Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Commitment

“...for the intervening year [between the Sea Island and Gleneagles Summits], we agree that it would be prudent not to inaugurate new initiatives involving transfer of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to additional states. We call on all states to adopt this strategy with prudence.”

_G8 Action Plan on Nonproliferation_ 387

Background

The G8’s focus on Weapons of Mass Destruction dates back to the 2002 Kananaskis Summit at which the Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction was launched. While this initiative was focused on safeguarding Russia’s decommissioned nuclear arsenal and preventing nuclear proliferation to terrorist organizations, the focused has shifted in recent years. At Sea Island Summit, concerns over nuclear proliferation were focused mainly on the issue ‘rogue states’ acquiring nuclear weapons — in particular, North Korea and Iran. This growing crisis has been fuelled by a series of events that have demonstrated the decay of the nuclear non-proliferation regime: the declaration by North Korea that it had restarted its nuclear fuel refinement process which the US estimates may already have yielded 1-2 atomic bombs; recent discoveries that Pakistan’s ‘father of the bomb’ A.Q. Khan had an extensive network of nuclear technology customers; and Iran’s decision to build further nuclear power stations across the country combined with its reluctance to submit to full IAEA inspections. In light of these alarming events, it has become increasingly important for G8 member countries to raise its level of cooperation on the issue of restricting the sharing of nuclear technology and enrichment techniques.

Assessment

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Score</th>
<th>Lack of Compliance –1</th>
<th>Work in Progress 0</th>
<th>Full Compliance +1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>–1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>+1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall: 0.78</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Individual Country Compliance Breakdown

1. Canada: +1

Canada registered a high level of interim compliance with Sea Island’s weapons of mass destruction commitments through contributions to the Global Partnership Program, participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative, and vocal support of non-proliferation issues.

On 4 August 2004, Foreign Affairs Minister Pierre Pettigrew announced CAD24.4 million to assist Russia dismantle three nuclear submarines, as well as plans for an additional CAD112 to support the dismantlement of twelve additional submarines over the next four years. The funding is part of Canada’s CAD1-billion pledge to the Global Partnership Against Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. The Partnership, launched at the 2002 G8 Kananaskis Summit, supports cooperative projects to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism, and nuclear safety issues. Also under the banner of the Partnership, Canada funded a number of the International Science and Technology Center’s projects, which contribute to the employment of former Soviet weapons scientists.

In September 2004, Canada’s Ambassador to Russia, Christopher Westdal, noted “Canada is firmly committed to making a significant and sustained contribution to the employment of former Soviet weapons scientists,” and also reaffirmed Canada’s CAD1-billion pledge to the Partnership Program.

Canada also participated in two exercises under the Proliferation Security Initiative, a US-led effort that aims to stop shipments of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials worldwide. On 1 October 2004, Canada sent operational experts to an American Department of Defense hosted maritime interdiction game. In late October, Canada participated as an observer in “Operation Samurai,” a Japanese-led maritime interdiction exercise.

Finally, Canada has called for strengthened non-proliferation mechanisms through the UN, as well as given vocal support to the IAEA’s efforts at ending Iran’s uranium enrichment program.

---

2. France: +1

France has maintained a high level of compliance to non-proliferation of weapons of mass destructions. Being a permanent member of Security Council in UN, France continued its strong support for the non-proliferation commitment throughout 2004. France actively took part in a Japanese-organized multinational naval exercise in the context of the Proliferation Security Initiative in October 26, 2004, which was aimed to stop the flow of weapons of mass destructions. After its launching in May 2004, France agreed and took action to dispatch the French navy frigate Vendémiaire. This initiative program included 15 other countries, of which members of the G8 were also included. This proved France’s eagerness to participate in strengthening coordination between countries that are part of the PSI initiative.

France also achieved a clear step towards non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in Iran. Three European countries, United Kingdom and Germany were working on negotiation with Iran to agree with the non-proliferation of nuclear program. The negotiation finally reached conclusion on November 15, 2004, with Teheran agreeing to stop uranium enrichment in this agreement. France wishes to elaborate this so-called Paris agreement to long-term agreement, for the guarantees of greater cooperation between the Europe Union and Iran with regards to the Iranian nuclear program. For the greater commitment of Iran to non-proliferation, France considers trade and cooperation agreement with Iran, as well as Iran's accession to the World Trade Organization.

France also showed its continuous involvement with regards to Resolution 1540, which was adopted by UN in April 28, 2004. France submitted a state report dealing with the obligations...

399 Teheran’s announcement about stopping uranium enrichment (November 16, 2004) Date of access: January 7, 2005 www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/article.gb.asp?ART=45939
400 Teheran’s announcement about stopping uranium enrichment (November 16, 2004) Date of access: January 7, 2005 www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/article.gb.asp?ART=45939
for international commitment to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, as required by the resolution.\footnote{French report to the UN Security Council on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson (Paris, October 28, 2004) Date of access: January 7, 2005 www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/article_gb.asp?ART=45596}

3. Germany: +1

Germany revealed a high level of interim compliance with Sea Island’s weapons of mass destruction commitments through continued negotiations with Iran, over the latter’s nuclear program, and participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative.


\footnotesize


4. Italy: +1

Italy registered a high level of interim compliance with Sea Island’s weapons of mass destruction commitments through continued participation in the Global Partnership Program and the Proliferation Security Initiative, as well as voicing a desire to become more involved in the negotiations to end Iran’s uranium enrichment program.

In November 2004, Italy committed €60 million to aid in the dismantlement of a Russian nuclear-powered cruiser formerly known as Admiral Ushakov. The aid is part of Italy’s €1-billion pledge to the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. The Partnership, launched at the 2002 G8 Kananaskis Summit, supports cooperative projects to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism, and nuclear safety issues.

Italy also participated in two exercises under the banner of the Proliferation Security Initiative, a US-led effort that aims to stop shipments of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials worldwide. On 1 October 2004, Italy sent operational experts to participate in an American Department of Defense hosted maritime interdiction game, and, in late October, Italy participated as an observer in Team Samurai, a Japanese-led maritime interdiction exercise.

Finally, on 13 December 2004 Italian Foreign Minister Gianfranco Fini expressed a strong desire to work through the EU to permanently end Iran’s uranium enrichment program.

5. Japan: +1

Japan demonstrated a high level of compliance with regards to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Being the only great power without nuclear arsenal, Japan has always shown great interest towards programs against weapons of mass destructions.

Throughout the year of 2004, Japan continuously acted upon the universalization of IAEA Additional Protocol. Being the only victim of major nuclear bombs, Japan has shown understanding for the increasing importance of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Japan welcomed the IAEA implementations of integrated safeguard to Japan’s nuclear activities as of September 15, 2004, which was the first case for a state to implement such integrated safeguard for large-scale nuclear activities.

---

414 Statement by the Press Secretary/Director-General for Press and Public Relations, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, on the Implementation of Integrated Safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to Japan's Nuclear Activities (September 14, 2004) Date of access: January 7, 2005.
As the only Asian participants in G8, Japan has exhibited considerable commitments in negotiation with North Korea. Japan played an active role in various talks in negotiating with North Korea, regarding its nuclear program throughout 2004. Despite heightened tension Japan had with North Korea regarding an abduction issue, Japan reconfirmed the Japan-DPRK Pyongyang Declaration of 2002 in the Japan-North Korea Meeting on May 22, 2004. Japan received a statement from Chairman Kim Jong-II that its primary goal is denuclearization of North Korea. This was to be elaborated in six-party talks of June 23-26, 2004. Japan also had frequent bilateral talks with the United States of America and South Korea to confirm their cooperative position towards the North Korean question.

Japan actively collaborated with European Union, as evident from the Japan-EU Joint Declaration on Disarmament and Non-proliferation signed in June 22, 2004. Joint work between Japan and EU for the peaceful community and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction were confirmed. Japan also led a multilateral meeting regarding naval exercise in the context of Proliferation Security Initiative on October 26, 2004. It was aimed to stop the flow of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related material and equipment to and from states and non-state actors that are sources of concern with regard to proliferation. 15 countries including G8 members participated in this meeting, which proves Japan’s active commitment towards the issues on weapons of mass destruction.

6. Russia: –

Russia has registered an unacceptable level of compliance with its Sea Island’s commitments regarding transfer of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to additional states. This wording applies to Russian partnership with Iran, and Russian level of compliance needs to be determined with an eye on its contract for construction of a pressurized light-water nuclear reactor in Bushehr and subsequent supply of fuel for the reactor. Russia has a unique position as a country with the second biggest nuclear arsenal in the world, an extensive civilian atomic energy program and the closest ties with Iran of all other members of G8.

In the months following the Sea Island summit, where Russia backed language of the declaration deploring Iran’s failure to cooperate with IAEA, Russia heightened restrictions on the technology and equipment it supplies for Iran's nuclear energy program but was reluctant to give

415 Japan-North Korea Meeting on May 22, 2004 Date of access: January 7, 2005
www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/koizumiphoto/2004/05/22saihouchou_e.html
416 Ibid.
417 Japan-EU Joint Declaration on Disarmament and Non-proliferation (June 22, 2004) Date of access: January 7, 2005
418 France took part in a Japanese-organized multinational naval exercise in the context of the Proliferation Security Initiative by Foreign Ministry Spokesperson (Paris, October 27, 2004) Date of access: January 7, 2005
www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/article.gb.asp?ART=45596
419 Ibid.
up the lucrative contracts. On September 2, 2004 Iranian Ambassador to Russia Gholamreza Shafei said that Moscow and Tehran should soon sign an agreement on returning spent nuclear fuel from Iran to Russia, which would be valid until Iran starts producing its own nuclear fuel. On September 20, 2004, Russian information agency announced that Russia supports the IAEA’s demand that Iran should resume its moratorium an all uranium enrichment activities. The same week, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin confirmed that Russia is categorically against the emergence of new nuclear states and Iran should fully comply with IAEA requirements. At the same time, he said that Russia believes that at the moment Iran was fulfilling every IAEA requirement. Three weeks later, Russia declared that it finished construction work at Bushehr nuclear reactor and was hoping to sign agreements on shipping nuclear fuel in November. On October 22, 2004 RosAtom (Russian Nuclear Agency) welcomed the initiative of EU3 to cooperate with Iran in nuclear technology domain and to ship nuclear fuel for a research reactor. On November 29, 2004 IAEA rewarded Iran for its agreement to freeze uranium enrichment activities and adopted a relatively mild resolution. Immediately after that Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that Russia will continue its cooperation with Iran on its peaceful nuclear program. On December 27, 2004 RosAtom head Alexander Rumiantsev expressed optimism about cooperation with Iran. He believes that the launch of Bushehr station will take place at the end of 2005 — beginning of 2006 and that in 2006 it will be fully integrated into Iran’s energy system. He also hopes that the final version of the agreement on spent fuel return will be signed in January 2005.

Besides playing a key role in the situation with Iran, Russia is participating in other initiatives like Global Threat Reduction Initiative. Together with western partners, it reduced and secured stockpiles of nuclear materials and returned spent fuel from Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and Libya, as well as took part in development of an international effort to improve security and control of radioactive materials that could be used to create a radiological dispersion device, or “dirty bomb.”

---

Russia also expressed interest in transparent cooperation between South Korea and the IAEA to clarify all issues related to its nuclear experiments. Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Valery Loshchinin raised the subject at his Moscow meeting with South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki-moon who accompanied President Roh Moo Hyun on his official visit to Russia.

Finally, Russia supported the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), launched by George Bush and favoured by United Nations. This initiative aims at stopping arms shipments to rogue states or state sponsors of terrorism.

Nevertheless, Russia’s somewhat ambiguous relationship with Iran renders it in non-compliance to the commitment, despite its efforts to support other initiatives regarding the Sea Island goal.

7. United Kingdom: +1

With the United Kingdom now holding the presidency of the G8, Prime Minister Blair has chosen two themes for the upcoming summit in Scotland: climate change and Africa. However, Blair and the United Kingdom have reaffirmed their commitment to halt all transfers of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to other states and pledge other states to adopt this strategy.

As per the commitment made by the United Kingdom at the Sea Island G8 Summit, the United Kingdom has taken a lead role in persuading other countries to stop the transfer of weapons making technologies and equipment, by building on past initiatives and not inaugurating new proposals. The United Kingdom is a strong supporter of effective control regimes, and is working to help raise the standards of export controls around the world. Strengthening on the commitments made by G8 leaders in Canada in 2002 and building on the Global Partnership agreements, the United Kingdom has pledged $750 million dollars over the next ten years and is currently working on projects, particularly with Russia, ranging from disposing 34 tons of plutonium, dismantling nuclear submarines, destroying Russia’s stock of chemical weapons and creating sustainable employment for former Soviet weapons scientists.

The United Kingdom is also working on promoting previous agreements among the top ten shipping commercial states, which cover some 70% of maritime trade, to allow boarding of suspected vessels which may be carrying materials that could be used for weapons of mass destruction.

Current initiatives that indicate Britain’s support for the commitment include participation in the activities of the Proliferation Security Initiative, including a maritime multilateral meeting hosted

---

46 Ibid.
47 Foreign Secretary’s Statements on WMD. www.fco.gov.uk/Files/KFile/SOSFA%20statement%2025%20Feb%202004.pdf
by the Japanese regarding naval exercises on October 26, 2004\textsuperscript{435}, and an American Department of Defense-hosted maritime interdiction game\textsuperscript{436}. The UK has also, along with Germany and France, continued to negotiate with Iran on its nuclear plans.\textsuperscript{437}

In July of 2004, the Butler inquiry was released to the public which outlined the reasons and justifications in going to war with Iraq. The Butler report outlined several areas which deal with the United Kingdom and weapons of mass destruction.

- Firstly, it lauded praise on the intelligence community for uncovering Libya’s weapons program as a major success
- The U.K. have been able to provide important insights on exports of missile delivery systems
- Finally, intelligence work in Iran, North Korea, Libya and the AQ Khan show the importance of exploiting links between supplies and buyers when fighting weapons proliferation\textsuperscript{438}

Since the G8 Sea Island Summit this past summer, the United Kingdom has not undertaken any new initiatives discussing the transfer of materials that could be used for weapons of mass destruction. Instead the United Kingdom has been extremely successful in building upon previous agreements which have been reached, both within the European Union, the international community and more specifically the G8, like the agreement reached in Canada in 2002. There are no indications that the United Kingdom plans on proposing any new initiatives and by all accounts and purposes the United Kingdom is completing its goals set forth in the 2004 Sea Island Summit.

8. United States: +1

Like the United Kingdom, the United States has pledged that it would be prudent not to inaugurate new initiatives involving transfer of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to additional states and that it would encourage other states to do the same.

The United States has remained ardent that itself, and other states throughout the world not transfer equipment or technology to other states that may aid in the creation or advancement of weapons of mass destruction. Washington is building upon the Global Partnership program which was created in the 2002 G8 summit, aimed at stopping the spread of weapons of mass destruction and has already pledged ten billion dollars.\textsuperscript{439}

\textsuperscript{435} Britain was an observer in this exercise. www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/team-samurai.htm
\textsuperscript{437} Teheran’s announcement about stopping uranium enrichment (November 16, 2004) Date of access: January 7, 2005 www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/actu/article.gb.asp?ART=45939
\textsuperscript{438} news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3892809.stm
\textsuperscript{439} www.bellona.no/en/international/russia/nuke-weapons/nonproliferation/24803.html
The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), launched by George Bush and favoured by United Nations, is indicative of this continued US support. This initiative aims at stopping arms shipments to rogue states or state sponsors of terrorism. Further to this initiative, on 1 October 2004, the Department of Defense hosted a maritime interdiction game. In late October, the US participated in “Operation Samurai,” a Japanese-led maritime interdiction exercise.

Additionally, the US remains firmly supportive diplomatically in ensuring North Korea gives up its believed nuclear ambitions, although there is a current stall in the six nation talks, that include fellow G8 member countries Japan and Russia. Current strong language regarding dealings with Iran also indicate a commitment to ensuring the latter’s peaceful use of nuclear technology.

The United States has not proposed any new initiatives that deal with the transfer of equipment and technologies. Much like the United Kingdom the United States is focusing on previous agreements agreed upon.

9. European Union +1

European Union has registered an acceptable level of compliance with Sea Island’s WMD commitments, focusing primarily upon the efforts towards prevention of uranium enrichment by Iran. Europe has traditionally strong economic ties with Iran, which is now its third biggest trade partner in the Middle East. On most occasions the European Union has been represented by the EU Big Three (or EU3) — France, Germany and Britain. This group persuaded Iran in October 2003 to halt activities consistent with a weapons program. In response to Iran’s step, EU3 promised to start supplying Iran with modern nuclear equipment but this promise was not fulfilled. Moreover, EU3 co-authored a highly critical resolution adopted at the IAEA managing board in June, which prompted Iran to declare that it was free from any obligations to these countries. Since then, EU3 has made considerable efforts to heal the rift.

On July 28 2004 European Union officials met in Paris with a high-level Iranian envoy to obtain guarantees from Iran that its nuclear program is peaceful. The parties shared their positions and

55 “N Korea lashes out at US ‘smears’”, news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/4090947.stm
continued negotiations process.\textsuperscript{448} Overall, European Union took a firm stance but not as tough as U.S. would like.\textsuperscript{449} European diplomats preferred to prepare a package of “carrots and sticks” to encourage Iran’s compliance with demands of IAEA.\textsuperscript{450} Chris Patten, commissioner for external relations at the European Union said that EU had to ensure that Iran does not think there is a wedge between Europe and U.S.\textsuperscript{451} On September 16, 2004 EU3 finalized Iran nuclear resolution to U.S. satisfaction, while still giving Iran until November 2004 to cooperate with IAEA until the issue is referred to UN Security Council.\textsuperscript{452} In response, Iran slammed the door on European Union efforts when Iran’s foreign minister declared that EU can’t stop Iran through negotiations from uranium enrichment.\textsuperscript{453} On October 18, 2004 Chris Sanders, Netherlands’ Permanent Representative to the UN Conference on Disarmament demanded on behalf of the European Union that Iran assists IAEA to understand the full extent of its nuclear program and clarifies outstanding issues before the next meeting of IAEA board of governors.\textsuperscript{454} EU3 at the same time told Iran that European Union is ready to promise a light-water reactor and other nuclear equipment in exchange of cooperation and will join US in taking Iran to UN Security Council if it fails.\textsuperscript{455} As a result, in mid-November Iran agreed to halt all its uranium enrichment activities and, although it made additional last minute demands, EU’s hard stance forced Iran to give up.\textsuperscript{456} However, on January 7, 2005 a high official of Iranian Atomic Energy Association said that Iran will resume its enrichment program if European Union breaches its commitments, which indicates that further efforts are necessary in order to resolve the conflict.\textsuperscript{457}

In addition to its efforts to freeze Iran’s nuclear program, EU is taking other active steps to promote non-proliferation. For instance, French ambassador to Seoul hinted that communication between European Union and North Korea is taking place through diplomatic channels.\textsuperscript{458} In a joint declaration with China on 8 December 2004, EU also confirmed its concern with illicit trade of WMD-related materials, equipment and technology; support of efforts in facilitating a

\textsuperscript{63} “WRAPUP 1-Iran says won't be made to end uranium enrichment”, Reuters (Tehran) 12 October 2004. Date of Access: 08 January 2005. global.factiva.com/en/eSrch/ss_hl.asp
\textsuperscript{66} “WRAPUP 1-Iran says won't be made to end uranium enrichment”, Reuters (Tehran), 12 October 2004. Date of Access: 08 January 2005. global.factiva.com/en/eSrch/ss_hl.asp
\textsuperscript{67} “Possible treaty banning production of fissile material for weapons purposes debated in First Committee”, M2 Presswire (Geneva), 18 October 2004. Date of Access: 08 January 2005. [global.factiva.com/en/eSrch/ss_hl.asp]
\textsuperscript{68} “Europe to offer Iran reactor if Tehran shows nuclear program is peaceful”, AFP (Vienna), 19 October 2004. Date of Access: 08 January 2005. www.spacewar.com/2004/041019210335.m84gaqew.html
\textsuperscript{70} “Iran will resume nuclear fuel production if Europe breaches commitments”, BBC Monitoring Middle East (Tehran), 7 January 2005. Date of Access: 08 January 2005. global.factiva.com/en/eSrch/ss_hl.asp
political resolution of the Iran nuclear issue and support for a Korean Peninsula free of nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{459}

Compiled by Kevin Keane, Philip Han, Stanislav Orlov, Hitomi Roppongi and Michael Varey