

Strengthening Democratic Security and Solidarity: Prospects for the G7 Brussels Summit

John Kirton, Director, G8 Research Group
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Introduction

The year 2014 brings many anniversaries of events whose memory and legacy hang heavy in the air. It is the 100th anniversary of the start of the First World War, the 75th anniversary of the outbreak of the Second World War, and the 70th anniversary of the D-Day landings, which all G8 leaders are due to celebrate together in Normandy on June 6, the day after the G7 Brussels Summit ends. It is the 35th anniversary of the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan that began the new Cold War. It is the 25th anniversary of the G7's Paris Summit, to which Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev sent the letter that ended the Cold War and soon brought a democratizing Russia into the enlarged democratic G8 fold. And now, for its 40th annual summit, the G8 has gone back to the G7, in a Europe engulfed in war between Russia and Ukraine.

The G7's Brussels Summit on June 4-5 will be the first annual summit held without Russia since 1992, when Boris Yeltsin first came. It will be the first such summit where G7 leaders will meet alone since 2002, when they had their last session "at seven" within the larger G8. It will be the second G7 summit within three months, following the G7's emergency meeting at the Hague on March 24. It will be the first summit held in a country that is not a member of the G7, marking the advent of the European Union, headquartered in Brussels, as a G7 summit host. And it will be the first summit in decades to showcase the democratic solidarity and responsibility that G7 members uniquely share, as they confront challenges reminiscent of those they faced from 1979 to 1989.

Global Challenges

The Brussels Summit agenda is composed of seven items: Ukraine and Russia, other foreign policy issues, the global economy, trade, energy security, climate change, and development. The focus will be on the implications of Ukraine's presidential election on May 25 and what it needs to become prosperous, well governed and territorially whole; the G7 sanctions against Russia; and the future relationship between Russia and the rest of the G8. Other foreign policy issues start with the civil war in a terrorist-ridden Syria still with its chemical weapons, the nuclear program in Iran, conflict and terrorism in the Middle East, North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, and threats from Afghanistan, China and North Korea on the Asian front. The global economy requires strengthening growth and jobs through macroeconomic management and structural reform. Trade includes advancing liberalization between the United States and European Union, across the Pacific and with Ukraine. Energy security involves reducing Europe's reliance on Russian supplies through a multi-pronged five-year plan. Climate change will be linked with energy security to chart a path toward a new global control regime due in 2015. And

development will focus on delivering and extending the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) also due in 2015, especially those on maternal, newborn and child health.

The Argument

On this formidable, full-strength agenda, Brussels promises to be a summit of strong success, above all on Ukraine and in the related security and energy fields. It will diplomatically and materially support the new Ukrainian government, reject Russia's forced annexation of Crimea and intrusions elsewhere in Ukraine, solidify the sanctions against Russia and support other insecure democracies within its reach. It will act against terrorism in Syria and elsewhere, fine-tune global economic policy and endorse the G8's 2013 program on trade, tax and transparency. It will produce a credible medium-term plan for energy security, reinforced by actions to control climate change and take steps to reach the lagging MDGs. Most of all it will affirm a future for the restored G7 summit, to which Russia can return at any time once it rediscovers the democratic interests and identity that it used to share. Brussels will thus perform more strongly than most G7 and G8 summits in the past (Appendix A).

This strong performance will be spurred above all by the unprecedentedly severe shock of Russia's aggression and annexation in Europe's Ukraine, and by the terrorist-fuelled civil war in nearby Syria, and by an unstable Middle East and Africa. With the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) paralyzed by Russia's veto of resolutions on Ukraine and Syria, the response will be led by the all democratically devoted G7, backed by the many well-performing multilateral organizations it controls. With the relative capabilities of G7 members rising, while those of Russia and its BRICS partners are mostly falling, the G7 has a predominance of power that it largely lacked at the start of the new cold war from 1979 to 1989. The G7's internal equality is enhanced by the revival of Japan, the United Kingdom and most of Europe. The absence at the summit of a Russia that has directly assaulted democratic values and basic norms of the Westphalian state system will reinforce the likemindedness of the G7 members, grounded in the common democratic principles and practices they have at home. Their leaders will come to Brussels with considerable political cohesion, based on long experience in G8 summitry and in managing publics now reluctant to use force abroad. With their unprecedented personal involvement in collectively preparing the summit, their more compact encounter without Russia, and the new hosting troika of the EU, UK and Germany, G7 leaders will be inspired to come together as real leaders to an exceptional degree.

To be sure, the speed of G7 success in producing the intended results will be slowed by the need to rebuild the capabilities and respect the preferences of a democratic Ukraine, and by the difficulty Russia's president and people will have in returning a Crimea they regard as theirs. But these results will come more quickly than the great transformation produced by the G7 during the dangerous decade from 1979 to 1989, which ended in the Cold War victory shared by all.

Plans and Preparations

Russia's Plans and Priorities

The 2014 summit was to have been hosted by Russia, at its regular spot in the annual rotation that had been established at Kananaskis in 2002. There the G7 had decided that Russia would be inserted into the hosting rotation, and not at the end as the newest member but in the middle, with Germany delaying its turn so that Russia could host sooner in its stead. Thus President Vladimir Putin hosted Russia's first G8 summit at St. Petersburg in 2006, selecting energy, health and education as its priority themes. Having returned as president after serving as prime minister after his first two presidential terms ended, Putin prepared to host Russia's second summit on June 4-5, 2014. He chose the location of Sochi, a southern resort that had been developed at great expense to host the 2014 Olympics and Paralympics a few months before the summit's scheduled start.

The Russian agenda, announced at the start of January 2014 when Russia formally assumed the G8 presidency, began with the overall theme of "Risk Management for Sustainable Growth in a Safe World." The top priority was "ensuring sustainable economic growth," by stimulating the global economy, reducing unemployment and removing protectionist barriers to trade and investment. Then came five specific priorities: drugs, terrorism and extremism, regional conflicts (such as Syria, and the Iranian nuclear issue), health, and disasters, defined as "establishing a global management system to address risks associated with natural and manmade disasters." Russia also promised to address inherited G8 issues including those dealt with at St. Petersburg in 2006.

The Russian Preparatory Process

Russia had begun its year as host in familiar fashion, launching the summit website at the start of January and identifying a dense schedule of preparatory meetings (Appendix C).

One set of meetings was for the Roma/Lyon Group. It usually holds two meetings per year, working among delegation heads and practitioners, and in groups for law enforcement, transport security and cyber/high tech crime. It has held seven senior expert meetings, to intensify the close counterterrorism capacity among G8 governments.

Another meeting was the first one of the working group on food security, scheduled for February 27-28, 2014, in Moscow. It was to focus on soil fertility and its preservation for future generations, in the face of desertification and land degradation.

The expectation of normalcy was strengthened by the announcement on January 23 by Germany's Angela Merkel that the G8 summit she was due to host in 2015 would be held in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, an alpine resort town one hour south of Munich, at the historic resort of Schloss Elmau.

The Post-G8 Preparatory Process

However, the 2014 preparatory process abruptly ended after the decision of Russia's Federation Council on March 1 to give Putin his request to use military force in Ukraine. The following day, G7 countries cancelled the meeting of foreign affairs sous-sherpas (FASS) scheduled for Moscow on March 3-4 and the sherpa meeting there due on March 17-18.

On March 2, the "Statement by G7 Nations" condemned Russia's "clear violation of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine." It said that because Russia's actions "contravene the principles and values on which the G7 and G8 operate ... we have decided for the time being to suspend our participation in activities associated with the preparation of the scheduled G8 Summit in Sochi in June, until the environment comes back where the G8 is able to have meaningful discussion." The statement also pledged support for Ukraine to restore its unity, stability and political and economic health, including financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other sources it would unlock. The G7 at the leaders' level had suddenly returned to life.

G7 finance ministers followed up a day later, issuing on March 3 the "Statement by G7 Finance Ministers on Economic Support for Ukraine." They pledged strong financial backing for Ukraine, which was undertaking market-oriented reforms, with the IMF in the lead and unlocking additional support from the World Bank, other international financial institutions (IFIs), the EU and bilateral donors. They further promised rapid technical assistance to support macroeconomic, regulatory and anti-corruption reforms.

On March 12, came the "Statement of G7 Leaders on Ukraine," the first statement issued explicitly in the leaders' name. It called on Russia to cease all efforts to change Crimea's status and indicated that G7 leaders would not recognize the outcome of a referendum under such illegal circumstances. It said annexation would have "grave implications" for all states and trigger further individual and collective action by G7 members. It declared G7 support for a "sovereign, independent, inclusive and united Ukraine" and reaffirmed the suspension of participation in summit preparations until a "meaningful discussion" could take place.

On March 24, in an unprecedented move, G7 leaders held their first spontaneous, inter-sessional summit attended by all members and by them alone, on the margins of the broader Nuclear Security Summit in the Hague. "G7: The Hague Declaration" condemned the illegal referendum and annexation of Crimea. The leaders said they "remain ready to intensify actions including coordinated sectoral sanctions." Drawing on the opening mission statement from the first G7 summit at Rambouillet in 1975, they declared "This Group came together because of shared beliefs and shared responsibilities" and thus "we will not participate in the planned Sochi Summit." Moreover, the leaders would meet again as the G7 in Brussels, at the same time as the scheduled Sochi Summit, to discuss their broad agenda. They advised their foreign ministers not to attend the planned G8 April meeting in Moscow and decided that their G7 energy ministers would meet to strengthen "our collective energy security." They

concluded by promising “strong financial backing” to Ukraine and assistance on trade and energy security.

On April 25, the “G7 Leaders Statement on Ukraine” expressed “deep concern at the continued efforts by separatists backed by Russia to destabilize eastern Ukraine and our commitment to taking further steps ... for the May 25 presidential election.” G7 leaders thus declared as fact Russia’s backing for the separatists. They pledged to follow through “on the full legal and practical consequences of this illegal annexation, including but not limited to the economic, trade and financial areas,” by swiftly imposing additional sanctions on Russia. They further promised to “prepare to move to broader, coordinated sanctions, including sectoral measures, should circumstances warrant.”

Through this unprecedented array of four statements within two months, G7 leaders made 32 commitments on Ukraine: eight on March 2, three on March 3, 16 on March 24 and five on April 25 (Appendix B). They also invoked the aid of other international institutions 13 times.

On May 6, the G7 energy ministers issued the “Rome G7 Energy Initiative for Energy Security” was issued at the end of their two-day meeting. It declared that energy should not be “used as a means of political coercion” and established seven principles for energy security, to guide a plan the ministers would develop for the short, medium and long term. The specific measures built on those that the G7 had successfully used since its response to the second oil shock in 1979 and 1980 but broadened to include piracy, cybersecurity and critical energy infrastructure. It pledged assistance to Ukraine to strengthen its energy security. It extended the focus to the globalized dimensions of energy security and offered to pursue cooperation within the broader G20. It also established a working group to develop its initiatives and report back to ministers within six months. Together these measures credibly promised to end Europe’s dependence on Russian oil and gas for good.

These ministerial meetings were accompanied by extensive personal contact directly among the leaders, including bilateral visits in the lead up to the summit.

Compliance Momentum

As the summit approached, momentum for a strong performance was fuelled by the substantial compliance by the G8 members with their priority commitments from the Lough Erne Summit in 2013, starting with their interim compliance in the first six months (Appendix D). On the eve of the Brussels Summit, the preliminary final compliance report of the G8 Research Group at the University of Toronto and International Organisations Research Institute of the National Research University Higher School of Economics indicated that G8 members had kept their 18 assessed priority commitments at an average of 76%. They were led by the UK at 89%, the US at 86%, the EU at 80% and Canada and France at 75%. Russia and Germany were ranked 6th at 70%. G8 compliance was lower than its unusually high score of 80% with the priority commitments from the Camp David Summit in 2012, but still at the solid evolving long-term average.

Also promising for Brussels performance was the strong match between its priority agenda and the issue areas where G8 compliance has been historically and reliably high (Appendix E). In the realm of security, the one most closely related to Brussels' Ukraine and Russia and other foreign policy agendas, the G8's cumulative compliance averaged 81%. It was led (in the areas where data is sufficiently reliable) by nonproliferation at 83%, terrorism at 82% and regional security at 79%. The average for energy was 87%, macroeconomics 86%, and climate change and development at 73% each. Only on trade was it a relatively low 69%.

Prospects

On the eve of the Brussels Summit, the prospects were promising for a strong overall performance, led by a very strong performance to protect Ukraine, backed by substantial advances in other domains.

Ukraine and Russia

At the centre of the summit agenda is the crisis in Ukraine in its many forms. The first task is supporting Ukrainian president Poroshenko, elected on May 25 in the first round of elections with an unprecedented 55% of the vote. G7 leaders will endorse the legitimacy of his election, in which one third of the polls were open in separatist-ridden Donetsk and one sixth in similarly afflicted Luhansk. G7 leaders will demand that Russia also recognize the results and Poroshenko's government as the legitimate one of Ukraine.

The second task is strengthening, synchronizing, sharing the burden and setting the cadence for sanctions against Russia. Leaders will seek to ensure that the sanctions are sufficiently timely, targeted, strong and coordinated across G7 members to both restrain Putin from further forceful incursions into Ukraine or elsewhere and, over time, to help restore the Crimean region to the sovereignty of an increasingly prosperous, democratic, well-governed Ukraine. Leaders will review the effectiveness of the existing set of sanctions and declare that they will stay in place until Crimea is returned to Ukraine. They will consider invoking further ones in response to Russia sending armed "volunteers" and arms from Russia to fight alongside and lead the separatist forces in Ukraine. They could well specify the conditions under which harsher sanctions, such as those affecting whole sectors of the Russian economy or key high technology areas, would be invoked. They will do so with the goal of signalling market players to stay or get out of Russia in the short term and of squeezing Russia materially over the medium term. They will ask other countries to join them, as Australia and Switzerland already have.

A third task is mobilizing more financial resources from the IMF, other IFIs and bilateral donors to quickly and reliably give Ukraine the money and tough conditions it needs to become a strong modern state. This will include money to help Ukraine pay its overdue gas bill to Russia, which is due in early June, and perhaps to build its security forces, starting with the professional police that Ukraine badly needs.

A fourth task is to set conditions to help Ukraine cut the corruption that has crippled its state since its independence in 1991. Only then will the money that flows in, instead of rushing out to tax havens abroad, so it stays to build the physical and human security that the Ukrainian people deserve. With such conditions and supports put in place, G7 leaders at Brussels can mobilize further financial support to convince all Ukrainians that they will be much better off in a strong, united, sovereign state of their own.

A fifth task, building on the priority on the advances in transparency from last year's G8 Lough Erne Summit is to recover the stolen assets taken from Ukraine's state and citizens by its former rulers. Together with moves to combat corruption, this will help shine a light on Russia, and the corruption and support for Ukrainians separatists that exist there.

A sixth task is to strengthen cooperation among G7 countries in outer space, cybersecurity and security in more traditional forms. While G7 leaders will act on the basis of what their defence ministers do at their North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) meeting in Brussels on June 3-4, they will likely leave direct announcements regarding deploying military forces to NATO's eastern members or boosting defence spending among NATO members to the NATO summit taking place in September in Wales.

Seventh, they will review their relationship with Russia more broadly, in the short and longer term. They will enrich the consensus about what changes Russia will need to make before conditions allow for a meaningful dialogue between it and its G8 partners to resume. The ultimate status of Crimea will be central here.

Foreign Policy

Other foreign policy issues begin with Syria. The first task is to complete the removal of all its chemical weapons, then to provide humanitarian access and assistance, stop the civil war and the growth of terrorism, and chart a path to a post-Assad regime. The latter is aimed at realizing the Lough Erne goal of installing a transitional government with full executive authority. Following the lead of US president Barack Obama, G7 leaders will likely reframe Syria as an issue of terrorism and endorse an appropriately more robust response, signalling more military aid to the responsible rebels.

The second issue is Iran. Led by Obama, G7 leaders will continue to try to contain its nuclear weapons program and adjust their sanctions on Iran to this end. They will also seek Iran's support for their Syrian goals, and will foster human rights in Iran.

The Middle East Peace Process will also be addressed. Leaders will reinforce the initiative that US secretary of state John Kerry has recently undertaken there.

North Africa will be dealt with through support for the Deauville Partnership, with attention paid to Egypt following the election of General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and to South Sudan. On Libya, at the initiative of Italy's Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, the G7

will address the deteriorating security situation and the need for intervention in some form.

In sub-Saharan Africa, the focus — led by France — will be on countering the return of separatist violence in Mali, terrorism by Boko Haram in Nigeria and perhaps civil conflict in the Central African Republic.

In Asia the key concern will be Afghanistan, where most US troops are due to depart by the end of 2014, and will all go if a new deal to keep some there is not forged with the country's new government. Led by Japan and the US, following Obama's recent visit to Asia, leaders will address an ever more threatening North Korea, China's maritime expansion and perhaps the military coup in Thailand.

Global terrorism and nuclear proliferation will also be dealt with more generally. As most of these serious security threats arise from countries next or close to Russia, it has a strong incentive to return to the G8 fold in rational pursuit of its national and human security goals.

Global Economy

The global economy agenda includes strengthening growth and jobs through macroeconomic management and structural reform. The immediate task is to keep the geopolitical risks from a geographically expanding but economically shrinking and slowing Russia and China from damaging the still fragile economic recovery and financial stability that the G7 members and their global democratic partners now enjoy and that other countries such as Ukraine need. Attention will also be given to the tough tasks of fiscal sustainability, employment, structural reform and tax fairness (Fauver 2014, Ryder 2014, Gurría 2014, Lesage 2014).

Trade

The trade agenda, led by UK prime minister David Cameron, builds on the substantial steps taken at Lough Erne last year. It begins with supporting legislative ratification of the Canada-Europe Economic Partnership and advancing negotiations for a similar agreement between the EU and the US. Leaders will also endorse the 12-country Trans-Pacific Partnership currently being negotiated among the US, Japan and their partners, and perhaps a prospective deal between the EU and Japan. Pro forma support will be given to completing the long overdue Doha Development Agenda of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and guidance for liberalization in specific sectors (Agah 2014). The centrepiece advance will be support for freer trade between Ukraine and the EU, and perhaps with the US and Canada too.

Energy Security

On energy security, leaders will endorse and build on the results of the G7 energy ministers' meeting in Rome on May 5-6. They will explore ways to keep gas and other energy supplies flowing to Ukraine, all of Central and Eastern Europe, and the European

Union as a whole. They will seek to diversify their sources of supply, thus reducing their reliance on gas imports from an unreliable Russia that has shut off twice in the recent past. In doing so they will be guided by their success in confronting the oil shock from the Middle East in 1979, recalling that their coordinated multifaceted strategy that then led within a decade to the demise and ultimate disappearance of the energy-empowered Soviet Union, which had invaded Afghanistan in late 1979 but left in defeat a decade later. G7 leaders will again commit to energy conservation and efficiency, starting with efforts to stop governments subsidizing and thus wasting fossil fuels. They will also shift to alternative and renewable fuels, and regulatory reforms and improved infrastructure to open and integrate markets across Europe, the Atlantic and Pacific, especially so that the abundant supplies from the emerging energy superpowers in North America can easily flow to a Europe and Japan where they are needed most. If necessary G7 leaders could signal or start the release of the excess oil from the strategic petroleum reserve that the US and other members of the International Energy Agency (IEA) have and even restart the nuclear power reactors in energy-dependent Japan and Germany. These moves will seek to steadily and substantially reduce the world price of oil and gas, and thus the fiscal resources, economic growth and currency value of Russia and other unfriendly petrodollar states.

Climate Change

The leaders' agenda and approach to climate change will be linked with energy security. Leaders will thus act to curb greenhouse gas emissions into the atmosphere and to help define the framework for an effective climate change control regime that can be approved by the full United Nations when its leaders meet in Paris at the end of 2015. Additional steps will flow from the climate control principles and promises their energy ministers made in Rome.

Development

Development will focus on delivering and extending the MDGs due in 2015. Led by Canadian prime minister Stephen Harper, MDGs 4 and 5 on maternal and child health will get a particular boost, reinforcing the special summit on maternal, newborn and child health that he hosted in Toronto on May 28-30 and the additional CA\$3.5 billion in new financial support he announced there. Food security will also be addressed, building on the New Alliance pioneered by Obama at the Camp David Summit he hosted in 2012. Dementia may be noted to support Cameron's initiative in 2013.

Propellers of Performance

This strong performance will be spurred by six forces: the unprecedentedly severe military shock from Russia for all G7 members, the strong support for G7 leadership from most relevant international institutions, the growing capabilities of G7 members, their democratic solidarity, their adequate political cohesion and their leaders' unprecedented use of their compact, cherished G7 club.

Shock-Activated Security Vulnerability

The first force is the severe, shock-activated sense of vulnerability of G7 members and their allies to the erupting threats of both old and new kinds across a broad, interconnected range of issue areas (Appendix G). They begin with inter-state war between Russia and Ukraine, and continue with civil war and terrorism in Syria, the Middle East, North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa, energy price rises and potential supply shortages, outbreaks of infectious disease, and potential financial crisis.

The first shock arose from the old threat of conscious, targeted, inter-state war in Europe, in the form of military aggression and political annexation against its Ukrainian neighbour, first in the Crimean region and then incrementally in the country's east. To be sure, this shock was not one arriving directly in G7 members or in one of their NATO or bilateral military allies. But this was the first serious act of aggression and annexation in the post-Cold War world following Saddam Hussein's ill-fated attack on Kuwait in 1990. It reawakened G7 leaders' memories of the Soviet Union's unsuccessful invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 and of Russia's intervention in Georgia in 2008 and Moldova's Transdnestria region in 1992. Moreover, Russia's invasion of Europe's Ukraine posed a military threat more proximate to G8 members than those initiated by the USSR or Russia before, especially as the EU now included Russia's exposed, small next-door neighbours in the Baltic states. And the US, Canada and Japan remain next-door neighbours of Russia too. Thus the European, North American/Arctic and Asian members of the G7 felt the shock of Russian military aggression to an equally high degree.

A second shock came from civil war. It arose above all in Syria where the death toll had passed 150,000 with no end to the war in sight (Amos 2014). The spectre of the use of weapons of mass destruction again appeared, with a chlorine gas attack in 2014, and with not all the chemical weapons removed from Syria by the due date of May 2014. Civil war was also present or in prospect in North Africa in South Sudan and sub-Saharan Africa in Nigeria, the Central African Republic and Mali. New human rights abuses erupted in Sudan itself.

A third shock came from terrorism (Appendix G-1). Within the G8 Russia had been the leading victim, with a December 29, 2013, suicide bomber from Dagestan killing 18 and injuring 44 in Volgograd, and another on a trolley bus there a day later killing 16 and injuring 41. While all other G7 members had been spared, the United States commemorated in April 2014 the anniversary of the Boston Marathon bombings on April 15, 2013, which had killed five and injured 264. Outside the G8, terrorist attacks took place in China, as dissidents from Xinjiang struck several sites in and outside the province. In India terrorists controlled several areas and in Syria terrorists fought on both side of a deadly civil war. In Nigeria the terrorist group Boko Haram mounted increasing atrocities, culminating in the abduction of more than 200 school girls in April 2014. On May 5, Boko Haram attacked the town of Gamburu, killing at least 125. In Afghanistan the prospect of the final G7 troops about to leave their combat roles in a terrorist-infested country also should inspire G7 leaders to take firm action against this common global scourge.

The fourth shock came from energy, where scarce supplies and soaring prices have led to strong, coordinated successful G7 action many times (Appendix G-2). The Russian-bred energy shock of 2014 harmed the energy and economic security of an import-dependent Japan and Germany, especially as these two countries chose to shut off their nuclear power reactors in response to the shock of the Fukushima natural and nuclear disaster in March 2011. Russia's threat to cut off gas to Ukraine and thus to Europe on June 3, 2014, revived memories of such interruptions in 2006 and 2009.

A fifth set of shocks came from health, the area that had been selected as one of the five major themes for the G8 Sochi Summit. By May 2014, the Middle East respiratory syndrome (MERS) virus that emerged in 2012 had infected about 500 people in Saudi Arabia, and had spread to two cases in the US. It stirred memories of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), a coronavirus from the same family that erupted in China in 2002, infected Canada in 2003 and killed about 800 people worldwide. Moreover, polio — recently on the point of extinction — was now spreading through war and terrorism in several countries beyond the G7, with the number of cases rising from 24 in 2013 to 68 by April 30, 2014, and the affected countries reaching from Pakistan, Syria and Cameroon to Afghanistan, Iraq and Equatorial Guinea. In early May 2014, the World Health Organization declared polio to be a global health emergency, only the second time it had declared one since acquiring the power to do so in 2007. And efforts to meet the MDG goals on maternal, newborn and child health and on HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria by the fast-approaching due date of 2015 continued to disappoint.

The sixth shock could come from another financial crisis, with China facing a property boom-turned-bust as the most likely source. Its precursor was the failure of financial and other firms from 2013 to 2014, some of which were not rescued by the Chinese government. While the probabilities of a Chinese-turned-global financial crisis were small, G7 leaders are now sensitive to the prospect by their recent property-fuelled American-turned-global financial crisis in 2008-09 and their euro crisis in 2010-13.

Together this set of shocks will spur the Brussels Summit to success, above all on Ukraine and in the related fields of security, energy and climate change. It is likely to resemble the high-performing summits of 1979 and 1980, driven by the second Soviet invasion and energy shocks, far more than the 1982 summit, where a determined US confronted France and Germany seeking to connect themselves by pipeline to the Soviet Union's abundant gas supplies (Putnam and Bayne 1984, 1987). It is noteworthy that Russia is more directly vulnerable to these shocks than the members of the G7 are.

Mixed International Institutional Performance

The second cause of strong, security-led success at Brussels is the multilateral organizational failure of the centrally relevant UNSC, but the strong support for the G7 of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), the rest of the UN system and the many consequential multilateral organizations controlled by the G7, notably the IMF, NATO, the IEA and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).

The UNSC failed to condemn Russia's invasion of Crimea, but UNGA provided strong support for the G7 and a sovereign Ukraine under Russian assault. The UNSC held seven sessions on Ukraine but could not pass a resolution due to Russia's veto. The issue then went to UNGA, where, on March 17, Resolution 68/262 recognized Crimea as residing within Ukraine's borders by a vote of 100 for and only eleven against, for a winning margin of 90%. There were 58 abstentions and 24 members did not vote. Voting against were Russia and only Armenia, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, North Korea, Nicaragua, Sudan, Syria, Venezuela and Zimbabwe — a small set of largely small, poor, authoritarian, conflict-ridden states that collectively represented, with Russia, only 4.49% of the world's population and 6.51% of the UN votes. None of Russia's G20 partners or its fellow BRICS members of Brazil, India, China and South Africa voted with Russia in either the UNSC or UNGA. Russia stood virtually alone.

By way of contrast, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan on December 27, 1979, a UNSC resolution condemning the invasion on January 7, 1980, was vetoed by Russia, with only East Germany voting on Russia's side. Then, under the "Uniting for Peace" procedure from the Korean War, a January 14 UNGA resolution deplored the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and called for the "immediate, unconditional and total withdrawal of the foreign troops from Afghanistan." That resolution passed with 104 for and 18 against, for a winning margin of 85%. The non-aligned and developing countries voted 78 to 9 for the resolution, overwhelmingly backing the West.

In 2014 the UNSC also failed on Syria. To be sure, in UNSC Resolution 2139 on February 22, it unanimously demanded immediate humanitarian access throughout the country. However, on May 22, Russia and China, in their fourth double veto since the Syrian conflict had started in 2011, stopped a resolution to refer to the International Criminal Court those responsible for the mass atrocity crimes in Syria.

The IMF provided strong support to the G7. On April 30, 2014, it approved a major new loan, with needed conditions, to Ukraine. Some of this money immediately began flowing to a financially desperate Ukraine, while the IMF approval allowed for much more money from other IFIs and bilateral sources. This initial monetary support for Ukraine included \$1 billion from the US and \$220 million from Canada. More support came from the EU and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

NATO, with its 28 democratic members, offered strong support for the G7 in the military realm. It swung forces to its newest members close to Russia to reassure them that Article Five would protect them from suffering Crimea's fate. In this "reassurance package" air, naval and land forces were sent to conduct exercises in and with the Baltic States, Poland and Romania. NATO also monitored Russia's 40,000-strong troop mobilization on Ukraine's eastern border and publicly declared that the troops had not withdrawn despite Putin repeatedly declaring that they had.

The IEA provided support in the energy field. The meeting of G7 energy ministers in Rome mandated the IEA to help develop a plan in six months. Similarly, the OECD supported the G7's work on tax and suspended its negotiations with Russia to join.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), whose 57 members include Russia, had a mixed performance. It failed to restrain Russia from invading and annexing Crimea and to stop the separatists in the eastern and southern regions of non-peninsular Ukraine. Indeed, led by a German soldier, a team of OSCE observers was taken hostage by armed Ukrainian separatists. On May 7, the OSCE president's meeting in Moscow was followed by Putin publicly announcing that he would withdraw his forces from Ukraine's borders and counselling the separatists to delay their referendum scheduled for May 11. A day later the separatists refused to follow Putin's public advice. NATO and the US said Russia had withdrawn no forces — the third time Putin had said it had but in fact had not. The OSCE offered useful reports on human rights abuses in Ukraine, which verified the G7 version of events rather than the Russian one.

The WTO was largely a failure. It did not restrain Russian protectionism, in general and against Ukraine. Hence, the Brussels G7 will focus on bilateral, plurilateral and sectoral trade liberalization where Russia is not involved.

The UN's failure to meet its fast-approaching 2015 deadlines to deliver its MDGs and climate change regime will prompt the G7 to act in these domains.

Predominant, Equalizing Capabilities

The third cause of Brussels strong success is the growing globally predominant and internally equalizing overall and relevant specialized capabilities of G7 members.

In the year leading up to Brussels, most G7 members' gross domestic product and currency values rose, while those of Russia declined and its BRICS partners slowed down (Appendix H-1). The G7 thus has a global predominance and superiority over Russia that it had lacked during its long if ultimately victorious Cold War. Within the G7, internal equality was enhanced by the revival of Japan, the UK and most of Europe, and the decline in US growth in the first quarter of 2014.

With regard to specialized military capabilities, now suddenly rendered relevant, the same was true (Appendix H-2). Moreover, the armed forces of most G7 members had fought several serious wars, and done so with considerable success, during the past 13 years. Those of Russia had not.

In the specialized capability of energy, the transcontinental G7 members of Canada and the United States, respectively the second and fourth geographically largest countries in the world, joined Russia as global energy superpowers. Indeed, they were full-strength superpowers in a way that Russia was not, for Canada had abundant supplies of uranium for nuclear power, hydroelectricity and wind power, and the US had strong solar power potential that Russia lacked. Firmly on the G7 side was Saudi Arabia, which had strong influence over the world price of oil. Energy-dependent Japan, Germany, France and the UK had the easy short-term option of turning their recently closed nuclear power plants back on or building more. Italy, while also energy dependent, was easily served by neighbouring France and by the oil- and gas-rich, democratizing Deauville Partnership

countries on the North African side of the Mediterranean. Moreover, only one 20th of the gas used in Europe as a whole came from Russia in 2014 (Wolf 2014).

In the specialized capability of soft power, the predominance of the G7 over Russia and the BRICS was even more pronounced (Appendix H-3).

Common Principles

The absence of Russia at the Brussels Summit and its direct assault on democratic values in Ukraine and in Russia itself will reinforce the ideational likemindedness of the G7 members, founded in the common democratic principles and practices they have at home (Appendix I). The central challenge of Russia's treatment of Ukraine puts the foundational principles of the Westphalian order and the core democratic values of the G7 at centre stage. Not surprisingly, the opening passages of the Hague Declaration quoted directly from the original one at Rambouillet in 1975, stressing the "responsibility" the G7 had to protect democracy in the world.

Domestic Political Cohesion

The fifth propeller of the Brussels Summit's strong success is the substantial supportive domestic political cohesion that G7 leaders will bring, as these summiters are both politically secure at home and experienced at summitry abroad.

At the executive level, US president Barack Obama, French president François Hollande and Canadian prime minister Stephen Harper were in exclusive control, while coalition governments existed in Japan led by Shinzo Abe, Germany led by Angela Merkel, the UK led by David Cameron and Italy led by Matteo Renzi. Executive control of both legislative chambers was absent only in the US, but existed in Canada, France and, thanks to coalitions, in the other G7 members. No leaders face elections within the next year, although the UK is confronting a referendum in Scotland on separation in September and the US will have its congressional mid-term elections in November.

At Brussels the leaders' political continuity and summit experience are strong. Harper and Merkel are coming to their ninth annual G7/8 summit, the European Union's José Manuel Barroso to his tenth and Herman Van Rompuy to his fifth. Obama will be attending his sixth, Cameron his fourth, Hollande his third, Japan's Shinzo Abe his third and Italy's Renzi — the only newcomer — his first. Together they bring an average of 5.6 years of summit experience, and four (Merkel in 2007, Harper in 2010, Obama in 2012 and Cameron in 2013) who have hosted a G7/8 summit before.

The popularity of the leaders and their parties was high in Japan and Germany, medium in Canada, and low in the US and France. While some G7 citizens might not approve of their own leaders, they had high regard for the other countries in the G7 club. Public support in G7 countries for G7 colleagues was substantial (BBC World Service 2013). Net favourable views of the UK existed in the US (+60), Canada (+54), Japan (+41), France (+40), Germany (+29) and Russia (+28). Views of the most powerful member, the US, were favourable in Japan (+32) and France (+13), neutral in Canada and the UK,

slightly negative in Germany (-4) and strongly negative in Russia (-36). Views of Russia were negative everywhere, above all in Germany (-49), as the biggest continental European power next door, and France (-38), followed by the US (-36), the UK (-31), Canada (-21) and Japan (-14). This deep reservoir of G7 solidarity and shared Russian antipathy, especially in Europe, offset and overwhelmed any potential societally fuelled intra-G7 divide bred by a business community that was dovish toward Russia in Germany in Europe and hawkish in the US, Japan and Canada, where less commerce and investment were at stake.

Constricted Club Participation

The sixth cause is the success-inducing constricted participation of G7 leaders in a club they cherish as their own. This effect was enhanced by six new features in 2014: the absence of Putin or a Russian replacement, the intense lead-up to the summit and statements, the EU hosting in Brussels, the troika chairing by the UK and Germany, the absence of pre-scheduled invited guests, and the D-Day anniversary celebrations including Putin planned for the day following the summit.

The absence of Putin at Brussels lowered transactions costs and divisions in starting positions, as it did when Putin withdrew from the substantially successful summit at Camp David in 2012. But unlike 2012, attended by Russian prime minister Dmitri Medvedev, there will be no Russian present at all at Brussels to slow down the process of arriving at ambitious agreements.

The unprecedentedly intense preparation among the G7 leaders consisted of one emergency summit on March 25 and three separate statements issued between March 2 and April 24. The leaders' direct preparation was much greater than ever before in the 40-year life of the G7/8. The G7's Hague Summit on March 24 was only the third time that an emergency, inter-sessional summit had been held, following one in New York in 1985 (which France boycotted) and another in Moscow in 1996 (to allow Russia's politically beleaguered president Boris Yelstin to host on the single, high-profile theme of nuclear safety and security). The strength of these 2014 summits and statements, and the collective negotiation behind them, set a firm foundation for the Brussels Summit, even with its broad agenda and short duration.

The EU's hosting in Brussels was the first time it had been inserted into the G7/8 hosting rotation. It reflected the greater supranational authority of the EU in the wake of the financial crisis from 2008 to 2013, while giving its newest members and front-line states next to Russia — notably Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania and Bulgaria — a more direct attachment to the event. It also allowed the G7 summit easy access to NATO, which is located in Brussels and whose defence ministers will meet there immediately before the G7 summit. As the EU has consistently high compliance with its G7/8 summit commitments, and as the host tends to have higher compliance than the other members, this factor may enhance the overall compliance with the Brussels commitments over the year following the 2014 summit.

The new troika arrangement added two co-chairs to the Brussels Summit: the UK as the previous year's host and Germany as the host in 2015. Together with the EU, this troika reduced any impression of this G7 summit being a US-led event. It also induced the G7's European members to come together, led by a hawkish UK and dovish Germany.

The absence of pre-scheduled invited guests increased the compactness and clubbiness of the event. It allowed the G7 leaders to be alone together for the entire summit, enhancing the opportunities for spontaneous combustion, cross-issue synergies and trade-offs, and for personal bonding. It remained possible for G7 leaders at the last minute to invite the Petro Poroshenko, new leader of Ukraine, to show their faith in his country's democratic leadership and their solidarity with the country as a whole. Poroshenko, elected with a majority in the first round of voting, was expected to make his first trip abroad to Brussels to sign the full association agreement with the EU, and was due to meet Obama in Poland just before the summit as well as all the G8 leaders in nearby Normandy on June 6.

The 70th-anniversary D-Day celebrations provided the opportunity for the G7 leaders to meet alone if need be or with a broader array of their allies. Because Putin was invited and seemed likely to attend, it also offered an opportunity for G7 leaders, alone or together, to meet with him immediately after the summit. At a minimum they could impress upon him their solidarity and determination and gain insights into his intentions. But, should the conditions be conducive to a more open conversation, they could also explore, in this diplomatic off-ramp, what accommodations might be possible to restrict and reverse the growing divide and escalation over Ukraine.

Conclusion

The G7's Brussels Summit will thus be a strong success, at least in the short term. Its longer term success depends critically on choices made within the G7, Russia, the rest of the world and, above all, Ukraine itself.

The G7's position has been clear, consistent and accommodating: it has temporarily suspended Russia's participation until the return of conditions that make a productive dialogue with Russia possible. There are several physical on-ramps in place to ease Russia's return. These include Normandy on June 6, the G20's Brisbane Summit in November, Angela Merkel's 2015 G7 summit — which Russia could attend as a G8 member or as chair of the BRICS summit that year — and the UN summits on development in September or December 2015. And in the policy sphere all consequential G7 governments and their citizens could individually be bought off, divide, forgive or forget most of Putin's recent behaviour.

But even so, it is difficult to see how the current G7 leaders could ever trust anything Putin says. And it is difficult to see how they could easily accept his aggression and annexation in Crimea. Great democratic leaders of great democratic powers must not be humiliated, and the nine at Brussels are the greatest of all. These G7 leaders could indeed go softer and slower and even call a stop to steadily strengthening their measures. But they are unlikely to surrender their starting principle that aggression and annexation

cannot be allowed to stand. Indeed, the new G8 could see Russia replaced as a full member by another major democratic power, perhaps an ever enlarging, more supranational EU, with democratic Ukraine and nearby countries inside.

Russia's government has said that it is ready to return to the G8 at any time. But it has also said that it does not need a G8 of declining relevance in a world where it has the G20 and the BRICS. It has signalled that any reunification would occur in a new group to replace the old G8. Far more importantly, as Putin said on May 24, "there are some red lines that we can't cross and Ukraine and the Crimea is such a red line" (Woodcock 2014). Could he reverse course, and carry with him a Russian people who would divide, forget or forgive if the costs to their national interests and human interests became too great? Could the current Russian conviction that Crimea is at the centre of Russian interests and identity evaporate as quickly as it arose from almost nowhere in 2014? The Russian people no doubt had a similar conviction about their much more powerful Soviet Union ever surrendering any of its territory in their moment of patriotic euphoria on December 27, 1979, when Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan. Just over a decade later, they and their leaders changed their mind.

The rest of the world has already spoken, at the UNSC and UNGA, to say that Russia stands virtually alone in its division and dismemberment of Ukraine. No country has since changed its mind. To be sure, China, like Ukraine and Europe, is willing to buy Russia's gas at the right price, until a cheaper, more reliable supplier or source comes along. India will also buy Russia's weapons as long as they are available, good and cheap. But Russia's basic claim that language, if not religion, justifies aggression and annexation is rejected by almost everyone, within the BRICS and beyond, apart from those non-state actors devoted to jihad. To be sure, the BRICS leaders did back the right of Russia and of themselves to attend the next G20 summit, taking place in Brisbane in November 2015. But with Australia sanctioning Russia alongside the G7, all G20 leaders will have to ask if the conditions will be conducive to a productive dialogue and if it is worth their time to come.

Ukraine, the most relevant actor, has already made its choice. As soon as it became clear that he had won the presidential election on the first round on May 25, Poroshenko declared that he would never recognize Russia's "occupation of Crimea," that the "sovereignty and territorial integrity" of Ukraine were his paramount goals and that integration with Europe was his course. He promised to head east to extinguish pro-Russian separatists. He did so knowing that Russia had retreated from further direct aggression and annexation in Ukraine, not only in the face of G7 and NATO counter-measures, but also when Ukrainians themselves, of whatever language group, had begun to fight for their country with force.

Under these circumstances, the Brussels Summit will not return the world to a cold war, for today's Russia has far less capability, fewer allies and supporters, and more societal openness, connectivity and friendships than the Soviet Union had from 1950 to 1985. Nor will Brussels soon restore a Crimea free to choose its place in a well-functioning Ukraine, or soon return a democratizing Russia to its proper place in a democratic G8. But it will

produce the principles, plan, processes and programs that could secure these goals within several years. Then all G8 leaders can resume their central task of working together, with responsibility, respect and reliability, to give the world the military, political, economic, energy, climate and human security it so badly needs.

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Appendix A: G8 Performance, 1975-2013

Year	Grade ^a	Dom Pol Mgt		Deliberative			Directional ^c	Decisional ^c	Delivery	Dev Glo Gov ^e	Attendees ^f	
		Communiqué compliments										
		#	Spread	# days	# state-ments	# words	# refs to core values	# commit-ments	Compliance	# G8 bodies created min/off	Mem	# par C/IO
1975	A-	2	29%	3	1	1,129	5	14	0.571	0/1	6	0/0
1976	D	0	0%	2	1	1,624	0	7	0.089	0/0	7	0/0
1977	B-	1	13%	2	6	2,669	0	29	0.084	0/1	8	0/0
1978	A	1	13%	2	2	2,999	0	35	0.363	0/0	8	0/0
1979	B+	0	0%	2	2	2,102	0	34	0.823	½	8	0/0
1980	C+	0	0%	2	5	3,996	3	55	0.076	0/1	8	0/0
1981	C	1	13%	2	3	3,165	0	40	0.266	1/0	8	0/0
1982	C	0	0%	3	2	1,796	0	23	0.840	0/3	9	0/0
1983	B	0	0%	3	2	2,156	7	38	-0.109	0/0	8	0/0
1984	C-	1	13%	3	5	3,261	0	31	0.488	1/0	8	0/0
1985	E	4	50%	3	2	3,127	1	24	0.01	0/2	8	0/0
1986	B+	3	25%	3	4	3,582	1	39	0.583	1/1	9	0/0
1987	D	2	13%	3	7	5,064	0	53	0.933	0/2	9	0/0
1988	C-	3	25%	3	3	4,872	0	27	-0.478	0/0	8	0/0
1989	B+	3	38%	3	11	7,125	1	61	0.078	0/1	8	0/0
1990	D	3	38%	3	3	7,601	10	78	-0.14	0/3	8	0/0
1991	B-	1	13%	3	3	8,099	8	53	0.000	0/0	9	1/0
1992	D	1	13%	3	4	7,528	5	41	0.64	1/1	8	0/0
1993	C+	0	0%	3	2	3,398	2	29	0.75	0/2	8	1/0
1994	C	1	13%	3	2	4,123	5	53	1.00	1/0	8	1/0
1995	B+	3	25%	3	3	7,250	0	78	1.00	2/2	8	1/0
1996	B	1	13%	3	5	15,289	6	128	0.41	0/3	8	¼
1997	C-	16	88%	3	4	12,994	6	145	0.128	1/3	9	1/0
1998	B+	0	0%	3	4	6,092	5	73	0.318	0/0	9	0/0
1999	B+	4	22%	3	4	10,019	4	46	0.382	1/5	9	0/0
2000	B	1	11%	3	5	13,596	6	105	0.814	0/4	9	4/3
2001	B	1	11%	3	7	6,214	3	58	0.55	½	9	0
2002	B+	0	0%	2	18	11,959	10	187	0.35	1/8	10	0
2003	C	0	0%	3	14	16,889	17	206	0.658	0/5	10	12/5
2004	C+	0	0%	3	16	38,517	11	245	0.54	0/15	10	12/0
2005	A-	8	67%	3	16	22,286	29	212	0.65	0/5	9	11/6
2006		6	44%	3	15	30,695	256	317	0.47	0/4	10	5/9
2007		12	100%	3	8	25,857	86	329	0.51	0/4	9	9/9
2008	B+	8	78%	3	6	16,842	33	296	0.48	¼	9	15/6
2009	B	13	67%	3	10	31,167	62	254	0.53	2/9	10	28/10
2010	C	10	89%	2	2	7,161	32	44	0.46	0/1	10	9/0
2011	B+	14	67%	2	5	19,071	172	196	0.54	1/0	10	7/4
2012	B+	7	67%	2	2	3,640	42	81	0.60	0/1	10	4/1
2013		7	44%	2	4	13,494	71	214	N/A (0.40*)	0/0	10	6/1
Total	NA	131	NA	104	214	374,954	828	3,764	15.657	15/101	329	115/53
Ave. all	B-	44%	1.74	2.7	5.63	9,867	21.79	99	0.423	0.42/2.81	8.65	3.03/1.40
Av. cycle 1	B-	47%	1.94	2.1	2.9	2,526	1.1	29	0.3246	0.14/0.71	7.43	0/0
Av. cycle 2	C-	46%	2.45	3	3.3	3,408	1.3	34	0.3239	0.29/1.14	8.43	0/0
Av. cycle 3	C+	33%	1.26	3	4	6,446	4.4	56	0.4754	0.58/1.29	8.14	0.57/0
Av. cycle 4	B	43%	2.04	2.9	6.7	10,880	5.7	106	0.4217	0.58/3.57	9.00	0.86/1.00
Av. cycle 5	B-	52%	0.88	2.9	10.88	23,677	65.75	237.88	0.5197	0.37/5.87	8.75	12.63/5.63

Notes: NA = not available.

a. Grades up to and including 2005 are given by Nicholas Bayne; from 2006 on are given by John Kirton and the G8 Research Group and are generated according to a different framework and method, as follows: A+ = standout or striking success; A = very strong success; A- = strong success; B+ = significant success; B = substantial success; B- = solid success; C+ = selective success; C = small success; C- = very small success; D = do-nothing summit; F = a failure that made things worse.

- b. Domestic political management (national policy addresses): % Mem = percentage of measured G8 countries that referred to the G7/8 at least once that year in their national policy addresses. Ave # refs = average number of references for the measured countries.
 - c. Directional: number of references in the communiqué's chapeau or chair's summary to the G8's core values of democracy, social advance and individual liberty.
 - d. Delivery: Compliance scores from 1990 to 1995 measure compliance with commitments selected by Ella Kokotsis. Compliance scores from 1996 to 2008 measure compliance with G8 Research Group's selected commitments. * is interim compliance score
 - e. Development of global governance: Bodies Min/Off is the number of new G7/8-countries institutions created at the ministerial (min) and official (off) level at or by the summit, or during the hosting year, at least in the form of having one meeting take place. The first number represents ministerials created. The second number represents official level bodies created.
 - f. Attendees refers to the number of leaders of full members, including those representing the European Community from the start, and the number of invited participants of countries and/or of international organizations at the G8 leaders' session. Russia started as a participant in 1991 and became a full member in 1998. In 1975, the G4 met without Japan and Italy; later that year the G6 met. C=Countries; IO=International Organizations. The first number represents non-G8 countries who participated. The second number represents International Organizations who participated.
 - g. The number of commitments listed under 2010 is the count by Jenilee Guebert.
 - h. The number of commitments in 2012 are those according to Caroline Bracht
- Done by Julia Kulik 2013 for Brussels paper.

Appendix B: G7 Leader Performance 2014

Year	DPM		DEL		DIR		DEC		DEL		DGG		Overall Grade
	Att.	CC	Words #	Words %	Doc	DEM	HR	CMT	MM	Compliance		IN	
Mar 2					1			8					6
Mar 12					1			3					1
Hague Mar 24					1			16					5
Apr 25					1			5					1
Total					4			32					13

Notes:

March 2: Statement by G7 Nations

March 12: Statement by G7 leaders on Ukraine

March 24: The Hague Declaration

April 25: G7 Leaders Statement on Ukraine

Notes: DPM: Domestic Political Management – measured by the number of leaders in attendance (Att.) and communiqué compliments (CC), the number of times a country or leader was positively mentioned

DEL: Deliberation – measured by the number of words on the subject (#), the percent (%) of words and the number of dedicated documents to the issue (Doc.)

DIR: Direction setting – measured by the number of references to the G8 democratic principles (Dem) and the number of references to human rights (HR)

DEC: Decisions – measured by the number of commitments (CMT) and (MM).

DVY: Delivery – measured by compliance with priority commitments (Cmp) and the number of compliance reports is represented by the number in the brackets

DGG: Development of Global Governance – measured by the number of governance mechanisms developed within the G8 (IN) and the number of governance mechanisms developed outside of the G8 (OUT)

Overall: Overall grade.

Appendix C: Preparatory Process

Leaders Meetings and Statements

March 2: Statement by G7 Nations
March 12: Statement by G7 leaders on Ukraine
March 24: Hague Declaration
April 25: G7 Leaders Statement on Ukraine

Ministerial Meetings and Statements

March 3: G7 Finance ministers statement on economic support for Ukraine
April 10: G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, Washington, D.C.
May 6: G7 Energy Ministers Meeting, Rome

Official Meetings

January 28-29: G8 Political Directors, Moscow
February 6-7: G8 Sherpas, Moscow

Leaders' Lead Up Bilateral Meetings

March 27: Obama to Renzi, Rome
April 23-25: Obama to Abe, Tokyo
May 26: Obama-Cameron phone call on Afghanistan, Ukraine and Syria

Appendix D: 2013 Lough Erne Final Compliance Scores

	Canada	France	Germany	Italy	Japan	Russia	United Kingdom	United States	European Union	Average	
Macroeconomic Policy: Global Demand	0	+1	0	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+0.56	78%
Macroeconomic Policy: Global Imbalances	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1.00	100%
Trade: Trade Deals	+1	0	0	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+0.67	84%
Trade: Green Growth	+1	0	-1	-1	+1	+1	-1	0	-1	-0.11	44%
Trade: African Trade and Infrastructure	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	-1	+1	+1	+1	+0.67	84%
Finance: Tax Evasion and Profit Shifting	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	0	0	+0.67	84%
Transparency: Corporate Transparency	0	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+0.78	89%
Transparency: Extractive Industries	+1	-1	0	+1	0	0	+1	+1	+1	+0.44	72%
Crime and Corruption: Anti-Money Laundering	0	-1	0	-1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	+0.22	61%
Crime and Corruption: Stolen Asset Recovery	0	0	0	0	+1	0	0	0	0	-0.22	39%
Information and Communications Technology	0	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+0.67	84%
Health: Deepening Impact on Malnutrition	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	-1	+1	+1	+1	+0.78	89%
Climate Change: Climate & Clean Air Coalition	+1	0	+1	0	-1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+0.56	78%
Climate Change Climate Finance	-1	0	+1	-1	0	-1	0	0	+1	-0.11	44%
Development: Country-Led Reforms	-1	+1	0	0	0	0	+1	+1	0	+0.22	61%
Terrorism: Countering Violent Extremism	+1	+1	0	+1	-1	0	+1	+1	+1	+0.56	78%
Regional Security: Deauville Partnership	+1	+1	0	+1	0	0	+1	+1	+1	+0.67	84%
Regional Security: Syria	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+1	+1	+1	0	+0.78	89%
2013 Final Compliance Average	+0.50	+0.50	+0.39	+0.33	+0.33	+0.39	+0.78	+0.72	+0.61	+0.51	76%
	75%	75%	70%	66%	66%	70%	89%	86%	80%	76%	
2013 Interim Compliance Average	+0.44	+0.44	+0.28	+0.28	+0.17	+0.22	+0.56	+0.61	+0.61	+0.40	
2012 Final Compliance Average	+0.71	+0.65	+0.76	+0.29	+0.65	+0.18	+0.65	+0.88	+0.59	+0.60	
2011 Final Compliance Average	+0.67	+0.50	+0.44	+0.33	+0.56	+0.56	+0.61	+0.61	+0.61	+0.54	
2010 Final Compliance Average	+0.61	+0.44	+0.50	+0.17	+0.28	+0.61	+0.50	+0.56	+0.44	+0.46	

Appendix E: G8 Compliance by Issue, 1975-2012

Issue	Number of Completed Assessments	Average		Number of Assessments to Be Completed
Economy	65	0.38	69%	
Macroeconomics	10	0.72	86%	2
Microeconomics	3	-0.24	38%	
Finance	6	0.36	68%	2
Trade	33	0.37	69%	4
Information & communication	13	0.69	85%	1
Sustainable Development	172	0.49	75%	
Development	37	0.45	73%	3
Health	57	0.50	75%	3
Education	9	0.41	71%	
Social policy	7	0.67	84%	
Food & agriculture	11	0.53	77%	
Crime & corruption	33	0.44	72%	3
Good Governance	11	0.58	79%	
Transparency	0			2
International organization reform	4	0.33	67%	
East-West relations	2	0.00	50%	
Heiligendamm Process	1	1.00	100%	
Environment	89	0.59	80%	
Climate change	66	0.46	73%	2
Environment	10	0.57	79%	
Energy	13	0.73	87%	2
Security	71	0.62	81%	
Nonproliferation	27	0.65	83%	
Nuclear safety	2	0.50	75%	
Regional security	16	0.57	79%	3
Terrorism	16	0.64	82%	1
Conflict prevention	8	0.51	76%	
Human rights	2	0.83	92%	1
Total	397	0.51	76%	29

Note: Compiled by Caroline Bracht, April 9, 2014.

Appendix F: Agenda

Ukraine and Russia

Support for Ukraine's government,
Financial support from IFI & bilaterally
Sanctions against Russia
Corruption and stolen asset recovery
Security strengthening
Russia's role in the G8

Other Foreign Policy

Syria: chemical weapons removal, humanitarian access, post Assad transition
Iran: nuclear proliferation, support for Syrian regime
Middle East Peace Process
Arab Spring
Deauville Partnership
Libya
Sudan
Mali
Terrorism: Nigeria
Central African Republic
Afghanistan
North Korea
China
Thailand

Economy

Growth
Fiscal Policy
Monetary Policy
Tax: BEPS, Automatic Information Exchange
Infrastructure
Employment
Information and communication technologies

Trade

Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership
Trans-Pacific Partnership
Ukraine's accession agreement with the EU
Energy Security Millennium Development Goals

Energy Security

Ukrainian Gas supplies

Energy security addresses reducing Europe's reliance on Russian supplies

Climate Change

Global regime due in 2015

Development

Millennium Development Goals

Maternal and Child Health

Food, Agriculture and Nutrition

Humanitarian and Natural Disaster Relief

Appendix G: Shock-Activated Vulnerability

G-1: Terrorist Attacks

Date	Event	G8/20 Member Hit	Impact
2013			
January 2013	Algeria	Japan	10 Japanese killed
April 15, 2013	Boston marathon bombing	United States	3 killed
May 23, 2013	London soldier attack	United Kingdom	1 killed
May 26, 2013	Dagestan suicide bombing	Russia	1 killed
June 2013	Luquan, Turpan, Xingjiang	China	35 killed
Lough Erne Summit			
Dec 29, 2014	Volgograd RR stn bomb	Russia	18 dead (44 injured)
Dec 30, 2013	Volgograd trolley bus	Russia	16 dead (44 injured)
2014			
April 14, 2014	School girls kidnapped	Nigeria	200+ kidnapped
Apr 30, 2014	Urumqi, Xianjing RR Stn	China	3 dead (79 injured)
April 30, 2014	Xianjing, lake	China	3 officials killed
April 30, 2014	India	India	

G-2: 2014 World Oil Prices

Date (source/time)	WTI (month ahead)	Daily Change	Brent	Daily Change
140302 close	104.65 (5 month high)	111.41 (2 m high)		
140321 close (FT)	100.25	+\$1.35	107.77	+1.32 ICE May
140321: Brent still down 1% on week, its fourth consecutive weekly fall				
140324 M close FT	99.46 NYMEX May		106.92	
140325 T close FT	99.60		106.81	
100407 M close FT	101.14		106.72	
140408 W close FT	100.44		105.82	
140409 close FT	102.56		107.67	
140501 14h00 EST	99.32	-0.42%	107.36	-0.66%
140502 11:40 EST	99.87	+0.45	108.56	+0.74
140505 M FT	99.76		108.59	
140506 T close FT	99.48		107.72	
140507 W close FT	99.50		107.06	
140508 R close FT	100.77		108.13	
140509 F close FT	100.26		108.04	
140512 M close FT	99.99		107.89	
150513 T close FT	100.59		108.41	
140514 W close FT	101.70		109.24	
140515 R close FT	102.37		110.19	
140520 T close FT	102.61		109.37	
140521 W close FT	102.33		109.69	
140522 R close FT	104.07		110.55	
140523 F close FT	103.74		110.36	
140526 M close FT	104.35		110.54	
140527 T close FT	104.35		110.32	
140528 W close FT	104.11		110.02	

Sources: *Financial Times* Markets Data, Reuters.

Appendix H: Relative Capability

H-1: Overall Capability (GDP)

Country	1980	1985	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2012	2013
G7									
United States	2862.48	4346.75	5979.55	7664.05	10289.73	13095.43	14958.30	16244.58	16799.70
Japan	826.14	1384.53	3102.70	5333.93	4731.20	4571.87	5495.39	5937.77	4901.53
Germany	691.26	639.70	1547.03	2525.02	1891.93	2771.06	3310.60	3427.85	3635.96
France	470.04	547.83	1247.35	1573.08	1220.22	2140.27	2569.82	2612.67	2737.36
United Kingdom	1086.99	468.96	1204.59	1181.01	1496.61	2324.18	2296.93	2484.45	2535.76
Italy	542.45	446.03	1140.24	1132.36	1107.25	1789.38	2059.19	2014.38	2071.96
Canada	274.37	362.96	594.61	602.00	729.45	1164.18	1614.07	1821.45	1825.10
Total	6753.73	8196.76	14816.06	20011.45	21466.39	27856.36	32304.30	34543.13	34507.36
BRICS									
China	303.37	307.02	390.28	727.95	1198.48	2256.92	5930.39	8229.38	9181.38
Brazil	148.92	231.76	465.01	769.74	644.73	882.04	2142.91	2247.75	2242.85
Russia	N/A	N/A	N/A	313.45	259.70	763.70	1524.92	2004.25	2118.01
India	181.42	237.62	326.61	366.60	476.64	834.22	1708.54	1858.75	1870.65
South Africa	80.55	57.27	112.00	151.12	132.97	246.95	365.17	382.34	350.78
Total	714.24	833.67	1293.89	2328.86	2712.52	4983.84	11671.92	14722.47	15763.67
Other G20									
India	181.42	237.62	326.61	366.60	476.64	834.22	1780.54	1858.75	1870.65
Australia	163.73	175.24	323.44	379.72	399.47	733.04	1249.25	1555.29	1505.28
Mexico	234.95	223.42	298.46	343.78	683.54	865.85	1050.85	1183.51	1258.54
Korea	64.39	98.50	270.41	531.14	533.39	844.87	1014.89	1129.60	1221.80
Indonesia	86.31	91.53	113.77	202.13	165.02	285.77	709.34	877.80	870.28
Turkey	94.26	90.58	202.25	227.81	266.67	482.74	731.54	788.04	827.21
Saudi Arabia	163.97	103.68	116.69	147.94	194.81	328.46	526.81	733.96	745.27
Argentina	209.03	88.19	141.35	258.22	284.41	181.36	367.56	475.21	488.21
Egypt	22.37	46.45	91.38	60.16	99.62	89.52	218.76	262.26	271.43
Total	1220.41	1155.21	1884.36	2517.50	3103.57	4645.82	7649.55	8864.41	9058.67
Other European Union									
Spain	224.37	176.59	520.42	596.94	582.05	1132.76	1387.43	1323.21	1358.69
Netherlands	177.20	133.17	295.57	419.35	386.20	639.58	778.61	770.49	800.01
Sweden	131.27	105.68	242.88	253.68	247.26	370.58	463.06	523.94	557.94
Poland	56.62	70.78	62.08	139.10	171.26	303.98	469.80	489.78	516.13
Belgium	121.98	83.44	197.71	284.79	233.25	378.01	472.03	483.22	506.56
Austria	80.11	67.93	165.17	238.80	192.63	305.51	378.38	394.68	415.37
Denmark	69.71	61.20	135.84	181.99	160.08	257.68	312.95	315.16	330.96
Finland	53.05	55.29	139.23	130.95	122.15	196.12	237.15	247.28	256.92
Greece	53.64	45.13	92.20	131.82	127.61	240.49	294.77	248.56	241.80
Portugal	32.12	26.82	78.24	116.40	117.64	192.18	229.37	212.26	219.97
Ireland	21.00	20.76	47.25	67.92	97.62	202.93	209.78	210.75	217.88
Czech Republic	N/A	N/A	N/A	57.79	58.80	130.07	198.49	196.45	198.31
Romania	45.59	47.80	38.24	35.48	37.33	99.17	164.78	169.18	189.66
Hungary	22.61	21.04	33.73	45.47	46.39	110.32	127.50	124.59	132.43
Slovakia	N/A	N/A	N/A	19.60	20.48	47.98	87.44	91.40	95.81
Luxembourg	6.47	4.57	12.70	20.69	20.33	37.71	52.15	55.17	59.84
Croatia	N/A	N/A	N/A	22.12	21.49	44.79	58.84	56.16	58.06
Bulgaria	26.68	28.05	21.12	13.42	12.94	28.97	47.84	51.33	53.05
Lithuania	N/A	N/A	N/A	6.73	11.50	26.10	36.71	42.34	47.56
Slovenia	N/A	N/A	N/A	20.97	20.08	35.77	47.08	45.41	46.85
Latvia	N/A	N/A	N/A	4.97	7.78	15.94	24.10	28.38	30.95
Estonia	N/A	N/A	N/A	3.78	5.70	13.93	19.08	22.39	24.48
Cyprus	2.13	2.40	5.52	9.14	9.20	16.92	23.10	23.00	21.83
Malta	N/A	N/A	N/A	3.73	4.04	6.14	8.56	8.85	9.55
Total	1124.54	950.65	2087.90	2825.62	2713.82	4833.61	6128.99	6133.97	6390.58

Notes: N/A=Data not available. Compiled by Julia Kulik, May 16, 2014.

Source: IMF World Economic Outlook Database.

<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/01/weodata/index.aspx>

H-2: Relative Military Capability

Country	1990	2000	2005	2010	2013	% of United States
United States	527,174	394,155	579,831	720,282	618,681	100.0
China	19,820	37,040	71,496	136,239	171,381	27.7
Russia/USSR	62,300 ^a	31,100	46,446	65,807	84,864	13.7
France	70,527	61,783	65,123	66,251	62,272	10.1
Japan	47,802	60,388	61,288	59,003	59,431	9.1
United Kingdom	58,824	48,000	58,150	62,942	56,231	9.1
Germany	71,666	50,614	46,983	49,583	49,297	8.0
Italy	36,892	43,063	42,342	38,876	32,663	5.3
Canada	20,582	15,651	17,811	20,684	18,704	3.0
Turkey	13,137	20,601	15,668	16,955	18,682	3.0
Netherlands	13,550	11,267	11,821	12,061	10,258	1.7
Poland	7,417	6,351	7,733	9,326	9,431	1.5
Iraq	N/A	N/A	2,545	3,489	7,251	1.1
Serbia (FYR)	N/A	1,633	976	1,028	919	0.1
Afghanistan	N/A	N/A	183	631	1,333	0.2
Libya	N/A	531	1,069	N/A	2,903 ^p	0.5
Mali	58.5	88.7	116	158	153	0.02
Iran	2,813	9,923	15,128	11,043	9,573 ^b	1.5
Russia/USSR	62,300 ^a	31,100	46,446	65,807	84,864	13.7
North Korea	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Sudan	764	1,676	2,166	N/A	N/A	N/A
Syria	1,117	1,856	2,339	2,366	N/A	N/A

Notes: ^a = 2002 figure, ^b = 2012 figure. Compiled by Julia Kulik, May 15, 2014.

Source: SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, 1988–2013, constant 2011 US\$ millions.

H-3: Soft Power*International Image of G7 and BRICS Countries, May 2013*

Country	Mainly Positive %	Mainly Negative %	Net (Rank)
Germany (G7)	59	15	+44 (1 st)
Canada (G7)	55 (2 nd)	13 (1 st)	+42 (2 nd)
UK (G7)	55	18	+37 (3 rd)
Japan (G7)	51	27	+24 (7 th)
France (G7)	49	21	+28 (4 th)
EU (G7)	49	21	+28 (4 th)
Brazil (BRICS)	46	21	+25 (6 th)
USA (G7)	45	34	+11 (8 th)
China (BRICS)	42	39	+03
S. Korea (G20)	36	31	+05
S. Africa (BRICS)	35	30	+05
India (BRICS)	34	35	-01
Russia (BRICS)	30	40	-20
G7 Average	51	21	30 (1-6 th , 8 th)
BRICS Average	37	33	04 (7,9,11-13)

Notes: Strong globally predominant capability, with G7 average +30 and members ranked 1-6th and 8th)
Strong internal equality as:

a. the USA, the world's most capable country is the lowest and last in the G7 with a net approval score of only +11 and a rank of 8th.

b. Canada, the least capable G7 member, is the least disliked country in the world (among those surveyed) and has the second highest net approval score of +42 for a rank of second, barely after first placed Germany.

Source: BBC World Survey, May 2013

Appendix I: Common Principles of Democracy

I-1: Polity IV: Authority Trends

Member	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Argentina	7	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Australia	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Brazil	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Canada	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
China	-7	-7	-7	-7	-7	-7	-7	-7	-7	-7	-7	-7	-7	-7	-7
France	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9
Germany	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
India	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9
Indonesia	-7	6	6	6	6	6	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Italy	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Japan	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
Korea	6	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Mexico	6	6	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8	8
Russia	3	3	6	6	6	6	6	6	4	4	4	4	4	4	4
S Arabia	-10	-10	-10	-10	-10	-10	-10	-10	-10	-10	-10	-10	-10	-10	-10
S Africa	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9	9
Turkey	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	7	9	9	9
UK	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10
USA	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10	10

Notes: The “Polity Score” captures this regime authority spectrum, which spans fully institutionalized autocracies through mixed or incoherent authority regimes to fully institutionalized democracies on a 21-point scale from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). Excludes the European Union.

Sources: Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2010. Monty Marshall and Keith Jagers, principal investigators. www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm

I-2: Freedom House Scores

Member	1999			2000			2001			2002			2003			2004			2005			2006			2007			2008			2009			2010			2011			2012			2013											
	R	L	S	R	L	S	R	L	S	R	L	S	R	L	S	R	L	S	R	L	S	R	L	S	R	L	S	R	L	S	R	L	S	R	L	S	R	L	S	R	L	S	R	L	S									
Argentina	2	3	F	1	2	F	3	3	P	3	3	P	2	2	F	2	2	F	2	2	F	2	2	F	2	2	F	2	2	F	2	3	F	2	2	F	2	2	F	2	2	F	2	2	F	2	2	F						
Australia	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F			
Brazil	3	4	P	3	3	P	3	3	P	2	3	F	2	3	F	2	3	F	2	2	F	2	2	F	2	2	F	2	2	F	2	2	F	3	4	P	2	2	F	2	2	F	2	2	F	2	2	F	2	2	F			
Canada	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F			
China	7	6	N	7	6	N	7	6	N	7	6	N	7	6	N	7	6	N	7	6	N	7	6	N	7	6	N	7	6	N	7	6	N	7	6	N	7	6	N	7	6	N	7	6	N	7	6	N	7	6	N	7	6	N
France	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	2	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F			
Germany	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	2	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F			
India	2	3	F	2	3	F	2	3	F	2	3	F	2	3	F	2	3	F	2	3	F	2	3	F	2	3	F	2	3	F	2	3	F	2	3	F	2	3	F	2	3	F	2	3	F	2	3	F	2	3	F			
Indonesia	4	4	P	3	4	P	3	4	P	3	4	P	3	4	P	3	4	P	2	3	F	2	3	F	2	3	F	2	3	F	4	4	P	2	3	F	2	3	F	2	3	F	2	3	F	2	3	F	2	3	F			
Italy	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	1	F	1	2	F			
Japan	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	2	F			
Korea	2	2	F	2	2	F	2	2	F	2	2	F	2	2	F	1	2	F	2	3	F	2	3	F	2	3	F	1	2	F	1	2	F	2	2	F	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	2	F			
Mexico	3	4	P	2	3	F	2	3	F	2	2	F	2	2	F	2	2	F	2	2	F	2	2	F	2	3	F	2	3	F	2	3	F	3	4	P	2	3	F	3	3	P	3	3	P	3	3	P	3	3	P	3	3	P
Russia	4	5	P	5	5	P	5	5	P	5	5	P	5	5	P	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	5	N	4	5	P	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	5	N	6	5	N
S. Africa	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	2	F	2	2	F	2	2	F	2	2	F	1	2	F	2	2	F	2	2	F	2	2	F	2	2	F	2	2	F	2	2	F			
S. Arabia	7	7	N	7	7	N	7	7	N	7	7	N	7	7	N	7	7	N	7	7	N	7	6	N	7	6	N	7	6	N	7	6	N	7	7	N	7	6	N	7	6	N	7	7	N	7	7	N	7	7	N	7	7	N
Turkey	4	5	P	4	5	P	4	5	P	3	4	P	3	4	P	3	3	P	3	3	P	3	3	P	3	3	P	3	3	P	3	3	P	4	5	P	3	3	P	3	3	P	3	3	P	3	3	P	3	3	P	3	4	P
UK	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	2	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	2	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F						
US	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F	1	1	F						

Notes: Each country is assigned a numerical rating from 1 to 7 for political rights (R) and an analogous rating for (L); a rating of 1 indicates the highest degree of freedom and 7 the lowest level of freedom. These ratings determine the status (S) of a country as free (F), partly free (P), or not free (N).
Sources: Freedom House, www.freedomhouse.org.

Appendix J: Domestic Political Cohesion

Leader	Executive Control	Legislative Control	Next Election	Popularity	Continuity
Obama	Sole	Upper			
Abe	Coalition	Both			
Merkel	Coalition				2006
Cameron	Coalition				
Hollande	Sole	Both			
Renzi					
Harper	Sole	Both			2006
Barroso					
Van Rompuy					