Non-Proliferation: Weapons of Mass Destruction

Commitment

“...for the intervening year [between Sea Island and Gleneagles Summits], we agree that it would be prudent not to inaugurate new initiatives involving transfer of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to additional states. We call on all states to adopt this strategy with prudence.”

G8 Action Plan on Nonproliferation

Background

The G8’s focus on Weapons of Mass Destruction dates back to the 2002 Kananaskis Summit at which the Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction was launched. While this initiative was focused on safeguarding Russia’s decommissioned nuclear arsenal and preventing nuclear proliferation to terrorist organizations, the focused has shifted in recent years. At the Sea Island Summit, concerns over nuclear proliferation were focused mainly on the issue ‘rogue states’ acquiring nuclear weapons — in particular, North Korea and Iran — as well as non-state terrorist actors. This growing crisis has been fuelled by a series of events that have demonstrated the decay of the nuclear non-proliferation regime: the arrest in 2002 of Abdullah Al Mujahir, a U.S. citizen, for allegedly conspiring with al Qaeda to detonate a ‘dirty’ (radiological) bomb inside the U.S.; the declaration by North Korea that it had restarted its nuclear fuel refinement process which the US estimates may already have yielded 1-2 atomic bombs; recent discoveries that Pakistan’s ‘father of the bomb’ A.Q. Khan had an extensive network of nuclear technology customers; and Iran’s decision to build further nuclear power stations across the country combined with its reluctance to submit to full IAEA inspections. In light of these alarming events, it has become increasingly important for G8 member countries to raise its level of cooperation on the issue of restricting the sharing of nuclear technology and enrichment techniques.

Currently, G8 member-states, the US, Japan, and Russia, along with South Korea and China are in six-party talks with North Korea to find a resolution to the nuclear crisis on the peninsula; these talks are stalled, however, over North Korea’s demands for direct bilateral talks with the United States which Washington refuses. Currently the US has deferred to the UK, France and Germany in their talks with Iran to find a resolution to the nuclear crisis in that country. The international community is demanding the Iran end full-nuclear fuel cycle activity which can produce weapons-grade plutonium and uranium and to submit to full IAEA inspections. Iran, for its part, is asserting its right to a civilian nuclear industry and has been highly reluctant to allow the IAEA full access.

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Assessment

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<th>Country</th>
<th>Non-Compliance</th>
<th>Work in Progress</th>
<th>Full Compliance</th>
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<td>Canada</td>
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<td>Overall</td>
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Individual Country Compliance Breakdown

1. Canada: +1

Canada registered a high level of compliance with Sea Island’s weapons of mass destruction commitments, successfully restraining from inaugurating new initiatives involving transfer of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to additional states. In addition, Ottawa has bolstered other non-proliferation efforts through contributions to the Global Partnership Program, participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative, and vocal support of non-proliferation issues.

On 4 August 2004, Foreign Affairs Minister Pierre Pettigrew announced CDN$24.4 million to assist Russia dismantle three nuclear submarines, as well as plans for an additional CDN$112 million to support the dismantlement of twelve additional submarines over the next four years. On 26 April 2005, Pettigrew announced an increase to CAD32 million for this project. The funding is part of Canada’s CAD$1-billion pledge to the Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. The Partnership, launched at the 2002 G8 Kananaskis Summit, supports cooperative projects to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism, and nuclear safety issues. Also under the banner of the Partnership, Canada funded a number of the International Science and Technology Center’s projects, which contribute to the employment of former Soviet weapons scientists. In September 2004, Canada’s Ambassador to Russia, Christopher Westdal, noted “Canada is firmly committed to making a significant and sustained

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contribution to the employment of former Soviet weapons scientists,” he also reaffirmed Canada’s CAD1-billion pledge to the Partnership Program.


Finally, Canada has called for strengthened non-proliferation mechanisms through the UN and given vocal support to the IAEA’s efforts at ending Iran’s uranium enrichment program. Canada’s 2005 International Policy Statement notes as key governmental priorities the prevention of the spread of WMD and the strengthening of international export control regimes on proliferation-sensitive technologies. Further, it holds the expansion of the Global Partnership Program and participation in joint training missions and information sharing with Proliferation Security Initiative partners as key initiatives.

2. France: +1

France registered a high level of compliance with Sea Island’s weapons of mass destruction commitments, successfully restraining from inaugurating new initiatives involving transfer of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to additional states. In addition, Paris has bolstered other non-proliferation efforts. Being a permanent member of Security Council in UN, France continued its strong support for the non-proliferation commitment in 2004 through May 2005. France actively took part in a Japanese-organized multinational naval exercise in the context of the Proliferation Security Initiative in October 26, 2004, which was aimed to stop the

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flow of weapons of mass destructions\textsuperscript{539}. After its launching in May 2004, France agreed and took action to dispatch the French navy frigate Vendémiaire\textsuperscript{540}. This initiative program included 15 other countries, of which members of G8 were also included. This proved France’s eagerness to participate in strengthening coordination between countries that are part of the PSI initiative\textsuperscript{541}.

In 2004 a deal was struck between Iran and Britain, France, and Germany (the EU3) wherein Iran agreed to suspend uranium enrichment and accept more intrusive inspections of its nuclear sites in exchange for technology. On 18 June 2004, the IAEA adopted a resolution drafted by the EU3 “deploring” Iran’s poor cooperation with inspectors\textsuperscript{542}. In response, on June 29\textsuperscript{th}, Iran announced it would begin enriching uranium\textsuperscript{543}. On November 15\textsuperscript{th}, following “intense negotiations,” German Foreign Minister Joschka Fisher announced an agreement between the EU3 and Iran, wherein Iran agreed to freeze uranium enrichment in exchange for technology and trade concessions\textsuperscript{544}. On the basis of that agreement, further negotiations between the two parties, and supported by European Union High Representative Javier Solana, commenced on December 15\textsuperscript{th} in search of a long-term accord. As of early May 2005, the negotiations are still in progress\textsuperscript{545} to “ensure that Iran’s nuclear program can only be used for peaceful purposes”\textsuperscript{546}. “France, the UK and Germany has reportedly offered Tehran incentives such as facilitated WTO membership and technical assistance for a civilian nuclear energy industry in exchange for making the November 15 arrangement permanent.

France also showed its continuous involvement with regards to Resolution 1540, which was adopted by UN in April 28, 2004\textsuperscript{547}. France submitted a state report dealing with the obligations

\textsuperscript{547} Non-proliferation / Adoption of resolution 1540 by the Security Council by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson (Paris, April 29, 2004) Date of access: May 7, 2005 www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/article.gb.asp?ART=41895}
for international commitment to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, as required by the resolution\(^548\).

To sum its past and on-going contribution to non-proliferation of the nuclear arms, France produced a progress report on its contribution to non-proliferation\(^549\). The report, entitled “Fighting Proliferation, Promoting Arms Control and Disarmament: France’s Contribution”, has been reviewed as the principal foundation of the collective security in the NPT Review Conference of May 2005 in New York\(^550\).

3. Germany: -1

Germany has registered a high level of compliance with Sea Island’s weapons of mass destruction commitments, successfully restraining from inaugurating new initiatives involving transfer of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to additional states. In addition, Berlin has bolstered other non-proliferation efforts through continued negotiations with Iran, over the latter’s nuclear program, and participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative.

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\(^548\) French report to the UN Security Council on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson (Paris, October 28, 2004) Date of access: May 7, 2005
\(^549\) Fighting proliferation, promoting arms control and disarmament : France's contribution (April 18, 2005) Date of access: May 7, 2005
\(^550\) Fighting Proliferation, Promoting Arms Control and Disarmament: France’s Contribution (2005) Date of access: May 7, 2005
\(^554\) Speech by Joschka Fischer at the 7\(^{th}\) Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, German Federal Foreign Office, (Berlin), 2 May 2005. Date of Access: 5 May 2005.
\(^555\) Speech by Joschka Fischer at the 7\(^{th}\) Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, German Federal Foreign Office, (Berlin), 2 May 2005. Date of Access: 5 May 2005.
offered Tehran incentives such as facilitated WTO membership and technical assistance for a civilian nuclear energy industry in exchange for making the November 15 arrangement permanent.

Finally, Germany participated in a number of activities under the flag of the Proliferation Security Initiative, a US-led effort that aims to stop shipments of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials worldwide. On 1 October 2004, Germany sent operational experts to participate in an American Department of Defense hosted maritime interdiction game. In late October 2004, Germany participated as an observer in Team Samurai, a Japanese-led maritime interdiction exercise. In late March 2005, Germany attended a meeting of the Proliferation Security Initiative’s Operational Experts Group.

4. Italy: +1

Italy registered a high level of compliance with Sea Island’s weapons of mass destruction commitments, successfully restraining from inaugurating new initiatives involving transfer of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to additional states. In addition, Rome has bolstered other non-proliferation efforts through continued participation in the Global Partnership Program and the Proliferation Security Initiative and by voicing concern on non-proliferation issues.

In November 2004, Italy committed €60 million to aid in the dismantlement of a Russian nuclear-powered cruiser formerly known as Admiral Ushakov. The aid is part of Italy’s €1-billion pledge to the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. The Partnership, launched at the 2002 G8 Kananaskis Summit, supports cooperative projects to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism, and nuclear safety issues.

Italy also participated in activities under the banner of the Proliferation Security Initiative, a US-led effort that aims to stop shipments of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials worldwide. On 1 October 2004, Italy sent operational experts to participate in an American Department of Defense hosted maritime interdiction game, and, in late October, Italy participated as an observer in Team Samurai, a Japanese-led maritime interdiction exercise.

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late March 2005, Italy attended a meeting of the Proliferation Security Initiative’s Operational Experts Group\textsuperscript{562}.

Finally, on 13 December 2004 Italian Foreign Minister Gianfranco Fini expressed a strong desire to work through the EU to permanently end Iran’s uranium enrichment program\textsuperscript{563}. On 3 May 2005, Fini called for the Non-Proliferation Treaty to be strengthened through better monitoring mechanisms and concrete initiatives to counter illegal trafficking\textsuperscript{564}.

5. Japan: +1

Italy registered a high level of compliance with Sea Island’s weapons of mass destruction commitments, successfully restraining from inaugurating new initiatives involving transfer of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to additional states. In addition, Tokyo has bolstered other non-proliferation efforts through a variety of activities detailed below. Being the only great power without nuclear arsenal, Japan has always shown great interest towards the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destructions.

Throughout 2004 and early 2005, Japan continuously acted upon the universalization of IAEA Additional Protocol. Being the only victim of major nuclear bombs, Japan has shown understanding for the increasing importance of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Tokyo welcomed the IAEA implementations of integrated safeguards to Japan’s nuclear activities as of September 15, 2004, which was the first case of a state implementing such integrated safeguards for large-scale nuclear operations\textsuperscript{565}. Japan has also urged Iran to implement relevant IAEA resolutions and reach an agreement with France, Germany and United Kingdom on the “objective guarantees” that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes\textsuperscript{566}.

As the only Asian participant in G8, Japan has exhibited considerable commitments in negotiation with North Korea. Japan played an active role in various talks in negotiating with North Korea, regarding its nuclear program in 2004 through early May 2005. Despite heightened tension between Japan and North Korea regarding abduction issue, Japan reconfirmed the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration of 2002 in the Japan-North Korea Meeting on May 22, 2004\textsuperscript{567}. Japan also had frequent bilateral talks with the United States of America and South Korea to


\textsuperscript{567} Japan-North Korea Meeting on May 22, 2004 Date of access: May 7, 2005 www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumiphoto/2004/05/22saihouchou_e.html
confirm their cooperative position towards the North Korean question. Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan Nobutaka Machimura conveyed in his speech at the NPT Review Conference that Japan will urge the DPRK to expeditiously return to Six-Party Talks which have recently stalled\textsuperscript{568}.

Japan has also actively collaborated with European Union, as evident from the Japan-EU Joint Declaration on Disarmament and Non-proliferation signed in June 22, 2004\textsuperscript{569}. Joint work between Japan and EU for the peaceful community and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were confirmed. Japan also led a multilateral meeting regarding naval exercise in the context of Proliferation Security Initiative on October 26, 2004\textsuperscript{570}. It was aimed to stop the flow of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related material and equipment to and from states and non-state actors that are sources of concern with regard to proliferation\textsuperscript{571}. 15 countries including G8 members participated in this meeting, which proves Japan’s active commitment towards the issues on weapons of mass destruction.

Japan submitted “21 Measures for the 21st Century”, a working paper for further measures to be taken for strengthening the NPT in Japan\textsuperscript{572}.

6. Russia: –1

Russia has registered a level of non-compliance with its Sea Island’s commitments regarding transfer of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to additional states. This wording applies to Russian partnership with Iran, and Russian level of compliance needs to be determined with an eye on its contract for construction of a pressurized light-water nuclear reactor in Bushehr and subsequent supply of fuel for the reactor.

In the months following the Sea Island summit, where Russia backed language of the declaration deploring Iran’s failure to cooperate with IAEA\textsuperscript{573}, Russia heightened restrictions on the technology and equipment it supplies for Iran’s nuclear energy program but was reluctant to give up the lucrative contracts.\textsuperscript{574} On September 2, 2004 Iranian Ambassador to Russia Gholamreza Shafei said that Moscow and Tehran should soon sign an agreement on returning spent nuclear

\textsuperscript{568} Statement by H.E. Mr. Nobutaka Machimura Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan at the 2005 NPT Review Conference (New York, May 2, 2005) Date of access: May 7, 2005
www.mofa.go.jp/policy/un/fmv0504/npt.html

\textsuperscript{569} Japan-EU Joint Declaration on Disarmament and Non-proliferation (June 22, 2004) Date of access: May 7, 2005

\textsuperscript{570} France took part in a Japanese-organized multinational naval exercise in the context of the Proliferation Security Initiative by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson (Paris, October 27, 2004) Date of access: May 7, 2005
www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/article.gb.asp?ART=44596

\textsuperscript{571} France took part in a Japanese-organized multinational naval exercise in the context of the Proliferation Security Initiative by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson (Paris, October 27, 2004) Date of access: May 7, 2005
www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/article.gb.asp?ART=45596


fuel from Iran to Russia, which would be valid until Iran starts producing its own nuclear fuel.\textsuperscript{575} On September 20, 2004, the Russian information agency announced that Russia supports the IAEA’s demand that Iran should resume its moratorium an all uranium enrichment activities.\textsuperscript{576} The same week, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin confirmed that Russia is categorically against the emergence of new nuclear states and Iran should fully comply with IAEA requirements. At the same time, he said that Russia believes that at the moment Iran was fulfilling every IAEA requirement. Three weeks later, Russia declared that it finished construction work at Bushehr nuclear reactor and was hoping to sign agreements on shipping nuclear fuel in November.\textsuperscript{577} This action immediately placed it in non-compliance with its Sea Island WMD commitments. Nevertheless, on October 22, 2004 RosAtom (Russian Nuclear Agency) welcomed the initiative of EU3 to cooperate with Iran in nuclear technology domain and to ship nuclear fuel for a research reactor.\textsuperscript{578}

On February 27, 2005 Russia and Iran signed an intergovernmental protocol on the return of spent nuclear fuel from the Bushehr nuclear power plant and amendments to the fuel contract.\textsuperscript{579} Iran agreed to repatriate spent nuclear fuel to Russia and to allow round-the-clock monitoring of the fuel by IAEA.\textsuperscript{580} Head of the Russian Federal Atomic Energy Agency Alexander Rumyantsev said the Bushehr power plant will be launched in 2006.\textsuperscript{581} On April 22, 2005 Vladimir Putin insisted that Russia-Iran atomic cooperation is exclusively peaceful and under complete control of IAEA, and that Russia will continue insisting on the Iranian refusal from the development of uranium enrichment systems and nuclear cycle technologies.\textsuperscript{582} On April 28, 2005 Moscow called on Iran to show a certain restraint in terms of using its right to develop nuclear technologies, and Iran obliged by treating these wishes with understanding, which can mean that Iran will not lift the moratorium on uranium enrichment or withdraw from the negotiating process in the near future.\textsuperscript{583} The next day, Vladimir Putin reiterated that Iran should give up the idea of creating a nuclear cycle technology and allow all of their nuclear programs to be placed under total international control, and did not exclude the possibility that Russia might

\textsuperscript{578} “Rosatom welcomes the decision of three leading European Union countries to cooperate with Tehran in the sphere of nuclear technologies”, ITAR-TASS (Moscow), 22 October 2004. Date of Access: 08 January 2005. global.factiva.com/en/eSrch/ss.hl.asp
support the transfer of this issue to the Security Council and the imposition of sanctions on Iran depending on how Iran deals with these issues.\textsuperscript{584}

Besides playing a key role in the situation with Iran, Russia is participating in other initiatives like Global Threat Reduction Initiative. Together with western partners, it reduced and secured stockpiles of nuclear materials and returned spent fuel from Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and Libya, as well as took part in development of an international effort to improve security and control of radioactive materials that could be used to create a radiological dispersion device, or “dirty bomb.”\textsuperscript{585} In addition, three more shipments are scheduled for this year from Latvia, the Czech Republic and Libya, and Russia continued high-level talks with U.S. to accelerate joint work on minimizing the proliferation threat from high-enriched uranium (HEU) at research reactors worldwide.\textsuperscript{586}

Russia also expressed interest in transparent cooperation between North Korea and the IAEA to clarify all issues related to its nuclear experiments. Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Valery Loshchinin raised the subject at his Moscow meeting with South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon who accompanied President Roh Moo Hyun on his official visit to Russia.\textsuperscript{587} In the mid-January 2005 Russian Deputy Foreing Minister Aleksander Alekseev discussed “some aspects of the nuclear problem on the Korean Peninsula” with the South Korean Ambassador in Moscow Kim Jae Sob and the North Korean Ambassador to Moscow Pak I Choon. Russia also urged all members of the “group of six” to return to negotiations “as soon as possible”.\textsuperscript{588}

7. United Kingdom: +1

The United Kingdom has registered a high level of compliance with regards to its Sea Island commitments over the course of the past year in regards to weapons of mass destruction. Plus, with the United Kingdom holding the presidency of the G8 this year, their role in the organization has taken an added degree of importance. The United Kingdom have affirmed their commitment to halt all transfers of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to other states, at the same time pressuring other states to adopt this approach as per the commitment made at the Sea Island summit.

Since November of 2004, when the United Kingdom, France and Germany signed a ground breaking agreement, persuading Iran to suspend all ‘enrichment-related’ activities\textsuperscript{589}, there unfortunately have been several developments that do not bode well on stemming nuclear


\textsuperscript{587} “Russia wants to know true purpose of nuclear experiments in S. Korea”, Interfax News Service (Moscow), 22 September 2004. Date of Access: 08 January 2005. global.factiva.com/en/eSrch/ss_hl.asp


enrichment and development. On May 8, Iranian leaders said that they plan to restart work on a plant in Isfahan to convert uranium ore into uranium hexafluoride gas, which in turn would aid in the process of nuclear enrichment. Jack Straw, the British Foreign Secretary stated that it was ‘far from a good idea and that it would put numerous benefits already secured for the country at risk.” The United Kingdom is actively trying to convince Iran not to restart its nuclear enrichment program, and is actively pushing for other states, most notably other European ones to put pressure on the Iranian government.

The United Kingdom has also condemned the decision by North Korea to actively pursue its nuclear program and is putting pressure on the North Koreans, but is leaving much of the active talk to be left to the United States, South Korea and Japan, which are all members of the virtually dead six party talks.

The United Kingdom is a strong supporter of effective control regimes, and is continuing to build upon the Global Partnership agreements, pledging $750 million over the next ten years.

Since the Sea Island Summit, the United Kingdom has actively complied with the commitments laid out in front of them. They have also taken a lead role in the situation over Iran’s desire to restart its nuclear program. There are no indications that the United Kingdom plans on proposing any new initiatives and by all accounts and purposes the United Kingdoms is completing its goals set forth in the 2004 Sea Island Summit.

8. United States: +1

The United States has registered a high level of compliance with regards to its Sea Island commitments over the course of the past year in regards to weapons of mass destruction and has taken a lead role throughout the world. The United States have reaffirmed their commitment to halt all transfers of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to other states, at the same time pressuring other states to adopt this approach as per the commitment made at the Sea Island summit.

The United States has remained ardent that itself, and other states throughout the world not transfer equipment or technology to other states that may aid in the creation or advancement of weapons of mass destruction. ‘Good’ news was released by the 1700 Iraq Survey Team which was responsible for the weapons hunt this past April, saying that they found no evidence that Iraq transferred WMD to Syria before the U.S. invasion in March 2003, and that it knew of no Iraq officials with direct knowledge of a transfer of weapons of mass destruction developed by former President Saddam Hussein.

The United States has also taken a very important role in the worsening situation in North Korea. With North Korea announcing that it had removed fuel rods to produce plutonium for several

590 Ibid.
591 BBC News, news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/4541195.stm
593 Reuters, No Proof Iraq Hid Weapons in Syria, April 26, uk.news.yahoo.com/050426/325/fh9dq.html
nuclear weapons, the United States has denounced the move and is continuing to put pressure on the North Koreans, as well as the European Union and Japan to help in the situation. The United States is also trying to revamp the failing six party talks that it seems to be relying quite heavily on, even though the six party talks, which also include fellow G8 member states Japan and Russia is essentially dead. Currently, the United States is weighing its options over North Korea and not closing the door to anything.

The Bush administration has taken a very active role in fulfilling its commitments. The Proliferation Security Initiative, launched by President Bush aims at stopping arms shipments to rogue states or state sponsors of terrorism.

The United States has not proposed any new nuclear initiatives and is fulfilling its commitments made at the Sea Island summit last summer.

9. European Union: +1

European Union has registered an acceptable level of compliance with Sea Island’s WMD commitments, focusing primarily upon the efforts towards prevention of uranium enrichment by Iran. Europe has traditionally strong economic ties with Iran, which is now its third biggest trade partner in the Middle East. On most occasions the European Union was represented by EU Big Three (or EU3) — France, Germany and Britain. This group persuaded Iran in October 2003 to halt activities consistent with a weapons program. In response to Iran’s step, EU3 promised to start supplying Iran with modern nuclear equipment but this promise was not fulfilled. Moreover, EU3 co-authored a highly critical resolution adopted at the IAEA managing board in June, which prompted Iran to declare that it was free from any obligations to these countries. Since then, EU3 has made considerable efforts to heal the rift.

On July 28 2004 European Union officials met in Paris with a high-level Iranian envoy to obtain guarantees from Iran that its nuclear program is peaceful. The parties shared their positions and continued negotiations process. Overall, European Union took a firm stance but not as tough as U.S. would like. On October 18, 2004 Chris Sanders, Netherlands’ Permanent

References:
Representative to the UN Conference on Disarmament demanded on behalf of the European Union that Iran assists IAEA to understand the full extent of its nuclear program and clarifies outstanding issues before the next meeting of IAEA board of governors. EU3 at the same time told Iran that European Union is ready to promise a light-water reactor and other nuclear equipment in exchange of cooperation and will join US in taking Iran to UN Security Council if it fails. As a result, in mid-November Iran agreed to halt all its uranium enrichment activities and, although it made additional last minute demands, EU’s hard stance forced Iran to give up. However, on January 7, 2005 a high official of Iranian Atomic Energy Association said that Iran will resume its enrichment program if European Union breaches its commitments, which indicates that further efforts are necessary in order to resolve the conflict. In response, EU3 took a tougher stance and cast doubts on Iran’s position that it has a legal right to produce nuclear fuel. On February 28, 2005 European Union backed the new deal between Moscow and Tehran but insisted on the need for Iran to respect IAEA safeguards and NPT. The European Parliament on March 10, 2005 had urged Iran to “reaffirm its commitment to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty”, to “make its decision to suspend nuclear enrichment permanent”, and to “cease making unsettling and contradictory declarations” on Iran’s intentions in negotiations with Germany, France and the United Kingdom. The EP also called on the Council of Ministers to apply pressure on the Russian government to secure guarantees that its supply of nuclear materials to Iran will be reserved for purely civil and peaceful uses. On 19 April, 2005 Iran and EU resumed talks in Geneva “in a more favourable atmosphere”. On May 7, 2005 Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi said that Iran would continue negotiations providing it will lead us somewhere tangible in a matter of time,” despite the deadlock over the Islamic Republic’s desire to make nuclear fuel. EU signalled continued commitment to negotiations, but said only countries “that unambiguously comply with their international obligations” under the NPT should have access to peaceful nuclear technology, as guaranteed by the treaty.

In addition to its efforts to freeze Iran’s nuclear program, EU is taking other active steps to promote non-proliferation. For instance, French ambassador to Seoul hinted that communication

610 “Pakistan to send centrifuge parts to IAEA for Iran tests; Tehran and Europeans recommit to talks”, Daily Star, 07 May 2005. Date of Access: 08 May 2005. global.factiva.com/en/eSrch/ss_hl.asp
between European Union and North Korea is taking place through diplomatic channels. In a joint declaration with China on 8 December 2004, EU also confirmed its concern with illicit trade of WMD-related materials, equipment and technology; support of efforts in facilitating a political resolution of the Iran nuclear issue and support for a Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons. EU will continue to urge North Korea to “comply fully with all its international non-proliferation commitments, including the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the IAEA safeguards Agreement, and to completely dismantle any nuclear weapons programme”. At the same time, it encourages more contacts between North Korea and the outside world and support of economic reform and change in this country.

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