

2003 Evian Interim Compliance Report Weapons of Mass Destruction

Commitment:

2003-186: “We reaffirm our support for the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), which should be granted the necessary means to implement its monitoring tasks.”

Background:

The focus on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) at the 2003 Evian Summit was driven by the threat of nuclear proliferation in the three countries labelled by US President Bush as the ‘Axis of Evil’ in his 2002 State of the Union address: Iraq, Iran and North Korea.⁴⁰⁵ At the time of the summit, many G8 member-states still supported the idea that the US had invaded Iraq prematurely and had failed to afford the IAEA adequate time to conclude its search for Iraq’s alleged WMD program. Furthermore, the US was also facing further criticism for denying the IAEA re-entry into Iraq to resume its search after the fall of the former regime in May 2003.⁴⁰⁶ In light of these tensions, the strong commitment delivered at the Evian Summit for the work of the IAEA can be interpreted partly as a reconciliatory gesture by all member-states in an effort to mend trans-Atlantic ties frayed in the US-led war on Iraq. The majority, however, of the G8’s robust commitment towards the IAEA can be attributed to the alarming risk of nuclear proliferation in both North Korea and Iran that emerged in the first-half of 2003. In October 2002, North Korea announced that it had resumed operation of an illicit nuclear weapons program mothballed in 1994. In January 2002, the country officially withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).⁴⁰⁷ Grave concerns over the recent unchecked proliferation of nuclear weapons to unstable states were only reinforced amongst accusations by the United States in the summer of 2003 that Iran was seeking to develop a WMD program.⁴⁰⁸ In both these instances, the United States and the international community have opted to chart a course of diplomacy and inspections as opposed to the use of force to counter nuclear proliferation. As a result, the G8 has directed renewed attention and support towards IAEA and its operations, which has been translated into several documents released at the Evian Summit pertaining to WMD. These documents include *Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction – A G8 Declaration*,⁴⁰⁹ as well as a reference to the matter in the *Chairman’s Summary* from which the above commitment is extracted.⁴¹⁰

⁴⁰⁵ “Timeline: Iran,” BBC World News: Internet Edition (London) 27 December 2003. Date of Access: 4 January 2003 news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/806268.stm.

⁴⁰⁶ “Putting the World Back Together Again,” The Economist (London/Washington D.C.) 7 June 2003. Date of Access: 4 January 2003 www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=S%27%29HL%2EQ1%5F%27%23P%21%28%0A.

⁴⁰⁷ “Timeline: North Korea,” BBC World News: Internet Edition (London) 28 December 2003. Date of Access: 4 January 2003 news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/1132268.stm.

⁴⁰⁸ “Timeline: Iran,” BBC World News: Internet Edition (London) 27 December 2003. Date of Access: 4 January 2003 news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/806268.stm.

⁴⁰⁹ Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction – A G8 Declaration, 2003 Sommet d’Evian Official Website (Evian/Paris) 3 June 2003. Date of Access: 3 January 2003 www.g8.fr/evian/english.

⁴¹⁰ Chairman’s Summary, 2003 Sommet d’Evian Official Website (Evian/Paris) 3 June 2003. Date of Access: 3 January 2003 www.g8.fr/evian/english.

Assessment:

Score	Lack of Compliance -1	Work in Progress 0	Full Compliance +1
Canada			+1
France			+1
Germany			+1
Italy			+1
Japan			+1
Russia			+1
United Kingdom			+1
United States			+1
European Union*			+1*
Overall			1

Individual Country Compliance Breakdown:

1. Canada: +1

Canada has maintained a high level of compliance throughout 2003 towards the weapons of mass destruction commitments proposed at the G8 Evian Summit. It has been able to do so through monitoring and dismantling projects in Russia, and an overall firm commitment to the G8 Global Partnership Initiative against the spread of weapons of mass destruction and other treaties pertaining to the latter, which are all administered or monitored by the IAEA. Canada has maintained this level of support for the IAEA due to its large exporter status of uranium, coupled with its status as a middle power country without a nuclear arsenal.

In August 2003, Rob McDougall, Director of Non-Proliferation Arms Control and Disarmament Division, of the Department of Foreign Affairs, restated Canada's commitment of CDN\$1 billion over the next ten years towards disarmament and non-proliferation issues in Russia in an effort to aid the IAEA in the region, and added that the commitment, "confirms this area as one of Canada's highest NACD priorities..."⁴¹¹ In addition, on 19 November 2003, Canada and the United Kingdom signed a Memorandum of Understanding in Moscow, part of the project designed by the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, launched in June 2002 by G8 leaders in support of the IAEA's efforts, geared towards supporting Russia in destroying its chemical weapons stockpiles. Canada is to provide CDN\$33 million, which the UK will use to finance the project.⁴¹²

⁴¹¹ Opening Remarks by Rob McDougall, Director Non-Proliferation Arms Control and Disarmament Division: Government Consultations with Civil Society on Issues Related to International Security, Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction and their Delivery Systems, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, (Ottawa), August 26, 2003. Date of Access: December 30, 2003. www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/mcdougall6-en.asp.

⁴¹² UK and Canada Cooperate to Assist Russia in Destroying Chemical Weapons, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, (Ottawa) November 19, 2003. Date of Access: January 2, 2004. www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/global_partnership/uk_canada-en.asp.

More universally, Canada has attempted to take a leadership role in the area of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by providing active support towards such non-proliferation treaties as the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which are administered and monitored by the IAEA.

Finally, Canada has also applauded Libya's decision to dismantle its weapons of mass destruction program and both it and Iran's decisions to accept IAEA inspectors in to their countries. In October 2003, Paul Meyer, Ambassador for Disarmament, stated at the UN General Assembly that, "we [Canada] are determined to strengthen the prohibitions against WMDs, to reinforce the non-proliferation and disarmament regimes, to advance the promising conventional arms control agenda and to contribute to the efficacy of UN and multilateral machinery in the entire field".⁴¹³

2. France: +1

France has revealed a high level of compliance in regards to the weapons of mass destruction commitments laid out at the 2003 Evian G8 Summit, principally through the IAEA's efforts in Libya and in Iran. France has repeatedly taken a strong stance in support of the IAEA's efforts due to its status as a nuclear power, not only militarily but through its civilian nuclear energy programs, and it being a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

Since February 2003, the IAEA has been occupied in verifying the Iranian nuclear program and its history. France has been a strong supporter of this task and has mobilized its efforts with those of its European partners to gain Iran's ascension to the IAEA Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. In October 2003, M. Dominique de Villepin, Minister of Foreign Affairs visited the Iranian Foreign Minister, Mr. Kharrazi, in Tehran in order to guarantee that Iran's obligations to the IAEA follow through, and was quoted as saying that, "it is an important visit because proliferation issues are at the heart of our [France's] concerns...".⁴¹⁴ In November 2003, France, along with Germany and Britain, also drafted a resolution, that was favoured strongly by the Board of Governors of the IAEA, where by Iran would commit itself to IAEA inspections and halt its uranium enrichment programs rather than be in violation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and succumb to UN sanctions.⁴¹⁵ France went on to congratulate Iran on its signing of the IAEA's Additional Protocol for Nuclear Safeguards on 18 December 2003, viewing the method of political approach to the Iranian dilemma as an effective and peaceful method to such a risky situation: "this approach stands as an example, and we hope that other States resolutely embark on the same path".⁴¹⁶

⁴¹³ Statement by Paul Meyer Ambassador for Disarmament To the First Committee of The Fifty-eighth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, (Ottawa October 8, 2003. Date of Access: December 30, 2003. www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/meyer-en.asp.

⁴¹⁴ Visit to the Islamic Republic of Iran: Interview given by M. Dominique De Villepin, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Press, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Paris) October 21, 2003. Date of Access: December 30, 2003. www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/bulletin.gb.asp?liste=20031022.gb.html#Chapitre2.

⁴¹⁵ Most IAEA board members favor EU trio-backed resolution, International Atomic Energy Agency, (Vienna) November 20, 2003. Date of Access: January 10, 2004. www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2003/iran-031120-irna02.htm.

⁴¹⁶ Libya Statement to the Media by M. Dominique De Villepin, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the Press, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Paris) December 20, 2003. Date of Access: December 30, 2003.

France has also welcomed Libya's decision to abandon its projects involving weapons of mass destruction in December 2003, stating that it was "an important step towards that country's fully-fledged return to the international community."⁴¹⁷ Furthermore, in regards to North Korea's nuclear program, although not belonging to the six-nation talks on the Korean Peninsula, France has supported the IAEA's efforts there and has demanded that North Korea dismantle its military nuclear program and allow IAEA inspectors into the country forthwith.⁴¹⁸

Finally, to further stress France's support for non-proliferation and the IAEA's activities, in September 2003, at the opening of the 58th Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations in New York, President Chirac emphasized the need for unity towards non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. He proposed a permanent team of inspectors under the control of the Security Council as a plan of action: "we must unite to assure the universality of agreements and the effectiveness of non-proliferation methods".⁴¹⁹

3. Germany: +1

Germany has registered a high level of interim compliance with commitments made at Evian regarding weapons of mass destruction in a very limited focus area. Most of Germany's effort has been focused on negotiations with Iran to allow the IAEA to inspect.

Iran was criticized this year very strongly for its failure to allow IAEA inspectors to monitor their nuclear program. Germany, together with the United Kingdom and France, entered into negotiations with Iran to encourage them to cooperate with the IAEA and to sign the Additional Protocol of the IAEA's Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. On 21 October 2003 Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer met with his counterparts from France and the United Kingdom in Tehran to discuss the situation with senior Iranian officials.⁴²⁰ On 25 November 2003, the IAEA released a resolution urging Iran to cooperate with inspectors and to sign on to the Additional Protocol. The German government was strongly in favour of this resolution, and joined France and the UK in blocking a US proposal calling for the matter to be automatically transferred from the IAEA to the UN Security Council in the event of Iranian non-compliance – a move that would have greatly diminished the ability of the IAEA to regulate the crisis itself.⁴²¹ Germany, France and the United Kingdom compromised with the United States by agreeing to condemn Iran's nuclear program while ensuring that management of the crisis would remain in the immediate jurisdiction of the IAEA and not the United Nations' Security Council where sanction would

www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/bulletin.gb.asp?liste=20031222.gb.html#Chapitre1.

⁴¹⁷ Ibid.

⁴¹⁸ Discours de Monsieur Jacques Chirac, President de la Republique Francaise a l'Ouverture de la 58eme Session de L'Assemblee Generale des Nations Unies, Le Palais de l'Elysee, Office of the President of the Republic (Paris) September 23, 2003. Date of Access: January 2, 2004. www.elysee.fr/ang/rech/rech_.htm.

⁴¹⁹ Ibid.

⁴²⁰ Bundeskanzler dankt Joschka Fischer fuer erfolgreiche Vermittlung in Iran, Office of the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany (Berlin) 22 October 2003. Date of Access 3 January 2004. www.bundeskanzler.de/-7698.545309/Bundeskanzler-dankt-Joschka-Fischer-fuer-erfolgr...htm.

⁴²¹ "US Welcomes Iran Report," BBC World News UK Edition (London) 26 November 2003. Date of Access 3 January 2004. news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3241662.

have been likely imposed.⁴²² Germany is further encouraging Iran's continued cooperation with the IAEA by promising, along with the United Kingdom and France, to cooperate in future technological developments with Iran⁴²³

Notably, Germany has been quite silent diplomatically in terms with regards to efforts by the international community to compel North Korea to return to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and allow IAEA inspectors in the country. Similarly, Germany had comparatively few comments about the decision by Libya on 19 December 2003 to scrap its weapons of mass destruction program and submit to IAEA inspections.

4. Italy: +1

Italy has registered a high level of interim compliance with respects to Evian's weapons of mass destruction commitments, focusing primarily upon the IAEA's efforts towards non-proliferation regarding North Korea and Iran. Italy in the unique position as a country without civilian or military atomic energy programs, as well as the country that held presidency in the European Union from 1 July to 20 December 2003.

One of the areas where Italy used its presidency of the EU to make a stand was with regards to the North Korean nuclear crisis. Although Italy and EU Presidency are not party to the six-way talks, they nonetheless worked towards the international community's goal of seeing North Korea return to the IAEA's Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Guido Martini, Director-General, Department of Asia and Oceania of Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, led the nine-member EU delegation to North Korea. The delegation visited the country in order to discuss about the next round of multilateral talks. Martini said that "the trip was very good for all of us".⁴²⁴ Martini made it clear to Pyongyang that EU would only cooperate with the North economically on condition that the nuclear crisis is settled and North Korea rejoins the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty⁴²⁵.

The other area where Italy, both as an independent state and as the President of the Council of the European Union, reiterated its support to IAEA was in its efforts to compel Iran to abandon its suspected nuclear weapons program and to sign the Additional Protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. On 14 July 2003, Italian Foreign Minister Frattini had a telephone conversation with his Iranian counterpart Khamal Kharrazi during which he "reiterated the European Union's call for Iran to cooperate fully and transparently with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)". In addition Martini "recalled that Italy's European partners wanted to continue constructive dialogue with Iran".⁴²⁶ Such a dialogue continued in October 2003, when

⁴²² "Interview with Mohamed El Baradei." CNN.com International 26 November 2003. Date of Access 2 January 2004. edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0311/26/I_qoa.01.html.

⁴²³ "Tehran Pledges to Work With the IAEA," BBC World News UK Edition (London) 29 November 2003. Date of Access 2 January 2003. news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3248854.stm.

⁴²⁴ "Six-nation nuclear talks on N. Korea planned", USA Today (McLean, Virginia) 12 December 2003. Date of Access: 05 January 2004. nuclearno.com/text.asp?7377.

⁴²⁵ "EU envoys brief Seoul on discussions with North", JoongAng Daily, 13 December 2003, Date of Access: 05 January 2004. www.iht.com/pdfs/jai/H200312131003000JAI.pdf.

⁴²⁶ Frattini, Kharrazi Confirm Desire to Continue EU-Iran Talks. Italian Presidency of the Council of the European Union (Rome) 14 July 2003. Date of Access: 29 December 2003 www.ueitalia2003.it/EN/Notizie/affariGeneraliRelazioniEsterne/Notizia_07141730740.htm.

the British, German and French foreign ministers traveled to Tehran for direct discussions with the Iranian leadership – an visit for which Italy expressed firm support and strong encouragement.⁴²⁷ Prior to their departure to Iran, Frattini engaged in communication with the ministers during which he highlighted “Italy’s attention to its relations with Iran and its interest in the action of these three countries, to which Italy, while supporting it, chose not to associate itself at this time, in light of its duties as the as the President of the EU”.⁴²⁸ In October 2003, Frattini praised Tehran’s promise to sign the Protocol.⁴²⁹

Finally, Italy expressed deep satisfaction with Libya’s decision to accept the Additional Protocol. Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi claimed that Italy was involved in the agreement and was personally praised by the US.⁴³⁰ Minister Frattini said that this development was “the crowning of Italy’s constructive dialogue-based approach”.⁴³¹

5. Japan: +1

Japan has registered a notably high level of interim compliance with respects to Evian’s weapons of mass destruction commitments, focusing primarily upon the IAEA’s efforts towards non-proliferation regarding North Korea and Iran. Japan has a heightened stake in the IAEA’s activities due to its standing as the sole great power without nuclear arsenal, its extensive civilian atomic energy program, and it being the only country to have experienced a nuclear attack.

North Korea’s expulsion of IAEA inspectors in late 2002 and its withdrawal from the IAEA’s Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in January 2003 has been the primary focus of Japan’s WMD compliance efforts. Japan is an active party to the six-nation multilateral talks to negotiate an end North Korea’s nuclear weapons program, and attended the group’s unsuccessful first meeting on 27–29 August 2003 in Beijing. At the talks, Japan clearly stated that “the nuclear problem...must be solved before the normalization of the relations between Japan and North Korea,” which included the latter returning to the NPT regime.⁴³² On 17 September 2003 Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi traveled to Pyongyang for a state visit with General Secretary Kim Jong Il. During his stay, Koizumi publicly stated that the Jong Il “made it clear that all relevant international agreements [namely the NPT] would be adhered to,” but stressed that, “what is important is that North Korea act on its promises”. Compelled by international pressure and deal-making sponsored partly by Japan, North Korea announced on 27 December 2003 that it would participate in another round of six-nation negotiations in 2004. Senior Japanese Foreign Ministry official Mitoji Yabunaka is scheduled to meet with South Korean

⁴²⁷ Information Paper, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Rome, 20 October 2003, Date of Access: 10 January 2004. www.esteri.it/attualita/2003/eng/notes/n031020a.htm.

⁴²⁸ Communication from Minister Frattini to Ministers Straw, de Villepin and Fischer on the eve of their visit to Iran, Italian Presidency of the Council of the European Union (Rome) 20 October 2003. Date of Access: 29 December 2003

⁴²⁹ Ibid.

⁴³⁰ “World leaders send clear signals to Libya after arms decision”, AFP (Paris), 20 December 2003, Date of Access: 10 January 2004. uk.news.yahoo.com/031220/323/ehjxb.html.

⁴³¹ Information Paper, Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Rome) 22 December 2003, DATE OF ACCES: 10 January 2004. www.esteri.it/attualita/2003/eng/notes/n031222a.htm.

⁴³² “Six-Party Talks on North Korean Issues (Overview and Evaluation),” The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (Tokyo) September 2003. Date of Access: 20 December 2003. www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n_korea/6party0308.html.

Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Soo-hyuck and China's Fu Ying on 28 December 2003 to discuss strategy for ending North Korea's nuclear weapons program and returning IAEA inspectors.⁴³³

The other main arena of Japan WMD-compliance efforts involves the Islamic Republic of Iran and related suspicions that it has launched a covert nuclear weapons program. On 26 August 2003, Japan hosted the Japan-Iran Expert Meeting on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol. At this bilateral meeting Japan "requested again that the Iranian side cooperate fully with the IAEA, and promptly and unconditionally sign, ratify and fully implement the Additional Protocol".⁴³⁴ In September 2003, Iranian Foreign Minister Sr. Seyyed Kamal Kharrazi attended a state visit to Tokyo, during which he presented a letter from Iranian President Khatami stating that Iran had "decided to expand its cooperation with the IAEA and begin talks on the IAEA Additional Protocol with the IAEA".⁴³⁵ On 16 September 2003, Japan co-sponsored a strongly-worded resolution passed by the IAEA Board of Governors condemning Iran for its covert nuclear weapons program. The resolution demanded that "Iran fully disclose uranium enrichment and other programs that can be directly linked to the development of nuclear weapons and sign an additional protocol to enable the IAEA to conduct inspections without prior notification".⁴³⁶ In addition, Japan endorsed the IAEA's 22 November 2003 report outlining Iran nuclear questionable activities. Along with the United States, Canada, the Netherlands, and Australia, Japan also held out for stronger language in the IAEA Board of Governors' statement demanding Iran cooperate more fully with the IAEA and sign the NPT Additional Protocol.⁴³⁷ The Government of Japan warmly welcomed Iran's signing of the NPT Additional Protocol on 18 December 2003, and offered to share "with Iranian experts... Japan's experience of the conclusion and implementation of the Additional Protocol".⁴³⁸

Lastly, Japan, like many other countries, openly applauded Libya's decision to voluntarily submit to IAEA weapon's inspectors on 20 December 2003. Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi stated that "North Korea should take the decision (by Libya) seriously and adopt a co-operative policy with the international community over the nuclear issue...Libya has judged that co-operating with the international community would lead to its prosperity".⁴³⁹

⁴³³ "North Korea Confirms Nuclear Talks," BBC World New UK Edition (London) 27 December 2003. Date of Access: 27 December 2003 [BBC World New UK Edition (London) 22 December 2003. Date of Access: 23 December 2003 news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3351615.stm].

⁴³⁴ Japan-Iran Expert Meeting on the IAEA Additional Protocol, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo) August 2003. Date of Access: 23 December 2003 www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/iran/iaea0308.html.

⁴³⁵ Visit to Japan by Dr. Seyyed Kamal Kharrazi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Overview and Evaluation) The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo) 16 September 2003. Date of Access: 23 December 2003 www.mofa.go.jp/region/middle_e/iran/fmv0308.html.

⁴³⁶ Statement by the Press Secretary/Director-General for Press and Public Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors' Adoption of the Resolution concerning the Nuclear Issues of Iran, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo) September 2003. Date of Access: 23 December 2003 www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2003/9/0916-2.html.

⁴³⁷ "US Wants Tough Resolution on Iran: Move Follows IAEA Report of Clandestine Nuclear Program," CNN.com (Atlanta) 22 November 2003. Date of Access: 22 December 2003 www.cnn.com/2003/US/11/22/us.iran.nuclear.

⁴³⁸ Statement by Minister for Foreign Affairs Yoriko Kawaguchi on Iran's signing of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo) 19 December 2003. Date of Access: 23 December 2003 www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/2003/12/1219.html#1.

⁴³⁹ "Libya Faces Early Nuclear Checks," BBC World New UK Edition (London) 22 December 2003. Date of Access: 23 December 2003. news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3339347.stm.

6. Russia: +1

Russia has obtained a high level of interim compliance with its Evian's commitments on weapons of mass destruction, focusing primarily upon the IAEA's efforts towards non-proliferation regarding North Korea and Iran. Russia has a unique position as a country with the second biggest nuclear arsenal in the world, an extensive civilian atomic energy program and the closest ties with Iran and North Korea of all other members of G8.

Russia showed strong support to IAEA during the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. In this 5 November 2003 speech Russian Minister of Atomic Energy Alexander Rumiantsev said that "Russia will fight to achieve universal acceptance of principles, adopted in Evian and Kananaskis by the leaders of G8, aiming at preventing access for terrorists and their supporters to weapons of mass destruction".⁴⁴⁰

On 2 December 2003 Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Yuri Fedotov met in Vienna with the Director General of IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei. They confirmed that approaches of Russia and the Agency coincide with regards to the solution of the questions linked to the nuclear programs of Iran and the DPRK.⁴⁴¹

Russia has a strong relationship with Iran but previous reluctance on the part of Iran was hurting their cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy. On 10 November 2003 Hasan Rohani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council of Iran, met with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow and declared that Iran was going to comply with the requirements of the IAEA.⁴⁴²

The other area where Russia demonstrated a readiness to help further IAEA goals, was North Korea's nuclear weapons program. Russia took part in the first round of talks on the North Korean nuclear problem, held in Beijing at the end of August, together with the representatives of the US, the DPRK, the Republic of Korea, Japan and China. On 13 November 2003 Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Alexander Losyukov received the Ambassador of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to Russia, Pak Ui Chun. In the course of the talk that took place, questions of preparation for a possible second round of six-way talks on the nuclear problem of the Korean Peninsula were touched upon. Both sides emphasized their readiness to conduct a constructive search for a just and mutually acceptable solution to this problem which would lead to the safeguarding of a de-nuclearized status for the peninsula with security guarantees for all the region's states, including the DPRK, and the establishment of

⁴⁴⁰ Intervention by Alexander Rumiantsev, Minister of the Atomic Energy, Ministry of Atomic Energy Press Centre (Moscow), Nov 2003. Date of Access: 05 January 2004. www.minatom.ru/presscenter/document/news/PRINT_news412.htm.

⁴⁴¹ Transcript of Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Yuri Fedotov's Interview with State Television Corporation of the State of Qatar, Daily News Bulletin of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russian Federation (Moscow), December 22, 2003. Date of Access: 05 January 2004. www.ln.mid.ru/Bl.nsf/arh/E1E7F121FF467202C3256E07005856CE?OpenDocument.

⁴⁴² "Iranian Atom and Kremlin Prestige" Krasnaya Zvezda (Moscow) 12 November 2003. Date of Access: 05 January 2004. www.redstar.ru/2003/11/12_11/3_02.html.

favorable conditions for their economic and social development.⁴⁴³ Another meeting between them took place on 2 December 2003.⁴⁴⁴

Moscow also has received with satisfaction the statement by the Libyan leadership that Tripoli is giving up its plans to develop and produce weapons of mass destruction and is ready for the widest cooperation in this area with the international community. Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs noted that: “The Russian side had invariably called for this in the framework of its contacts with the Libyan partners for the last few years. We welcome Libya’s declared readiness to sign an Additional Protocol to the IAEA Safeguards Agreement Pursuant to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, accede to the Chemical Weapons Convention and adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime”.⁴⁴⁵

7. United Kingdom: +1

The United Kingdom has registered a high level of interim compliance with the commitments made at Evian regarding weapons of mass destruction. The United Kingdom has supported the IAEA’s efforts in Libya, Iran, and North Korea, and has worked closely with the United States and the European Union to reduce the threat of WMDs.

The United Kingdom has cooperated closely with the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in its efforts to convince Libya to dismantle its nuclear program. Since being approached by envoys of Colonel Gaddafi in March 2003, Prime Minister Tony Blair has been negotiating with Libya and the United States. Largely as a result of those negotiations, Libya has agreed to allow IAEA inspectors into the country.⁴⁴⁶ In response to Libya’s cooperation, Blair stated: “We have offered our support to Libya in presenting its programs to these international bodies and are prepared to offer assistance with dismantlement”.⁴⁴⁷

The United Kingdom has also made progress with Iran. Following the Evian Summit, Tony Blair called upon Iran to cooperate with the IAEA “without delay or condition”.⁴⁴⁸ On 21 October 2003, Jack Straw, Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom, met with the Foreign Ministers of France and Germany in Tehran to encourage Iran to cooperate with the IAEA.⁴⁴⁹ On 29 November 2003, Iran announced that it would cooperate with the IAEA. This decision was

⁴⁴³ Press Release, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow), 13 November 2003. Date of Access: 05 January 2004. www.in.mid.ru/BI.nsf/arh/8BF15C3EEF40CD9343256DDE00310965?OpenDocument.

⁴⁴⁴ Daily News Bulletin, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow), 02 December 2003. Date of Access: 05 January 2004.

www.in.mid.ru/BI.nsf/arh/61E58B287C8EA30943256DF0004349F0?OpenDocument.

⁴⁴⁵ Statement by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov Regarding Libya's Decision to Give Up Its Weapons of Mass Destruction Programs, Daily News Bulletin, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation (Moscow), 22 December 2003. Date of Access: 05 January 2004.

www.in.mid.ru/BI.nsf/arh/3F90085ABF261FA7C3256E04004F0C05?OpenDocument.

⁴⁴⁶ “Libyan FM Confirms Nuclear Stance,” BBC World News UK Edition (London) 27 December 2003. Date of Access 30 December 2003. news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/3350645.stm.

⁴⁴⁷ PM Welcomes Libyan WMD Announcement, Office of the Prime Minister (London) 19 December 2003. Date of Access 31 December 2003. www.number-10.gov.uk/output/page5086.asp.

⁴⁴⁸ PM Briefs MPs on G8 Summit, Office of the Prime Minister (London) 4 July 2003. Date of Access 27 December 2003. www.number-10.gov.uk/output/page3817.asp.

⁴⁴⁹ “Iran’s Nuclear Move in Press Spotlight,” BBC World News UK Edition (London) 23 October 2003. Date of Access 10 January 2004. news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3207261.stm.

reached after the United Kingdom, France, and Germany offered to cooperate with Iran in the development of future technology.⁴⁵⁰

Blair has put less effort into North Korea. He called on North Korea to dismantle its nuclear weapons program, asserting that it represented a breach of international obligations.⁴⁵¹ He has also expressed its support for the Six Party talks in North Korea⁴⁵², but the United Kingdom is not a party to those negotiations.

Tony Blair has continued to support the United States' policy towards Iraq. Despite a lack of weapons of mass destruction at this point, Blair believes that they exist and will be found. He also regards Iraq as a "test case" to determine what action may be taken against states suspected of having WMDs.⁴⁵³ Blair's government has also made moves to involve the United Nations more in Iraq, and supports eventual cooperation with the multilateral organization – the first step in allowing for the potential return of UN IAEA inspectors to the country.⁴⁵⁴

8. United States: +1

The United States has shown a sometimes ambivalent yet in the end strong level of compliance with this particular commitment. Despite working closely with the IAEA in Libya and North Korea, however, the United States has been less supportive of the IAEA in Iran and Iraq.

The United States has made the most progress in terms of the IAEA with Libya. Covert negotiations began between the United States, the United Kingdom and Libya in March of 2003, with inspectors from both the US and UK visiting Libya in October and December of that year.⁴⁵⁵ Libya announced that they would cooperate on this issue with both governments on 19 December 2003. In a statement regarding the announcement, President George W. Bush affirmed his support of the IAEA, and suggested that this move would improve relations between the United States and Libya.⁴⁵⁶ On 29 December 2003, Mohamed El Baradei, head of the IAEA, confirmed that the program had been largely dismantled.⁴⁵⁷

⁴⁵⁰ "Tehran Pledges to Work With the IAEA," BBC World News UK Edition (London) 29 November 2003. Date of Access 2 January 2004. news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3248854.stm.

⁴⁵¹ PM Briefs MPs on G8 Summit, Office of the Prime Minister (London) 4 July 2003. Date of Access 27 December 2003. www.number-10.gov.uk/output/page3817.asp.

⁴⁵² PM Welcomes Libyan WMD Announcement, Office of the Prime Minister (London) 19 December 2003. Date of Access 31 December 2003. www.number-10.gov.uk/output/page5086.asp.

⁴⁵³ "Blair Issues 'Rogue Regime' Plea," BBC World News UK Edition (London) 4 January 2004. Date of Access 4 January 2004. news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/3367717.stm.

⁴⁵⁴ "Analysis: Turning Point for Iraq?" BBC World News UK Edition (London) 14 December 2003. Date of Access 3 January 2004. news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3318257.stm.

⁴⁵⁵ Press Background Briefing by Senior Administration Officials, Office of the Press Secretary of the White House (Washington D.C.) 19 December 2003. Date of Access 4 January 2004. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031219-14.html.

⁴⁵⁶ President Bush: Libya pledges to dismantle WMD programs, Office of the Press Secretary of the White House (Washington D.C.) 19 December 2003. Date of Access 4 January 2004. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031219-9.html.

⁴⁵⁷ "Libya's Nuclear Program Mostly Dismantled, U.N. inspector says," New York Times On-Line Edition, 29 December 2003. Date of Access 3 January 2004. www.nytimes.com/2003/12/29/international/middleeast/29CND-LIBY.html.

North Korea continues to be an issue for the United States. The US has maintained that it has no desire for a military conflict with North Korea and that it hopes to solve the problem through diplomacy and work through the IAEA.⁴⁵⁸ President George W. Bush has refused offers by North Korea to continue negotiations in exchange for concessions from the US. In spite of this, Korea will continue to participate in the six-nation talks, in which the US has been a leading figure.⁴⁵⁹ President Bush, in an interview on 22 October 2003, expressed the hope that talks with the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and South Korea would encourage North Korea to cooperate with the IAEA.⁴⁶⁰ On 6 January 2004, the North Korean government announced that it is willing to suspend its nuclear program in order to improve relations with the United States.⁴⁶¹

The United States has worked less closely with the IAEA over the issue of Iran and related suspicions that it is building a nuclear weapons program. In November 2003, the US promoted a resolution at the IAEA Board of Governors stating that in the event of further non-compliance by Iran, the issue would be automatically removed from the immediate jurisdiction of the IAEA and referred to the United Nations Security Council for further action.⁴⁶² Since the IAEA did not recommend imposing sanctions on Iran, the United States was arguably eager to transfer the issue out of the Agency's control and to the Security Council where sanctions could be levied.⁴⁶³ In addition, the US has also been skeptical of reports by the IAEA that there is no evidence that Iran is building an atomic bomb.⁴⁶⁴ However, President George W. Bush has noted that since Iran has been cooperating with the IAEA, he supports the IAEA in their effort to hold Iran to its obligations.⁴⁶⁵

The United States is still involved in Iraq, but has chosen not to include the IAEA in their search for WMD. They have formed their own organization, the Iraq Survey Group, to look for WMD in Iraq. The Iraq Survey Group has at this point failed to make any significant discoveries or find evidence of WMD.⁴⁶⁶ Mohamed El Baradei, head of the IAEA, has called for the organization to

⁴⁵⁸ President Bush Meets With President Roh Moo-hyun, Office of the Press Secretary of the White House (Washington D.C.) 20 October 2004. Date of Access 10 January 2004. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/20031020-2/html.

⁴⁵⁹ "Timeline: North Korea Nuclear Crisis," BBC World News UK Edition (London) 2 January 2004. Date of Access 3 January 2004. news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/2604437.stm.

⁴⁶⁰ Roundtable Interview of the President by the Press Pool, Office of the Press Secretary of the White House (Washington D.C.) 22 October 2003. Date of Access 4 January 2004. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/20031022-7.html.

⁴⁶¹ "N Korea Makes Nuclear Offer," BBC World News UK Edition (London) 6 January 2004. Date of Access 8 January 2004. news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3371267.stm.

⁴⁶² Press Briefing by Scott McClellan, Office of the Press Secretary of the White House (Washington D.C.) 25 September 2003. Date of Access 10 January 2004. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030925-7.html.

⁴⁶³ Most IAEA board members favor EU trio-backed resolution, International Atomic Energy Agency (Vienna) November 20, 2003. Date of Access: January 10, 2004. www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2003/iran-031120-irna02.htm.

⁴⁶⁴ "Timeline: Iran Nuclear Crisis," BBC World News UK Edition (London) 27 November 2003. Date of Access 5 January 2004. news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3210412.stm.

⁴⁶⁵ President Bush: Libya pledges to dismantle WMD programs, Office of the Press Secretary of the White House (Washington D.C.) 19 December 2003. Date of Access 4 January 2004. www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031219-9.html.

⁴⁶⁶ "Iraq top WMD hunter 'will resign'," BBC World News UK Edition (London) 19 December 2003. Date of Access 4 January 2004. news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/333909.stm.

return to Iraq, but his requests have been ignored by the coalition.⁴⁶⁷ Although it is noteworthy that the US has continued the search for WMD, the fact that the IAEA has not been permitted to participate calls their commitment to the resolution into question.

9. European Union: +1*

The European Union (EU) has taken positive steps towards the resolutions agreed upon for weapons of mass destruction at the G8 Evian Summit.

On 16 June 2003 the European Council at Thessaloniki agreed to implement an Action Plan to counter the proliferation of WMDs. Specifically, the aim of the plan was to take a united common position towards the, “reinforcement of multilateral agreements in the field of non-proliferation on WMD and their means of delivery...”.⁴⁶⁸ The EU has extended its support of the IAEA with the Action Plan through a commitment to implement and ratify any future Additional Protocols created by the IAEA, and to support “an adequate increase in the IAEA safeguards budget to ensure the credibility of the IAEA’s verification systems on an urgent and exceptional basis...”.⁴⁶⁹ Furthermore, in November 2003, the European Council of Foreign Affairs reaffirmed the decision, implemented in the Action Plan, to entrench a clause of nuclear non-proliferation into any agreements concluded with a country from the Global South.⁴⁷⁰ It was finally remarked that the “fight against proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery is a high priority”.

The EU has shown support for the IAEA in its efforts to increase its safeguards and prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In a joint statement by European Council President Costas Simitis, European Commission President Romano Prodi and U.S. President George W. Bush, in Washington in June 2003, it was agreed that both parties would, “support an adequate increase in the IAEA safeguards budget to ensure the credibility of the IAEA’s verification system,” and that, “proliferation is a threat not only to our security, but also to the wider international system”.⁴⁷¹

The European Union has also played a decisive role in bilateral talks with Iran over its nuclear program. On 31 August 2003 Tehran invited EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) Javier Solana to discuss a bilateral cooperation to, “prevent the

⁴⁶⁷ In Focus: IAEA and Iraq, International Atomic Energy Agency (Vienna), 16 October 2003. Date of Access 5 January 2004. www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIraq.

⁴⁶⁸ 2541st Council Meeting of External Relations Provisional Version 14500/03 Presse 321 – Weapons of Mass Destruction Council Conclusion, Council of the European Union, (Brussels) November 17, 2003. Date of Access: January 2, 2004. ue.eu.int/newsroom/NewMain.asp?LANG=1, 21.

⁴⁶⁹ Weapons of Mass Destruction: Basic principles, Council conclusions and Action Plan, Council of the European Union, (Brussels) June 16, 2003. Date of Access: January 9, 2004. ue.eu.int/newsroom/makeFrame.asp?MAX=1&BID=111&DID=76328&LANG=1&File=/pressData/en/reports/76328.pdf&Picture=0, 6–7.

⁴⁷⁰ Conseil Affaires Generales et Relations Exterieures: Conclusions – Extraits, Quai d’Orsay, French Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Paris), November 17, 2003. Date of Access: January 2, 2004. www.doc.diplomatie.fr/BASIS/epic/www/doc/DDW?M=9&K=927465481&W=DATE+%3D+%2717.11.2003%27+ORDER+BY+DATE/Descend.

⁴⁷¹ EU-US SUMMIT - Washington, 25 June 2003 - Joint Statement on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Council of the European Union (Brussels) June 25, 2003. Date of Access: January 2, 2004. ue.eu.int/newsroom/NewMain.asp?LANG=1.

politicization of Iran's nuclear programs".⁴⁷² In a meeting with the Head of Iran's Atomic Energy Organization (IAEO) Gholam-Reza Aqazadeh, Solana remarked that, "Tehran's cooperation with IAEA will remove ambiguities and hasten to assuage the prevailing political atmosphere". In October 2003, foreign ministers from France, Britain and Germany, representing the EU, were invited to Tehran to provide Iran with their viewpoints on the additional protocols of Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) designed by the IAEA. There, the ministers were able to emphasize the importance of the protocols and aid the IAEA in its efforts in Iran. British Foreign Minister Jack Straw was quoted as saying that they had managed to achieve "an agreed statement from the government in Iran and three foreign ministers who were present about the co-operation by Iran with the IAEA".⁴⁷³ In December 2003, Dr. Javier Solana welcomed Iran's signing of the IAEA's Additional Protocol by saying that it was, "important step in building international confidence about the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program".⁴⁷⁴

The European Union has also been involved in aiding the IAEA in its efforts with the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in other countries as well in 2003. The EU has also demonstrated an interest in stemming the tensions on the Korean Peninsula by urging North Korea in June 2003, "to visibly, verifiably and irreversibly dismantle that program and to come into full compliance with international non-proliferation obligations," and supporting the six-nation talks to which the EU is not a party.⁴⁷⁵ Dr. Solana remarked in a statement at the time that, "the European Union remains willing to contribute to an overall resolution of the situation".⁴⁷⁶

A statement by the Deputy Foreign Minister of Italy, Roberto Antonione, on behalf of the EU at the 47th Annual IAEA Conference in Vienna in September 2003, commended "the Agency [IAEA] for its efforts since last September, and supports efforts by the Director General to seek dialogue with the DPRK in order to find a solution".⁴⁷⁷ Mr. Antonione also urged North Korea to

⁴⁷² "Iran invites EU to cooperation on nuclear programs: Aqazadeh," Islamic Republic News Agency (Tehran) August 31, 2003. Date of Access: January 2, 2004. www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2003/iran-030831-irna02.htm.

463 Ibid.

⁴⁷³ Iran visit represented the 'Best of European Cooperation' – Straw – Edited Transcript of An Interview Given by the Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw for BBC Radio 4, British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, (London) October 23, 2003. Date of Access: January 9, 2004. www.fco.gov.uk/servlet/Front?pagename=OpenMarket/Xcelerate/ShowPage&c=Page&cid=1007029391629&a=KArticle&aid=1065717863726.

⁴⁷⁴ "EU warmly welcomes Iran's signature to Additional Protocol," Islamic Republic News Agency (Brussels) December 19, 2003. Date of Access: January 2, 2004. www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2003/iran-031219-irna07.htm.

⁴⁷⁵ EU-US SUMMIT - Washington, 25 June 2003 - Joint Statement on the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Council of the European Union (Brussels) June 25, 2003. Date of Access: January 2, 2004. ue.eu.int/newsroom/NewMain.asp?LANG=1.

⁴⁷⁶ HR Javier Solana welcomes North Korea's agreement to participate in multilateral talks, Council of the European Union, (Brussels) August 4, 2003. Date of Access: January 2, 2004. ue.eu.int/newsroom/NewMain.asp?LANG=1.

⁴⁷⁷ Statement by the Deputy Foreign Minister of Italy Roberto Antonione on behalf of the EU at the 47th Annual IAEA Conference in Vienna, International Atomic Energy Agency, (Vienna), September 15-19, 2003. Date of Access: January 9, 2004.

www.iaea.org/About/Policy/GC/GC47/Statements/eu.pdf#xml=www.iaea.org/search97cgi/s97.cgi?action=View&VdkVgwKey=http%3A%2F%2Fwww%2Eiaea%2Eorg%2FAbout%2FPolicy%2FGC%2FGC47%2FStatements%2Feu%2Epdf&doctype=xml&Collection=IaeaSite&QueryZip=EU&

469 Ibid

unconditionally allow the, “full implementation of all the required safeguards measures at all times including the return of IAEA inspectors”.

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