their committed to NEPAD principles and have effective sector programs and national poverty reduction strategies in place.⁷⁵ In total, Canada will be investing \$555 million in basic education programs from 2000 to 2005.⁷⁶

2. Britain: +1

The achievement of the Dakar goals for education has been a priority of Britain's international development policy, particularly in Africa. In its *G8 Africa Action Plan: towards the 2003 summit*, the Department of International Development (DFID) committed to support the efforts of African governments that have a clear commitment to achieving education for all.⁷⁷ According to the Secretary of State Clare Short, this "strong commitment" is indicated by the following: the amount of resources the government is prepared to allocate to basic primary education, the level of political will to give high priority to achieving Universal Primary Education, and the rapid abolition of user fees and other direct cost barriers to education.⁷⁸

In support of the Dakar goals, the British government will be providing 1.3 billion pounds for basic education over the next five years, with the vast majority of this assistance going to Africa. Within their focus on universal primary education, Britain is placing significant emphasis on strengthening education sector governance,⁷⁹ as well as encouraging better monitoring of progress for girls' education, supporting the expansion of information and communications technology and concentrating on countries with large numbers of children out of school like Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo.⁸⁰

⁷³ Canadian International Development Agency, *Action Plan on Basic Education*, www.acdi-cida.gc.ca April 2002

⁷⁴ Prime Minister's Office, *Canada Helps Build New Partnerships with Africa*, pm.gc.ca 27 June 2002

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Canadian International Development Agency, *Minister Whelan Launches Action Plan to Support Education in Developing Countries*, www.acdi-cida.gc.ca 24 April 2002

⁷⁷ Department of International Development, *G8 Africa Action Plan: towards the 2003 Summit*, www.dfid.gov.uk November 2002

⁷⁸ Department of International Development, *DFID's Support for EFA Since Dakar*, www.dfid.gov.uk 14 April 2003

⁷⁹ Ibid.

⁸⁰ Department of International Development, *G8 Africa Action Plan: towards the 2003 Summit*, www.dfid.gov.uk November 2002

Assistance will also be targeted at countries emerging from conflict and/or with high HIV/AIDS prevalence.⁸¹

In addition to its bilateral work with individual developing countries, the British government has also been very engaged with international organizations like UNESCO, UNICEF, the World Bank, the EU, UNAIDS, the G8, and NEPAD, as well as civil society organizations and key networks in Africa to enhance cooperation for the achievement of EFA.⁸² They have also aggressively promoted the fast tracking of additional funding, particularly through the World Bank, for countries with credible education sector plans.⁸³

3. France: +1

Since the World Education Forum in 2000, France has remained supportive of the Dakar goals. Through its participation in the High level group on EFA within UNESCO, France has publicly stated its commitment to assist EFA efforts both nationally and internationally. The French government has placed significant emphasis on the importance of sound education sector strategies and ownership, indicating that resources should not be invested in education systems that show no efficiency.⁸⁴

Within UNESCO, France has created an education fund of \$467,000 US to assist countries in developing their respective EFA action plans.⁸⁵ More broadly, France has committed to increasing its Official Development Assistance (ODA) by approximately 50% by 2007, to 0.5% of GDP. They hope to raise this to 0.7% by 2012.⁸⁶

4. Germany: 0

Education has been a long-time priority in development policy in Germany. In 2000, education comprised 19% of bilateral ODA.⁸⁷

Within this commitment to education, Germany has been very supportive of the Dakar goals.⁸⁸ As part of its efforts to achieve universal primary education, Germany has placed significant emphasis on increased support for girls and women as well targeted measure

⁸¹ DFID's Support for EFA Since Dakar, online

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ "Highlights of the discussion on the second day of the High-level Group", *Dakar Follow-up Bulletin No. 36*, www.unesco.org/education/efa/bulletin/en/b_36.shtml 30 October 2001

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Speech by Jacques Chirac, *Twenty-Second Summit of the Heads of State of Africa and France*, www.diplomatie.gouv.fr.actu.bulletin.gb.as?liste=20030224.gb.html 20 February 2003

⁸⁷ Eid, Dr. Uschi, *The Road Forward: International Development*, www.bmz.de/en/media/speech/speech20021010.html 10 October 2002

⁸⁸ Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, *Poverty Reduction – A Global Responsibility, Program of Action 2015*, www.bmz.de/ April 2001

to increase the enrolment of girls and extend the time in which they remain in school.⁸⁹ Germany has also emphasized the importance of education sector reform, basic teacher training and curriculum development.⁹⁰

In June 2002, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder reiterated Germany's support for EFA and announced plans to double its investments in primary education for developing countries.⁹¹ It remains to be seen how and when this will be implemented, particularly on the African continent.

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⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ GTZ, *Social Development – Education*, www.gtz.de/themen/english/social-development/education.htm
May 2003

⁹¹ Schroder, Gerhard, "Africa is committed to taking responsibility for its own destiny" *Suddeutsche Zeitung* www.germany-info.org/relaunch/politics/new/pol_schroederG8-sdz.html 26 June 2002

2002 Kananaskis Final Compliance Report Development – Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative

Commitment:

We will fund our share of the shortfall in the HIPC initiative, recognizing that this shortfall will be up to US \$ 1 billion.

Background:

The Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative (established in 1996) involves coordinated action by international creditors to reduce the external debt burdens of the world's poorest to sustainable levels, subject to satisfactory policy performance, so as to ensure that adjustment and reform efforts are not put at risk by continued high debt and debt service burdens. The Operations Evaluation Department (OED) of the World Bank concluded in a February, 2003 review that HIPC is highly relevant, has increased growth oriented spending and enjoys wide support but that there is a need for better management, more growth oriented focus, greater realism and transparency maintaining strong policy performance standards as prerequisites. Concerns have been raised with regard to the shortfalls in bilateral donor contributions to the HIPC Trust Fund, which the World Bank estimates to be of the amount US \$ 800 million. The IMF, the World Bank and the Finance Ministers of the G7 have reiterated the commitment taken at the G8 summit at Kananaskis to top off the gap the financing of HIPC. In October 2002 donor countries pledged an additional US \$ 850 million to the HIPC Trust Fund of which \$39 million has been paid. Donor countries are expected to fulfill their commitments to the HIPC before the end of 2003. The Communiqué of the International Monetary and Financial Committee of the Board of Governors of the IMF of April 12, 2003, states, "The Committee reaffirms its commitment to the full financing in the Initiative. It urges all creditors to participate fully in and encourage Bank-Fund initiative to help"

The Development Committee Communiqué of the Spring 2003 Meeting of the IMF and World Bank "We welcomed the progress made on the HIPC initiative and reconfirmed our commitment to its implementation and full financing... We welcomed the donor community pledges to close the financing gap in the HIPC Trust Fund and urged donors to translate these into concrete contributions in the coming months... We once again reiterated the request that all official bilateral and commercial creditors that have not yet done so participate in the HIPC initiative."⁹² However, a report issued in 2003 alleges that the G8 has failed in its pledge to reduce debt to sustainable levels. While one third of the 4205 billion owed by the 42 poorest and most highly indebted countries should have been cancelled only 20% has been so far.⁹³

⁹² www.worldbank.org/hipc/hipc_review/Fact_Sheet_mar03_.Pdf

⁹³ www.jubilee2000uk.org/hipc/hipc_news/debtrelief070103.htm

Assessment:

Country	Lack of Compliance -1	Work in Progress 0	Full Compliance +1
Canada			+1
France		0	
Germany		0	
Italy		0	
Japan	-1		
UK			+1
US		0	
Russia	-1		
Overall		0	

Individual Country Compliance Breakdown:***1. Canada: +1***

According to the World Bank's data on the status of bilateral donor pledges to the HIPC Trust Fund as of end January 2003, Canada's total paid-in bilateral contributions amounts to US \$ 114 million in Nominal terms.⁹⁴ In a statement made on April 12, 2003 in Washington D.C., John Manley, said, "Debt reduction remains a key element of our strategy to promote longer term developing country growth and poverty reduction. In this context, we strongly support the enhanced HIPC initiative and the Fund's and the Ban's continued involvement in Debt relief." He urged donors to close the funding gap stating that Canada had just made a contribution of US \$ 75 million, which represents Canada's estimation of the gap.⁹⁵

2. France: 0

According to the World Bank's data on bilateral donor pledges to the HIPC Trust Fund as of end January 2003, France's contributions/pledges including EU/EC attribution to bilateral amounts to US \$187 millions in nominal terms.⁹⁶ In a statement made by François Mer, Minister of Economy, Finance and Industry of France at the International Monetary and Finance Committee meeting on April 12, 2003 at Washington D.C.: 'One of the priorities in our fight against poverty is to implement the HIPC initiative fully and to reinforce it's impact Implementation of this initiative is a determining factor for the credibility of the international financial community, which is firmly committed to its success. Hence I want its implementation pace to be stepped up. We are also in favor of changing the method used to calculate the topping-up process in order to ensure bilateral

⁹⁴ www.worldbank.org/hipc/StatUpdate_April03.pdf

⁹⁵ www.imf.org/external/spring/2003/imfc/state/eng/can.htm

⁹⁶ www.worldbank.org/hipc/StatUpdate_April03.pdf

debt relief with a genuine add-on effect for countries having endured economic shocks. I regret to say that there is no consensus on this issue at this time.”⁹⁷

3. Germany: 0

According to the World bank’s data on bilateral donor pledges to the HIPC Trust Fund as of end January 2003, Germany’s total contributions pledges including the EU/EC attributions to bilateral amounts to US \$ 232 million in nominal terms. In a statement made by Mr. Hans Eichel, Germany’s Minister of Finance on April 12: “These are essential ingredients to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. Furthermore, only budget proposals, which are neither overly optimistic nor unduly pessimistic, can serve as a reliable basis for a fruitful cooperation between donors and recipient countries. We continue to believe that good governance in debtor countries is key to achieving and sustaining economic development. If this causality is taken into account, then debt forgiveness should be aimed at good governance. We, therefore, propose that any additional financial support should primarily benefit countries with a convincing track record of good governance.”⁹⁸

4. Italy: 0

According to the World Bank’s data on bilateral donor pledges to the HIPC Trust Fund as of end January 2003, Italy’s total contributions/pledges including the EC/EU attribution to bilateral amounts to US \$ 156 million in Nominal terms.⁹⁹

The Governor of the Fund for Italy, Guilio Tremonti, made a statement at the Joint Annual Discussion of the IMF and World Bank on 29 September 2002 that questioned the effectiveness of the HIPC initiative. Tremonti noted that the global slowdown and the fall in commodity prices have hampered debt sustainability in a number of HIPC countries. He emphasized that “topping up at the completion point must remain an exceptional event linked to exogenous factors beyond the country’s control “Tremonti urged that all committed fund be provided and that “Italy cannot accept that it additional voluntary bilateral relief be diverted to repay other creditors instead of being channeled to provide supplementary resources to stimulate growth and reduce poverty.”

5. Japan: -1

According to the World Bank’s data on bilateral donor pledges to the HIPC Trust Fund as of end January 2003, Japan’s total contributions amounted to US \$ 200 million.¹⁰⁰

Japan signed an agreement in February 2003 granting US \$ 2.9 million in debt relief. In the April 12 IMFC meeting Japanese Finance Minister, Masajuro Shiokawa emphasized

⁹⁷ www.imf.org/external/spring/2003/imfc/state/eng/fra.htm

⁹⁸ www.worldbank.org/hipc/StatUpdate_April03.pdf

⁹⁹ www.worldbank.org/hipc/StatUpdate_April03.pdf

¹⁰⁰ www.worldbank.org/hipc/StatUpdate_April03.pdf

the uncertainties on the path to recovery the wake of the Iraq conflict and that “it is essential to promptly restore the debt sustainability of a country in crisis through an appropriate combination of policy adjustment, official lending from the IMF and other international financial institutions, and private sector involvement (PSI), including debt restructuring as necessary.” He welcomed the “strengthening” of criteria in the extension of resource.¹⁰¹

6. United Kingdom: +1

According to the World Bank’s data on the status of bilateral donor pledges to the HIPC Trust Fund as of end January 2003, UK’s total contributions/pledges including EU/EC attributions to bilateral amounts to US \$ 309 million in nominal amounts.¹⁰² In March 2003, the UK Chancellor Gordon Brown proposed a new scheme the ‘International Financing Facility’ to double aid flows from \$50 billion to \$100 billion in order to meet the MDGs targets by 2015 by enabling donor countries to borrow from capital markets and pay back by 2032 from their debt budgets.¹⁰³ These proposals were reiterated in a statement by Gordon Brown at the April 12, 2003 meeting of the IMFC. A long term commitment on the part of the UK to combating the ‘evil of world poverty’ and achieving the MDGs was asserted along with the claim that the aid budget would be increased to 49 billion pounds by 2006.¹⁰⁴

7. United States: 0

According to the World Bank’s data on the status of bilateral donor pledges to the HIPC Trust Fund as of end January, 2003, the US’s total contribution amounts to US \$600 million.¹⁰⁵ In the statement made by Secretary John W. Snow of the United States Treasury at the April 12 meeting of the IMFC, the ‘rebuilding of Iraq’ was explicitly referred to it was also said that “Maintaining strong standards on HIPC is vital. The current approach to topping up debt reduction is appropriate to assist countries to cope with external shocks.”¹⁰⁶ Snow called for Russia, Germany and France to cancel its debt to Iraq at the Finance Ministers meeting at Deauville.

8. Russia: -1

A statement made by Aleksii L. Kurdin at the April 12, IMFC meeting is as follows: “We continue to support implementation of the HIPC Initiative, *inter alia* in bilateral relations with those countries that are our debtors. Debt relief may indeed contribute to poverty reduction and sustainable economic growth in the poorest countries.” This statement was, however, qualified as follows: “We continue to believe, however, that debt relief alone,

¹⁰¹ www.imf.org/external/spring/2003/imfc/state/ipn.htm

¹⁰² www.jubilee2000uk.org/latest/iff120303.htm

¹⁰³ www.worldbank.org/hipc/StatUpdate_April03.pdf

¹⁰⁴ www.imf.org/external/spring/state/eng/gbr.htm

¹⁰⁵ www.worldbank.org/hipc/StatUpdate_April03.pdf

¹⁰⁶ www.imf.org/external/spring/state/eng/usa.htm

without implementing sound economic policies and strengthening institutions and governance, will not yield the desired results. For various reasons some HIPC countries may approach their completion points with deteriorated debt burden indicators.” The ‘topping-up’ commitment was said to apply only in cases where ‘the deterioration in the debt burden indicators is a result of exclusively exogenous shocks’ in strict accordance with the rules of the Initiative. This policy was reiterated in the wake of the Iraq crisis.

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Development – Official Development Assistance (ODA)

Commitment:

Assuming strong African policy commitments, and given recent assistance trends, we believe in aggregate that half or more of our development assistance commitments announced at the Monterrey could be directed to African nations that govern justly, invest in their own people and promote economic freedom.

Background:

Official Development Assistance (ODA) targets the needs of the Less Developed Countries (LDCs). Geared towards basic social services like health, education, transportation, housing, water and nutrition, tied and untied ODA is crucial to the development of the majority of the world's population, as outlined in the United Nations Millennium Declaration (2000) and Monterrey Consensus (2002). G8 countries are in possession of a majority of the world's wealth and bear a responsibility towards reducing global poverty. Each member country has committed to achieving an ODA/GNP level of 0.7 per cent. However, each country remains below its target. At Kananaskis, the Africa Action Plan was adopted pledging support for the African initiative and promising that half of the additional US\$12 billion in official government assistance (ODA) which are to be raised until 2006 (as decided in Monterrey in March) will be given to African nations. However, a January 2003 estimate by the UK Government indicates that the above stated amount is not adequate to meet the Millennium Development Goals by 2015.

The Development Assistance Committee High Level Meeting of the OECD on 22-23 April 2003 took note of the preliminary ODA statistics for 2002 released on 22 April 2003, and welcomed the 5 per cent increase they record, to \$57 billion in total net ODA. They confirmed existing commitments, which, according to Secretariat calculations, would generate an increase by 2006 of about 30 per cent, or \$16 billion in real terms, over 2001 levels. Several participants restated their countries' commitments to further increases in the longer term.

Assessment:

Country	Lack of Compliance -1	Work in Progress 0	Full Compliance +1
Britain			+1
Canada			+1
France			+1
Germany		0	
Italy		0	
Japan		0	
Russia		0	
United States			+1
Overall			+0.50

Individual Country Compliance Breakdown:

1. Britain: +1

Britain's level of Official Development Assistance (ODA) will increase by £1.5 billion to reach 0.40 percent of GDP by 2005-06, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, announced 15 July 2002. This is the largest aid increase in the UK's history. A 93 percent real term increase in aid since 1997 provides proof of the Government's continued commitment to make progress towards meeting the UN target of an ODA/GNI ratio of 0.7 percent.¹⁰⁷ (6a)

The Department for International Development's (DFID) budget will grow to nearly £4.6 billion a year by 2005-06, an average increase of 8.1 percent per annum in real terms, including a £1 billion annual bilateral program for Africa. This increase means a substantial contribution to the reduction of poverty, enrolling children in primary school and the provision of basic health services in the poorest countries in Africa and Asia. DFID will also continue spending in other essential areas such as conflict prevention, strengthening good governance and making long-term commitments to support those countries which effectively implement their own poverty reduction strategies.

The increase means the UK's aid ratio will be more than double the current G7 ODA/GNI country average and well ahead of the current OECD average (0.22%). The UK will also have exceeded the average EU ODA/GNI target agreed earlier this year in the run up to the UN Financing for Development conference held at Monterrey, Mexico.¹⁰⁸

2. Canada: +1

Canada was the first G8 country to commit a specific sum of money to the Africa Action Plan in the form of the CDN\$500 million Canada Fund for Africa (CFA) launched by the Prime Minister at the Kananaskis Summit on 26-27 June 2002. The Fund will allocate this sum over three years in addition to its regular aid. The CFA fosters innovation and economic growth, strengthens African institutions, and improves the well being of future African generations.¹⁰⁹

Between 1995 and 1999, the percentage of Canada's GDP allocated to ODA was 0.32. In a DAC peer review of Canada (updated 6/12/2002), the Committee welcomed Canada's commitment to increase international assistance funding by 8 percent per year with the aim of doubling ODA volume by the end of the decade and raising the ODA/GNI ratio to around 0.35%.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁷ www.britain_info.org

¹⁰⁸ www.official_documents.co.uk

¹⁰⁹ www.acdi_cida.gc.ca

¹¹⁰ www.oecd.org

3. France: +1

From 1995 to 1999, the percentage of French GDP allocated to ODA was 0.45.¹¹¹ In a Statement issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 18 February 2003 noted that: “NEPAD is one of our priorities. Among the actors that will be useful in implementing this plan, the African Capacity Building Foundation, ACBF, founded in 1991 on World Bank initiative, stands out in particular. It is currently handling 64 development projects in 29 African countries in the context of 19 regional organizations.

In 1991 we contributed to financing the first phase of the foundation—25 million FF. We will be contributing to its medium-term action program for the next three years: a total of 5 million euros. We are strengthening our action. This contribution will be earmarked for projects identified by the foundation in French-speaking African countries. We are targeting our financial support to French-speaking countries because we wish to encourage these countries to be in the ACBF in order to make the institution a more representative structure of the continent’s cultural diversity.”¹¹²

A speech by President Jacques Chirac on 21 May 2003 reaffirmed France’s commitment to the plan of action adopted on Africa at the Kanankis summit, stating that France supports the proposal of the President of the EU to allocate 1 billion Euros for action in this area.

4. Germany: 0

The percentage of German GDP allocated to ODA in the period 1995 to 1999 was 0.29. The German Government has promised support for NEPAD even in the face of the skepticism of NGOs. The Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development, Heidemarie Wiecek-Zeul, stated €110 million would be made available in 2002 and 2003 “to add momentum to this vision of a new Africa.” The money will be used to support Africa’s own efforts in the fields of crisis prevention, economic promotion, education and health.

Africa is already the priority area for German development cooperation. 39 of 72 partner states are African countries. Almost 30 per cent of all bilateral funding goes to Africa. Including the €110 million, Germany will provide €1 billion for Africa for the years 2002/2003.¹¹³

5. Italy: 0

The percentage of Italian GDP allocated to ODA in the 1995 to 1999 period was 0.16. The Italian Government has given its full support to NEPAD both on a bilateral basis and as a member of the G8. A paper released on 26 July 2002 notes that the Under-Secretary

¹¹¹ www.asiapacific.ca/data/devt/dono

¹¹² www.elysee.fr/actus/arch03G8/03G8G8/speechg8.htm

¹¹³ www.dse.de/zeitschr/de502-9.htm

for Foreign Affairs, Alfredo Mantica, stressed the importance of giving new and added impetus to cooperative efforts that effectively utilize ODA directed towards Africa.¹¹⁴ Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's statement to the 57th General Assembly of the UN on 13 September 2002, committed 0.39 percent of Italian GDP to LDCs with a particular emphasis on Africa. Berlusconi asserted that financial aid was no longer enough and that donors should adhere to the action plan adopted at Genoa and Kananaskis.¹¹⁵

6. Japan: 0

According to Grant Aid statistics for FY2002, grants to Africa totaled 100 million Yen between 1 July and 31 December 2002. The ODA budget for 2002 was 538.9 billion Yen while 613.9 billion Yen had originally been proposed for FY 2003. In February, 2003, however, the Foreign Ministry announced that spending on official development aid in the proposed 2003 budget is slated to drop 9.4 percent to US\$9.64 billion compared to the US\$10.6 billion allocated last year. The government cut 11.9 percent from foreign aid in 2002.

The proposed budget includes cuts in both overseas loans and grants. Grant Aid for 2003 is to fall 8 percent from last year while loan assistance is slated for a 3.5 percent decrease. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi has emphasized that donor countries should focus on the quality of aid, not the overall amount.¹¹⁶ In a review of Japan's ODA, published 14 March 2003, various principles of Japanese ODA were articulated and Asia was identified as the focus area.

7. Russia: 0

At a press conference following the G8 Summit of 2002, President Vladimir Putin outlined Russia's position on African development. Putin emphasized Russia's debt write-offs, contributions to health care development, environmental protection and education. Putin stated that: "Russia's assistance to African countries is multi-pronged, and we are convinced that this activity ultimately meets the national interests of the Russian Federation itself and intend to continue this work together jointly with other G8 countries." A statement by the Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Kasyanov notes that "Russia has written off African debts totaling 35 billion dollars, which constitutes approximately half of the total amount written off by the other nations."¹¹⁷ However, no statements pertaining to an increase in ODA to Africa that would fulfill the 50% G8 commitment were found.

¹¹⁴ www.esterii.it/attualita/2002/eng/notes/index.html

¹¹⁵ www.italyun.org/statements.Berlusconi57eng.htm

¹¹⁶ www.iht.com/articles/85543.html

¹¹⁷ www.ln.mid.ru

8. United States: +1

Text taken from the FY2003 Budget Justification indicates that USAID will “increase funding for its core programs in agriculture, child survival and health, democracy and conflict mitigation in Africa.”¹¹⁸ The summary of the FY2002-3 Budget Request outlining the regional distribution of ODA shows an increase in aid to Africa (US\$44,820,000) that exceeds 50 percent of the total increase in aid to other regions from FY 2002 to FY 2003.¹¹⁹ The aid estimated to be directed towards Africa, exceeding US\$1 billion in ODA, is the highest level in the country’s history.¹²⁰

The proposal for the budget for FY 2004 requests US\$8.7 billion for development and humanitarian assistance, focusing on basic education and agriculture. The fiscal year 2004 budget request builds on the Agency’s programmatic “pillars”: Democracy; Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance; Economic Growth and Global Health. The Global Development Alliance, USAID’s fourth “pillar” mobilizes resources from alliances between American public and private actors. Funding through such alliances has reached US\$15 million.¹²¹

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¹¹⁸ www.usaid.gov/country/afr/index.html

¹¹⁹ www.usaid.gov/pubs/cbi2003/request.html

¹²⁰ www.state.gov/documents/organization/17141.pdf

¹²¹ www.usaid.gov/press/releases/2003/fs030203.html

2002 Kananaskis Final Compliance Report Arms Control and Disarmament

Commitment:

The G8 calls on all countries to join them in commitment to the following six principles to prevent terrorists or those that harbour them from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment and technology.

Background:

Denying terrorists and rogue states access to weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has become a priority of paramount importance in the post-September 11th world. At the same time, it has become clear that, unlike disarmament proper where bilateral negotiations are the preferred formula, successful non-proliferation strategies are best implemented through collective and concerted actions. Starting with the 1992 Munich summit, the annual G7/8 summits have proved to offer an expedient forum for the forging of collective arms control initiatives, but by the end of the 1990s it was clear greater commitment was required. The Global Partnership against the Proliferation of WMD, unveiled at the 2002 Kananaskis summit, came at the end of a decade of irresolute efforts aimed at assisting Russia and the former Soviet Republics in decommissioning their excess nuclear, biological and chemical weapon stashes. In addition to pledging unprecedented financial and technical assistance for the dismantlement of WMD capabilities and related production facilities, the G8 resolved to help the former communist countries to develop adequate capacity to safeguard the vast WMD arsenals inherited from the former Soviet Union.

As with nearly all arms control initiatives over the past 60 years, it was the United States that took the lead in this issue area. Recognizing the great danger posed by potential proliferation of decommissioned Soviet WMD technology, matériel and laid-off scientists to rogue states, the passage of the landmark 1991 Nunn-Lugar Act in the United States pioneered what are now known as “threat reduction programs.” Subsequently espoused by the rest of the G7, these efforts have involved pressing the CIS countries to relinquish all WMD capabilities by either destroying them or handing them over to Russia. In turn, Moscow has pledged to dismantle all unnecessary or proscribed WMD’s. Until Kananaskis, financial aid intended to alleviate the prohibitive disarmament costs for Moscow has come mainly through US, EU and other bilateral programs. In 2002 the G8 countries for the first time resolved to pool and coordinate their arms control and non-proliferation foreign aid and administer it on a multilateral basis. The Global Partnership is expected to provide critical support for the chief components of the “threat reduction” programs already pursued by the US, the EU and some European countries:

- disposal of decommissioned nuclear submarines and warheads;
- programs for re-integration and re-employment of sensitive (esp. nuclear) scientists;

- technical cooperation for the training of customs, intelligence and police officials from CIS countries aimed at strengthening these countries' capacity to protect sensitive material in their possession and intercept the transit of suspicious materials.

The Global Partnership framework, with its bold \$20-billion commitment (for comparison, the total funds expended by G8 members on WMD non-proliferation and disarmament in Russia over the past 10 years have amounted to less than \$7 billion) and multilateral coordination approach, was designed to address the need for better management and greater financial commitments, inaugurating a new era in WMD non-proliferation and disarmament. The six practical principles underlying the G-8 declaration were first developed by the G-8 Non-Proliferation Expert Group. The G-8 foreign ministers then endorsed these principles at their summit in Whistler and referred the document to their leaders' consideration at Kananaskis. Many observers, however, remain sceptical about the implementation prospects of such an ambitious program. While the US can be feasibly expected to live up to its expected \$10-billion contribution (it has been traditionally spending \$1 billion per annum on disarmament aid to Russia), it is doubtful whether the European G7 members and Japan will be able to raise the matching \$10 billion. As of now, a little less than \$5 billion of this "matching contribution" has been assured and that has already caused budgetary strains on the EU.

Assessment:

Country	Lack of Compliance -1	Work in Progress 0	Full Compliance +1
Britain		0	
Canada		0	
France		0	
Germany		0	
Italy		0	
Japan		0	
Russia			1
United States			1
Overall		0	+0.25

Individual Country Compliance Breakdown:

1. Britain: 0

Britain has not fully complied with this commitment. However, it is doing work in progress. London took part in the proceedings of the a conference held in Hague in November 2002 and signed, together with the other G8 members, the ground-breaking International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (ICOC)—an instrument that will strengthen the international non-proliferation Missile Technology

Control Regime. The Exchequer has already announced the earmarking of some \$750 million towards Great Britain's commitment under the Global Partnership framework¹²². Together with France, the US and Russia, London helped several Central Asian governments conclude 5 years of negotiations by signing, on September 27, 2002, the Samarkand Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) Agreement. As part of the Open Skies initiative, Britain allowed a one-week Russian verification mission to fly over its territory and inspect its ground installations. Britain played an active role for the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1441 calling for the total and unconditional disarmament of Iraq, and took part in the coalition that enforced a long series of UNSC resolutions and disarmed the Saddam Hussein regime in March-April 2003. Britain has expressed its alarm with North Korea's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the professed resumption of reactor fuel reprocessing in Yongbyon.

2. Canada: 0

Canada has not fully complied with this commitment. However, it is doing work in progress. Canada was one of the first G8 members to earmark \$650 million towards its Kananaskis 2002 commitment under the Global Partnership¹²³. Pursuant to the Russo-Canadian agreement for the destruction of chemical weapons of November 25, 2002, Ottawa announced it would give Russia US\$ 5 million for chemical weapons destruction¹²⁴, as well as US\$ 100 million to aid Moscow's disposal of radioactive waste disposal and decommissioned nuclear submarines¹²⁵. The Canadian government plays an active role in setting up the new G-8 Nuclear Safety Group, and agreeing the specific budgetary details for the upcoming fiscal year. Canada was a signatory to the above-mentioned Hague ICOC, and has actively sought to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime by urging India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and engaging Moscow in strategic partnership in non-proliferation discussions. Canada also indicated its resolve to see UNSC Resolution 1441 fully complied with and has lent its full diplomatic support to the UNMOVIC weapons inspections. Ottawa also expressed its regrets over North Korea's decision to reopen its nuclear plants and remove IAEA monitoring equipment therefrom.

3. France: 0

France has not complied with this commitment. However, it is doing work in progress. Under France's able leadership, the Senior Officials Group, the body charged with the practical implementation of the Kananaskis agreement, has met 5 times since the summit and has achieved progress in agreeing on substantive priorities (proposed by Russia and centred on the disposition of decommissioned nuclear submarines and chemical weapons)

¹²² *Arms Control Today* (November 2002): www.armscontrol.org

¹²³ *Arms Control Today* (November 2002): www.armscontrol.org

¹²⁴ Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English 14:37 GMT, 25 Nov 02 (Accessed via BBC Monitoring Service)

¹²⁵ Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English 10:58 GMT 25 Nov 02 (Accessed via BBC Monitoring Service)

and procedural issues (Russian concessions on exempting foreign aid under the Global Partnership from taxes, as well as promises to provide unfettered access and security clearances). The central problem of producing the concrete project proposals mandated by the Global Partnership, however, remains. In March 2003, at a joint press conference M. Dominique de Villepin, France's minister for foreign affairs, announced that Paris is pledging a \$750 million contribution for the Global Partnership. In addition to signing the above-mentioned ICOC in November 2002, Paris helped negotiate the Samarkand NWFZ Agreement and joined the international community in issuing very strong statements "deploring" North Korea's rescinding of its voluntary moratorium on nuclear weapons development. Paris has expressed serious concern over Russia's announcement that Moscow would provide assistance to Iran in building a civilian nuclear power plant. France opposed the coercive disarmament of Iraq.

4. Germany: 0

Germany has not fully complied with this commitment. However, it is doing work in progress. Germany should be commended on committing \$1.5 billion towards the \$10 billion budget target of the Global Partnership¹²⁶. In August, 2002, experts from the German *Bundeswehr* carried out Open Skies verification mission in Russia. On August 21, 2002, Russia opened its first chemical weapons destruction plant at Gorny, which was financed largely by the German government (cost reported at \$39 million)¹²⁷. In December, Adolph Birkhofer, the Director of the German Centre for Nuclear Safety, met with the President of Armenia to discuss nuclear safety issues¹²⁸. Germany also signed the ICOC along with its G8 colleagues, but opposed the coercive disarmament of Iraq.

5. Italy: 0

Italy has not complied with this commitment. Italy announced its intention to commit \$400 million towards the Global Partnership budget. The programmatic details of the Partnership's initiatives (submarine decommissioning and chemical weapons destruction) were the topic of ministerial Russia-Italy talks on September 17, 2002¹²⁹. Rome has been strongly supportive of the US-led Iraq disarmament initiative: in August, the Italian Prime Minister took a solemn step in making its acceptance of an invitation to visit Iraq conditional on Baghdad's acceptance of international inspections¹³⁰. More progress is needed, however.

¹²⁶ Testimony of Kenneth Luongo, Director of RANSAC, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (www.senate.gov)

¹²⁷ *Arms Control Today* (September 2002): www.armscontrol.org

¹²⁸ Armenian News Agency, December 3, 2002.

¹²⁹ Russian MFA daily press bulleting, same date.

¹³⁰ *La Stampa*, Turin, in Italian 11 Aug 02

6. Japan: 0

Japan has not complied with this commitment. However, it is doing work in progress. Japan announced it is committing \$200 million for the Global Partnership¹³¹ (mainly consisting of the \$168-million assistance package for submarine decommissioning that was withheld in FY02 because of a temporary fall-out between Moscow and Tokyo). More funding is needed, as Japan's present commitments fall short of G8 expectations. In light of Pyongyang's alarming reopening of its nuclear program, understandably Tokyo considers the strengthening of the global non-proliferation and disarmament regime a top priority. In partnership with the IAEA, Japan hosted a two-day international conference (December 9-11, 2002) on safeguard measures against the proliferation of nuclear weapons¹³². Japan also signed the above-mentioned ICOC and has taken strenuous steps in strengthening of the Vienna-based non-proliferation regime, as well as in pushing for an intensified implementation of the Additional Protocol signed by 67 countries and already in effect for Tokyo. Japan and Russia discussed progress on the implementation of the Global Partnership during the annual Consultations on Strategic Stability held in Tokyo in mid-March 2003.¹³³ Japan has protested vehemently North Korea's decision to renew nuclear weapons development, but has also gone a step further by meeting with senior N. Korean leaders and engaging Pyongyang in constructive dialog in the hope of reversing North Korea's alarming decision.

7. Russia: +1

Russia has complied with this commitment, albeit not fully. Moscow is in the unique position of bearing the responsibility for its own compliance as well as for the facilitation of its G-8 partner activities in this vein. Russia deserves credit for its understanding that the era of East-West confrontation is over, and the new security threats it faces along with the other G-8 members make them all equally vulnerable, and call for new cooperation of unprecedented scale. Russia collaborated with the US, the UK and France to facilitate the signing of the Samarkand NWFZ. On December 23, 2002, the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry announced that the higher security of its sites and training of its personnel for the prevention and handling of possible terrorist acts would be its highest priorities in 2003¹³⁴. In 2002, the Ministry held two large command-and-staff drills at Rostov-on-Don and Krasnoyarsk, testing these two sites' vulnerability to a potential terrorist attack. Per the Global Partnership commitments and its direct talks with the US, in 2002 Russia scrapped 17 nuclear submarines. Its FY2002 weapons disposal budget (at US\$ 59.76 million) has been the biggest ever, but the FY2003 one is expected to be even larger¹³⁵. Russia exhibited great flexibility by disclosing sensitive information, concluding landmark understandings (such as the Canada-Russia Memorandum of Understanding on

¹³¹ Asahi News Service, June 29, 2002.

¹³² Kyodo News Service, Tokyo, in English 0959 gmt 3 Dec 02

¹³³ RIA-OREANDA (Economic News), March 12, 2003.

¹³⁴ Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English 0923 gmt 23 Dec 02

¹³⁵ Interfax-AVN military news agency web site, Moscow, in English 0812 gmt 23 Dec 02

Cooperation in the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy of November 25, 2002), and cooperating with the G-7 donors to put together a concrete framework for implementation of the six principles underlying the Kananaskis declaration. In August 2002, Russia opened its first chemical weapons disposal facility at Gorny. Also during that month, Moscow collaborated with the US in evacuating 48 kg. of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) from a Serbian research facility to the safety of a supervised military base in Russia. Moscow was the first and only G8 country to float a set of concrete proposals for projects to be funded under the Global Partnership (at the January 2003 Senior Officials Group meeting in Paris)¹³⁶ for nuclear submarines disposition and destruction of chemical weapons stashes. Furthermore, even at the height of the Iraq crisis, Russia strove to keep the Global Partnership dialogue alive: US Secretary of State Colin Powell and Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov discussed the implementation progress on the Global Partnership framework during their two telephone conversations in April, 2003. In addition to the issues around the tax exempt status of the disarmament aid under the Global Partnership (which was resolved in April 2003 when Russia did grant this concession¹³⁷), another persistent problem whose resolution is wholly contingent on an action by Moscow is the obstruction of verification and assessment inspections. Russia has been granting such access to chemical weapons facilities only reluctantly, has been very uncooperative in according access to its “forbidden” nuclear cities, and has outright refused to allow foreign experts in its suspected secret biological facilities. In a more troubling development, the Russian Parliament (the *Duma*) postponed ratification proceedings on the May 2002 US-Russia Arms Reduction Agreement. To be deemed in full compliance with the Global Partnership commitment, Russia needs to seriously improve on these concerns.

8. United States: +1

The United States has complied with its commitment, albeit not fully. Being the main initiator of the Global Partnership, the US undertook to bear the brunt of the financial burden of the WMD disarmament and arms control activities: The US Administration asked Congress to authorize \$1 billion dollars for FY03¹³⁸. Washington was also at the forefront of establishing a new G-8 Nuclear Safety Group, which will not supplant the existing G-8 Non-Proliferation Group, but will rather expand the existing G-7 NSG, and agreeing on the concrete budget details at the September ministerial meetings. On October 23, 2002, President George W. Bush waived the disclosure compliance requirement under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (also known as the Nunn-Lugar Act) thereby releasing significant funding for chemical weapons destruction at the Shuchuch`ye facility that had been withheld because of Russia’s failure to provide destruction verification and access to the facility. On September 20, 2002, President George W. Bush unveiled a landmark National Strategy against the Proliferation of

¹³⁶ BBC Monitoring International Reports (February 2003).

¹³⁷ ITAR-TASS (April 11, 2003)

¹³⁸ John Wolf’s remarks on the Global Partnership. Accessed October 9, 2002 (www.state.gov/t/np/rls/rm/14277.htm)

WMD. Washington also played an instrumental part in forging the ICOC and the Samarkand NWFZ Agreement, as well as financed the evacuation of 48 kg. of HEU from a Serbian scientific facility. The U.S. Administration also secured the passage of the Russian Federation Debt for Non-Proliferation Act of 2002 as part of the Congressional FY03 Foreign Relations Authorization Act; the Act will allow the President to trade up to \$2.7 billion in Russian land-lease and agricultural debt for equivalent amounts of non-proliferation investment¹³⁹. The U.S. Non-proliferation and Disarmament Fund (NDF) was expanded and played an instrumental role in financing and overseeing the destruction of several hundred Bulgarian Soviet-era SS-23 missiles. As part of the Second-Line Defence Kazakh-US program, the United States also sponsored the specialized training of Kazakh customs officers and police officials in better detecting and interdicting WMD transits¹⁴⁰. Influential circles, led by Sen. Richard Lugar have called on Congress to ratify the May 2002 US-Russia Arms Reduction Agreement. The United States also led an international coalition to enforce the disarmament of Iraq, long suspected of possessing and developing illicit WMD. In April 2003, Washington also engaged in the bilateral dialogue with North Korea requested by Pyongyang in the hope of reversing that country's decision to withdraw from the NPT and reinstate its nuclear weapons program. But, in a stark departure from the vertical non-proliferation principles implied in the Global Partnership's pledge to strengthen the international arms control regime, on May 9, 2003, the US Senate Armed Services Committee voted to repeal a 10-year-old ban on the development of small nuclear arms (limited-effect nuclear weapons that some argue could be used for tactical purposes without causing an ecological and humanitarian disaster).¹⁴¹

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May 2003

¹³⁹ Testimony of Kenneth Luongo, Director of RANSAC, before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (www.senate.gov)

¹⁴⁰ *Kazakhstanskaya Pravda*, Almaty, in Russian 21 Dec 02, p6

¹⁴¹ *New York Times* (May 9, 2003).

2002 Kananaskis Final Compliance Report Conflict Prevention

Commitment:

Training African peace support forces including through the development of regional centres of excellence for military and civilian aspects of conflict prevention and peace support, such as the Kofi Annan International Peace Training Centre (**19: Africa Action Plan 1.2.2**)

Background:

The fostering of peace and security on the African continent was perceived to be an essential goal of the African Action Plan (AAP) at the Kananaskis Summit – a necessary prerequisite for the achievement of parallel AAP goals in other issue areas. The majority of compliance that has occurred in this issue area has been on an individual member-state basis with little coordinated or multilateral action being taken by the G8 as a whole.

On December 7-8, 2002, the G8 Personal Representatives for Africa met in Accra, Ghana for further implementation negotiations on the AAP that included the Ghanaian President and senior officials from the Kofi Annan International Peace Training Centre. Peace and security in Africa dominated the agenda and participants agreed to “the development of a joint AU/NEPAD/G8/UN peace support operations capacity development program.”¹⁴²

It should be noted that several G8 member states are involved in activities to promote peace, security and conflict resolution on the African continent, typically in conjunction with UN Peacekeeping Operations. These activities should not be confused with compliance with the commitment in question, since this commitment is explicitly concerned with the promotion of peace and security solely through the training of African forces for military and civilian aspects of conflict prevention and peace support. Instead these parallel activities affirm a broad concern with peace and conflict on the continent and imply compliance with other AAP commitments outlined under Section 1.1: Supporting African Efforts to Resolve Principal Armed Conflicts on the Continent and Section 1.6: Providing more effective peace-building support to societies emerging from or seeking to prevent armed conflicts.

¹⁴² Press Statement on the Meeting of the NEPAD Steering Committee and the G8 Africa Personal Representatives in Bamako, Mali, on April 14, 2003. The NEPAD Secretariat (Bamako, Mali) www.avmedia.at/cgiscript/csNews/news_upload/LATEST_20NEWS_2edb.PRESS STATEMENT.pdf

Assessment:

Country	Lack of Compliance -1	Work in Progress 0	Full Compliance +1
Britain			+1
Canada			+1
France			+1
Germany			+1
Italy	-1		
Japan	-1		
Russia		0	
United States			+1
Overall			+0.38

Individual Country Compliance Breakdown:

1. Britain: +1

Britain has displayed a high level of compliance with its AAP commitments to promote the training of an African peacekeeping force, both in terms of its policy rhetoric and in realized application through budgetary expenditures and military training.

In its *G8 Africa Action Plan: Towards the 2003 Summit*, released by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in November 2002, the UK committed to “support the development of a long-term plan to build the conflict management capacity in Africa, and specifically, support an effective African peacekeeping force by 2010.”¹⁴³ Britain has also committed in *The UK Conflict and Prevention Initiative for Africa* released by FCO in December 2002, to “working with the United Nations, the US, and within the EU to develop an agreed programme of action to support and enhance Africa’s peacekeeping capacity...”¹⁴⁴ The United Kingdom’s Personal Representative for Africa, Baroness Amos has also made peacekeeping training a main focus of her comments. In a speech in South Africa in March 2003, Amos stated that “In this area [of conflict prevention] above all, where the UK has the lead in G8 input, we will be there to help with peacekeeping training [and] with funds for deployment.”¹⁴⁵ African peacekeeping training also figured in the bilateral summit between PM Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac in

¹⁴³ *G8 Africa Action Plan: Towards the 2003 Summit*, Foreign and Commonwealth Office & Department for International Development (London), November 2002 www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/G8africaactionplan.pdf

¹⁴⁴ *Foreign Policy: Regional: Policy on Africa: The UK Conflict Prevention Initiative for Africa*, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (London), DATE OF ACCESS: November 11, 2002 www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1017756005037

¹⁴⁵ *Cooperation Not Colonialism: Speech by UK Foreign Office Minister Baroness Amos, South Africa on 31 March, 2003*. The British Embassy to the United States of America (Washington D.C.) 31 March 2003 www.britainusa.com/africa/SearchResults.asp?link=1&Article_ID=3472&Table Name=tblBIS_Articles

Touquet on 4 February 2003. In their discussion on conflict in Africa, both leaders affirmed to working with the UN and G8 to strengthen Africa's peacekeeping capacity.¹⁴⁶ Resulting from the policy consensus reached by the United Kingdom, the United States, and France in May 1997 to promote Africa's capacity to police its own conflicts, the UK already has significant initiatives in place to register its compliance with this commitment.¹⁴⁷ PM Blair launched the Conflict Prevention Pool (CPP) in 2001 as a joint initiative between the FCO, the Ministry of Defense, and the Department for International Development. The CPP is divided into the Global Pool and the Africa Pool, the latter of which holds a mandate that includes the supporting programs aimed at developing the capacity of African countries and regional organizations to engage in peacekeeping operations.¹⁴⁸ For FY2002 and FY2003, the Africa Pool was awarded annually £50-million for program operations and £65-million for peacekeeping operations – with peacekeeping training overlapping these two policy areas.¹⁴⁹

The British Armed Forces are also involved in wide range of programs within Africa itself that involve the direct training of African peacekeeping troops by the UK military for ongoing and future peacekeeping operations. These include the British Military Advisory and Training Teams (BMATT) that since the late 1990s were provided with a new mandate to provide regional training for African peacekeepers. As of 2002, BMATT South Africa, established in 1994, hosted 10 British military staff while BMATT West Africa in Ghana, established in 1996, hosted a staff of 4 officers. The United Kingdom also operates an International Military Advisory and Training Team (IMATT) in Sierra Leone since 2000 whose 117 staff members are mandated to, among other things, provide peacekeeping training to regional troops. The British Peace Support Team (BPST), operating in Kenya since 2000, also has a similar mandate for its 5 military members.¹⁵⁰

2. Canada: +1

Canada has exhibited an impressive level of compliance with its AAP commitment to support training for peace forces primarily through the form of financial investment in established programs and facilities. As outlined at the Kananaskis Summit itself on June

¹⁴⁶ "Touquet Summit Foster Franco-British Cooperation," *News From France*, a publication of the French Embassy to the United States of America (Washington D.C.) 21 February 2003 www.info-france-usa.org/publi/nff/0302/eve.htm

¹⁴⁷ Eric G. Berman, *French, UK and US Policies to Supporting Peacekeeping in Africa: Current Status and Future Prospects* (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, February 2002), 1 www.nupi.no/PubFelles/Notat/PDF2002/NUPIwp622.pdf

¹⁴⁸ *Conflict Prevention Strategy*, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (London). Accessed April 2, 2003 www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391629&a=KArticle&aid=1013618391532

¹⁴⁹ Eric G. Berman, *French, UK and US Policies to Supporting Peacekeeping in Africa: Current Status and Future Prospects* Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, February 2002), 13-14 www.nupi.no/PubFelles/Notat/PDF2002/NUPIwp622.pdf

¹⁵⁰ Eric G. Berman, *French, UK and US Policies to Supporting Peacekeeping in Africa: Current Status and Future Prospects* Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, February 2002), 15-16 www.nupi.no/PubFelles/Notat/PDF2002/NUPIwp622.pdf

27, 2002 in Canada's integrated compliance package for the AAP, *Canada Helps Build New Partnership with Africa*, the government has devoted considerable attention to issues of peace and security on the African continent. That document outlined the Canadian government's commitment of CDN\$4-million over three years to assist the African Union (formerly the Organization for African Unity) in conflict prevention and peacekeeping efforts.¹⁵¹ Canada has also offered its established technical expertise in the field of peacekeeping, as well as equipment, to the African Union to further these goals, but what these promises will translate into has not been specified.¹⁵²

Compliance has also been pursued with this commitment through targeted investment in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Partnership for Common Security. Over three years, Canada will provide CDN\$15-million to ECOWAS initiatives to strengthen, among other things, policing, border security, civil-military relations and the region's capacity to support peace and security objectives in what is known as the Canada/West Africa Peace and Security Initiative.¹⁵³ On April 17, 2003, the Canadian government announced that \$3-million of those funds would be jointly awarded to the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre in Victoria, Canada and the Kofi Annan International Peace Training Center in Accra, Ghana to develop a coordinated curriculum tailored towards West Africa's specific security needs. In addition, Canadian International Development Minister Susan Whelan toured Ghana, Senegal, and Mali in late April 2003 to highlight Canada's cooperative strategy with ECOWAS states, with a particular focus on issues of peace and security.¹⁵⁴

Adding to its policy of working collaboratively with African organizations such as the AU and ECOWAS, *La Francophonie* is also a partner with Canada in its compliance with this issue area. On October 17, 2002, Canada announced a commitment of CDN\$1.3 million over three years to fund programs to improve the effectiveness of peacekeeping training at the Pearson Peacekeeping Centre for military and civilian police of African member-states of *La Francophonie* (of which there are over 25 African states including Côte d'Ivoire, DRC, and Senegal). Canada has also stated that such funds will be used to build the training capacities of regional schools in Africa for peacekeeping and conflict resolution, such as the Kofi Annan International Peace Training Centre. This investment

¹⁵¹ *Canada Helps Build New Partnership with Africa*, Prime Minister's Office Press Office (Ottawa), June 27, 2002 www.pm.gc.ca/default.asp?Language=E&Page=newsroom&Sub=newsreleases&Doc=africa.20020627_e.htm

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ *Canada Support Peace Training in West Africa*, Canadian International Development Agency (Ottawa) April 17, 2003 www.acdicida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf/dccfe1952450f552852568db00555b47/8a7f860e14ccb04e85256d0b0054c20d?OpenDocument

builds upon an earlier one of CDN\$4.5 million in 1999 also directed toward cooperation between the Pearson Peacekeeping Center and African *La Francophonie* states.¹⁵⁵

3. *France: +1*

Arguably more than any other G8 member-state, France has been a long-term proponent and vocal advocate for the development of an African peacekeeping force and enjoys some of the closest bilateral ties with African countries. France's firm commitment to compliance with its peace training commitment under the AAP is evidence in both in its official diplomatic rhetoric and in its foreign and international development policy.

Currently holding the rotating Presidency of the G8 as of January 1, 2003, French President Jacques Chirac has made it a personal priority to ensure that the momentum and focus directed towards Africa in the 2002 Kananaskis Summit is carried over the Evian Summit. France hosted the 22nd Conference of Heads of State of Africa and France in February 2003 which devoted particular focus to issues of peace-building and conflict management in Africa. During the conference, Chirac reaffirmed his government's support for an African peacekeeping force and promised to be a "tireless advocate" for Africa at the upcoming Evian Summit.¹⁵⁶ In this respect, "particular emphasis on the Partnership for Africa's development" has been made one of the Evian Summit's four main priority areas.¹⁵⁷ In addition to this, the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs has ensured that "the enhancement of Africa's peacekeeping capacity [is] also among issues for discussion at the summit."¹⁵⁸ The French President has also already begun a diplomatic campaign to gather support amongst G8 leaders for his Evian agenda, including the creation of an African peacekeeping force. On 4 February 2003 Chirac met with British PM Tony Blair in a bilateral summit at Touquet during which both leaders affirmed to working with the UN and G8 to strengthen Africa's peacekeeping capacity.¹⁵⁹

Due to the close relationship France enjoys both politically and militarily with many African nations, France (along with United States) has arguably progressed further than any other G8 member-state in its concrete compliance efforts. The primary vehicle of France's compliance in this field is through the Reinforcement of African Peace-keeping

¹⁵⁵ *Canada supports good governance and security in francophone countries in Africa*, Canadian International Development Agency (Ottawa), October 17, 2002 www.acdicida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf/852562900065549d85256228006b10c0/a38fd51244c2650d85256c55005ef759?OpenDocument

¹⁵⁶ "22nd Africa/France Summit at the Palais des Congrès in Paris," *News From France*, a publication of the French Embassy to the United States of America (Washington D.C.) 21 February 2003 www.info-france-usa.org/publi/nff/0302/eve.htm

¹⁵⁷ *2003 G8 Summit in Evian-les-Bains Website*, under the auspices of the Office President of the Republic (Paris) Accessed April 12, 2003 www.g8.fr/evian/english/

¹⁵⁸ *France-Africa: Paris Offers a New Partnership*, Dossier MFI/RFI, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Paris) 29 January 2003 www.france.diplomatie.fr/actu/article.asp?ART=31855

¹⁵⁹ "Touquet Summit Foster Franco-British Cooperation," *News From France*, a publication of the French Embassy to the United States of America (Washington D.C.) 21 February 2003 www.info-france-usa.org/publi/nff/0302/eve.htm

Capacities (ReCAMP) program, established in May 1997 under the auspices of the United Nations and in conjunction with the Organization for African Unity (now the African Union). ReCAMP is a joint initiative by the French Foreign and Defense Ministries, formulated in response to a 1997 common policy goal of the United States, Britain and France that Africa should be able to provide increased numbers of peacekeepers to mediate its conflicts.¹⁶⁰ Now entering its third phase after successful peace training operations in Côte d'Ivoire in 1997-1998, and Gabon in 1999-2000, ReCAMP III operations in 2002 involved peace training exercises near Dar Es Salaam and Tanga, Tanzania codenamed 'Tanzanite' – notably an expansion outside France's former colonial sphere and evidence of France's commitment to promote African peacekeeping across the continent. ReCAMP III included cooperation between the French military and those of Kenya, Madagascar, and all of the fourteen member states of the Southern Africa Development Community for the provision of training, expertise and equipment for 900 African peace keepers.¹⁶¹

ReCAMP I in Côte d'Ivoire resulted in the joint-establishment of the Zambakro Peacekeeping School in 1999 by the French and Ivorian governments. The Center has since moved to Koulikourou, Mali, however, the French government continues to provide €152 449 annually for its day-to-day operations – this in addition to the €2 439 184 France provided for the establishment of the Center in 1999.¹⁶² Current training is taking place in Tanga, Tanzania although it is unknown whether permanent training facilities will be established there by the French government.¹⁶³ "Tanzanite" is scheduled to be the final phase of the ReCAMP program with the program terminating in 2003. Nevertheless, due the wide-spread success of the operation it is unclear if the French will extend the mandate of its operations or possibly restructure the program like the Americans and British have with their parallel operations in recent years.¹⁶⁴

4. Germany: +1

Germany has made considerable progress towards full compliance with its commitment to the training of African peacekeeping forces under the AAP primarily through generous funding grants and the training of civilian peace forces on German soil. Nevertheless, it

¹⁶⁰ *Reinforcement of African Peace-Keeping Capacities*, Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations Website (New York) www.un.int/france/frame_anglais/declarations_at_un/frame_ang_search_engines.htm

¹⁶¹ Ruth Nabakwe, "France Continues Peace Keeping Initiative for Africa," Pan-African News Agency (Dakar, Senegal), January 23, 2002 www.globalpolicy.org/security/peacekpg/region/france.htm

¹⁶² *Chapter 3: France's International Action: Prevention and Control*, French Permanent Mission to the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (Geneva). Accessed April 14, 2003 www.delegfrance-cd-geneve.org/brochure_armes_legeres/anglais/3.pdf

¹⁶³ *Individual PK Training*, Permanent Mission of France to the United Nations Website (New York) www.un.int/france/frame_anglais/declarations_at_un/frame_ang_search_engines.htm

¹⁶⁴ Eric G. Berman, *French, UK and US Policies to Supporting Peacekeeping in Africa: Current Status and Future Prospects* (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, February 2002), i www.nupi.no/PubFelles/Notat/PDF2002/NUPIwp622.pdf

should be noted that Germany's compliance efforts remain regrettably disjointed from the government's overall comprehensive strategy towards both Africa and peacekeeping.

Following the 2002 Kananaskis Summit, the German government exhibited a high degree of enthusiasm towards the training of African peacekeeping troops, suggesting this would be a central component of its overall compliance strategy with the AAP. This reality is underscored in G8 Summit 2002 in Kananaskis, Canada, released by the German Federal Foreign Office one month following the summit. Within it, the German government identifies the commitment that "the G8 will work together with African partners to deliver a joint plan, by 2003, for the development of African capability to undertake peace support operations" as being one of the four issue areas in which Germany will focus its compliance efforts with the AAP.¹⁶⁵ As well, such comments concerning Germany's heightened interest in African peacekeeping training have been echoed by its G8 Africa Personal Representative Uschi Eid. At a High-level Plenary Meeting of the United Nations General Assembly to Consider How to Support the NEPAD in September, 2002 as well as in other policy documents, Eid stated that Germany will provide financial and technical help for the planned establishment of an African peacekeeping centre.¹⁶⁶

Germany's centerpiece component of its compliance with the commitment in question has taken the form of its funding grant of €1.8 million to the Kofi Annan International Peace Training Centre in Ghana. Germany received wide accolade for its grant from the Ghanaian Minister of Defense Dr. Kwame Addo Kufuor, the majority of which will be devoted to the infrastructural development of the Centre.¹⁶⁷ Domestically, Germany is also contributing towards the training of civilian peace forces for conflict prevention and management. The Centre for International Peace Operations (ZIF) was publicly launched on 24 June 2002 in Berlin in conjunction with the Federal Foreign Office. ZIF's primary mandate is to provide training, deployment and support for civilian personnel serving in international peace missions under the auspices of the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). While initially restricted to members of the German Foreign Service, ZIF training programs now include international participants who are free to enroll in all courses. While the majority of the ZIF's pertains to missions in the Balkans, there is evidence that civilians from African countries are involved in the training programs.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁵ *G8 Summit 2002 in Kananaskis, Canada*, Federal Foreign Office (Berlin) July 2002 www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/aussenpolitik/friedenspolitik/g8/2002.html

¹⁶⁶ *Afrika: G8 beschließt neue Partnerschaft mit Afrika*, Uschi Eid Personal Website (Berlin). Accessed November 14, 2002 www.uschi-eid.de

¹⁶⁷ "Kofi Annan Centre Makes Progress," *Accra Mail* (Accra, Ghana) 12 December 2002 allafrica.com/stories/200212120243.html

¹⁶⁸ *Centre for International Peace Operations (ZIF)*, Federal Foreign Office (Berlin) January 2003 www.auswaertiges-amt.de/www/en/aussenpolitik/friedenspolitik/ziv_km/zif_bp.html

5. Italy: -1

No evidence of Italy's compliance with its AAP commitment to support the training of African peacekeeping forces could be found at this time. Like other G8 member-states, Italy is involved in conflict prevention on the African continent and in UN Peacekeeping Operations – in Italy's case predominantly on the Horn of Africa the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE).¹⁶⁹

Nevertheless, these should not be construed as compliance with this issue area in question as no evidence can be found that Italy's efforts in these activities include the training of regional peacekeeping forces.

6. Japan: -1

Despite Japan's highly impressive compliance in issues of economic growth and human-centred development with regards to the Africa Action Plan, in efforts to promote the development of an African peacekeeping core are next to non-existent. On June 20, 2002 Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi released "Solidarity between Japan and Africa: Concrete Actions, a compliance package outlining how Japan intends to fulfill its commitments under the AAP."¹⁷⁰ While issues areas such as "Realizing Human-Centered Development," and "Integrating Africa into the World Economy" are accompanied by detailed strategies including exact funding figures and proposed legislation, the section pertaining to "Conflict Prevention and the Consolidation of Peace" is comparatively vague. Only a generic statement is provided that "It is necessary to assist African countries' efforts for the transition from conflict to reconstruction and to assist refugees, who are both the victims of conflicts and the possible player in the future development. It is also important to spread the culture of conflict prevention from regional communities and civil societies to regional organizations."¹⁷¹ No evidence can be attained to suggest that this statement has been translated into the provision of funding or resources for an African peacekeeping force.

Such a policy is in line with Japan's overall domestic and international security strategy as outlined in Japan's major position paper on the topic, the Diplomatic Bluebook 2002: Politics and Security. Under the issue area of "Comprehensive Approach to Conflicts" and "Conflict Prevention" the report makes wide reference to both UN Peacekeeping Operations (UNPKO) and conflict zones in Africa, but is notably silent on any issues of

¹⁶⁹ *Ethiopia and Eritrea: UNMEE: Facts and Figures*, United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (New York) Accessed March 29, 2003 www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmee/facts.html

¹⁷⁰ *Announcement by Prime Minister Koizumi Concerning Measures for Africa*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo) 21 June 2002 www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/measure/announce0206.html

¹⁷¹ *Solidarity between Japan and Africa: Concrete Actions*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo) 21 June 2002 www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/action.html

peacekeeping training or the development of an African peacekeeping core.¹⁷² This lack of compliance is disappointing considering the renewed and central focus the Japanese government has awarded UNPKOs in its foreign policy.¹⁷³ This flows from the lifting of major restrictions on the activities of the Japanese Security and Defense Forces participating on UNPKOs in December, 2001 by the Japanese Diet that has allowed Japan to vastly increase its involvement in international peace missions.¹⁷⁴

7. Russia: 0

The Russian Federation has exhibited limited compliance with its commitment to the training of African peacekeeping forces, primarily in terms of official policy statements. In addition, Russia has implemented certain direct measures for peacekeeping training, however, such efforts are still in the planning phase and will likely not reach completion before the end of the Kananaskis compliance cycle in June 2003. The majority of Russia's compliance to date is primarily found in the statement by Gennady Gatilov, Russia's First Deputy Permanent Representative at the Session of the UN General Assembly Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations, March 4, 2003. In his address, Galitov stated that with regards to "the increasing role of regional peacekeeping, [Russia] thinks it is justified to consider separately in the Special Committee [on Peacekeeping Operations – PKO] the questions of strengthening coordination and the complementarity of the UN and regional organizations in this field." In further statements during his speech, Galitov restated Russia's explicit desire for UN member-states and the UN Special Committee on PKO to actively consider and debate the use of regional peacekeeping forces and training centers. He also reinforced Russia's support of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's proposal to increase support and cooperation with regional peacekeeping centres to deal with Africa's armed conflicts (with some reservations). He also advised that the "In personnel work the Secretariat should use more actively the comparative advantages of national training centers for peacekeepers and civilian policemen for service in UNPKOs."¹⁷⁵ As well, after the meeting of G8 APR in Accra, Ghana on December 7-8, 2002 focusing on peace and security in Africa, Russia was one of the only G8 nations to issue a formal press release on the matter. The release by the Russian Foreign Ministry included the statement that "preparation of a joint plan

¹⁷² "Chapter II: Japan's Foreign Policy in Major Diplomatic Fields and the Response of the International Community: Section I: Politics and Security," *Diplomatic Bluebook*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo) 97-100. Accessed March 31, 2003. www.mofa.go.jp/policy/other/bluebook/2002/chap2-1.pdf

¹⁷³ *Statement by H.E. Mr. Yoshiyuki Motomura Deputy Permanent Representative of Japan at the Meeting of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations in New York*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo) 3 March 2003 www.mofa.go.jp/announce/speech/un0303.html

¹⁷⁴ *Japan: Diet approves bill that boosts SDF role as peacekeepers*, Asian Human Rights News (Hong Kong) 12 December 2001 www.ahrchk.net/news/mainfile.php/ahrnews_200112/2241

¹⁷⁵ *Statement by Mr. Gennady Gatilov, First Deputy Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, at the Session of the UN General Assembly Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations on March 4, 2003*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Moscow) 6 March 2003 www.in.mid.ru/Bl.nsf/arh/6526A9FCB0019E3543256CE20029E862?OpenDocument

for the establishment of an African peacekeeping potential figured prominently” in the meeting discussions.¹⁷⁶

Russia also announced that it is hosting training courses for UN military observers and civilian police officers on Russian soil in the summer of 2003 that are open to new troop-contributing countries to UNPKOs – which is generally construed to include African countries such as Namibia, Uganda, and Ethiopia. Russia has requested that the most significant of these courses on a regional scale should be granted international status and financial support by the United Nations. Nevertheless, whether this request was granted is unclear as is the degree of African participation in the program and, thus, it cannot be counted towards Russian compliance efforts.¹⁷⁷

8. United States: +1

Flowing from the joint policy statement released by the United States, France and the United Kingdom in 1997 committing themselves to promoting Africa’s peacekeeping capacity,¹⁷⁸ the United States has already registered a notable high level of compliance with its AAP commitments. The United States established significant programs to aid in the training of African peacekeepers under the Clinton Administration, many of which have been restructured and expanded under the Bush Presidency.

Since 1997, the US Departments of State and Defense have jointly operated the African Crisis Response Initiative (ACRI) whose express goal is to build a peace keeping force of 12 000 African soldiers in cooperation with the UN, AU and ECOWAS. From 1997-2000, the United States military assisted in the peacekeeping training of over 6000 African military personnel from Benin, Uganda, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, Malawi, Mali, and Senegal.¹⁷⁹ Along with the French RECAMP initiative, ACRI is the most successful African peacekeeping training program launched by any G8 member-state. This initiative continues in 2002, with the US Congress awarding the program an operating budget of USD\$15-million for FY2002 and the US Department of State

¹⁷⁶ Alexander Yakovenko, *the Official Spokesman of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Answers a Russian Media Question About the Outcome of the Meeting of the G8 Personal Representatives for Africa in Accra*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation: Information and Press Department (Moscow), December 14, 2002 www.in.mid.ru/Bl.nsf/arh/74B7F5DD7435E71F43256C90003606FC?OpenDocument

¹⁷⁷ *Statement by Mr. Gennady Gatilov, First Deputy Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations, at the Session of the UN General Assembly Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations on March 4, 2003*, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Moscow) 6 March 2003 www.in.mid.ru/Bl.nsf/arh/6526A9FCB0019E3543256CE20029E862?OpenDocument

¹⁷⁸ Eric G. Berman, *French, UK and US Policies to Supporting Peacekeeping in Africa: Current Status and Future Prospects* (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, February 2002), www.nupi.no/PubFelles/Notat/PDF2002/NUPIwp622.pdf

¹⁷⁹ *African Crisis Response Initiative: Fact Sheet May 2000*, International Information Programs in the US Department of State (Washington D.C.), May 2000 usinfo.state.gov/regional/af/acri/fact_0500.htm

requesting USD\$10-million for FY2003.¹⁸⁰ The Clinton-administration designed ACRI initiative was dissolved in late July, 2002 and replaced by the African Contingency Operation Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program designed by the Bush-administration. ACOTA is the direct successor to ACRI, but differs in that it allows for tailor-made training programs to be implemented for various African countries and focuses not just on training soldiers but also on developing African peacekeeping trainers. The end goal of the program is this not merely to develop Africa's peace keeping core, but to make such a core self-sufficient in recruiting new officers. ACOTA has already begun training of troops from Ghana and Senegal and in discussion with South Africa and Nigeria, both non-ACRI states, to expand into those countries.¹⁸¹ The US State Department is requesting a budget of USD\$15-million for the ACOTA program in FY2004.¹⁸²

The United States has also launched the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capacities (EIPC) Initiative during the Clinton Administration and continues on during the Bush Presidency. EIPC provides funding, resources, and training for countries in conflict regions (including Africa) to develop and expand their regional peacekeeping capabilities. EIPC encourages the development of regional peacekeeping forces to police their own conflicts and establishment of regional peace training centers. Currently, the majority of EIPC training occurs at the Center for Civil-Military Relations in Monterey, California, however, funding does exist for the eventual transfer of the program to parallel institutions abroad. EIPC differs from ACRI/ACOTA in that it does not appear to involve direct military training by US Armed Forces. According to the State Department, since its inception Botswana, Ghana, South Africa, and Tunisia have all received EIPC funds and training. The EIPC initiative was awarded a USD\$4-million budget by the US Congress in FY2002, and the US State Department has requested \$4-million and \$2million operating budgets for FY2003 and FY2004, respectively.¹⁸³ Furthermore, in the US Agency for International Development's (USAID) 2003 budget proposal, the US has committed to increase funding to Africa by 53% for democracy and conflict prevention programs.¹⁸⁴ While this is step towards even further compliance, this facet remains a work in progress as it is unclear as to whether these funds will be directed towards peace forces training.

¹⁸⁰ *FY2004 International Affairs (Function 150) Budget Request: Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)*, US Department of State (Washington D.C.), February 03, 2003 www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/iab/2004/

¹⁸¹ "US Readies to Launch Military Training Program for Sub-Saharan African Countries," *Voice of America News* (Washington D.C.), July 27, 2002 www.voanews.com/article.cfm?objectID=692BCA14-086D-415994345E92677E4B39&title=US%20Readies%20to%20Lauch%20Military%20Training%20Program%20for%20Sub%2DSaharan%20African%20Countries&catOID=45C9C789-88AD-11D4A57200A0CC5EE46C

¹⁸² *FY2004 International Affairs (Function 150) Budget Request: Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)*, US Department of State (Washington D.C.), February 03, 2003 www.state.gov/m/rm/rls/iab/2004/

¹⁸³ *Military Assistance: International Military Education and Training, Foreign Military Financing, Peacekeeping Operations*, US Department of State (Washington DC). Accessed 8 April 2003 www.state.gov/documents/organization/17783.pdf

¹⁸⁴ *FY 2003 Congressional Budget Justification*, United States Agency for International Development (Washington D.C.), 2002 www.usaid.gov/country/af/index.html

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2002 Kananaskis Final Compliance Report Economic Growth – Agricultural Trade

Commitment:

Without prejudging the outcome of the negotiations, applying our Doha commitment to comprehensive negotiations on agriculture aimed at substantial improvements in market access, reductions of all forms of export subsidies with a view to their being phased out, and substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support. (Africa Action Plan, 57)

Background:

At the Doha Ministerial Conference held in November 2001, participants implemented the Doha Declaration which reconfirms the objective of the WTO Agreement to establish a fair and market-oriented trading system by preventing restrictions and distortions in world agricultural markets.¹⁸⁵ At the G8 summit in Kananaskis, the G8 countries implemented the Africa Action Plan in support of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD), an African-led strategy for sustainable development and poverty reduction in Africa. As part of the action plan, the G8 countries are committed to agricultural reforms in order to improve Africa’s position in world agricultural markets.¹⁸⁶ Within the action plan member countries have pledged to improve global market access for African exports by tackling trade barriers and farm subsidies by 2005.¹⁸⁷

Assessment:

Country	Lack of Compliance -1	Work in Progress 0	Full Compliance +1
Britain		0	
Canada			+1
France		0	
Germany		0	
Italy		0	
Japan		0	
Russia		0	
United States		0	
Overall			+1.13

¹⁸⁵ World Trade Organization. www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dohaexplained_e.htm#agriculture

¹⁸⁶ DFAIT. www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/canadexport/docs/active/vol.%2018,%20no%2018@2345-e.htm

¹⁸⁷ BBC News, news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2069632.stm

Individual Country Compliance Breakdown:

1. Britain: 0

Britain has partially complied with this commitment. The UK supports major changes to the system of farming subsidies under the Common Agriculture Policy (CAP).¹⁸⁸ The UK government plans to work to complete the CAP mid-term review to enable the European Union to commit to reductions in agricultural support by the World Trade Organization Ministerial meeting in Cancun, Mexico in September 2003.¹⁸⁹ The UK's objective of reforming international trade arrangements to promote the development of African agriculture will be accomplished through the reduction agricultural subsidies in the WTO context, seeking cuts in other G8 and OECD members' support systems. In order to increase market access for Africa, the UK will work with European Union G8 partners to reduce or eliminate tariff escalation on goods of particular interest to Africa.¹⁹⁰

Special Note: European Union

The EU presented a proposal for WTO negotiations on agriculture, calling for improved market opening and reduction of trade distorting support. The Commission paper proposes to cut import tariffs by 36%, export subsidies by 45% and to reduce trade distorting domestic farm support by 55%. EU Farm Commissioner Franz Fischler said that the proposal meets the objectives agreed at Doha.¹⁹¹ The issue of farm subsidies divides the EU. Germany, Britain and others are in favor of changes while France is eager to maintain the system.¹⁹² Recently, the European Commission condemned the quota and subsidy reforms created by the WTO in preparation for the Ministerial Meeting in Tokyo. The European Commission criticized indirect farm support offered in countries like Australia and the US's emergency aid payments.¹⁹³ At the Paris meetings of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), world leaders gathered to discuss reforms to world trade. Developing countries expressed their concern over the lack of reform of EU farm subsidies regime. Although the European

¹⁸⁸ Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, UK response to EU proposals for CAP reform. www.britaininfo.org/agriculture/xq/asp/SarticleType.1/Article_ID.2457/qx/articles_show.htm

¹⁸⁹ Foreign & Commonwealth Office, G8 Africa Action Plan: towards the 2003 summit. www.fco.gov.uk/Files/KFile/G8africaactionplan.pdf

¹⁹⁰ Foreign & Commonwealth Office, G8 Africa Action Plan: UK Implementation up to G8 Summit 2003. www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/uk_g8,0.pdf

¹⁹¹ Europa, WTO and Agriculture: European Commission proposes more market opening, less trade distorting support and a radically better deal for developing countries europa.eu.int/rapid/start/cgi/guesten.ksh?p_action.gettxt=gt&doc=IP/02/1892|0|RAPID&lg=EN&display=

¹⁹² The Tocqueville Connection, Europe Takes Aim at subsidies for Farmers. www.adetocqueville.com/cgi-binloc/getzip.cgi?0+4210

¹⁹³ "Trade chiefs slate agriculture reforms" BBC News, February 12, 2003. news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2754605.stm

Commission has committed itself to reforming CAP, some EU members have yet to show a commitment to the plan.¹⁹⁴

2. Canada: +1

Canada has complied with this commitment. Canada is pursuing a trade policy to improve market access and to level the playing field through the current round of WTO negotiations. Within the WTO, Canada is pushing for real and substantial market access improvements and the elimination of export subsidies.¹⁹⁵ Canada is also seeking a maximum reduction of trade-distorting domestic support and addressed the issue in a draft to the WTO.¹⁹⁶ Prime Minister Jean Chrétien announced that Canada would work to open its markets to African imports by eliminating tariffs and quotas on most imports from 48 Least Developed Countries, of which 34 are in Africa, effective January 1, 2003. The Canadian government has also allocated \$20 million for initiatives to increase Africa's trade capacity by working to promote exports within and outside Africa as well as to strengthen the role of African countries and institutions in multilateral trade negotiations.¹⁹⁷ International Trade Minister Pierre Pettigrew stated Canada's aim is to achieve commitments to reduce agricultural subsidies and improve market access for all agricultural products and Agriculture and Agri-Food Minister Lyle Vanclief stated that Canada would work to achieve these goals.¹⁹⁸

3. France: 0

France has partially complied with this commitment. As an entrenched EU member France, has committed to a proposal for WTO negotiations on agriculture to improve market opening and reduce of trade distorting support (See the Britain assessment). However, the French government has not made any specific commitments to reducing farm subsidies in the European Union that predominantly benefit French farmers.¹⁹⁹

*See Britain (Special Note: European Union)

¹⁹⁴ James Arnold, "Progress on world trade deal" BBC News, April 30, 2003. news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2988941.stm

¹⁹⁵ Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, www.agr.gc.ca/cb/apf/bgd_comp_e.html

¹⁹⁶ Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, Modalities for Domestic Support Specific Drafting Input: Canada www.agr.gc.ca/itpd-dpci/english/current/support.htm

¹⁹⁷ DFAIT Canada Helps Build Partnerships with Africa. www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/jakarta/canada_partnership_africa-en.asp

¹⁹⁸ "Canada Concerned Important Deadline Missed in the WTO Agriculture Negotiations" Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, April 1, 2003. www.agr.gc.ca/cb/news/2003/n30401be.html

¹⁹⁹ The Tocqueville Connection, www.adetocqueville.com/cgi-bin/loc/getzip.cgi?0+4612

4. Germany: 0

Germany has partially complied with this commitment. As an entrenched EU member, Germany has committed to a proposal for WTO negotiations on agriculture to improve market opening and reduce of trade distorting support (See the Britain assessment). Moreover, the German government has recognized the need to improve economic prospects in the agricultural sector and has promoted the need to increase agricultural productivity in Africa. Germany has stated that countries should express their point of view in regards to the **opening of OECD markets** to agricultural products and the dismantling of the industrialized countries' export subsidies in the WTO negotiating process.²⁰⁰

*See Britain (Special Note: European Union)

5. Italy: 0

Italy has partially complied with this commitment. As an entrenched EU member, Italy has committed to a proposal for WTO negotiations on agriculture to improve market opening and reduce of trade distorting support (See the Britain assessment). However, a specific implementation program in order to improve market access, reduce and possibly eliminate export subsidies and reduce trade-distorting domestic support is currently unavailable.

*See Britain (Special Note: European Union)

6. Japan: 0

Japan has not outlined a specific implementation program in order to comply with this commitment. However, Japan, as a member of the WTO, has made a broad commitment to work toward an agreement in WTO negotiations on agriculture in order to achieve “the maximum possible reduction or elimination of production and trade-distorting domestic support.”²⁰¹ In a speech by Ms. Yoriko Kawaguchi, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan, at the United Nations Conference Center she stated that Japan has been working with Africa for the integration and development of Africa. Kawaguchi outlined Japan's basic policy, the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) process. Prior to 2003, Japan stated that it intended to take its own initiatives in implementing the Africa Action Plan, but made no mention of policies regarding agriculture.²⁰² In February, the Government of Japan hosted a WTO Informal Ministerial Meeting in Tokyo. The government stated its interest in the success of the Doha Round

²⁰⁰ Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, The African Challenge. www.bmz.de/en/media/concepts/afrika/afrika13.html

²⁰¹ DFAIT, Article 3 - Domestic Support. www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/agsagit/ftaa_negotiating_group-en.asp

²⁰² Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Policy Speech by Ms. Yoriko Kawaguchi Minister. www.mofa.go.jp/region/afrika/fmv0208/ethiopia.html

negotiations. The Japanese government, as host of this meeting, explained its dedication to accomplishing the set goals and advancing the Doha negotiation process.²⁰³ The WTO talks to open up the agricultural sector to free trade worried Japan because of the damage that exposure to its protected rice market would incur.²⁰⁴

7. *Russia: 0*

Russia has not outlined a specific implementation program in order to comply with this commitment. Russia, as a member of the WTO, has agreed to work towards the reduction or elimination of production and trade-distorting domestic support in the area of agriculture.²⁰⁵ Under the Russia-South Africa Joint Intergovernmental Committee for trade and economic cooperation, Russia was engaged in searching for bilateral contacts in agriculture. Russian authorities will soon put South Africa on the list of developing countries enjoying privileges in trade with Russia, but there is no specific reference as to whether this will include the area of agriculture.²⁰⁶ In spite of a lack of information regarding Russia's implementation policies, there are signs that Russia is complying with the commitment to Doha principles. For example, in recent meetings with Canada, Russian Agriculture Minister Aleksei Gordeyev and Canadian Agriculture and Agri-Food Minister Lyle Vanclief discussed sustainable agriculture policy and improving market access for both countries.²⁰⁷

8. *United States: 0*

The United States has not complied with this commitment. The United States has explored a bilateral free trade agreement with Morocco and a regional free trade agreement with the Southern African Customs Union, which would demonstrate a commitment to reducing trade barriers if implemented. The U.S. stated that these negotiations would benefit African nations by opening agriculture markets and reducing trade-distorting farm subsidies.²⁰⁸ In a press conference Secretary of Agriculture Ann Veneman and U.S. Trade Representative Ambassador Bob Zoellick discussed the U.S.' trade proposal for agriculture in the WTO which demonstrated an effort by the United States to try to eliminate agriculture trade barriers.²⁰⁹ While it appears that the

²⁰³ "WTO Tokyo Informal Ministerial Meeting" Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, January 28, 2003.

www.mofa.go.jp/announce/event/2003/1/0128.html

²⁰⁴ "Chaos at WTO farm talks" BBC News, 24 February, 2003. news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2795307.stm

²⁰⁵ DFAIT, Article 3 - Domestic Support. www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/agsagit/ftaa_negotiating_group-en.asp

²⁰⁶ Pravda, South Africa makes important decisions to develop trade and economic cooperation with Russia. english.pravda.ru/economics/2002/11/22/39829.html

²⁰⁷ "Canadian and Russian Agriculture Ministers Discuss Trade Agricultural Issues" Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada, May 7, 2003. www.agr.gc.ca/cb/news/2003/n30507ae.html

²⁰⁸ The President and the Whitehouse, Fact Sheet: G-8 Africa Action Plan. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020627-10.html

²⁰⁹ The President and the White House, Press Briefing by Secretary of Agriculture Ann Veneman and USTR Ambassador Robert Zoellick. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/08/20020813-8.html

commitment is a work in progress in the U.S., the U.S. farm bill, which increases subsidies and other farm aid to U.S. farmers by more than \$170 billion over the next decade, is seen by the international community as a “step backwards” in agricultural reform.²¹⁰ The President’s recent proposal outlined a plan to continue implementation of a farm program safety net to ensure more farms and ranches receive conservation assistance through increased funding. Just over 40% of all farms receive government payments. At the same time, the US government has pledged to remove trade barriers.²¹¹ At the Paris meetings of the OECD, Zoellick argued that a major obstacle in any global trade reform was Europe’s CAP because it subsidizes European farmers and raises barriers to non-European agricultural goods.²¹²

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²¹⁰ The Tocqueville Connection, Europe takes Aim at Subsidies for Farmers. www.adetocqueville.com/cgi-bin/loc/getzip.cgi?0+4210

²¹¹ "Department of Agriculture" Office of Management and Budget, May 12, 2003. www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2004/agriculture.html

²¹² James Arnold, "Progress on world trade deal" BBC News, April 30, 2003. news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2988941.stm

2002 Kananaskis Final Compliance Report Economic Growth – Free Trade

Commitment:

Working toward the objective of duty-free and quota-free access for all products originating from the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), including African LDCs, and, to this end, each examining how to facilitate the fuller and more effective use of existing market access arrangements; (58: Africa Action Plan)

Background:

This commitment was made as part of the Africa Action Plan. Economic stability for Africa can only be achieved if the members of the G8 give LDCs the opportunity for economic growth through increased trade by decreasing trade barriers. Increased economic stability provides a favourable climate for political and overall stability, which after September 11th, is of paramount importance to the G8 members.

Assessment:

Country	Lack of Compliance -1	Work in Progress 0	Full Compliance +1
Britain		0	
Canada			+1
France		0	
Germany		0	
Italy		0	
Japan	-1		
Russia		0	
United States	-1		
Overall			-0.13

Individual Country Compliance Breakdown:

1. Britain: 0

The United Kingdom is currently in the intermediate stages of achieving compliance. There has been official reaffirmation of the commitment, most notably in the Department of Trade and Industry 2003 expenditure plan, which states that “The Department works closely with the Department for International Development (DfID) to ensure that developing countries benefit more from, and participate more fully in, the world trade

system.”²¹³ Further reaffirmation was presented in the 2003 budget presented by the Rt. Hon Patricia Hewitt to the House of Commons, which stated the need to redouble British efforts to deliver on the promises made at Doha, as well as further commitment to the WTO.²¹⁴ Progress includes encouraging a Commonwealth consensus in favour of the development of the multilateral trading system, in particular by alleviating cost barriers that exclude LDCs from full participation in the global market. However, there has been no evidence of internal bureaucratic review (no current consultations are in progress on market-access or quota reduction initiatives), British agricultural subsidies remain high, and tariffs on agricultural imports remain one of the highest of all OECD countries.²¹⁵

2. Canada: +1

The government of Canada has thus far complied fully with the commitment to work toward duty and quota-free access for products originating from the Least Developed Countries. There has been public reaffirmation of this commitment on numerous occasions, in both domestic and international fora, notably in remarks by David Dodge made to the Canada-UK Chamber of Commerce, which stressed the importance of structural change in response to the need for LDC access to industrialized markets.²¹⁶ While all products are not free for export without duties, the Government of Canada’s LDC Market Access Initiative extends duty-free and quota-free access to Canadian imports from 48 LDCs for most goods, excluding supply-managed agricultural products. This initiative takes effect as of January 1, 2003, and is addressed within the context of the Doha Development Round of multilateral trade negotiations.²¹⁷ While further commitment to making existing trade more efficient and conducive to LDC interests is needed, Canada has achieved substantial compliance.

3. France: 0

France has made efforts to increase LDC access to industrialized markets. French Ambassador to Zambia Jean-Paul Monchau yesterday disclosed that the French government will increase its assistance to Africa by 50% in the next five years, due to the fact that Africa’s benefits from multilateral trade liberalization have been marginal. He also called for guaranteed preferential access of African products to developed countries markets for a period long enough to influence positive investment decisions of the private

²¹³ UK Department of Trade and Industry, The Government's Expenditure Plans, 2001-02 to 2003-04, Chapter 8. www.dti.gov.uk/expenditureplan/expenditure2001/objective_c/chapter8/section6.htm

²¹⁴ Budget 2003, presented by Rt. Hon. Patricia Hewitt to the House of Commons, April 14 2003, www.dti.gov.uk/ministers/speeches/hewitt140403.html

²¹⁵ "The Hypocrisy Behind our Compassion," The Guardian Unlimited Observer, October 20, 2002. www.observer.co.uk/comment/story/0,6903,814946,00.html

²¹⁶ "Meeting Global Challenges: The Importance of Sound Economic Policies," Remarks by David Dodge to the Canada-UK Chamber of Commerce, March 12, 2003.

²¹⁷ Government of Canada Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, LDC Initiative Backgrounder, www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/ldc_back-en.asp

sector.²¹⁸ Market access is not universal, however, nor is it expected to be permanent. The proposal issued by the European Commission to open up duty and quota-free access for all LDC exports except arms by 2003 (the “Everything but Arms” initiative) remains a goal that countries are working toward, but have not yet achieved. The European Union pledged last year at trade talks in Doha, Qatar, to reduce tariffs and subsidies that hinder world commerce. However, there has been no agreement yet in world trade talks on reducing farm subsidies (especially in agriculture and fisheries), leaving developed countries increasingly frustrated at the difficulty of market access in Europe.²¹⁹ Despite reforms, European farmers and agricultural firms are still subsidized, particularly fisheries, thereby driving their poorest competitors out of the market.²²⁰ France’s compliance is therefore still in progress.

4. Germany: 0

Germany is in the process of complying with this commitment. External economic policy is a major component of the government’s policy.²²¹ “Alongside the overall treatment of fundamental issues of foreign trade and payments, as well as those of bilateral economic relations to countries outside the European Union, Directorate-General V has included as one of its tasks: the liberalization of foreign trade within the framework of the European Union and the World Trade Organization.”²²²

“On December 16, 2002, the German Government pledged an additional donation of 1 EUR million (about CHF 1.45 million) over two years – 2005 and 2006 – to the WTO Doha Development Agenda Global Trust Fund. This brings the total of contributions pledged to CHF 4.15 million.”²²³ Despite a deal between France and Germany to keep CAP spending unchanged until 2013, which looks like it might “...push reform far beyond the Doha timetable,”²²⁴ Germany announced that it will be “...increasing its support for developing countries by seven percent compared to the previous year.”²²⁵ Thus, Germany has reaffirmed its commitment to developing countries even though it is currently struggling with its own weak economic situation.

²¹⁸ Speedwell Mupuchi, "France to Increase its Aid to Africa by 50%," The Post (Lusaka), March 12, 2003.

²¹⁹ Abimola Akosile, "Stop Farm Subsidies to Help Feed Africa – UN Scribe," This Day (Lagos), March 12, 2003.

²²⁰ "The Hypocrisy Behind our Compassion," The Guardian Unlimited Observer, October 20, 2002. www.observer.co.uk/comment/story/0,6903,814946,00.html

²²¹ Federal Ministry of Economics, www.bmwi.de/Homepage/English%20Pages/the%20ministry/DG05.jsp#service

²²² Ibid.

²²³ WTO, www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres02_e/pr326_e.htm

²²⁴ "The Doha Squabble," The Economist, March 29 2003.

²²⁵ "Germany increases support for developing countries by seven per cent," April 24 2003. eng.bundesregierung.de/frameset/index.jsp

5. Italy: 0

Italy is in the process of complying with this commitment. The Italian government contributed 1 million euros for the year 2002 to the WTO Doha Development Agenda Global Trust Fund.²²⁶ In doing so, Italy is working toward duty-free and quota-free access for all products by using existing market access arrangements by helping LDCs become part of the WTO where they will be able to participate in trade negotiations with other members. As Ambassador Negrotto Cambiso states: it will help LDCs and low-income countries in transition to "...adjust to WTO rules and disciplines, implement obligations and exercise the rights of membership, including drawing on the benefits of an open, rules-based multilateral trading system."²²⁷ Even though the Doha March 31st deadline for freeing up trade in agriculture was missed, Italy remains committed to "...the Doha Development Agenda and to meeting the overall timetable and interim milestones."²²⁸

6. Japan: -1

Japan continues to persist with agricultural subsidies (particularly in the dairy and grain sectors), thus precluding LDC access to its market at equitable prices.²²⁹ Plagued by deflation, a declining trade surplus and a burgeoning fiscal deficit, Japan is currently focusing on internal economic reforms.²³⁰ Therefore no progress has been made on compliance with this commitment.

7. Russia: 0

In order for Russia to be able to comply with this commitment, it first needs to tackle some crucial domestic economic issues – which it is steadfastly doing. Chairman Ambassador Kåre Bryn announced on December 18, 2002, that he feels that the WTO is ready to put in place an accelerated program for accession for Russia – it currently holds observer status. Russia has also recently been taken off the Financial Action Task Force's (FATF) blacklist. FATF is an international group dealing with financial abuse.²³¹ This is a big step for Russia as it shows its serious dedication to becoming a fair market economy and moving away from its money-laundering past. It will bring increased confidence in its financial institutions²³² and its overall economic climate. Russia has also made the

²²⁶ WTO, www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres02_e/pr296_e.htm

²²⁷ Ibid.

²²⁸ "Statement of G-7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors", February 22 2003, Paris, France – found on the G8 Research Group Website: www.g8.utoronto.ca.

²²⁹ "Subsidies Distort Trade," New Vision (Kampala), March 8 2003.

²³⁰ "Falling Trade Surplus Clouds Japan Rebound," Bloomberg News, October 24 2002. [www.iht.com/ihtsearch.php?id=74740&owner=\(Bloomberg%20News\)&date=20021223171814](http://www.iht.com/ihtsearch.php?id=74740&owner=(Bloomberg%20News)&date=20021223171814) and "In Brief" International Herald Tribune, July 17 2002, www.iht.com/ihtsearch.php?id=64667&owner=&date=20020718141056

²³¹ Pravda, english.pravda.ru/economics/2002/10/12/38066.html

²³² Ibid.

elimination of trade barriers as an area that will require its focus.²³³ Further to this, Sergei Lavrov, Russia's Permanent Representative to the UN claims that Russia has abolished customs duties on commodities imports and lifted quantitative restrictions on imports from LDCs.²³⁴ The Ministries of Finance and Trade have yet to corroborate this, and so Russia is left with a Work in Progress for this commitment.

8. United States: -1

The United States has not complied with this commitment even though some positive steps have been taken over the past year. It took a giant step towards increased power for its President in trade negotiations as the Trade Promotion Authority (TPA) was approved by Congress in the summer of 2002. This gives the President the ability to negotiate new trade deals.²³⁵ Previous TPA had lapsed in 1994, which sidelined the U.S. while other countries brokered trade deals.²³⁶ Former Director-General of the WTO, Mike Moore commented that the new TPA would forge WTO negotiations ahead.²³⁷ Overall, this means that the U.S. will be better equipped administratively to comply with its G8 trade commitments. At Global trade negotiations in December, however, little progress was made on some very important issues that would help eliminate trade barriers. "The question of whether developing countries have the right to override foreign patent protections for essential medicines has become an overarching issue."²³⁸ This is a contentious issue in the U.S. where industry lobby groups apply pressure to the government.

The American Farm Bill signed last May which increased subsidies to farmers by 80% has also been a point of contention for other WTO members. The U.S. has made some significant progress, however, with respect to the agricultural issues, which were considered to be the main contributor to the missed March 31st Doha deadline. "The Americans want to phase out export subsidies over five years, to cut subsidies to 5% of the value of farm production and to slash tariffs to no more than 25%."²³⁹ What also needs to be addressed however, is a protective tariff on steel imports, and the fact that "recently, subsidized U.S. cotton on world markets took away more than 1% of GDP from...very poor African countries highly dependent on cotton production."²⁴⁰

The U.S. would be considered in the process of complying with this issue because of its efforts to reduce tariffs and barriers (albeit so far unsuccessfully) since the last summit,

²³³ Pravda, english.pravda.ru/politics/2002/06/10/30087.html

²³⁴ www.ln.mid.ru/B1.nsf/arh/B47750523A80C4F143256C47002DD452?OpenDocument

²³⁵ ustr.gov/releases/2001/06/01-37.htm

²³⁶ www.tpa.gov/Call-to-Action.htm

²³⁷ WTO, wto.org/english/news_e/pres02_e/pr308_e.htm

²³⁸ *New York Times*, query.nytimes.com/search/article-page.html?res=9B02EEDA103BF934A35751C1A9649C8B63

²³⁹ "The Doha Squabble," *The Economist*, March 29 2003.

²⁴⁰ Birdsall, Nancy and Michael Clemens, "From Promise to Performance: How Rich Countries Can Help Poor Countries Help Themselves," Center for Global Development April 2003, Volume 2, Issue 1.

however due to its dumping of 5 farm commodities into the global market, ie. “exporting wheat at prices 40% lower than production costs”²⁴¹, they therefore receive a lack of compliance. Dumping goods has 2 significant effects on the LDCs, whose main industries are agriculture: “below-cost imports drive developing country framers out of their local markets, and farmers who sell their products to exporters find their global market share undermined by the lower-cost competition.”²⁴² Dumping is also a violation of WTO trade rules.

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²⁴¹ "The Great Grain Drain: U.S. Floods Global Markets," The Trade Observatory. April 23, 2003, www.tradeobservatory.org/News/index.cfm?ID=4309

²⁴² "Dumping of U.S. Ag Commodities Hurting Farmers in U.S. and Around the World," Press Release from the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy. February 11 2003. www.wtowatch.org/library/administration/uploadedfiles/Press_Realease_Dumping_of_US_Ag_Commodities_Hur.htm

2002 Kananaskis Final Compliance Report Environment – Sustainable Agriculture

Commitment:

Supporting the development and the responsible use of tired and tested new technology, including biotechnology, in a safe manner and adapted to the African context, to increase crop production while protecting the environment through decreased usage of fragile land, water and agricultural chemicals; (116: Africa Action Plan)

Background:

The need to improve agricultural techniques in order to secure adequate crops in a sustainable manner was one of the initiatives that the G8 countries agreed upon in the 2002 African Action Plan. On the road to Evian, the environment ministers of the G8 nations (April 25-27, 2003) stressed the crucial role of biodiversity in the livelihoods of African nations and promoting its conservation and sustainable use as essential efforts to reduce poverty. In this respect, support for trans-boundary cooperation to fight illegal logging, efforts against desertification, and assistance to research and capacity building for a joint G8-African knowledge and advance technology are initiatives that keep the commitment alive among the G8 nation. There is an obvious need to improve agricultural techniques in order to ensure future sustainability and to aid in areas where immediate action is required.

Assessment:

Country	Lack of Compliance -1	Work in Progress 0	Full Compliance +1
Canada			+1
France			+1
Germany		0	
Italy		0	
Japan			+1
Russia		N/A	
United Kingdom			+1
United States		0	
Overall			0.57

Individual Country Compliance Breakdown:

1. Canada: +1

The 2001 OECD report in Aid to Agriculture gives statistical estimates to the commitments towards sustainable agriculture endorsed since the Genoa Summit. The report’s statistical definition of aid to agriculture includes agricultural sector policy, planning and programs, agricultural land and water resources, agricultural development

and supply of inputs, crops and livestock production, agricultural services, agricultural education, training and research as well as institution capacity building and advice. Following this report, in 2000, Canada allocated US\$ 64 million to this sector's development assistance²⁴³.

Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) document "Canada Making a Difference in the World: A Policy Statement on Strengthening Aid Effectiveness" aims at increasing the leadership role of developing countries, improving coordination with other donors, working with the private sector and fostering coherence in Canada's policies that affect our developing-country partners. In keeping with these principles, the document outlines CIDA's intention to concentrate more of its resources on low-income countries that are committed to reform, particularly in Africa. In its new aid policy directions Canada increases its focus on Africa clearly responding to the New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD) and the G8 Africa Action Plan. In addition CIDA will adopt a more Knowledge-Based institutional role, and will strengthen its field presence. Although the agency will continue to focus on its four social development priorities – Health and Nutrition, AIDS prevention, Basic Education and Child Protection – at the same time it will strength its investments in rural development, which includes agriculture, water and the environment²⁴⁴.

Working partly through the International Development Research Centre, Canada has tried to create awareness and strengthen technologies in Africa. In 1995, the African Highlands Ecoregional Program was launched to improve food security and to manage natural resources in sustainable manner²⁴⁵.

The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) has devoted CDN\$2 million to the Pan-African Bean Research Alliance, a project that runs from 2000-03. The project focuses on reducing iron deficiency anemia. The Bean Program has investigated genetic variability that allows bean breeder to improve iron content by up to 80 percent while maintaining high yield and drought tolerance. The program aims to provide micronutrients to women and children in Africa through bean production while improving community decision-making skills of local farming communities²⁴⁶.

On 24 September 2002, the Minister for International Cooperation, Susan Whelan, issued a policy statement with a significant portion focussed on agricultural and rural development strategies. The document notes that "agriculture is heavily based on natural resources [hence the] development of the sector is inextricably linked to other global

²⁴³ OECD, Aid to Agriculture. December 2001. www.oecd.org/pdf/M00029000/M00029854.pdf

²⁴⁴ Canadian International Development Agency, *Canada Making a Difference in the World: A Policy Statement on Strengthening Aid Effectiveness*. September 2002. www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf/vall/5714A0BE7C23BCB285256C3A0063793E?OpenDocument

²⁴⁵ Government of Canada, "Sustainable Development Efforts in Africa," 16 August 2002, www.canada2002earthsummit.gc.ca/sd_action/stories/sus_dev_africa_e.cfm.

²⁴⁶ Canadian International Development Agency, "Pan-African Bean Research Alliance," www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cidaweb/webcountry.nsf/vall/05609B249D7210B585256BE30056B146?OpenDocument#9.

issues such as water and land degradation”; and that as “agriculture responds to the pressing need to achieve food security and eradicate poverty, interventions must be guided by careful assessments of the impacts on biodiversity, ecosystems and the environment as a whole”²⁴⁷. The document emphasizes that CIDA must strive to reverse a recent decline in investments in agriculture (from more than 11 percent of annual bilateral funding in the early 1990s to less than 5 percent in 2001/2002). CIDA expects that as early as April 2003 enough countries will have ratified the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, an agreement that addresses the transboundary movement, transit, handling and use of living modified organisms (LMOs), and that this will have implications throughout Canada’s and other G8 members’ development agencies. The document outlines proposed programming areas including: the strengthening of human capital base; improve the knowledge base of the agricultural sector; striking the appropriate balance between renewable and non-renewable resources in agricultural production; balanced approach to the uses of new science in areas of genomics and biotechnology; removing market constraints; and promoting intra- and inter-regional programming synergies²⁴⁸.

2. France: +1

From OECD’s report estimates that in 2000 France allocated US\$178 million into aid to the agriculture sector²⁴⁹.

Food security and Agricultural development are priorities in the French diplomacy. Mr. Jacques Chirac addressed the issue of agricultural development in a speech prepared for the Evian G8 summit. Chirac points at food security relying on self-sufficiency but also being the source of cash and thus Africa also needs to develop export crops. He regards the European agricultural policy as the “most open and favorable” since it proposes generous scheme to the African countries and both continent’s agriculture do not compete but rather complement in the market. France proposes first, the improvement of the management of aid and agricultural export policies in developed countries, to prevent them from destabilising Africa’s food production; secondly, to defend privileged trade treatment for Africa; and thirdly, to reopen the question of raw materials and primary products, essential for African development²⁵⁰.

In a document presented to the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development in September 2002 France outlined a Green Revolution that promotes

²⁴⁷ Susan Whelan, Minister for International Cooperation, Canada, "Message from the Minister," 16 December 2002, www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/agricultureconsultation.

²⁴⁸ Canadian International Development Agency, "Sustainable Rural Development: The Role of Agriculture in Canada's International Assistance Program," October 2002, www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/cida_ind.nsf/vall/ECE27220C9FA44AF85256C4D006A0B4D?OpenDocument.

²⁴⁹ OECD, Aid to Agriculture. December 2001. www.oecd.org/pdf/M00029000/M00029854.pdf

²⁵⁰ Jacques Chirac. Working Document: Speech on Agricultural Development by Mr. Jaques Chirac, President of the Republic, to the 22nd Conference of the Heads of State of Africa and France. February 21, 2003. www.g8.fr/evian/english/navigation/news/22nd_conference_of_heads_of_state_of_africa_and_france.html

ecosystemic approached to agriculture. The document notes that the world's poorest people may benefit most since "[e]xperiments now under way show that it is possible to produce more and better with much less input and without deep tillage."²⁵¹ The French estimate that 50% of production increases in agriculture come from the exploitation of wild genetic heritage. The document urges the need to strike a balance between wild and safely genetically modified agriculture. The piece emphasizes that 2002 will be a crucial year for the concrete implementation of site management through the Natura 2000 initiative. As the document recognizes, "Natura 2000, with its considerable financial resources, should assert itself as a real tool for the development of regions, guaranteeing the conservation of flora, fauna and natural habitats."²⁵² A French Government partnership proposal outlines the DURAS Project, which is geared towards promoting sustainable development in Southern agricultural research systems. Four project areas are outlined: agricultural practices compatible with environmental conservation; incorporating local knowledge in ecosystem management; promoting agriculture in rural areas through the emergence of market-led opportunities and SME networks; and, selecting varieties suited to addressing the priorities of food security and poverty. The program proper is set to begin at the beginning of 2003 and last for 4 years. Proposed funding for the project is estimated to reach €5 million.²⁵³

In practical terms, France has supported the development of cotton production in rural Africa²⁵⁴ and has given \$7.5 MF to Cameroon for rural development and land management²⁵⁵.

3. Germany: 0

From OECD's report estimates that in 2000 Germany allocated US\$136 million into aid to the agriculture sector²⁵⁶

Within the framework of bilateral cooperation, which is co-ordinated by the BMZ, with developing countries, Germany makes available approx. €75 to 100 million per annum for projects promoting the protection and sustainable use of biodiversity.²⁵⁷

²⁵¹ Government of France, "Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development 2002: What is at Stake? What Contribution Will Scientists Make?" www.france.diplomatie.fr/culture/livre_et_ecrit/vitrine/johburg/pdf/johburg_gb.pdf.

²⁵² Ibid.

²⁵³ Government of France, "The DURAS Project: Promoting Sustainable Development in Southern Agricultural Research Systems," www.johannesburgsummit.org/html/sustainable_dev/p2_managing_resources/2508_promote_sd_south_agric.pdf.

²⁵⁴ Ministère des Affaires Etrangères. Le Développement de la culture du cotonnier dans la zone franc. www.france.diplomatie.fr/cooperation/actions/acex05.html

²⁵⁵ Ministère des Affaires Etrangères. Développement paysan et gestion des terroirs au Nord-Cameroun. www.france.diplomatie.fr/cooperation/actions/acex04.html

²⁵⁶ OECD, Aid to Agriculture. December 2001. www.oecd.org/pdf/M00029000/M00029854.pdf

²⁵⁷ Government of Germany, "Johannesburg Summit 2002: Germany Country Profile," www.un.org/esa/agenda21/natlinfo/wssd/germany.pdf.

Germany has committed itself to initiatives that promote the expansion of conversion to organic farming and expanding agri-environmental support for multiple crop rotation.²⁵⁸

A report released by the German Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), a government owned corporation for international cooperation, in June 2002 outlines initiatives for rural sustainable development. The report emphasizes food security for all, including access to markets and sufficient purchasing power with a focus on supporting research needed to boost food production in an environmentally sound manner and safeguarding essential genetic resources. The report also promotes regionalization by dismantling development barriers through regional planning, decentralizing policies and economic development.²⁵⁹

There is no emphasis on Africa in Germany efforts towards sustainable agricultural development.

4. Italy: 0

From OECD's report estimates that in 2000 Italy allocated US\$31 million into aid to the agriculture sector²⁶⁰. The Instituto Agronomico per l'Oltremare (IAO) is pursuing a number of projects throughout Africa with the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. For example the AFRICOVER project aims to set up a digital database on land cover of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in order to improve the knowledge of the DRC and to strengthen national capacities for the use of data for natural resources management.²⁶¹

A document prepared for the Johannesburg Summit on Sustainable Development (August/September 2002) entitled "Italian Cooperation and Sustainable Development: Case-studies 2000-2002" includes projects directly related to the commitment taken at Kananaskis. One initiative, known as the Early Warning and Agricultural Production Forecast Project [AP3A], that takes place in the Sahel region of Africa begun in 1995 and came to an end in 2002 with approximately 4.5 million euros being committed. The project has produced early warning products/systems for the region by taking into account the level of structural vulnerability at both national and supra-national levels. A database now provides cross-cultural technical services, the possibility of monitoring crops and pastures based on satellite data, and vulnerability analysis. As the report notes, "one of the most important aspects lies in the role technological innovation can play in

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

²⁵⁹ Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit, "Index of Publications," www.gtz.de/publikationen/english/publications/index.asp.

²⁶⁰ OECD, Aid to Agriculture. December 2001. www.oecd.org/pdf/M00029000/M00029854.pdf

²⁶¹ Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "AFRICOVER/Democratic Republic of Congo," www.iao.florence.it/coop/dgcsprojects/projectpage.php?key=22.

supporting capacity building for regional development. On the basis of this lesson, the Project has resolutely undertaken a multi-sided transfer to the Sahelian countries.”²⁶²

5. Japan: +1

From OECD’s report estimates that in 2000 Japan allocated US\$849 million into aid to the agriculture sector. In the report, Japan in fact extends to 40% of the aid that is given to the sector.²⁶³ Japan has set out an impressive programme of specific goals to meet its environmental commitments. As part of this program, since 1999, Japan together with China have committed to US\$1million in the “Asia Africa cooperation for Agriculture and rural Development” program. The program stands within Africa long term objectives of food security and exportation. Their program is composed on the development of rice production, assistance in the development of aquaculture, and in strengthening the extension services for an integrated rural schemes.²⁶⁴

The Koizumi Initiative concerning “Concrete Actions of the Japanese Government to be taken for Sustainable Development – Towards Global Sharing” that was publicized on 21 August 2002 emphasized two initiatives to contribute to improving food security through Green Technology Innovation. The first being the promotion of the development and dissemination of New Rice for Africa (NERICA)²⁶⁵, a hybrid combining the benefits of African and Asian rice that can be cultivated with less fertilize4r and chemicals, and without irrigation systems. The second is the extending of approximately US\$30 million of aid to tackle the food crisis in southern Africa.²⁶⁶

A speech by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Yoriko Kawaguchi at the “NERICA” Side Event, on 31 August 2002, notes that 2003 will be defined as “the year leading up to TICAD III....a ‘leap year’ for cooperation with Africa.”²⁶⁷

6. Russia: N/A

On 29 November 2002 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation released a summary of meetings of the Intergovernmental Russian-Ethiopian Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation and Trade Commission Meeting which reaffirmed joint

²⁶² Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Italy, "Italian Cooperation and Sustainable Development: Case Studies 2000-2002," www.esteri.it/eng/foreignpol/coop/index.htm.

²⁶³ OECD, Aid to Agriculture. December 2001. www.oecd.org/pdf/M00029000/M00029854.pdf

²⁶⁴ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Asia Africa cooperation for Agriculture and Rural Development Program". www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/ticad2/list98/agri/2_3_45.html

²⁶⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Dissemination of the NERICA Rice," www.mofa.go.jp/policy/environment/wssd/2002/type2/2-3-1.html.

²⁶⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, "Koizumi Initiative—Ownership and Solidarity," www.mofa.go.jp/policy/environment/wssd/2002/kinitiative.html#2_2.

²⁶⁷ Yoriko Kawaguchi, Minister for Foreign Affairs, Japan, "Speech at the NERICA Side Event," 31 August 2002, www.mofa.go.jp/policy/environment/wssd/2002/event31-5.html.

work on “concrete promising projects of cooperation in the industrial, agricultural, geological prospecting, electricity generation and other fields.”²⁶⁸

An official spokesman of Russia’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Alexander Yakovenko, noted that questions of raising the productivity of agriculture in Africa were discussed at the G8 Personal Representatives for Africa meeting in Accra on 7-8 December 2002.²⁶⁹

7. United Kingdom: +1

From OECD’s report estimates that in 2000 Britain allocated US\$174 million into aid to the agriculture sector²⁷⁰. Following the Department of International Development report Britain allocates £ 44,622 in research for sustainable rural areas and for environmentally sound policies²⁷¹. In addition, from its overall aid budget Britain is committed to provide £1 billion of development assistance to Africa by 2005/06²⁷². The U.K. has plaid a leading role in responding with humanitarian aid to *food shortages* in Seven countries in Southern Africa (Mozambique, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Lesotho, Angola and Swaziland). The U.K. has in fact been the second largest donor to the Southern Africa crisis with a total support of £137 million in humanitarian assistance and recovery programs²⁷³.

The “Better livelihoods for people: The role of Agriculture” report, released by the Department for international Development (DfID), outlines efforts to reduce poverty through agriculture development. At the regional and country level, DfID plans to support the refinement of poverty analysis, diagnosis and monitoring by taking into account rural, peri-urban and urban contexts. DfID also aims to support the establishment of alternative models for rural services such as technology, knowledge, finance, insurance, and rural infrastructure using affordable client driven methods with private and civil society involvement. Moreover, DfID strives to create proper conditions and incentives to increase access by poor people to new technologies and approaches to sustainable management of natural resources, “with greater emphasis on participatory or demand led technology development and involvement of the private sector,” and investing in the “generation and dissemination of agricultural technology through the

²⁶⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, "Intergovernmental Russian-Ethiopian Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation and Trade Commission Meeting Held," 02 December 2002, www.in.mid.ru/Bl.nsf/arh/6E6F31D6FA6C458543256C83003898CC?OpenDocument.

²⁶⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, "Alexander Yakovenko, the Official Spokesman of Russia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Answers a Russian Media Question About the Outcome of the Meeting of the G8 Personal Representatives for Africa in Accra," 15 December 2002, www.in.mid.ru/Bl.nsf/arh/74B7F5DD7435E71F43256C90003606FC?OpenDocument

²⁷⁰ OECD, Aid to Agriculture. December 2001. www.oecd.org/pdf/M00029000/M00029854.pdf

²⁷¹ Department of International Development. Departmental Expenditure. www.dfid.gov.uk/

²⁷² Ibid.

²⁷³ Department of international development. "Southern Africa Humanitarian Crisis". www.dfid.gov.uk/

[Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research] CGIAR and other parts of the global research system”²⁷⁴.

8. United States: 0

From OECD’s report estimates that in 2000 U.S. allocated US\$405 million into aid to the agriculture sector²⁷⁵. African countries raised concerns over accepting genetically modified corn obtained through US food aid in August 2002.¹⁷² The US urged that the food is approved by the US Environmental Protection Agency and is eaten by Americans every day.²⁷⁶

The USAID Office of Sustainable Development outlines five elements for the Initiative to End Hunger in Africa (IEHA). These include the reduction of hunger, an agricultural action plan to rapidly and sustainably increase agricultural growth and rural incomes in sub-Saharan Africa, a focus on three subregional areas and investment, and the development of a framework to guide USAID agricultural growth investments in Africa. The fifth element includes initiatives to harness new technology and global markets to raise the productivity of food and export products, to increase the stability and volume of supplies, to improve product quality, relieve pressure on natural resources, reduce post-harvest losses, help producers respond to markets, help entrepreneurs develop profitable enterprises, and raise farm incomes and lower the price of food to consumers.²⁷⁷

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May 2003

²⁷⁴ Department for International Development, "Better Livelihoods for Poor People: The Role of Agriculture," 23 August 2002, www.dfid.gov.uk/Pubs/files/agri_livelihoods.pdf.

²⁷⁵ OECD, Aid to Agriculture. December 2001. www.oecd.org/pdf/M00029000/M00029854.pdf

²⁷⁶ BBC News, "Should Southern Africa Accept GM Food Aid?" 30 July 2002, news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/talking_point/2149638.stm.

²⁷⁷ United States Agency for International Development, "USAID Managed Administration Initiative to End Hunger in Africa," www.afr-sd.org/Agriculture/AgInitiative.htm.

2002 Kananaskis Final Compliance Report Environment – Water

Commitment:

Supporting African efforts to promote the productive and environmentally sustainable development of water resources.

Background:

At the 2002 G8 Summit in Kananaskis, objectives aimed at initiatives for Africa were embodied in the Africa Action Plan in which several environmental concerns were addressed. One vital environmental resource – not only in Africa but also worldwide – is water, and the development of clean, sustainable methods of abstraction. The current crisis in this area is aggravated and distorted by uneven distribution of water on a global scale. G8 leaders have recognized the need for leadership to ensure future sustainability of the world’s water and demand for this essential resource grows.

Assessment:

Country	Lack of Compliance -1	Work in Progress 0	Full Compliance +1
Canada			+1
France			+1
Germany		0	
Italy		N/A	
Japan			+1
Russia		N/A	
United Kingdom			+1
United States		0	
Overall			+0.67

Individual Country Compliance Breakdown:

1. Canada: +1

Canada has worked to address concerns for water resources through the development of new fog collection technology in the early 1990s. The FogQuest Organization was formed to promote fog, rain, and dew as sustainable water resources in developing countries. Currently, CIDA is involved in various fog-harvesting projects in the Americas and parts of Africa. Canada also hosted the Managing Shared Waters Conference in June 2002 to discuss the effective management of transboundary coastal ecosystems and shared waters.

Prime Minister Jean Chretien announced several initiatives to foster new partnerships with Africa on 27 June 2002 to improve water resources. The Prime Minister noted that

CDN \$1 million would be allocated to encourage private sector investment “by creating an African investment fund that will leverage private sector resources for investment projects, including infrastructure, such as roads, water supply and pipeline construction”; CDN \$6 million “to help improve local governance by working with African partners to develop new approaches to providing basic community needs, such as access to water, sanitation and health”; CDN \$50 million “to improve water management and access to water and sanitation through the Global Water Partnership”; and CDN \$10 million “to collaborate with the African Development Bank to support a Project Preparation Facility to help develop financially viable water and energy infrastructure projects.”²⁷⁸

2. France: +1

France has also recognized water as a national asset and has worked to increase user awareness. The employment of their ‘polluter-pays’ principle has contributed towards new wastewater treatment facilities.

France presented five priorities to encourage Africa’s sustainable development efforts at the Johannesburg summit, one of which includes a proposal to increase access to basic water services. France emphasizes the need for the further incorporation of women into the political decision making process in the management of water resources and the need to carefully manage underground water reserves.²⁷⁹

France proposed an integrated water resource management by catchment area initiative that would incorporate training, the exchange of experience through networks, and contribute to providing the necessary tools for water management in regions like Sub-Saharan Africa. Total French funding obtained for this project amounts to EU 7.3 billion.²⁸⁰

The French government also supports the following programs in Africa under its “access to water and sanitation” initiative. France strives to improve the supply of drinking water to the semi-urban areas in the Niolo/Diema region of Mali; assist the water treatment plan in West Alexandria, Egypt; study the feasibility of restructuring the El Jadida water

²⁷⁸ Office of the Prime Minister, Canada, "Canada Helps Build New Partnerships With Africa," 27 June 2002, www.pm.gc.ca/default.asp?Language=E&Page=newsroom&Sub=newsreleases&Doc=africa.20020627_e.htm

²⁷⁹ Ministère de l'Ecologie et du Développement Durable, France, "Aider l'Afrique à sortir de la pauvreté: une priorité pour la France!," www.johannesbourg.environnement.gouv.fr/johannesbourg/fr/priorites/initiatives_afriq.htm.

²⁸⁰ Government of France, "Type II Partnership Proposal Presented by the French Government – Integrated Water Resource Management by Catchment Area." www.johannesbourg.environnement.gouv.fr/johannesbourg/gb/initiative_g/word/eau_ressen.doc

management plan in Morocco; and improve sanitation for all of Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. Total French funding identified for this initiative is EU 66 million.²⁸¹

In preparation for the Third World Water Forum which took place in March 2003, France aimed “to achieve recognition of the need for international co-operation in managing certain large rivers, particularly in Africa” and to “get some ideas about reasoned and economical water management adopted, which are still insufficiently dealt with in international documents.”²⁸² President Chirac proposed to the Forum the creation of “a Charter of general principles of good governance for water resources that sets out the rights and duties of each party.”²⁸³

3. Germany: 0

Germany will undertake its water management under the regulatory framework for EU water policy (the EC Water Framework Directive).

As outlined in a country profile report submitted to the Johannesburg Summit Germany contributes EU 3.5 billion to ongoing bilateral projects and programs in the water sector. Germany moved to have several recommendations integrated into the results of the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002. These included, improved access for the poor in a gender sensitive manner; the introduction of cost-covering tariffs once it is simultaneously guaranteed that the poor will be able to meet their minimum water needs; and that decision-making structures be organized in a decentralized, transparent, and results-oriented manner based on clear responsibilities in order to professionally manage water supply and sanitation.²⁸⁴

In March of 2003 Germany hosted the opening conference in Berlin for the International Year of Freshwater. There the Federal Development Minister Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul proposed that annual donations “be made available for development cooperation for water supply.” She went on to state that “the German Government has advocated a solution to the drinking water problems for many years, and for the development of an appropriate infrastructure for water supply and management, especially in developing countries.” She emphasized the need for private sector involvement and offered German government support for establishing the necessary institutions in the case of such involvement. Finally, Minister Wieczorek-Zeul promised several German initiatives in

²⁸¹ Government of France, "Type II Partnership Proposal Presented by the French Government – Access to Water and Sanitation," www.johannesbourg.environnement.gouv.fr/johannesbourg/gb/initiative_g/word/eau_accesen.doc

²⁸² France Objectives for the Third World Water Forum, www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/article.gb.asp?ART=33200

²⁸³ President's Statement to Third World Water Forum, Japan, March 2003 www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/bulletin.gb.asp?liste=20030318.gb.html#Chapitre5

²⁸⁴ Government of Germany, "Johannesburg Summit 2002: Germany Country Profile," www.un.org/esa/agenda21/natlinfo/wssd/germany.pdf

the coming year including “an ‘International Round Table’ in the autumn dealing with transboundary water body management.”²⁸⁵

In addition the German government has identified several field of action in their development co-operation which include international sector dialogue, reform of the water sector, and preventing conflicts over cross-border water resources.²⁸⁶

4. Italy: N/A

There is no information available to suggest that Italy has complied with this commitment.

5. Japan: +1

On the 21 of August 2002 Japan inaugurated its Koizumi Initiative (Concrete Actions of Japanese Government to be taken for Sustainable Development – Towards Global Sharing), under which several new initiatives were targeted:

- ‘Decade of Education for Sustainable Development’
- ‘Environmental Conservation Initiative for Sustainable Development’
- to take a leading role for entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol
- advocating the entry into force of the Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants.

The Koizumi Initiative also outlines Japanese water commitments, including assistance in creating safe and stable water supply and development of hygienic facilities, the strengthening of co-operation with NGOs and women, and the convention of the “Third World Water Forum” and its International Ministerial Conference in March 2003.²⁸⁷

Japan outlined its “Initiative for Official Development Assistance on Water” at the outset of the Third World Water Forum in March 2003, particularly its’ comprehensive approach in three steps:

- “Japan will provide assistance for safe drinking water and basic sanitation to poor countries and regions including Africa, which are suffering from shortages. For this

²⁸⁵ Press Release No. 23/03, Berlin, 06 March 2003, Joint Press Statement Federal Environment Ministry/ Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development "Global water resources – their sustainable use and fair distribution – German opening conference in Berlin for the International Year of Freshwater", www.bmu.de/english/fset1024.php

²⁸⁶ German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development "Environment, Poverty, and Sustainable Development", www.bmz.de/en/topics/umwelt/umwelt18.pdf

²⁸⁷ Government of Japan, "Koizumi Initiative: Water," 21 August 2002, www.nz.emb-japan.go.jp/economic/koizumi.html#23e

purpose, Japan has established the 'Water Resource Grant Aid', and 16 billion yen will be earmarked in the FY 2003 budget proposal for this scheme."

- "Assisting the ownership and capacity-building of developing countries Japan will provide assistance for capacity-building to approximately 1000 people over the next five years from FY 2003 in order to improve the developing countries' capacity for planning, management, and control in the field of water supply system and sewage system."
- Japan also pledges to strengthen international co-operation primarily through the Japan-U.S. Clean Water for People Initiative and Japan-France Water Sector Co-operation (the latter was launched at the Forum).

Also at the Forum Japan identified six pillars for water sector economic co-operation:

- safe drinking water supply and sanitation
- improvement of water productivity
- addressing the problem of water pollution and ecosystem conservation
- disaster mitigation
- water resources management
- strengthening of partnerships with NGOs.²⁸⁸

Japan also cooperates actively within two water sector international partnerships. Through the U.S.-Japan Initiative there has been progress made towards West African needs in a Washington meeting on 30 December 2002 which was followed by two joint visits to the region in January 2003.²⁸⁹ Japan and France have together through their 'Water Sector Cooperation' identified several areas for joint action: Senegal River Basin, Djibouti, and Lao People's Democratic Republic. Finally, the Third Toyko International Conference on African Development (TICAD II) will take place in late September 2003.²⁹⁰

6. Russia: N/A

There is no information available to suggest that Russia has complied with this commitment.

²⁸⁸ 'Initiative for Japan's ODA on Water' 23 March 2003 www.mofa.go.jp/policy/environment/wwf/initiative.html

²⁸⁹ U.S.- Japan Clean Water for People Initiative mofa.go.jp/policy/environment/wwf/initiative.pdf

²⁹⁰ Japan-France Water Sector Cooperation, www.mofa.go.jp/region/europe/france/w_coop0303.html

7. United Kingdom: +1

The Department for International Development (DfID) agreed to a UK 19.8 million Water and Forestry Support Program in July 2002. The plan includes the implementation of major changes in the way water and forestry issues are managed in South Africa. UK 5 million is earmarked for water and sanitation services support; UK 4 million for water resources support; and UK 2.5 million for institutional transformation support.²⁹¹

A speech by the Secretary of State for International Development, Clare Short, on 31 October 2002 addresses water as a key to sustainable development. She notes that the “importance of water and its fundamental contribution to sustainable development is now recognized. But the contribution of water to poverty reduction will only be realized if it is set in the broader context of social and economic development and environmental improvement. DFID is ready to work with our development partners, both donors and recipients, to help achieve this.”²⁹²

An example of a British water initiative is DFID’s Nigeria Jigawa State Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Program. The project seeks to “sustainably improve the delivery of piped water supply and sanitation services in five urban centers in Jigawa State through the provision of new and rehabilitated infrastructure and, equally importantly, through strengthening the capability of relevant institutions.” The project’s implementation phase is set to begin in June 2003.²⁹³

In April 2003 FCO Minister Baroness Amos reiterated the government’s commitment in this area, saying “We currently support a number of multilateral initiatives, including the Global Water Partnership, the World Bank Water and Sanitation Programme and the Water Supply and Sanitation Collaborative Council. We also support bilateral programmes in many countries in the developing world, including Uganda, Nigeria and South Africa, but also countries in Asia.”²⁹⁴

8. United States: 0

In August 2002 a new USAID West Africa Water Initiative was announced. The initiative is a US\$41 million public-private partnership between USAID and the Conrad

²⁹¹ Department for International Development, United Kingdom, "Water and Forestry Support Programme," 62.189.42.51/DFIDstage/Pubs/files/sa_waterprog_story.htm

²⁹² Clare Short, Secretary of State for International Development, United Kingdom, "Water – A Key to Sustainable Development," 31 October 2002, 62.189.42.51/DFIDstage/Pubs/files/sp31oct02_waterspeech.pdf

²⁹³ Department for International Development, "DFID Nigeria Jigawa State Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Programme," December 2002, 62.189.42.51/DFIDstage/Contracts/files/ojec_4451_bb.htm

²⁹⁴ "East Africa: 'Debt Relief and Increased Donor Support have had a Significant Effect' Statement by FCO Minister Baroness Amos, House of Lords, 7 April 2003 www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Servlet?pagename=Openmarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391629&a=KArticle&aid=1049390182394

N. Hilton Foundation that is to provide potable water and sanitation to rural villages in Ghana, Mali and Niger.²⁹⁵

USAID continues to support the Retail Water Development Project (RWDP) in South Africa. The RWDP provides training and technical assistance to improve access to cleaner, safer and abundant water.²⁹⁶

In addition, under the U.S. 'Water for the Poor Initiative', "the U.S. will invest \$970 million over three years (2003-2005). It is anticipated that these investments will mobilize a total amount of more than \$1.6 billion for water-related activities globally." The U.S. government has made investments in several specific areas under this initiative:

- **Enhancing Access to Clean Water and Sanitation Services:** "The United States will invest \$510 million through USAID programs worldwide, concentrating on investments in countries where water authorities are undertaking the reforms necessary to enable viable partnerships that engage local governments, water utilities, the private sector, NGOs, communities and families." (USAID spends US\$ 6 million each year in South Africa for water services.)
- **Improving Watershed Management:** "The United States is investing over \$400 million over the next three years to integrate surface water, aquifer, and coastal zone issues to better manage water resources and to protect watersheds."
- **Increasing Productivity of Water:** The United States is investing \$60 million over the next three years to ensure that agricultural and industrial water use is as productive as possible."

The U.S. also participates actively in the Safe Drinking Water Partnership and the Transboundary Water Resources Management.²⁹⁷

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²⁹⁵ United States Agency for International Development, "West Africa Water Initiative," www.usaid.gov/about/westafricawater/

²⁹⁶ United States Agency for International Development, "Water and Sanitation for Rural South Africans," 3 October 2002, www.usaid.gov/regions/afr/ss02/southafrica3.html

²⁹⁷ "Water for the Poor Initiative" Fact Sheet, U.S. Agency for International Development, 20 March 2003 www.state.gov/g/oes/rls/fs/2003/18914.htm

2002 Kananaskis Final Compliance Report Fighting Terrorism

Commitment:

We are committed to sustained and comprehensive actions to deny support or sanctuary to terrorists, to bring terrorists to justice, and to reduce the threat of terrorist attacks.

Background:

This commitment stems from the increased attention that has been directed toward the apprehension of terrorists by the international community, including the members of the G8, following the September 11th terrorist attacks on the United States. Although terrorism has been an area of concern addressed at previous G8 summits, with particular emphasis placed on the actions of the Al-Qaeda, the events of September 11th have led to increased efforts aimed at reducing the international threat of terrorism.

Assessment:

Country	Lack of Compliance -1	Work in Progress 0	Full Compliance +1
Canada			+1
France			+1
Germany			+1
Italy			+1
Japan			+1
Russia			+1
United Kingdom			+1
United States			+1
Overall			+1

Individual Country Compliance Breakdown:

1. Canada: +1

Numerous actions have been taken by Canada to fulfil this commitment. On 28 June 2002 Canadian Deputy Prime Minister John Manley and United States White House Homeland Security Advisor Tom Ridge finalized and released a progress report on the Smart Border Declaration and its companion Action Plan. Key points of the report in the field of anti-terrorism included strengthened cooperation to intercept high-risk travellers before they arrived in Canada or the United States, creation of a binational steering group to reduce risks to the shared critical infrastructure of both countries, improvement in the speed with which information and intelligence is shared (such as the planned creation of a

total of 14 Integrated Border Enforcement Teams in the 18 months following the report), and a commitment to conduct joint anti-terrorism exercises, including a major exercise in May 2003.²⁹⁸

In July 2002, Canada's HMCS *Algonquin* frigate co-operated with CF marine patrol aircraft and a French warship to apprehend four suspected Al-Qaeda members. Boarding parties from the HMCS *Algonquin* detained suspects and handed them over to U.S. military forces on 13 July and 17 July 2002.²⁹⁹ The Solicitor General of Canada, Lawrence MacAulay, met with U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft on 22 July 2002 at the sixth annual Canada-U.S. Cross-Border Crime Forum in order to fulfill a key action item in the Smart Border Declaration and its Action Plan. The meeting was attended by more than 150 senior law enforcement and justice officials from Canada and the United States and addressed a number of trans-national crime issues, including terrorism. The Canadian Solicitor General and the U.S. Attorney General announced the establishment of five new Integrated Border Enforcement teams—multi-agency law enforcement teams—in order to assist with detection, arrest and prosecution of crime.³⁰⁰

Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and U.S. President George Bush released a joint statement on the implementation of the Canada-U.S. Smart Border Declaration and Action Plan on 9 September 2002. Progress on counterterrorism activities included adoption of common standards and technology for biometric identifiers; enhancement of cooperation between the embassies of each country overseas to allow officials to more routinely and efficiently share intelligence on high risk individuals; coordination in visa impositions and exemptions, agreement to share advanced passenger information and passenger name records on high risk travellers destined to either country with an advanced passenger information system in place in at Canadian airports in October 2002 and an automated Canada-U.S. data sharing program in place by Spring 2003; a commitment to institute a pilot program of joint passenger analysis units (including a co-location of customs and immigration officers) in September 2002 to enhance cooperation in identifying high risk travellers, completion of a study to enhance border security at seaports; a commitment by Canada to provide CDN\$600 million over five years for physical and technological improvements at key border crossings; a commitment to invest in new container-screening technologies; the establishment by Canada of National Security Enforcement Teams that will include representatives from federal enforcement and intelligence agencies and international law enforcement partners on a case-by-case basis; the development of an electronic system for exchange of

²⁹⁸ Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Manley and Ridge Release Progress Report on the Smart Border Declaration and Action Plan," 28 June 2002, webapps.DFAIT-maeci.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.asp?FileSpec=/Min_Pub_Docs/105343.htm&Language=E.

²⁹⁹ Canada, National Defence, "Backgrounder: The Canadian Forces' Contribution to the International Campaign Against Terrorism," 13 November 2002, www.forces.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=490.

³⁰⁰ Solicitor General Canada, "U.S. Attorney General and Solicitor General of Canada Attend Sixth Canada-U.S. Cross-Border Crime Forum," 22 July 2002, www.sgc.gc.ca/publications/news/20020722_e.asp.

criminal records information by the RCMP and FBI by October 2002; various joint operations to remove deportees to source countries; an agreement to share advance information on individuals and organizations that may be designated as terrorist in order to coordinate asset freezing; and an agreement to conduct a major joint counter-terrorism exercise in May 2003.³⁰¹

On 16 September 2002 the federal government's interdepartmental initiative created to prepare for and respond to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats announced 24 projects elected for funding in its first year of operation. This represents the first disbursements, in the aggregate amount of CDN\$46 million, for the five-year research and technology initiative backed up by a CDN\$170 million fund as part of the government's comprehensive security package announced in the 2001 budget.³⁰² On 23 April 2003, Solicitor General Wayne Ester announced 17 counter-terrorism research projects to receive an additional CDN\$28.8 million in monies drawn from this fund.³⁰³ On 9 May 2003, the Solicitor General announced a further CDN\$26 million in funding for counter-terrorism projects as a result of partnerships between the government and private sector.³⁰⁴

The Canada Customs and Revenue Agency's Advance Passenger Information/ Passenger Name Record Program was implemented on 7 October 2002. This program identifies known terrorists and other criminals before they reach Canadian shores. The collected passenger information is run through law enforcement databases either at the time of entry or through analysis of travel patterns that lead to detection of conspiracies and criminality.³⁰⁵

On 31 October 2002, Federal Transport Minister David Collenette introduced into the House of Commons the *Public Safety Act, 2002*. This Act replaces the original Bill C-55, which was introduced in April, 2002 but died when Parliament was prorogued in September. The *Public Safety Act, 2002* contains a number of provisions that will enhance the government's capacity to prevent terrorist attacks and respond quickly should a significant threat arise. The Act will enhance the federal government's ability to provide a secure environment for air travel; improve data sharing between air carriers and federal departments and agencies in the fields of transportation and national security;

³⁰¹ Prime Minister of Canada "Prime Minister Chrétien, President Bush Release Joint Statement on Canada-U.S. Border Cooperation," 9 September 2002, www.pm.gc.ca/default.asp?Language=E&Page=newsroom&Sub=NewsReleases&Doc=can-u.s.border20020909_e.htm.

³⁰² Canada, National Defence, "CRTI Announces \$46 Million for Counter-terrorism Research Projects," 16 September 2002, www.dnd.ca/eng/archive/2002/sep02/16CRTI_n_e.htm. No longer available, see Canada, National Defence, "Backgrounder: CRTI Interdepartmental Initiative," 16 September 2002, www.dnd.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=437.

³⁰³ Canada, Solicitor General Canada, "CRTI Announces \$28.8 Million for CBRN Counter-terrorism Research and Technology," 23 April 2003, www.sgc.gc.ca/publications/news/20030423_e.asp.

³⁰⁴ Canada, Government of Canada, "Counter-terrorism Projects Receive Additional \$54 M," 9 May 2003, www.sgc.gc.ca/publications/news/20030509_e.asp.

³⁰⁵ Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, "The CCRA: Protecting Canadians," 27 September 2002, www.ccra-adrc.gc.ca/newsroom/releases/2002/sep/api-e.html.

allow the government to issue interim orders in emergency situations subject to proper controls over regulatory actions; prevent hoaxes that imperil the public or heighten public anxiety; create tighter controls over explosives and hazardous substances, related activities and the export and transfer of technology; help detect and prevent interference with computer systems operated by counter-terrorism agencies; and deter the proliferation of biological weapons.³⁰⁶

Canada's HMCS Winnipeg Frigate joined her sister ship in the Arabian Gulf region on 1 November 2002 as part of the Canadian Naval Task Group deployed for Operation Apollo, Canada's military contribution to the international antiterrorism campaign. The primary job of the HMCS Winnipeg is to detect and capture Al-Qaeda and Taliban members who are attempting to escape by sea and surveillance patrols. The 225 members of the frigate's crew were among the approximately 1,000 Canadian forces personnel deployed on Operation Apollo as of 1 November 2002, and were scheduled to serve on their assignment with the Canadian Naval Task Group for six months.³⁰⁷

As of April, 2003, the naval task group in Operation Apollo consisted of the frigates HMCS Regina, HMCS Fredericton and the destroyer HMCS Iroquois. The HMCS Regina joined the coalition fleet on March 16, 2003, replacing the HMCS Winnipeg. On March 5 March 2003, the HMCS Fredericton and HMCS Fredericton left Halifax, Canada. As of 2 April 2003, the HMCS Iroquois became the flagship for a large coalition naval task force, the HMCS Regine replaced the HMCS Winnipeg and the HMCS Fredericton replaced HMCS Montréal.³⁰⁸

On 14 March 2003, Canada deployed a security platoon of approximately 35 soldiers to the Arabian Gulf region in support of CF units sent to assist in Operation Apollo.³⁰⁹

By 28 January 2003, Canada completed deployment of the third rotation of Canadian Forces members assigned to its tactical airlift team to the Arabian Gulf Region. Approximately 350 Canadian personnel, three CC-130 Hercules transport aircraft and

³⁰⁶ Transport Canada, "Backgrounder: Actions Taken in Response to September 11, 2001," 8 January 2003, www.tc.gc.ca/majorissues/transportationsecurity/Actions.htm; Transport Canada, "News Release: Government of Canada Introduces Improved *Public Safety Act, 2002*," 31 October 2002, www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/releases/nat/2002/02_gc004e.htm.

³⁰⁷ Canada, National Defence, "HMCS *Winnipeg* Joins Campaign Against Terrorism," 1 November 2002, originally online at www.forces.ca/eng/archive/2002/nov02/01APOLLO_n_e.htm, URL no longer active.

³⁰⁸ Canada, National Defence, "Backgrounder: The Canadian Forces' Contribution to the International Campaign Against Terrorism" 4 April 2003, www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=490; Canada, Government of Canada, "Canadian Warships Iroquois and Fredericton Arrive in Theatre of Operations," 2 April 2003, news.gc.ca/canada/GFNE/2003/04/02/c6851.html?lmatch=/canada/GFNF/2003/04/02/c6853.html&lang=_e.html.

³⁰⁹ Canada, National Defence, "Backgrounder: The Canadian Forces' Contribution to the International Campaign Against Terrorism" 4 April 2003, www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=490.

two CP-140 Aurora long-range maritime patrol aircraft were deployed in support of coalition forces in the Arabian Gulf region.³¹⁰

On 5 November 2002 federal Transport Minister David Collenette announced the assignment of two additional responsibilities to the Canadian Air Transport Security Authority in order to further enhance aviation security. These are the implementation of an improved restricted area pass system for Canadian airports and screening of non-passengers entering restricted areas at airports.³¹¹

Federal Solicitor General Wayne Ester announced on 27 November 2002 that the Government of Canada had listed six additional entities as terrorist organizations in accordance with the Criminal Code.³¹² On 12 February 2003 the Solicitor General announced that a further three entities were being listed as terrorist organizations,³¹³ and announced another seven on 3 April 2003, bringing the total number of listed entities under the Criminal Code to twenty-six.³¹⁴ The relevant Criminal Code provision provides that the assets of any listed person or group may have its assets seized and forfeited. In addition, persons and organizations that knowingly participate in, contribute to, facilitate the activities of or deal in the property or finances of a listed entity may be subject to severe penalties, including imprisonment.

In December 2002 Canada became the first country to ratify the Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism. This convention, adopted by the Organization of American States General Assembly in June 2002, will further coordinate hemispheric efforts aimed at eliminating threats of terrorism. The Convention calls for stronger hemispheric cooperation in various areas, including law enforcement, legal assistance and border management, and requests member states to adopt their own measures to combat terrorism. It also requires members to become parties to ten United Nations counterterrorism instruments, all of which Canada has ratified. The Convention will come into force upon ratification by six OAS member states.³¹⁵

³¹⁰ Canada, National Defence, "Backgrounder: The Canadian Forces' Contribution to the International Campaign Against Terrorism" 4 April 2003, www.forces.gc.ca/site/Newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=490; Canada, National Defence, "Canadian Forces Sustains Air Force Contribution to the Campaign Against Terrorism," 22 January 2003, www.forces.gc.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=989.

³¹¹ Transport Canada, "News Release: Transport Minister Announces Further Enhancements to Aviation Security," 5 November 2002, www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/releases/nat/2002/02_h120e.htm.

³¹² Solicitor General Canada, "Federal Solicitor General Wayne Ester Announces Further Action Against Terrorism," 27 November 2002, www.sgc.gc.ca/publications/news/20021127_e.asp.

³¹³ Canada, Solicitor General Canada, "Federal Solicitor General Wayne Ester Announces Further Action Against Terrorism," 12 February 2003, www.sgc.gc.ca/publications/news/20030212_e.asp.

³¹⁴ Canada, Solicitor General Canada, "Federal Solicitor General Wayne Ester Announces Further Action Against Terrorism," 3 April 2003, www.sgc.gc.ca/publications/news/20030403_e.asp.

³¹⁵ Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "News Release: Canada Becomes First Country to Ratify Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism," 2 December 2002, webapps.DFAIT-maeci.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.asp?FileSpec=/Min_Pub_Docs/105751.htm&bPrint=False&Year=&ID=&Language=E.

On 6 December 2002 Canadian Deputy Prime Minister John Manley and United States Office of Homeland Security Advisor Tom Ridge released another progress report on the first anniversary of the Smart Border Declaration and its 30-point Action Plan. The status report updated a 9 September 2002 report delivered to Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien and United States President George Bush. Recent progress in two areas relevant to the prevention of terrorism, as well as with respect to other matters, is outlined in the report. First, Canada and the United States have agreed on detailed binational workplans to safeguard shared critical infrastructure in the energy, telecommunications and transportation sectors. Second, the report indicates that Canada is participating in TOPOFF 2, a major United States counterterrorism exercise involving a comprehensive range of participants from first responders to top government officers.³¹⁶

The two countries also agreed to deepen cooperation within the existing action plan in three key areas. First, the two countries agreed to increase security and remove barriers to cross-border truck traffic as well as implement driver security screening for the cross-border transportation of dangerous goods. Second, Canada and the United States approved an expansion to existing efforts to improve marine security, including sharing innovations in cargo and container screening on an ongoing basis. Third, the countries agreed to strengthen the interoperability of processes and communications of their border and law enforcement agencies.³¹⁷

In addition, the Deputy Prime Minister and the Homeland Security Advisor also discussed an agenda for cooperation in the areas of biosecurity and science and technology. They agreed that the two countries will coordinate research and development, emergency preparedness, public health surveillance and other activities to jointly address these threats. In addition, they resolved that United States and Canada would work to synchronize procedures at the border to satisfy law enforcement and facilitation goals. Finally, the Deputy Prime Minister and the Homeland Security Advisor agreed that each country will coordinate science and technology research to discover novel solutions to border management challenges, including the detection and illicit transportation of chemical, biological, radiological and explosive materials.³¹⁸

Canada's Minister of National Defence and Minister Responsible for Emergency Preparedness, John McCallum, and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bill Graham, announced on 9 December 2002 an agreement to enhance Canada's security cooperation with the United States. The arrangement created a bi-national group to develop coordinated contingency planning to respond to potential disasters such as terrorist attacks within North America. The group is also charged with the task of coordinating maritime

³¹⁶ Canada, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "Governor Ridge and Deputy Prime Minister Manley Issue One-Year Status Report on the Smart Border Action Plan," 6 December 2002, www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/can-am/menuen.asp?act=v&mid=1&cat=243&did=1671.

³¹⁷ *Ibid.*

³¹⁸ *Ibid.*

surveillance and intelligence sharing, threat assessments, and planning and exercises that will deter or respond to terrorist threats.³¹⁹

On 17 December 2002, Canada's Solicitor General Wayne Ester met for the first time with U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft in Washington. There, they discussed progress in anti-terrorism efforts, including increased information sharing and expanding the Integrated Border Enforcement Teams program.³²⁰

Minister of National Revenue Elinor Caplan announced on 6 January 2003 that the Cross Border Currency and Monetary Instrument Reporting Regulations came into force. These regulations were the final component of Canada's *Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act* to be implemented. The regulations mandated all persons and entities to report to the Canada Customs and Revenue Agency when importing or exporting currency and monetary instruments of CDN\$10,000 or more. Failure to submit a written currency report pursuant to the regulations may result in seizure or a penalty of \$250 to \$5,000. Upon submission, all completed reports are to be sent to the Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada for assessment and analysis.³²¹

On 21 January 2003, Minister of National Revenue Elinor Caplan unveiled the first set of new mobile Vehicle and Cargo Inspection Systems purchased by Canada. The units are truck-mounted mobile scanning systems that capture images of the contents of marine containers, assisting customs officers to examine potentially dangerous goods. Over the course of 2003 the mobile units, at cost of CDN\$2 million each, will be installed at strategic locations across Canada.³²²

On 22 January 2003, Transport Minister David Collenette announced a five-year package of initiatives designed to increase security of Canada's marine transportation infrastructure and maritime borders. The value of the initiatives is up to CDN\$172.5 million.³²³

³¹⁹ Canada, National Defence, "Canada and the U.S. Enhance Security Cooperation," 9 December 2002, www.dnd.ca/site/newsroom/view_news_e.asp?id=508.

³²⁰ Canada, Solicitor General Canada, "Federal Solicitor General Wayne Ester and U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft Meet on Cross Border Co-operation," 17 December 2002, www.sgc.gc.ca/publications/news/20021217_e.asp.

³²¹ Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, "Minister of National Revenue announces new requirements for cross border movements of currency," 6 January 2003 www.ccra-adrc.gc.ca/newsroom/releases/2003/jan/currency-e.html; Canada, Government of Canada, "Transaction reporting requirements take effect Monday," 28 March 2003, www.fintrac.gc.ca/publications/nr/2003-03-28_e.asp

³²² Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, "New gamma ray technology improves marine port security," 21 January 2003, www.ccra-adrc.gc.ca/newsroom/releases/2003/jan/gamma-e.html.

³²³ Canada, Transport Canada, "Government of Canada Announces up to \$172.5 Million in New Marine Security Projects," 22 January 2003, www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/releases/nat/2003/03-gc001.htm.

On 11 March 2003, Minister of National Defence and Minister Responsible for Emergency Preparedness John McCallum announced funding of \$13.3 million to increase Canadian emergency preparedness capacities.³²⁴

On 26 March 2003, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police established a National Security Tip Line. It encouraged the public to use the toll-free number to report any information that could pose a threat to national safety and security, particularly with respect to terrorism.³²⁵

Canada held its eighth annual Emergency Preparedness Week beginning 10 May 2003. Co-ordinated by the Canadian government, activities stressed the importance of emergency preparation and showcased the programs, training and equipment that has been implemented to enhance the security of Canadians.³²⁶

The long-planned five-day joint U.S.-Canadian exercise in connection with combating terrorism (TOPOFF 2), originally articulated in the Smart Border Action Plan, commenced on 12 May 2003. Canada's participation involves approximately 18 federal departments and agencies that have counter-terrorism functions and the province of British Columbia. The goal of the simulation include improving extreme event-management capacity, validating authorities and procedures, and constructing systematic national exercise programs to support the security strategies of United States and Canada.³²⁷

The customs agencies of Canada and the United States and Canada's major railways announced on 3 April 2003 that they signed a declaration of principles to increase security at the Canada-U.S. border. The announcement was the culmination of a subset of railway security discussions occurring under the rubric of the Smart Border Declaration adopted by Canada and the United States in 2001.³²⁸

³²⁴ Canada, Government of Canada, "Government of Canada Announces \$13.3 Million to Increase Canadian Emergency Preparedness Capacities," 11 March 2003, www.ociepc-bpiepc.gc.ca/info_pro/NewsReleases/NR-110303nat_e.asp.

³²⁵ Canada, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, "RCMP National Security Tip Line 1-800-420-5805," 26 March 2003, www.rcmp.gc.ca/news/nr-03-10.htm.

³²⁶ Canada, Government of Canada, "Minister of National Defence Announces Emergency Preparedness Week in Canada," 5 May 2003, www.ociepc-bpiepc.gc.ca/info_pro/NewsReleases/NR03-0502epw_e.asp.

³²⁷ Canada, Solicitor General Canada, "'TOPOFF 2' – Week-long Combating Terrorism Exercise Begins May 12," 5 May 2003, www.sgc.gc.ca/publications/news/20030505_e.asp; American Red Cross, "Red Cross TOPOFF 2 Response in Full Swing," 14 May 2003, www.redcross.org/news/ds/terrorism/030514TOPOFF4.html; American Red Cross, "Mock Dirty Bomb 'Detonated' in Seattle as Homeland Security Drill Begins," 13 May 2003, www.redcross.org/news/ds/terrorism/030513TOPOFF3.html.

³²⁸ Canada Customs and Revenue Agency, "U.S. and Canadian customs agencies, and Canada's two largest railways reach agreement to strengthen security measures for transborder rail shipments," 3 April 2003, www.ccr-aadrc.gc.ca/newsroom/releases/2003/apr/rail-e.html.

Canada is slated to meet the deadline set by G8 member countries for reinforced flight deck doors on passenger aircraft by 9 April 2003.³²⁹ The government of Canada has also participated in the United Nations Sub-Committee of Experts on the Transport of Dangerous Goods. This sub-committee was scheduled to consider a paper that includes general security measures in December 2002.³³⁰

2. France: +1

France continues to remain committed to playing an active role in combating the international threat of terrorism by denying support to terrorists or those states that would provide sanctuary to them. France has been working outside its borders to prevent terrorists, and those who harbour them, from acquiring weapons of mass destruction in accordance with resolutions reached at the G8 Summit in Kananaskis, Alberta 27 June 2002. France supports the implementation of the UN Resolution UNSCR1441 regarding Iraqi disarmament. France remains a leading contributor to the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In continuing to lend support for these operations, France has provided over thirty experts and remains committed to providing expertise and equipment.

Domestically, French anti-terrorism agents have had recent success. They arrested eight suspected terrorists in late November that were connected to a failed plot by a British man to blow up a trans-Atlantic flight last year. In late December the French Interior Ministry revealed that four self-confessed Islamic militants, with links to Chechen rebel leaders, were arrested for planning future attacks. Later that month, French authorities arrested a group of Islamic militants were arrested in Paris for planning to attack a Russian embassy. In a letter from the Permanent Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Security Council Committee concerning counter-terrorism (Res. 1373) the French outline measures taken to prevent terrorist groups from recruiting, collecting funds or soliciting other forms of support for terrorist activities to be carried out inside or outside France. These include imprisonment, expulsion, and surveillance of front organizations and internet sites. France also provides an organizational chart that outlines the administrative machinery established to enforce laws and regulations. The structure incorporates the following branches of authority: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Directorate of Strategic and Disarmament Affairs; The Ministry of Justice; the Treasury Department; the French Financial Intelligence Unit (TRACFIN); the Anti-Terrorist Coordination Unit (UCLAT); and the Ministry of Interior among others.

³²⁹ Transport Canada, "News Release: Transport Minister Announces New Regulations to Reinforce Cockpit Doors to Further Protect Canadian Travellers," 10 April 2002, www.tc.gc.ca/mediaroom/releases/nat/2002/02_h040e.htm.

³³⁰ Hazmat Safety, "The United Nations Transport of Dangerous Goods Sub-Committee," hazmat.dot.gov/uncomtdg.htm.

3. *Germany: +1*

A number of actions have been taken by Germany to fulfill the first commitment. The federal government has rendered a motion to deploy the Bundeswehr in 'Operation Enduring Freedom', the international campaign against terrorism, which was approved by the German Bundestag in November 2001 and extended for another year. The motion provides for deployment of up to a maximum of 3,900 troops, including personnel for medical evacuation, air transport capacity, nuclear, biological and chemical weapons defence forces to an international operational force contingent in Kuwait, and naval forces at the Horn of Africa. This makes Germany the second largest provider of troops in 'Operation Enduring Freedom'.³³¹ It should be noted that Germany would not support a war against Iraq within the framework of "Operation Enduring Freedom" since the government's position is that such an attack would not fall under the rubric of the fight against worldwide terrorism.³³²

The *Fourth Financial Market Promotion Act* came into effect on 1 July 2002. With the coming into force of this act, the following measures have been implemented to assist in executing international standards and strengthen efforts to combat money laundering and the funding of terrorist activities by drying up the financial sources for terrorism: banks are required to place information on all accounts held in Germany in a central database is being installed at the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority; credit institutions and financial services institutions must set up adequate internal processes to guard against money laundering and financial fraud by allowing business transactions to be screened for high risk groups and suspicious features; requiring those carrying on a credit card business to obtain a license and be subject to ongoing supervision by the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority; tightening checks on the ownership of banks and insurance companies to prevent acquisition being obtained with funds from illegal activity; and amendments to the *Fiscal Code* and the *Income Tax Law* to ensure that information indicating money laundering or comparable offences discovered by the revenue authorities during the exercise of their supervisory functions can be passed on to the law enforcement authorities.³³³

Germany's Interior Minister Otto Schily has also employed an anti-terrorism law on associations, announcing a ban on 5 August 2002 of a fundraising organization suspected

³³¹ Germany, Die Bundesregierung, "Deployment of the German Bundeswehr within operation 'Enduring Freedom'," 18 November 2002, eng.bundesregierung.de/frameset/index.jsp; German Embassy, Washington, D.C., "Enduring Freedom Deployment Wins Large Majority," 15 November 2002, www.germany-info.org/relaunch/politics/new/mil_ef_nov2002a.html; German Embassy, Washington, D.C. "Cabinet Approves 12-month Extension of Enduring Freedom Deployment," 6 November 2002, www.germanyinfo.org/relaunch/politics/new/pol_afgmil9.html.

³³² German News (English Edition), "Struck says attack against Iraq is not fight against terrorism," 16 December 2002, www.mathematik.uni-ulm.de/de-news/2002/12/162000.html#8.

³³³ German Embassy, Washington, D.C. "Fact Sheet: Germany's Contribution to the Coalition Against Terrorism", 13 December 2002, www.germanyinfo.org/relaunch/info/archives/background/fs_afgan.html.

of supporting the radical terrorist group Hamas, a group claiming responsibility for numerous terrorist attacks in the Middle East.

As of 13 December 2002, Germany's Public Prosecutor General was conducting more than 30 investigative proceedings in relation to terrorism. One indictment had resulted from the investigations as of this date; on 23 August 2002 Mounir El Motassadeq was charged with suspicion in a terrorist organization and more than 3,000 counts of murder, and held in custody.³³⁴ As of 19 February 2003, Motassadeq was convicted in a Hamburg court and found guilty of over 3,000 counts of accessory to murder and of membership in a terrorist organization. His 15 year sentence was the maximum permitted under German law.³³⁵ International arrest warrants have been issued against other suspected terrorists who fled Germany shortly before the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center in New York.³³⁶

In addition, on 10 October 2002, German authorities arrested a Moroccan citizen believed to have assisted the Hamburg-based terrorist cell that helped to execute the September 11th attacks in the United States. The accused knew the targets of the attacks and provided logistical support to the cell, which included three of the eventual hijackers. He also spent time in training camps in Afghanistan in the summer of 2000 where the attacks were planned.³³⁷ As of 9 May 2003, Germany had commenced prosecution against this accused, the second prosecution of a defendant criminally charged with involvement in the September 11 attacks on the United States. The indictment charged the accused with membership in a terrorist organization and aiding and abetting murder.³³⁸

Authorities also searched the headquarters and homes of 'Al Qsa' leaders and seized the organization's accounts in the amount of €300,000 in Aachen and Cologne. Schily said that the group had funneled contributions to Hamas and promised financial support to the families of potential assassins. The law went into effect at the beginning of 2002, and

³³⁴ Ibid. See also German Embassy, Washington, D.C., "First Charges Filed Against 9/11 Suspect in Germany," 29 August 2002, www.germany-info.org/relaunch/politics/new/pol_terror_indictment2.htm.

³³⁵ German Embassy, Washington, D.C., "9/11 Terror Defendant Gets Max Sentence," 19 February 2003, www.germanyinfo.org/relaunch/politics/new/pol_motassadeq.html; German News (English Edition), "Maximum sentence in terrorist trial in Hamburg," 19 February 2003, www.mathematik.uni-ulm.de/de-news/2003/02/191800.html#4.

³³⁶ German Embassy, Washington, D.C., "Fact Sheet: Germany's Contribution to the Coalition Against Terrorism," 13 December 2002, www.germanyinfo.org/relaunch/info/archives/background/fs_afgan.html. See also German Embassy, Washington, D.C., "First Charges Filed Against 9/11 Suspect in Germany," 29 August 2002, www.germany-info.org/relaunch/politics/new/pol_terror_indictment2.htm.

³³⁷ Germany Embassy, Washington, D.C., "Authorities Arrest Al Qaeda Suspect in Hamburg," 11 October 2002, www.germany-info.org/relaunch/politics/new/pol_terr_5.html.

³³⁸ Germany Embassy, Washington, D.C., "Government Welcomes Middle East 'Roadmap' to Peace," 12 May 2003, www.germanyinfo.org/relaunch/politics/new/pol_terror_indictment_2003.html.

permits the banning of organizations that support violent or terrorist activities outside Germany.³³⁹

On 5 September 2002, German authorities arrested a man and woman in Walldorf, Baden-Württemberg, who were in possession of explosive-making chemicals, likely preventing a bomb attack on either a United States military installation or on downtown Heidelberg. A search of their apartment revealed 280 pounds of materials that could be used to produce bombs, a picture of terrorist leader Osama bin Laden and books on building bombs.³⁴⁰

Media reports on 10 January 2003, indicated that German authorities had arrested two men suspected of belonging to the Al Qaeda terrorist network.³⁴¹

On 6 February 2003, federal prosecutors advised that German authorities were questioning three people and investigating two others in connection with terrorist activity. The individuals were suspected of belonging to a terrorist organization and possibly providing support to Al Qaeda.³⁴² As of 12 February 2003, German Chief Federal Prosecutor Kay Nehm had ordered police action against presumed terrorists in eleven locations that were searched by authorities. The police investigation was initiated against three persons suspected of being members of a terrorist organization and alleged supporters. Two of the accused were detained by police.³⁴³

On 21 March 2003, German officials began questioning six people suspected of recruiting Arab students to conduct terrorist bombings. They believed that the suspects were part of an international terrorist network.³⁴⁴ More recently, on 16 May 2003, German federal prosecutors announced that charges had been laid under the country's anti-terrorism legislation on a Jordanian man accused of belonging to a radical terrorist group allegedly preparing attacks on Germany. The prosecution was the result of investigations of 21 apartments throughout Germany in April 2002. Four people detained in connection with these investigations remained in custody as the investigation continued.³⁴⁵

³³⁹ German Embassy, Washington, D.C., "Authorities Seize Accounts of Group That Funneled Money to Hamas," www.germany-info.org/relaunch/politics/new/pol_terr_alaqsa.html.

³⁴⁰ German Embassy, Washington, D.C. "US Base or Heidelberg Downtown May Have Been Targeted," 9 September 2002, www.germanyinfo.org/relaunch/politics/new/pol_terror_heidelberg.html.

³⁴¹ CNN, "German arrests Al Qaeda suspects," 10 January 2003, www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/01/10/germany.alqaeda/index.html.

³⁴² CNN, "Terror suspects held in Germany," 6 February 2003, www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/02/06/germany.arrests/index.html.

³⁴³ German News (English Edition), "Raid on suspected Islamic terrorists," 12 February 2003, www.mathematik.uni-ulm.de/de-news/2003/02/121800.html#7; CNN, "Terror raids in German cities," 12 February 2003, www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/02/12/germany.raids/index.html.

³⁴⁴ CNN, "German terror police quiz six," 21 March 2003, www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/03/21/germany.terror/index.html.

³⁴⁵ CNN, "Germany charges alleged terror cell member," 16 May 2003, www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/05/16/germany.islamic.ap/index.html.

With respect to international cooperation, the German government has supported its allies in the area of criminal proceedings and investigation. It agreed to the Spring 2002 request for legal assistance by the United States government in the case of a French citizen, Zaccharias Moussaoui, who was accused of being involved in planning the attacks of September 11th. This decision followed assurances from the United States government that the evidence and information provided by Germany would not be used against the defendant nor against a third party towards imposition of the death penalty.³⁴⁶

In the days following the deadly terrorist bomb attack in Bali, Indonesia that killed more than 180 people on 12 October 2002 Chancellor Gerhard Schröder offered Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri assistance in finding the perpetrators. By 15 October 2002 German Federal Criminal Police had already sent agents to Bali to assist in identifying the victims.³⁴⁷

Germany and the United States announced on 30 September 2002 that they had blocked the financial assets of four men alleged to have connections to the Al Qaeda terrorist network. One of the men is one of the alleged planners of the September 11th terrorist attacks. The four men were accused of providing support to three of the 19 hijackers who died in the terrorist attacks. The German government also previously introduced a proposal to the United Nations Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee calling for the four men to be added to a list of individuals and organizations that are subject to sanctions under United Nations anti-terrorism resolutions. The proposal was adopted on 30 September 2002 and took immediate effect in all United Nations member states, freezing the assets of the four individuals, blocking their entry into or transit through the territories of member states, and prohibiting the supply, sale or transfer of arms, technical advice or military training to them.³⁴⁸

The German Interior Minister has also met, on separate occasions, with the United States FBI director, the United States Attorney General, and the United States Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to share information on terrorist threats and review the status of co-operation between the two countries in the fight against international terrorism. The discussions also included issues surrounding the use of biometric indicators, the establishment of a German-American working group for the development of international

³⁴⁶ German Embassy, Washington, D.C. "Germany gives legal assistance in the Moussaoui case," www.germany-info.org/relaunch/politics/new/pol_terror_trial3.html.

³⁴⁷ German Embassy, Washington, D.C. "Chancellor Offers Help in Bali Bombing Case", 15 October 2002, www.germany-info.org/relaunch/politics/new/pol_bali_bomb.html.

³⁴⁸ German Embassy, Washington, D.C. "Germany and US Block Financial Assets of Al Qaeda Suspects," 11 October 2002, www.germanyinfo.org/relaunch/politics/new/pol_terr_5.html; German Embassy, Washington, D.C. "Germany, U.S. Take Measures Against Suspected Al Qaeda Members," 30 September 2002, www.germany-info.org/relaunch/politics/new/pol_terr_4.html.

standards in this field, and an agreement for authorities in each country to work together to build an information board on terrorist suspects.³⁴⁹

Following agreement between Germany's Interior Minister and the United States Director of Homeland Security, delegations from Germany and the United States also met and agreed to several meetings of experts that could integrate German experiences into the creation of the United States Homeland Security Department. The German officials comprised specialists in counterterrorism, IT security, biometrics, protection of critical infrastructures, disaster prevention, and protection against biological and chemical attacks.³⁵⁰

Finally, in the area of meetings, German Defense Minister Peter Struck met with United States Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld at the Pentagon on 8 November 2002. At the meeting they discussed cooperation in the 'Operation Enduring Freedom'.³⁵¹ German Ambassador Wolfgang Ischinger and United States Customs Commissioner Robert Bonner signed a declaration on 1 August 2002 to improve bilateral cooperation on shipping container security. This initiative is intended to prevent terrorists from using sea cargo containers to smuggle weapons of mass destruction.³⁵²

Interior Minister Otto Schily announced on 16 January 2003 that Germany's anti-terrorism laws were being used to outlaw Hizb ut-Tahrir, an extremist terrorist organization active in the country. All activities of the group in Germany were banned by the law, enforceable by criminal sanction, and its assets were seized.³⁵³

The German government has also been active in reforming its domestic legislation to combat terrorism. On 12 July 2002, the German Bundesrat approved federal legislation concerning the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings of 15 December 1997.³⁵⁴ As of 2 April 2003, the German government agreed to paragraph 129a of the criminal code, adding to the list of criminal offences relating to terrorism,

³⁴⁹ German Embassy, Washington, D.C. "German Interior Minister Meets With Director of FBI," 26 September 2002, www.germany-info.org/relaunch/politics/new/pol_schily_FBI.html. See also German Embassy, Washington, D.C. "Interior Minister Meets with US Counterparts on Cooperation in Terrorism Investigation," 25 October 2002, www.germanyinfo.org/relaunch/politics/new/pol_terr_6.html.

³⁵⁰ German Embassy, Washington, D.C. "Homeland Security Focus of One-day German-U.S. Meeting," 6 August 2002, www.germanyinfo.org/relaunch/politics/new/pol_terror_statedept.html.

³⁵¹ German Embassy, Washington, D.C. "Defense Minister Struck Meets with Sec. Rumsfeld," 8 November 2002, www.germany-info.org/relaunch/politics/new/pol_struck_dc_2002b.html.

³⁵² German Embassy, Washington, D.C. "Agreement on Container Security Strengthens Cooperation in Fight Against Terrorism," www.germanyinfo.org/relaunch/politics/new/pol_terr_customs.html.

³⁵³ German Embassy, Washington, D.C., "Groups Banned Under Anti-extremism Law," 16 January 2003, www.germanyinfo.org/relaunch/politics/new/pol_schily_ban.html; German News (English Edition), "Additional Islamic organization banned," 15 January 2003, www.mathematik.uni-ulm.de/de-news/2003/01/152200.html#6.

³⁵⁴ Germany, Die Bundesregierung, "UN Conventions against Terrorism," 12 July 2002, eng.bundesregierung.de/frameset/index.jsp.

increasing the maximum penalties available, and setting out new criteria used to define a terrorist organization.³⁵⁵

Federal Interior Minister Otto Schily announced on 26 November 2002 that the government would be introducing a new visa format. The visa would include an ink-jet printed passport picture, and any attempts to forge the document would cause its destruction due to the ink.³⁵⁶ This initiative is likely to assist in the deterrence and apprehension of terrorists seeking illegal entry into Germany.

On 8 April 2003, the German and United States governments reached agreement on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. The agreement is significant for co-operation between the two countries in the international fight against terrorism, and is slated to be formalized as a treaty once final technical matters are resolved.³⁵⁷

On 13 May 2003, following terrorist attacks on complexes housing Westerners in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, German chancellor Gerard Schroder sent a telegram to United States president George Bush affirming that "the fight against terror ... is not over." As well, German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer sharply condemned the attacks and asserted that the German government is bound to the responsibility of countering the threat of terror in an effective and sustained fashion.³⁵⁸

4. Italy: +1

Italy is complying with its commitment to deny support or sanctuary to terrorists. Italian authorities have made several arrests and have frozen the assets of various terrorist groups.

In July 2002 Italian authorities arrested nine people on charges of providing logistical support and false papers to members of the Al-Qaeda network. Authorities also increased security in Venice's historic Jewish Ghetto area to guard against potential militant threats.³⁵⁹

In August 2002 Italian police arrested five people on suspicion of plotting to attack a church in Bologna. Reportedly, the one Italian and four Moroccans with ties to the Al-

³⁵⁵ German News (English Edition), "New anti-terrorism paragraph added to penal code," 2 April 2003, www.mathematik.uni-ulm.de/de-news/2003/04/021800.html#2.

³⁵⁶ German News (English Edition), "Forgery-proof visas with passport picture," 26 November 2002, www.mathematik.uni-ulm.de/de-news/2002/11/262200.html#5. See also Germany, German Embassy, Washington, D.C. "Photo Technology to Make EU Visas More Secure" (undated), online: www.germanyinfo.org/relaunch/politics/new/pol_vis_a_tech.htm.

³⁵⁷ German Embassy, Washington, D.C., "Agreement Reached on German-US Legal Assistance," 8 April 2003, www.germanyinfo.org/relaunch/politics/new/pol_zypries.html.

³⁵⁸ German Embassy, Washington, D.C., "World Must Continue Fight Against Terror," 13 May 2003, www.germanyinfo.org/relaunch/politics/new/pol_fischer_ME_2003_3.html.

³⁵⁹ news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2125101.stm

Qaeda network were planning to bomb the basilica, which contains a fresco considered by some Muslims to be offensive due its depiction of the Prophet Mohammed.³⁶⁰

In August 2002 police in Sicily arrested 15 Pakistanis that were believed to be members of the Al-Qaeda network on charges of conspiracy to commit terrorism. The suspects were all traveling with false passports on a cargo ship that had left Morocco for Libya, off the southern coast of Sicily.³⁶¹

On 29 August 2002 the Italian Foreign Ministry stated that 11 individuals and 14 organizations had been submitted to a United Nations international terrorism blacklist. Ten of the eleven individuals were placed in Italian jails and charged with various terrorist related offences, three have been formally sentenced.³⁶² The names of the accounts held by the individuals and organizations were submitted to a United Nations panel to be placed on an international terrorism blacklist.³⁶³

In October 2002 Italian police arrested three Egyptians suspected of planning attacks on a US War Cemetery, Rome's airport, and various fast food outlets. Police found explosive material and maps that highlighted potential targets.³⁶⁴

As of December 2002, Italian authorities continued to investigate groups suspected of having links with terrorist organizations. Investigations have been undertaken into the Somali movement *Al-Ittihad al-Islamiya* and the Somali *Al-Barakaat* bank, and charges have been brought against members of the Algerian organization Exile and Anathema. These investigations and trials are being conducted pursuant to previously enacted Law No. 438/2001 that introduced a new crime of "conspiracy to commit acts of international terrorism."

On 31 January 2003, Italian police announced that they had detained 28 Pakistani nationals in a raid. The police indicated that they may have uncovered a terrorist sleeper cell linked to Al Qaeda. During the raid, the police seized explosives, maps and manuals instructing how to falsify documents. The individuals were charged with possessing illegal materials and belonging to a terrorist organization.³⁶⁵

5. Japan: +1

Japan has complied with this commitment, particularly in the Asian region. In a letter addressed to Indonesian President Megawati Soekarnoputri following the terrorist

³⁶⁰ news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2205263.stm

³⁶¹ news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2253097.stm

³⁶² CNN, "Italy freezes 'terror' funds," 29 August 2002, www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/08/29/italy.terror/index.html.

³⁶³ Ibid.

³⁶⁴ BBC, "Terror suspects arrested near Rome," 5 October 2002, news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2302059.stm.

³⁶⁵ CNN, "Italy police raid 'terror cell'," 31 January 2003, www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe/01/31/naples.arrests/index.html.

bombing in Bali, Indonesia on 12 October 2002 Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi stated that “Japan would extend as much support as possible to Indonesia’s efforts against terrorism.”³⁶⁶

In his General Policy Speech to the Diet on 18 October 2002 the Prime Minister reiterated his government’s support to “do everything in its power to ensure the safety and security of the people while actively fulfilling Japan’s role as a member of the international community in contributing to the peace and stability of the world” in the fight against terrorism.³⁶⁷

In response to the terrorist attacks in Bali, Japan dispatched the following to Jakarta: a profiling expert to support the identification of the victims, two three-person Terrorism Response Teams of the National Police Agency to exchange information with local security authorities and support the investigation, and an expert on forensic odontology to identify the remains of victims.

A letter delivered from Prime Minister Junicho Koizumi to President Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation on 26 October 2002 noted that the Japanese towards terrorist acts that involve ordinary citizens, such as the occupation of a theatre in Moscow “can never be tolerated. Such acts threaten international peace and security and should be denounced.”³⁶⁸ In the wake of the terrorist occupation of a theatre in Moscow in October 2002, Japan and the Russian Federation called a Japan-Russia Consultation on Counter-Terrorism in November 2002.³⁶⁹

Japan commitment is again evidenced through the *APEC Leaders’ Statement on Recent Acts of Terrorism in APEC Member Economies*. The statement reaffirms that “terrorism in all its forms and manifestations committed wherever, whenever and by whomsoever, constitutes a brutal and heinous act of violence that contravenes the applicable law, religious beliefs and the fundamental values of APEC members” and calls for “strengthened international cooperation to support the region’s efforts to eliminate terrorism and restore economic confidence.”³⁷⁰

³⁶⁶ Prime Minister of Japan, "Message from the Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to President Megawati Soekarnoputri of Indonesia concerning the bombings in the Republic of Indonesia," 14 October 2002, www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2002/10/14message_e.html.

³⁶⁷ Prime Minister of Japan, "General Policy Speech by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to the 155th Session of the Diet," 18 October 2002, www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2002/10/18sisei_e.html.

³⁶⁸ Prime Minister of Japan, "Message from the Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to President Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation Concerning the Occupation of a Theater in Moscow," 26 October 2002, www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2002/10/26message_e.html.

³⁶⁹ Prime Minister of Japan, "Japan-Russian Action Plan," www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2003/01/10keikaku_e.html.

³⁷⁰ "APEC Leaders' Statement on Recent Acts of Terrorism in APEC Member Countries," 26 October 2002, www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumispeech/2002/10/26tokubetu_e.html.

6. Russia: +1

In 2002 Russia increased its monetary contribution toward combating terrorism, created an anti-terrorist centre and worked toward the re-structuring of its armed forces to better counter the terrorist threat both internationally and domestically. Russia remains firmly committed to the prevention of terrorism and the elimination of its social, political, and economic roots most notably in Chechnya and Iraq.

Russia believes that the fight against terrorism has not ended with the military operation in Afghanistan and that countries must primarily work toward blocking the financing of terrorist activities. Although the government has stated that they have no concise evidence that Iraq is involved in the financing of terrorist organizations it still believes that there is cause for concern in regard to the possibility of weapons of mass destruction that may be being produced in the territory of Iraq. Russia supports The United Nations Resolution UNSCR1441 that allows for United Nations observers to investigate sites and facilities inside

Iraq that are of interest in this regard. As for possible use of force in Iraq, Russia believes the international community should act within a UN framework. Faced with the international threat of terrorism that has transpired in Chechnya Russia has taken steps toward the creation of new bodies that would work toward preventing terrorist activities in this area, including the formation of a local law-enforcement agencies with an entirely Chechen staff. Presently, Russia is not pursuing any large-scale military operations in the area, and attests that the country wishes to protect the life of peaceful civilians and ensure stability and security in the Caucasian region. Russia recognizes that there is a humanitarian dimension and in this regard a judiciary is operating in Chechnya, as well as a prosecutor's office and Russian law enforcement agencies fighting not only terrorists and separatists but also the military whom Russia believes to be responsible for certain crimes and terrorist activity.

In November 2002, the Duma budget committee recommended to the State Duma that it increase expenditures on the struggle against terrorism in its 2003 budget by 1.5 billion rubles. Russia has also set up an antiterrorist centre in its continued efforts to combat terrorism both domestically and internationally.

The centre will include antiterrorist experts, Emergency Ministry representatives, medical workers and professional negotiators. The tragedy that ensued from the hostage situation in the Theatre centre in Moscow has also resulted in new measures to counter terrorists, including political, economic, financial, as well as military efforts.

On 1 December 2002, with the armed forces of the Russian Federation beginning a new academic year, plans for new military innovations were released that programs for combat training specifically oriented toward studying methods and techniques of fighting terrorists. Changes will also be made in such areas as the task of protecting and defending key military and economic facilities. Many of these facilities include nuclear power stations, hydro-electric power schemes, chemical and other hazardous plants, military

arsenals, and arms dumps in accordance with Russia's agreement to help prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

7. United Kingdom: +1

On both international and domestic levels, Britain has continued its efforts to combat terrorist activity. In 2002, having outlined global terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, and state failure as the three great threats to the country's international security, Britain further highlighted its commitment to ensuring Iraqi disarmament under the auspices of the United Nations. The Prime Minister stated that he was delighted with the Security Council's unanimous adoption of Resolution 1441. The British government however, also noted that it would prefer the creation of a second resolution that takes a tougher line and is more specific. Having reaffirmed its support of the United Nations, Britain believes it necessary to work through the UN in order to resolve the issue. The Prime Minister has stated however, that should Saddam Hussein defy the UN, Britain would be prepared to use force to ensure Iraqi disarmament.

On 30 October 2002, the government agreed to act on recommendations of an independent review of airport security. Recommendations included a coordinated approach to the threat from serious and organized crime at airports and a reexamination of police powers at airports.

In October 2002, the United Kingdom stressed the key role that Volunteer Reserves would play in the aftermath of major incidents, like the aftermath of a terrorist attack. Three proposals were underlined: fourteen civil contingency reaction forces, each composed of approximately 500 volunteers, will provide assistance on short notice; new Reserve teams will be added to military headquarters, in the event of an incident these teams will become part of a 24 hour command structure; and, an existing Territorial Army formation will provide the communications infrastructure to support a regional command chain with new equipment compatible with that being introduced in the emergency services. There will also be an extra 700 Volunteer Reserve posts with extra training provided.

In November 2002, Chancellor Gordon Brown instructed UK financial institutions to freeze any accounts belonging to the Benevolence International Foundation, an organization that raised Al Qaeda funds. Brown noted that "in the UK the police have acted swiftly against terrorist suspects, with significant seizures of terrorist funds."

8. United States: +1

Throughout 2002 the United States has remained committed to preventing terrorism on an international and domestic scale and continues to battle terrorism through its commitment to waging war on those who would harbour or support terrorists. President George W. Bush outlined two main priorities in the areas of National and Homeland Security for 2002-2003 and efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction remains a central component to the American efforts in combating terrorism.

On 17 September 2002, the United States released The National Security Strategy of the United States of America committing the country to defending the Nation against its enemies. The strategy calls for the use of military power, better homeland defences, law enforcement, intelligence, and efforts to undermine terrorist financing. The United States believes the document will aid them in their ongoing efforts to prevent terrorists from developing bases inside of America. The strategy also reaffirms the United States commitment to building defences against ballistic missiles and other means of delivery for weapons of mass destruction. President Bush's call for all military personnel to be inoculated with the Smallpox vaccine and for the establishment of Smallpox Response Teams for civilians is further evidence of America's efforts to defend the country against biological weapons as well.

The United States believes that the state of Iraq has violated all obligations it consented to at the end of the Persian Gulf War and America calls on the United Nations to take action that ensures Iraq terminates all development of weapons of mass destruction and ceases to support terrorist organizations. America continues to urge the Security Council to adopt a tough policy setting out immediate requirements for Iraqi disarmament, and supports the current resolution UNSCR 1441, although the Administration has expressed a degree of skepticism regarding the effectiveness of the resolution to bring about Iraqi disarmament.

On 25 November 2002, President Bush signed the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The Act restructures and strengthens the executive branch of the Federal Government with the intent of more effectively meeting any threat to the United States posed by terrorism. The establishment of a new Department of Homeland Security for the first time creates a Federal department whose primary goal is to prevent, protect against, and respond to acts of terrorism. A US\$3.5 billion increase in the budgets of America's first line responders will be provided, which includes the police, fire fighters and emergency medical personnel. The President also signed the Bob Stump National Defence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 in December. The President's Budget proposes over US\$360 billion in 2003 for defence purposes, with the possibility of an additional US\$9 billion, if needed, to fight the war on terrorism.

Compiled by: Ryan B. Lavalley, Bob Papanikolaou, and Janel Smith
University of Toronto G8 Research Group
January 2003

2002 Kananaskis Final Compliance Report Transnational Crime and Corruption

Commitment:

45 (Africa Action Plan), 12 (Chair's Summary)

Working to secure the early establishment of a UN Convention on Corruption, and the early ratification of the UN Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime; **We support the Transitional Authority of Afghanistan.**

Background:

The UN Convention Against Transnational Crime represents a major step forward in the fight against transnational organised crime. The Convention is a recognition by all U.N. members that transnational organised crime is a serious and growing problem that can only be solved through close international co-operation. The Convention was adopted by the UN General Assembly on November 15, 2000 and now has 145 signatories but only 28 parties³⁷¹.

The failing score that the Research Group gave to the G8 ratification of this convention last year was regarded as a big surprise given that the G8 states harbour strong criminal international organisations. More surprisingly, this year, after the G8 Africa Action Plan, the G8 Recommendations for Transnational Crime, and several ministerial meetings, advocated for the convention's ratification, only two countries Canada and France, have effectively done so. In addition Canada and France, as well as Japan, have also ratified two protocols: the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air. Both protocols supplement the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.

The establishment of a UN Convention on Corruption is still in progress. The fifth Ad Hoc Committee on the Negotiation of a Convention against Corruption was held in March 2003. Although the first three Ad Hoc Committee meetings have produced early drafts of a Convention, no country has yet signed or ratified any accord³⁷².

³⁷¹ United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime- Signatories Page. Accessed: April 28, 2003. www.undcp.org/odccp/crime_cicp_signatures_convention.html

³⁷² United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Negotiation of a Convention against Corruption. Accessed: April 28, 2003. www.undcp.org/odccp/crime_cicp_convention_corruption_docs.html

Assessment:

Country	Lack of Compliance -1	Work in Progress 0	Full Compliance +1
Britain		0	
Canada			+1
France			+1
Germany		0	
Italy		0	
Japan		0	
Russia		0	
United States		0	
Total			+0.25

Individual Country Compliance Breakdown:**1. Britain: 0**

Britain signed the UN Convention Against Transnational Crime on December 14, 2000, but has yet to ratify it³⁷³.

2. Canada: +1

Canada signed the UN Convention Against Transnational Crime on December 14, 2000, and ratified it, together with its two instrumental protocols on May 13, 2002. Canada has therefore met its commitment to Convention ratification. Canada acknowledges that no country is exempt from corruption, condemns it and ties it to international organised crime and terrorism.

3. France: +1

France signed the UN Convention Against Transnational Crime on December 12, 2000, and ratified it, together with its two instrumental protocols on October 29, 2002. It too has met its commitment to Convention ratification.

4. Germany: 0

Germany signed the UN Convention Against Transnational Crime on December 12, 2000, but has yet to ratify it. The German Federal Foreign Office suggests that “Critical to the success of the Convention and its Protocols will be their implementation,” and

³⁷³ United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime – Signatories Page- Accessed: April 28 2003. www.unodc.org/odccp/crime_cicp_signatures_convention.html

confirms Germany's belief that the integrated fight against Transnational Crime is necessary³⁷⁴.

Germany is already a partner country on a pilot project of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children³⁷⁵.

5. Italy: 0

Italy signed the UN Convention Against Transnational Crime on December 12, 2000, but has yet to ratify it³⁷⁶.

6. Japan: 0

Japan signed the UN Convention Against Transnational Crime on December 12, 2000, but has yet to ratify it³⁷⁷. However, Japan signed three supplemental protocols: the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children (hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Trafficking in Persons); the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Smuggling of Migrants); and the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components, and Ammunition (hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Firearms) in December 2002³⁷⁸.

7. Russia: 0

Russia signed the UN Convention Against Transnational Crime on December 12, 2000, but has yet to ratify it³⁷⁹.

8. United States: 0

The United States signed the UN Convention Against Transnational Crime on December 13, 2000, but has yet to ratify it³⁸⁰.

Compiled by: University of Toronto G8 Research Group
May 2003

³⁷⁴ German Federal Foreign Office United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime Accessed: Dec. 20, 2002. www.auswaertigesamt.de/www/en/aussenpolitik/vn/konventionen_ok_html

³⁷⁵ www.undcp.org/odccp/trafficking_projects.html

³⁷⁶ United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime- Signatories Page- Accessed: April 28, 2003. www.undcp.org/odccp/crime_cicp_signatures_convention.html

³⁷⁷ Ibid.

³⁷⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan Signing of Three Protocols Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2002/12/1206.html

³⁷⁹ United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime- Signatories Page- Accessed: April 28 2003. www.undcp.org/odccp/crime_cicp_signatures_convention.html

³⁸⁰ Ibid.