Prospects for Solid Success at the G7 Biarritz Summit

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Introduction
The 45th annual Group of Seven (G7) summit, taking place on 24–26 August 2019 in Biarritz on France’s Atlantic coast, will be an important event. It comes when the climate change crisis has reached a critical stage, when the established liberal multilateral order is under assault, and when growing populism, protectionism, provincialism and doubts about democracy tempt many to turn inward to temper the inequalities that globalization has often intensified in their societies at home.

To address these concerns, G7 leaders at Biarritz will focus on the ambitious goals that French president Emmanuel Macron as summit host has set. Under the theme of fighting inequality, they will focus on five priorities. The first is enhancing equality of opportunity through gender equality, access to education and high-quality health services. The second is environmental equality through climate finance, a fair ecological transition, the oceans and biodiversity. The third is more fair and equitable trade, tax and development policies. The fourth is promoting peace, amid security threats and terrorism. And the fifth is seizing the opportunities offered by digital technology and artificial intelligence.

The Biarritz Summit will also address the reform of the world’s major international institutions, notably the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the International Labour Organization (ILO) (on its 100th anniversary), and spur a more coherent configuration in which the United Nations, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and new powers have a prominent place. It will consider the role of non-state actors and the manipulation and taxation of information and will improve the G7’s alliance with Africa. G7 leaders will also address key security issues such as nuclear proliferation in North Korea; regional security risks in Ukraine, the Baltic states, the Middle East and North Africa, Venezuela and Asia; terrorism; crime and corruption; and violations of democracy and human rights.

Macron, at his third G7 summit, will host several fellow G7 veterans. Germany’s Chancellor Angela Merkel will attend her 14th. Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe will attend his eighth, having just hosted the G20’s successful Osaka Summit in June. Canadian prime minister Justin Trudeau will come for his fourth summit, having hosted at Charlevoix in June 2018 and approaching a national election on October 21, 2019. President Donald Trump of the United States will be at his third summit, arriving after his mid-term congressional elections in November 2018 and as the presidential election in November 2020 approaches. The European Union will send veteran Donald Tusk, but it appeared Jean-Claude Juncker would have to miss his last summit for health reasons. The newer faces at the summit table will be Italian prime minister Giuseppe Conte at his second and the United Kingdom’s new prime minister Boris Johnson, at his first and preoccupied with the UK’s scheduled October 31st withdrawal from the European Union.

France also seeks to reform the G7 format by inviting the leaders of several other powers to pioneer new forms of coordination to meet the unprecedented challenges of today’s globalized, digitalizing world. The first set consists of leaders of democracies from other global regions: India’s prime minister Narendra Modi, Australia’s prime minister Scott Morrison, South Africa’s president Cyril
Ramaphosa and Chile’s president Sebastián Piñera. The second set comprises African leaders: Egypt’s president Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, Senegal’s Macky Sall, Rwanda’s Paul Kagame, Burkina Faso’s Roch Marc Kaboré, as chair of the Sahel G5, and African Union Commission Chair Moussa Faki.

Supporting the leaders at their summit is a full program of seven ministerial meetings covering nine portfolios: for foreign affairs and the interior in Dinard and Saint-Malo on April 5–6; environment in Metz on May 5–6; gender on May 9–10; health in Paris on May 16–17; labour and employment in Paris on June 7; development and education in Paris on July 4–5; and finance and central banks in Chantilly on July 17–18. Inputs also come from an energetic civil society led by engagement groups for business, labour, civil society, women, youth, science, think tanks and university presidents.

The Debate
In the lead-up to the Biarritz Summit, the prospects for its performance has been the subject of a debate among several schools of thought.

The first school saw differences dominant. Matthew Goodman (2019) asserted: “At this year’s gathering in France, differences are likely to emerge over trade, climate change, and global tax policy. Among other things, the United Kingdom and France have announced they will institute a digital services tax that primarily targets U.S. technology giants, raising the ire of both the Trump administration and Silicon Valley.”

The second school saw awareness raising only on issues such as gender equality, due to the divisions and distrust between Macron, Merkel, Trudeau and Abe on the one hand and Trump, Conte and a Brexiting Britain on the other. Jess Smee (2019) emphasized these divisions afflicting all Macron’s priorities and his shift to limit damage by preparing not to issue a formal summit communiqué.

The third school saw an unclear consensus due to Trump’s protectionism. NHK World News (2019) identified an agenda of Africa, inequality, economic growth, North Korea, women entrepreneurs in Africa, quality infrastructure there, education and job training in developing countries, and trade, but highlighted Trump’s disagreement with other leaders on trade.

The fourth school saw a diplomatic quagmire due to Johnson and Brexit. Daniel Boffey (2019) noted that the new UK prime minister, making his first foray on the world stage, had no relationship with other G7 leaders and they had very little trust in him over his hard-line demands on Britain’s exit from the EU.

The fifth school saw a summit of at least solid success. John Kirton (2019) predicted such success across all the French priorities, including digital taxation, crypto currencies, and promoting democracy and human rights in Iran, Russia and China. Driving this success were the shocks from the escalating Ebola epidemic in the Democratic Republic of Congo and extreme heat, floods and wildfires throughout the G7 and beyond, while constraining success was the resistance of the United States on climate change.

Puzzles
On the summit’s eve, none of these schools took adequate account of the new shocks arising from plummeting economic growth in the United Kingdom and Germany, an unfolding financial crisis in Argentina and the new UK prime minister’s Boris Johnson’s determination to leave the European Union by the end of October at whatever cost, and security shocks from Iran seizing oil tankers in the Strait of Hormuz, India’s full acquisition of Kashmir and North Korea’s new missile tests. Such shocks could divert G7 leaders’ energy from the top French social and ecological priorities and highlight the differences among members. They could, alternatively, unify the leaders to produce even greater success on classic G7 economic and security concerns, especially those more closely
connected to the G7’s distinctive foundational mission to promote globally open democracy and human rights.

Nor did these existing schools consider the pronounced domestic political weakness of most G7 leaders. Only Japan’s Abe was backed by strong political cohesion, while new weakness appeared in the United Kingdom, Italy and Canada where elections loomed. Moreover, the protectionism, nativism, international inexperience and unpredictability of Donald Trump was now joined by that of Boris Johnson on the summit’s eve.

**Thesis**

Still, G7 leaders at Biarritz will likely produce a summit of at least solid success, across most of the priorities France has set and the others the summit will be forced to address. It will thus perform at least at the average level set by the 44 G7 summits since their start in 1975 (see Appendix A).

On gender equality the Biarritz Summit will advance the legal status of women in the lead-up to the UN’s Beijing+25 conference in 2020 and mobilize money for women’s financial inclusion in developing countries. On education and health, it will boost the desired 15% funding increase for the Global Fund to Fight HIV/AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis and strengthen the response to the Ebola outbreak in the Congo after the shock of its spread to Goma in mid-July. On the environment all members but the United States will promise to implement and improve the Paris Agreement on climate change, support the UN’s Climate Action Summit in September and bolster biodiversity, while U.S. resistance will cripple the needed response to the extreme heat now reaching new peaks around the world. There will be important agreements on proportionally fair and minimum digital taxation and efforts to regulate the cryptocurrencies introduced by private giants, lest they undermine the protections provided to citizens by their sovereign states. G7 leaders and their partners will also protect their democratic elections from internal interference, curb social media use for violent extremism, and narrow their differences over the threats to democracy and human rights from Iran, Russia and China.

These advances will be spurred by recent ecological, health, security and economic shocks, and the failure of the major multilateral organizations of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), World Health Organization, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to respond to an adequate degree. Thus the G7, with its globally predominant financial and specialized capabilities, will be inspired to act, in ways based on its members’ common principles and characteristics of open democracy and human rights. Constraints will come from the gap between rising U.S. capabilities and declining ones in most other members, and the low domestic political cohesion that most leaders have. Yet the compact participation of their cherished club, reinforced by the four democratic guests, will induce them to adjust to produce successful summit at least to a moderate degree.

**Plans and Preparations**

**Macron’s Initial Vision, September 2018**

Macron publicly presented his initial vision for the summit in his address to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on September 28, 2018 (Macron 2019) (see Appendix B). He began by highlighting the overarching theme of fighting inequality, involving several other powers, working for new forms of coordination and reporting the results to the next UNGA in September 2019.

He started with the inequalities in nationality, education, gender and health. On education he noted the need to give schooling to 620 million more children globally, including 444 million Africans, by 2030. On gender he highlighted the need to protect women and girls from poverty, conflict, global
warning and sexual violence and to give them access to education, health care, jobs, and economic and political decision-making. He proposed a coalition to create new laws for gender equality and promised to devote half of French development aid to reducing gender inequality. On health he promised to replenish the Global Fund and to take action against fake drugs and major pandemics.

Focusing on climate change, he promised to support the Paris Agreement, implement the protocol against hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), conclude an ambitious pact for the environment in 2020, make the Beijing Conference of the Parties (COP) to the Convention on Biological Diversity in 2020 a success, implement existing commitments, include environmental and social obligations in trade agreements, and mobilize sovereign funds to finance low-carbon policy. He also promised to revise upwards the climate change commitments made at the 21st COP to the UNFCCC in Paris and seek to new coalitions and formats to do so if necessary.

Finally, he proposed that the UN, OECD and other international institutions support a new collective mechanism to reduce inequalities, assess members’ actions, make them more consistent and share best practices, with the G7 as the necessary driving force. He further promised a new alliance with Africa, as a fervent champion of multilateralism and regional integration.

In all Macron set out a broad, ambitious vision, focused on sustainable development rather than on economic-financial or peace and security concerns.

**France’s Plan, January 2019**

France began its formal hosting year in January 2019 with a well-developed, ambitious plan. It had decided to hold the summit in August, in part because Canada’s Justin Trudeau did not want it to be too close to the Canadian election in October, and because Japan wanted to host its G20 summit in June due to its emperor’s abdication. Thus the G20 summit would precede the G7 one.

As guests, France planned to invite the heads of major international organizations, or at least the United Nations Education, Science and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

Most of the ministerial meetings would be scheduled to take place before the summit: foreign affairs and home affairs in April, environment alone in May, a meeting on women inequality on May 9 and 10, a ministerial on health in May, and in July ministerials on jobs and employment — referred to as the Social G7 — and on development and education, and the finance ministers and central bank governors. After the summit there would be sherpa meetings to coordinate with the next summit.

France wanted to follow Charlevoix’s example of holding an outreach session. It needed to find a logic about which leaders and countries to invite, perhaps including one or two per continent. Tunisia might be interesting for many topics, for example, such as women’s empowerment and small enterprise. Involving other countries was a way to get support from beyond the G7 members and to deflect criticism about legitimacy, especially if the G7 is publicly perceived as divided between the United States and the other members.

As the presidency began, there was a deliberate effort to address the issue of U.S. participation and that perception of six plus one versus seven. Trump’s behaviour after Charlevoix, when he tweeted his dissatisfaction with the G7 communiqué after the summit was over, still cast a shadow. France thought Canada had organized an effective summit, which it was overshadowed by a single tweet. So France would work to prepare for such an eventuality. It would proceed on the assumption that Trump would participate in the Biarritz Summit, and France would therefore have to reach the best agreement with the most ambitious agenda possible. It would aim to have everyone together.
France would remain committed to achieving things, particularly on the partnership with Africa. It would also address the Charlevoix topics of security, terrorism, digitalization, cybersecurity and education.

**Summit Schedule**
The summit would start with an informal dinner on Saturday, August 24, followed by a full day on Sunday, August 25, and then continue on the morning of Monday, August 26. Part of the summit would include the stakeholders, perhaps on the 26th only or the morning of the 25th. Still to be decided was how many sessions would take place on each day.

In January, the sherpas were still discussing the subject of the outreach session. Possible subjects were Africa, digital technology or artificial intelligence, which would be decided by France as chair.

France was also considering including other countries to participate in the preparatory sherpa meetings.

**Civil Society**
France wanted the summit process to be open to civil society. It thought a strength of Canada’s 2018 presidency was its openness with civil society, so it intended to engage with many forums and other countries, especially those that shared G7 values and could join in some actions. France sought to replicate what it had done for the Forum de la Paix, involving member states, civil society, non-governmental organizations, institutions and the private sector. It was planning to hold discussions with the Youth 7, Women’s 7, Labour 7, Business 7 and so on, as well as with the French people.

**Partnership with Africa**
Partnership with Africa would be at the heart of the G7 discussions at Biarritz. In all the subjects — multilateral cooperation, development, finance, gender equality, women’s empowerment — Africa had a major role to play. France would engage with other countries and continents. It was considering inviting Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa. France was considering adopting the “Agenda de Biarritz,” a proactive agenda on all different topics. It wished to elaborate an “Initiative Sahel,” to strengthen the links with Africa and stabilize the region. Africa was also important because of peacekeeping operations.

One major idea for an outcome of the summit was to forge an equal partnership with Africa — a centre of inequality — through everyone committing to an inclusive growth model. This partnership would include countries that shared democratic values, many from within the G20, to try to achieve concrete results. The aim would be for this partnership with Africa and a number of countries to agree and commit. That would be a commitment by the G7 and beyond to place Africa more at the centre of G7 concerns. This partnership would be the topic of an outreach session, to be prepared in advance perhaps with the involvement of African sherpas in preparatory meetings. France was still defining the issues and kinds of commitments that other countries would be willing to make.

**Priorities**
At the start of France’s G7 presidency, the priorities reflected Canada’s for Charlevoix. The main theme was the fight against inequality in all sectors. France would divide the topic into different subjects, including reducing environmental inequality; promoting fair and equitable trade, tax and development policy; and fighting inequality of opportunity — notably gender equality, access to education and high-quality health services. It would emphasize peace and security and terrorism. It would address digital technology and artificial intelligence. The fight against inequality was very timely given events in France, the world and Venezuela.
**Gender Equality**
On equality between women and men, there would be a new council that would follow the same model as the Gender Equality Advisory Council (GEAC), but with new members. The aim was to adopt a “Pacte de Biarritz” that might propose a summary of legislation and best practices regarding gender equality that the G7 countries could consider adopting. It might extend beyond the G7, such as in Sweden or the Nordic countries that have effective legislation.

The issue of gender equality would focus on Africa and the education of girls in Africa, following Charlevoix.

**Education**
Education would be a focus, overlapping with the work on gender equality on the empowerment of girls. It would include the challenges of elder education, the acquisition of fundamental skills such as writing, reading and calculating, the promotion of vocational training, and the Global Partnership for Education (GPE).

**Health**
On health, there would be a replenishment of the Global Fund, promotion of access to quality health systems and, particularly, access to primary health care and strengthening the fight against non-communicable diseases through promoting prevention and reducing risk factors.

**Climate Change**
France would stress climate finance, specifically how to encourage financial institutions including banks to finance adaptation, and the transition to low carbon economy. It was planning to hold a One Planet summit at the same time as the G7 summit, which would focus on biodiversity. It planned to hold another at the same time as the Climate Action Summit in September to address climate finance and in particular sustainable finance, at the request of the UN. It had low expectations given the position of the United States, although there was always a possibility it might recognize the huge market for green finance as opportunities for investors and insurance.

**Biodiversity**
France would also stress biodiversity and the preservation of the oceans, looking toward 2020, when the biodiversity COP would meet in Beijing and there would be the IUCN World Conservation Congress in Marseille. Biodiversity was an important subject that the G7 had to address, because many species had disappeared. The world needed a wakeup call as with carbon dioxide emissions and oceans.

**Trade**
The issue of trade would include the fight against protectionism, and how to modernize the WTO, always with the focus on addressing inequalities.

Macron had launched the idea of modernizing the WTO at the OECD’s ministerial meeting in May 2018. France pushed to create a working group. At stake was protectionism, international rules of law and fairness, organized well to be able to address the challenge of updating the rules that no longer worked given the new balance of power. What role should China play? The United States agreed with France on the need to modernize the WTO, although it was blocking the WTO from settling disputes effectively.
Tax
On the finance agenda, France sought to focus on fair and balanced taxation, to prevent tax evasion, to fight against corruption, and to avoid tax havens. It would cover competition between member states, the resilience of the financial system and cybersecurity.

Development
France sought to create an initiative to enhance the resilience of the most vulnerable populations, particularly in the Sahel on food and nutrition. Africa would be referenced in all subjects.

Migration
Migration would be part of the development, education and perhaps African agenda.

Digital Economy and Artificial Intelligence
On the digital economy and AI, the main topics would be cybersecurity, taxation, the impact of digital economy on jobs, fair access to jobs, reduced inequality in access to digital economy and AI ethics. These would be addressed with India, South Africa, perhaps Mexico and Australia — with their leaders, at the ministerial G7 level, in civil society or institutions. The level was undecided.

Mobilizing Money
The Biarritz Summit would not mobilize money, beyond the Global Fund — its replenishment conference would take place in October in Lyon — and perhaps the Global Partnership on Education.

Nonetheless, France intended to stress the importance of funding. It had committed €200 million to the GPE in February 2018, doubling its contribution, and would commit to do more. The partnership with Africa, for example, could ask for financial support from the World Bank or the regional banks or the private sector.

The Alliance Sahel, which was launched by France, Germany and the European Union and now includes the United Kingdom and Italy, includes half the G7’s members, could coordinate the aid brought by the donors. The reasoning was to help immigrants — whether refugees or economic migrants — find or create jobs in their countries of departure. Some countries and the EU were already funding initiatives. Such combined action to restore peace and to develop the region would help people will stay in their countries.

France’s military was on the ground in Mali and Chad. The region was very dangerous and had many terrorist groups, which exposed Europe to being a target for both attacks and refugees. France would seek efficient ways to treat refugees and economic migrants and make a distinction. One way would be to provide jobs in the countries of departure.

France remained committed to the climate finance goal of $100 billion a year by 2020. Last year it had contributed $70 billion to stay on track, and it held the One Planet summit, where there were commitments to involve private finance, financial institutions, and regional development banks and the World Bank.

The Ministerial Meetings’ Momentum
Supporting the leaders at their summit was a full program of seven ministerial meetings covering nine portfolios. These meetings made many commitments, which provided a firm foundation for the summit’s success.
Moreover, because the presence of a pre-summit ministerial meeting tends to increase compliance with the summit commitments made on the same subject, Biarritz could perform well in delivering on its decisions on the many subjects it addresses.

**Foreign Affairs and the Interior, Dinard and Saint-Malo, April 5–6**
The foreign and interior ministers met in Dinard and Saint-Malo on April 5–6 and produced 176 commitments (see Appendix C). This was the third highest total of commitments of the 22 annual meetings since 1998. It was exceeded only by the 200 in 2018 and the 181 in 2017. This suggested that Biarritz could be primarily a political-security success.

**Environment, Metz, May 5–6**
The environment ministers in Metz on May 5–6 produced 131 commitments (see Appendix D). That included 30 commitments contained in the Metz Charter on Diversity, and far exceeded any previous meeting since their start in 1992. It was almost double the 69 commitments produced at Halifax in September 2018 (Kirton and Warren 2018). It suggested that Biarritz would be above all an environmental success.

**Gender, Bondy and Paris, May 9–10**
The ministers in charge of gender equality met in Bondy and Paris on May 9-10, which coincide with a meeting of the GEAC. This was the second time the G7 had held a ministerial meeting on the issue, the first having been under the Italian presidency in 2017.

**GenderHealth, Paris, May 16–17**
Health ministers in Paris on May 16–17 made only 13 commitments (see Appendix E). This was far lower than the 102 in 2017 and the lowest of the five meetings since the start in 2006. It suggested that Biarritz would achieve only a small success on health.

**Labour and Employment, Paris, June 7**
In Paris on June 7, labour and employment ministers made 31 commitments (see Appendix F). This was lower than the 38 in 2018 and the 41 in 2015 but higher than all other of the 17 meetings since their start in 1994. It suggested that Biarritz would be a substantial success on labour and employment.

**Development and Education, Paris, July 4–5**
Development ministers, meeting with their education colleagues, in Paris on July 4–5 made 37 commitments (see Appendix G). This was far fewer than the 60 they had made at Whistler in 2018. It suggested Biarritz would be a limited development success.

**Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, Chantilly, July 17–18**
In Chantilly on July 17–18, finance ministers and central bank governors made 27 commitments (see Appendix H). This was fewer than the 40 they had made in 2017, but far more than the six they had made in 2018, the 15 in 2016 and none at all in 2013, 2014 and 2015. It suggested that Biarritz could be a substantial success on the finance and the economy.

**Compliance Momentum**
Further momentum for success came from the high level of compliance on the Biarritz Summit’s eve with the 20 priority commitments leaders had made at Charlevoix in 2018. The draft final compliance report of the G7 Research Group (2019) showed average compliance of 81%. This was a slight increase from the final compliance score from 2017 of 80%.
Compliance with the 20 Charlevoix commitments was led by the European Union at 95%, Canada and the United Kingdom at 90%, Japan at 84% (on 19 commitments), France at 78% and the United States (on 17 commitments) at 74%. Italy had the lowest score of 65%. Complete compliance of 100% came with the commitments on climate change and the Paris Agreement, the African Union’s Agenda 2063, skills and education, gender equality in labour markets, and energy security. The lowest scores came on the commitments on sexual and gender-based violence in digital contexts at 50% and on climate change insurance risk at 44%.

This suggests that Donald Trump’s post-summit tweet disavowing the Charlevoix communiqué he had just accepted had no impact on the summit’s subsequent results.

**Progress by Mid July 2019**

**Summit Schedule**

As of mid July, there was a general outline of the summit schedule. It showed the summit would start on the afternoon of August 24 with a G7-only session in the afternoon and a G7-only dinner. This plan was still with Macron’s office so was still loose. The summit would start with the G7 leaders on their own on the first day, and continue on the second day with a mix of sessions with G7 and outreach leaders and sessions of G7-only leaders, rather than adding on sessions with the invited leaders at the end of the summit. It would, however, start with just the G7. The two sets of outreach groups had been determined, although how to refer to them was still being considered, with the leader of South Africa joining both the leaders of Burkina Faso, Egypt, Rwanda, Senegal and the head of African Union and also the leaders the Australia, Chile and India. The mixed session with the African leaders would likely take place before the session with the other partners. Heads of the international organizations were also invited, and it was not yet determined which sessions they would attend.

Despite the initial impetus to include civil society in some capacity, there was no yet a clear decision on what form that inclusion would take, especially in a small city such as Biarritz. France had decided it was not appropriate to hold a One Planet summit at Biarritz so close to the UN’s Climate Action Summit just a few weeks later.

In terms of the issues on the agenda, some aspects of the order was still unclear. The opening session might focus on peace and security or on the global economy. It was, however, clear that those issues would be discussed by the G7 leaders before they turned to Africa, digitalization, democracy and climate change. Inequality, socioeconomic issues and gender equality would be discussed on the morning of the third day. The future of work was also on the agenda, in particular ways to address emerging technologies in a human-centred way.

There would, as has become the custom, be a cultural event on one of the evenings, which may also include the leaders’ spouses. This too was still being determined, and depended in part on how many spouses would be in Biarritz. But it had been decided that all the leaders would attend the dinner on the second night of the summit.

The number of outcome documents was still in flux. With the different groupings of G7 only and G7 with partners, there could be an outcome document for each, which could be a negotiated communiqué or statement, or could be a chair’s summary. These decisions were still being discussed.

There could also be other announcements, as there were many initiatives on the table, with many unfolding in different forums. For example, France and Canada were working broadening support...
from their G7 partners and a governance structure for the International Panel on Artificial Intelligence, which had been announced under Canada’s G7 presidency.

**Deliverables**

As memorable deliverables, France was experimenting with how to manage the G7 as an exclusive club or a larger club, or as a platform for building alliances. It had proposed a large number of ambitious deliverables and announcements. It was considering how to deliver them, and how or where to involve civil society, the private sector or other partners. By mid July no single thing had emerged as a major announcement, although the relationship with Africa was clearly a significant priority.

**Gender**

The GEAC, continued under in a new configuration from its Canadian origins, had been identifying laws globally as its 2019 contribution. Three GEAC meetings had produced a compendium of best practices in legal frameworks and a platform for alliance building. France was considering if the G7 and others could sign on to those best practices and commit to consider them in reviewing their own laws, passing new laws and repealing discriminatory laws. France would review results by the Beijing anniversary conference next October.

**Health**

As a dedicated issue, health was not on the G7 agenda. With G20 members China and India accounting for more than a third of the world’s population, it has become more of a G20 issue. However, the Ebola epidemic could become an issue for the leaders' agenda. The exception was the Global Fund. The discussions on peace and security might include some consideration of opioids.

**Climate Change**

On climate change, Macron had become a global hero at the Osaka Summit when he refused to agree to a communiqué that did not refer directly to climate change. He intended to use Biarritz to boost the UN’s Climate Action Summit and compel the United States to act.

The Biarritz session on the environment would consider the entire spectrum on climate globally. France aimed to use the summit to bring leaders together to build larger alliances on the environment, climate and oceans, to support the many initiatives around the world.

**Biodiversity**

The issue of biodiversity had been discussed thoroughly by the environment ministers and covered in their Metz Charter on Biodiversity. It was an example of what France’s new model of the G7 could be, with the ministers producing an agreed communiqué and a charter, which France focused on, plus several initiatives that some signed. The Biarritz leaders would add little more.

**Middle East Peace**

The issue of peace in the Middle East had been discussed by the foreign affairs sous sherpas and would be discussed by the sherpas at their next meeting, which would take place by videoconference. The foreign ministers’ meeting in April was too early to shape what leaders would do in August, especially on developing issues such as Iran. France would include such topics in the preparatory meetings just before Biarritz.

**China**

The foreign ministers’ communiqué had clearly outlined the G7’s position and caution on China with regard to security issues such as the South China Sea and human rights issues arising in Xinjiang.
There had been focused discussions at the G20 summit in Osaka, which would likely continue at Biarritz.

**Russia**
On Russia, Trump had expressed his desire to invite Russia back to the summit. Other members were conscious of the reasons behind reformulating the G8 back to the G7. There was an agreed set of assumptions about what was required to change the situation, including progress on the Minsk Agreement on Ukraine. Russia has shown no interest in returning.

**Mid-July Summary**
Six weeks before the summit, there remained little certainty and clarity about France’s goals for Biarritz. The agenda was still being formulated. There had been some agreements already secured. There was no emphasis on seeking a consensus communiqué, which followed the pattern at the foreign ministers’ meeting in Dinard: France went into the meeting saying it was comfortable without having a communiqué, but then pushed at the last minute to produce one.

Climate change would remain challenging. It was clear that Africa would be prominent at the summit, particularly the issue of inequality in Africa. The issue of inequality was not as high a priority for some countries, including the United States, as it was for others so consensus might be difficult to achieve. France sought an open summit, with the private sector and African countries and civil society involved, but it remained unclear how that would take shape.

There were rumours that Trump would not attend the summit, and contingency planning for such an eventuality. However, it would be unusual given that the United States will host the 2020 summit.

Among the officials overseeing the preparations for the French presidency, Macron’s sherpa had been appointed ambassador to Washington and was replaced by a new advisor to the president. Several members from Macron’s cabinet had recently left.

Six weeks before the summit, France began to move from seeking consensus at the technical level to outlining clear expectations. It had proposed many initiatives, but several attracted resistance and few made progress.

**Prospective Results**
Amid this uncertainty, the G7 leaders at Biarritz will likely produce solid achievements on several of the priorities France has set and on those arising on the summit’s eve.

**Gender**
On gender equality the summit will easily advance the legal status of women in the lead-up to the UN’s Beijing+25 conference in 2020 and mobilize money for women’s financial inclusion in developing countries.

**Education**
On education, G7 leaders will endorse the agreement achieved by their education and development ministers at Paris to support 12 years of good education for all including hard-to-reach girls, end the discrimination that keeps pregnant or married girls from attending school, promote gender-responsive education, back the French-led “Gender at the Centre” Initiative from the foreign ministers’ meeting, strengthen technical and vocational training, and respond to some degree to France’s request to double education aid to the Sahel (Albright 2019)
Health
On health, the Biarritz Summit will boost the desired 15% funding increase for the Global Fund and will also strengthen the response to the Ebola outbreak in the Congo after the shock of its spread to Goma in mid-July.

Environment and Climate Change
All members but the United States will promise to implement and improve the Paris Agreement on climate change and support the UN’s Climate Action Summit in September. U.S. resistance will cripple the needed response to the extreme heat now reaching new peaks around the world.

More specifically, the G7 Biarritz climate coalition will produce a foundation for concrete commitments to improve the efficiency of cooling systems, promote electro-mobility, reach carbon neutrality by 2050, protect the oceans and eliminate plastic waste (Piñera 2019).

Digitalization
On digitalization there will be important agreements on proportionally fair and minimum digital taxation and efforts to regulate the cryptocurrencies introduced by private giants, lest they undermine the protections provided to citizens by their sovereign states. Here they will build on the agreements reached by their finance ministers in Chantilly on June 17–18.

G7 leaders and their democratic partners will act against the increasing harmful and illegal content and activity on the internet, to protect citizens and children against violence and hate, and to defend democratic values citizens safety and women and vulnerable groups against online abuse (Piñera 2019). They will work with stakeholders to improve transparency, accountability, content review and education.

Peace and Security
G7 leaders and their partners will also protect their democratic elections from internal interference, curb social media use for violent extremism and narrow their differences over the threats to democracy and human rights from Iran, Russia and China.

Information and democracy would be easy advances. They would continue work on dealing with online hate speech following the Christchurch massacre. A G7 digital charter could appear.

Causes
These advances will be spurred by recent ecological, health, security and economic shocks, and by the inadequate response of the major multilateral organizations of the UNFCCC, WHO, UNSC and IMF. Thus the G7, with its globally predominant financial and specialized capabilities, will be inspired to act in ways based on its members’ common principles and characteristics of open democracy and human rights. Constraints will come from the gap between rising U.S. capabilities and declining capabilities in most other members, and the low domestic political cohesion that most leaders have. Yet the compact participation of their cherished club, reinforced by the four democratic guests, will induce them to adjust to produce successful summit to at least a moderate degree.

Shock-Activated Vulnerability
Ecological shocks were big and broad. Global temperatures reached historic highs in July 2019 including in France, Germany and the United Kingdom and elsewhere in Europe (Hook 2019). Massive wildfires in Siberia that month prompted Russia to declare a state of emergency, as the smoke spread to the West Coast of Canada and the US.
Health shocks arose in the Congo in July as Ebola deaths surpassed 1,800, the disease spread to Goma, and WHO declared it a public health emergency of international interest.

Economic shocks grew from largely self-inflicted sources. The UK’s new prime minister Boris Johnston pledged to exit the EU on October 31 without any deal. In early August Donald Trump threatened to impose a 10% tariff on September 1 on $300 billion worth of Chinese exports into the United States. Global stock markets plunged in response, the renminbi reached the psychologically important seven-to-one ratio against the U.S. dollar, and the United States declared China a currency manipulator.

Security shocks erupted in July and early August in the Middle East, as Iran seized three foreign oil tankers. In Asia, North Korea repeatedly fired short range missiles and demonstrations escalated in Hong Kong along with Chinese threats of retaliation. In early August, the United States withdrew from the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with Russia and India changed its constitution to assume full, direct control of the hitherto semi-autonomous, Muslim-majority region of Kashmir.

**Multilateral Institutional Failure**
The major multilateral organizations of the UNFCCC, WHO, UNSC and IMF failed to respond to a sufficient degree. The UNFCCC was unable to complete its implementing rulebook for the 2015 Paris Agreement in 2018 and was not scheduled to try to improve its members’ increasingly inadequate climate change control commitments until December 2019. The WHO had been slow to declare an international emergency for the expanding Ebola epidemic and the World Bank did not release the funds it had assembled for such purposes. The UNSC remained paralyzed by the vetoes of permanent members Russia and China on Iran, North Korea and their own situations. The IMF continually downgraded its estimates for global growth, but could not constrain the United States from declaring China a currency manipulator nor raise the resources needed to further support Argentina and other prospective clients. The WTO was powerless to stop the escalating U.S.-China trade war or the many other protectionist moves. And no international institution was clearly able to govern the oceans or digital economy.

**Predominant Equalizing Capability**
To fill the gap, G7 members, especially with their outreach partners, still commanded a predominant share of the specialized capabilities needed to respond, especially as all the once surging BRICS countries were seeing their growth rates decline. Yet with the gross domestic product of the United States still enjoying growth of over 2%, while that of Germany and the United Kingdom declined and that of Japan and Italy stagnated, the United States had less incentive to adjust to the wishes of its G7 partners.

**Political Cohesion**
A further constraint came from the low political cohesion in many G7 members. While Japan’s coalition government was secure, the United Kingdom had a new prime minister with low approval ratings and was facing an election at any time. Italy’s coalition government was dissolving and could fall at any time. Macron in France suffered from low popularity. Germany’s coalition faced a Green Party surging in the polls, with Merkel having announced her departure in a few years. In Canada Trudeau’s Liberal Party was even with the main opposition party as the October 21 election approached.

In the United States, Donald Trump has lost control of the House of Representatives in the mid-term elections in November 2018 and continued to have negative net approval ratings, even as the U.S. economy was growing and the November 2020 presidential elections approached. As of August
20, 2019, the leading poll of polls showed that 53.9% of Americans disapproved of him and only 41.9% approved (FiveThirtyEight 2019).

However, more broadly, a NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll reported on August 18, 2019, showed that 64% of Americans, and majorities of both Democrats and Republicans, agreed that free trade was good for America because it opened up new markets, while only 27% believed free trade was bad (Murray 2019). A Pew Research Poll taken on July 10–15, 2019, similarly found that 65% felt free trade agreements between the United States and other countries were good for the United States, while only 22% felt they were bad (Pew Research Center 2019). A majority of Democrats and Republicans felt they were good.

The Pew poll also found that respondents ranked the major threats to the well-being of the United States as cyber attacks from other countries first at 74%, global climate change and Iran’s nuclear regime tied for second at 57%, China’s and influence fourth at 54%, and the Islamic militant group known as ISIS and North Korea’s nuclear program tied for fifth at 53%.

**Club at the Hub**

A strong spur of success was the compact participation in a club that all leaders cherished. Already a veteran of two G7 and two G20 summits, Donald Trump has come to every G7 and G20 summit during his presidency and adjusted to make them a success. He has met most of his Biarritz colleagues many times.

The G7 brings together, in the same room, key leaders even if they may not otherwise wish to meet. Regardless of what is contained in the summit’s outcome documents, progress can come behind the scenes.

To have these leaders, with complicated schedules and competing priorities, spend three days plus travel time and talk about the issues they want to discuss about is valuable. The small, informal G7 allows for free-flowing conversations that the larger, more diverse G20 does not.

All leaders except Juncker were scheduled to attend the Biarritz Summit for the full time.

**Conclusion**

As the United States holds the 2020 G7 presidency, during an election year, Trump will also need to adjust to make the 2019 summit a success to set up for the summit he will host. He may signal his intentions at the end of the summit. His summit will likely be held in May, possibly at a Trump resort in Florida, and could include energy security as a priority.

The Biarritz Summit will thus be a summit of at least a solid success.
References
## Appendix A: G7 Summit Performance, 1975–2018

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### John Kirton: Prospects for Solid Success at the G7 Biarritz Summit

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**Notes:**

- Grades up to and including 2005 are given by Nicholas Bayne; from 2006 on are given by John Kirton and the G7 Research Group and are generated according to a different framework and method. See Kirton Scoring Scheme at [http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/scoring.html](http://www.g7.utoronto.ca/evaluations/scoring.html).
- Domestic political management: Number of compliments includes all explicit references by name to the full members of the summit that specifically express the gratitude of the institution to that member. The percentage of members complimented indicates how many of the full members received compliments within the official documents.
- Direction setting: number of references in the communiqué to the G7’s core values of democracy, social advance and individual liberty.
- Delivery: Compliance scores from 1990 to 1995 measure compliance with commitments selected by Ella Kokotsis. Compliance scores since 1996 measure compliance with G7 Research Group’s selected priority commitments.
e. Development of Global Governance: number of ministerial-level bodies or officials-level bodies established at or by the summit, or during the hosting year, at least in the form of having one meeting take place.

f. Participation: the number of full members present, including those representing the European Community from the start; the number of invited countries; and the number of international organizations. Russia started as a participant in 1991 and became a full member in 1998. In 1975, the G4 met without Japan and Italy; later that year the G6 met.
Appendix B: Speech by President Emmanuel Macron to the United Nations General Assembly, 25 September 2018

… The fight against inequalities will be the priority of France’s G7 summit presidency in 2019. Indeed, after Canada — whose leadership I want to pay tribute to here — France [holds] the next presidency of the G7, whose format I would like to thoroughly revise to involve more effectively several other powers, and work at new forms of coordination.

It’s at the United Nations first that I want to say this inequalities agenda will be central to the next G7. I am also pledging to you to report back on the results of the Biarritz G7 next September, because the time when a club of rich countries could alone define the world’s balances is long gone …

We must tackle inequalities of destiny. It’s a moral aberration as much as a reality which is untenable. It is unacceptable not to enjoy the same opportunities depending on the country you are born in, not to be able to go to school in some countries because you are a woman, not to have access to certain basic care.

Education
… The Global Partnership for Education’s Financing Conference in Dakar in February [2018] raised $2.5 billion to develop access to education in the world. It’s a historic sum. France increased its contribution tenfold. The active efforts the G7 has already begun to make under Canada’s presidency will have to allow further progress.

We are at a watershed on this issue, during which we’ll be able to grasp the full extent of the challenge facing us, or not. Six hundred and twenty million more children in the world need to be provided with schooling between now and 2030, including 444 million Africans. Are we going to give ourselves the resources for this? Are we going to give them all the resources for a solid grounding, enabling them to take control of their lives, fraternal lives in tomorrow’s world? If we don’t, what kind of world are we setting up for ourselves?

… This is why I call on you all to become part of this global drive for education. Education and health won’t just be the pillars of our societies in the 21st century; they will be the basic components of our economies too.

Gender
We must also fight passionately against gender-linked inequalities. I have made gender parity in France the great cause of my five-year term, and I issue an appeal here to make this a great global cause with you. Women and girls are the first to be affected by poverty, conflict, the consequences of global warming; they are the first victims of sexist and sexual violence, which too often prevents them from moving around freely, working or choosing what happens to their bodies.

Our responsibility in the 21st century is to end these kinds of violence, from harassment on the street to femicide. It’s time our world stopped making women victims and at last gave them their rightful place — the one where they are leaders too! We must guarantee them access everywhere to education, healthcare, jobs, and to taking economic and political decisions, and fight every kind of violence they are subjected to.
So France will propose to governments wishing to move forward with us the creation of a coalition for adopting new laws for gender equality. Fifty percent of our development aid will be devoted to projects to reduce gender inequalities.

**Health**
We must also relaunch efforts to fight health inequalities at international level. We are hosting the Replenishment Conference of the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria in Lyon in [October] 2019. We will retake the initiative on the fight against fake drugs and step up our action to tackle major pandemics. I call on everyone here to mobilize.

**Climate**
Finally, we must fight — with a passionate sense of urgency — against environmental inequalities. It is unacceptable for 45% of greenhouse gas emissions to be produced by 10% of the planet’s richest inhabitants. It is inefficient — as is the case with solar power — for countries with the largest potential and greatest needs to be those with the least access to the appropriate technology.

It is indefensible that 100 million more people will be doomed to extreme poverty by 2030 if we don’t succeed in honouring our commitments to fight global warming. Here too, it is a battle which must bring us together.

Some countries here are suffering more than others and we owe them solidarity. But we will all have to provide an explanation to our peoples and our own children for this growing number of disasters.

**Paris Climate Agreement**
The heralded breakdown of the Paris Agreement has been averted, because we’ve managed to remain united, despite the American decision to withdraw from it. This strength must continue to carry us along and dispel all fatalistic approaches.

We’re told that it is already too late, that we won’t meet the targets. Then let’s speed up … Let’s implement the protocol against HFC gases, which could enable us to reduce the planet’s average temperature by 1°C by 2050. Let’s set ourselves the goal of concluding in 2020 a plan for an ambitious global pact for the environment, and making the Beijing COP on biodiversity and the IUCN World Conservation Congress in France in 2020 decisive steps.

Let’s commit ourselves clearly and let’s all be equally clear, concrete and coherent. It is an emergency. So let’s comply with the commitments we’ve made. Let’s sign no more trade agreements with powers that don’t respect the Paris Agreement. Let’s ensure our trade commitments include our environmental and social obligations. Let’s more heavily mobilize sovereign funds, which finance this low-carbon policy strategy.

France will continue to exercise global leadership in this battle, along with everyone who so wishes. We will work at the G7 to ensure that the commitments made at COP21 are revised upwards, and if one of the members doesn’t want to move forward, we will move forward even so, going to seek new coalitions, new formats, because the G7’s remit is to remain a united group of countries committed to democracy. But today it must also help create new coalitions enabling the global collective system to be furthered and rebuilt….
Inequalities

Only together can we effectively combat all these inequalities, which have each fractured our societies.…

Otherwise there will ultimately be only two solutions. The first would be to always choose the lowest common denominator and follow the standards we know; this is what we have done for decades.…

The other response would be to say it is the rules that don’t work. So let’s withdraw into ourselves. Isolationism, protectionism. But this leads to only one thing: an increase in tensions.…

I propose, on the contrary, that we establish a collective mechanism for working together on what we’re doing, in each of our countries, to reduce inequalities.

To assess our actions but also make them more consistent and spread good practice. So I propose that the international institutions — the United Nations but also, of course, the OECD — support us in establishing this mechanism, for which the G7 will have to be the driving force.…

Africa

We must give Africa its full role, to ensure its role is central to the recomposition of the international system.…

Because it is indeed today in Africa that we find the most fervent champions of multilateralism and regional integration, because our African partners have clearly understood that together we will be in a position to tackle our common challenges. And the French G7 presidency will also set to work on this new alliance with Africa.

As you see, I believe very strongly that in the face of these rifts, these challenges in the contemporary world order, we can build a new language of action and we must, at the same time, attack the underlying causes that contemporary inequalities represent.…
## Appendix C: G7 Foreign Ministers’ Commitments, 1993–2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Summit</th>
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<th>Number of documents</th>
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<td>2011 France</td>
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<td>1 (including Annex)</td>
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### Appendix D: G7 Environment Ministers’ Commitments, 1992–2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Environment ministerial</th>
<th>Commitments</th>
<th>Chair’s statement</th>
<th>Communiqué</th>
<th>Other</th>
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<td>2007 Potsdam, March 15–17</td>
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<td>2008 Kobe, March 24–26</td>
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<td>2016 Toyama, May 15–16</td>
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<td>2019 Metz, May 5–6</td>
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Notes:
- = no commitments found in document. Blank = no meeting held, no document issued.
- 21 ministerial meetings, 23 documents produced at 17 meetings, 17 documents contain commitments.
- a. Environment and development ministers’ meeting.
- b. Environment and energy ministers’ meeting.
- c. Pre-summit and Post-summit = date of leaders’ level summit and number of days between leaders’ level summit and environment ministerial meeting.
- d. 14 of the 37 commitments in “other” were found in the annex to the document.
- e. 29 of the 65 commitments were found in the annex to the Chair’s Summary/Statement.
- f. 21 of the 49 commitments were found in the annex to the Chair’s Summary/Statement.
- g. Two Chair’s summaries were produced. The environment ministers’ chair’s summary had 17 commitments and the joint ministerial session on healthy oceans, seas and resilient communities had 26. Two “other” issue specific documents were produced at Halifax. The G7 Innovation to Address Marine Plastic Litter had seven commitments and the G7 Initiative on Earth Observation and Integrated Coastal Zone Management had 19.
## Appendix E: G7 Health Ministers’ Commitments, 2006–2019

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Meeting</th>
<th>Number of commitments</th>
<th>Number of environment-related commitments</th>
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<td>2006 Moscow</td>
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<tr>
<td>2015 Berlin</td>
<td>36</td>
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<tr>
<td>2016 Kobe</td>
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<tr>
<td>2017 Milan</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2019 Paris</td>
<td>13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>40 (21%)</td>
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</table>

Note: There no meeting of health ministers in years not listed.
## Appendix F: G7 Labour and Employment Ministers’ Commitments, 1994–2019

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Summit</th>
<th>Number of commitments</th>
<th>Type of document</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
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<td>1994 March, Detroit</td>
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<td>Summary Statement by Treasury Secretary</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996 April, France</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Chair’s Conclusions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997 November, Kobe</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Chair’s Conclusions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998 February, London</td>
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<td>Chair’s Conclusions</td>
</tr>
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<td>1999 February, Washington</td>
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<td>Chair’s Conclusions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000 November, Turin</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>Chair’s Conclusions; Turin Charter Towards Active Ageing</td>
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<td>2002 April, Montreal</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003 December, Stuttgart</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005 March, London</td>
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<td>Press Release (not counted)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2006 October, Moscow</td>
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<td>No document issued</td>
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<td>2007 May, Dresden</td>
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<td>Chair’s Conclusions</td>
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<tr>
<td>2008 May, Niigata</td>
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<td>Chair’s Conclusions</td>
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<tr>
<td>2009 March, Rome</td>
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<td>Conclusions</td>
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<tr>
<td>2015 October, Berlin</td>
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<td>2017 September, Turin</td>
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<td>Declaration</td>
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<td>2018 March, Montreal</td>
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<td>Chair’s Summary; Annex A; Annex B; Annex C</td>
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<tr>
<td>2019 Paris, France</td>
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<td>Social Communiqué; Social Tripartite Declaration</td>
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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td>Chair’s Summary; Declaration; Other</td>
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Notes: Excludes individual country action plans and press releases. No meetings were held in years not listed.
Appendix G: G7 Development Ministers’ Commitments, 2019 (37)

Joint Paris G7/G5 Sahel Communiqué, July 4, 2019

Long-term challenges and fragilities in the Sahel
2019-1: Ministers endorsed strong action in order to unlock the social and economic opportunities and address the root causes of instability in the Sahel.

2019-2: Ministers endorsed strong action to address urgent challenges, including the lack of economic prospects and employment, especially for young people and women, limited access to resources, health systems and basic services such as justice, nutrition, education and social protection, and weak governance.

2019-3: Ministers endorsed strong action to be undertaken, first by the Sahel countries, to improve governance, domestic resource mobilization, increase budget expenditures and strengthen institutional capacity for the provision of quality basic services to all, without discrimination.

2019-3: [Ministers endorsed strong action to be undertaken] by the international community, to support these efforts with enhanced, coherent and coordinated support.

Taking the partnerships in the Sahel one step further
2019-4: We commit to strengthening the G7 and G5 Sahel partnership, which is key as the G7 provides half of the total annual ODA received by the G5 Sahel countries.

2019-5: We express our strong support for a successful nineteenth Replenishment of the International Development Association (IDA) and fifteenth Replenishment of the African Development Fund, with an enhanced focus in both funds on addressing fragility, including in the G5 Sahel States.

Changing methods: Sahel Alliance, humanitarian-development-peace nexus, ownership by capacity building and domestic resource mobilization
2019-6: We will continue to work with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on how IMF-supported programs can support this continuum of policy actions in low-income countries and in particular in Sahel countries, drawing on the outcomes of the Review of Facilities for low-income countries and the Review of Program Design and Conditionality.

A significant step forward in human development
2019-7: In particular, we express our strong support to the World Bank’s Africa Human Capital Plan, including its dedicated effort in the Sahel region, which aims to increase human development financing in Africa to 15 billion USD between 2021-2023.

2019-8: We support the existing initiatives in this area, such as the Women Entrepreneurs Finance Initiative (We-Fi) or the Affirmative Finance Action for Women in Africa (Afawa) programme launched by AfDB.

2019-9: Commit to advancing our collaboration together and with other relevant stakeholders to speed up progress in addressing all forms of malnutrition, though systemic approaches, including by strengthening nutrition within health systems and by promoting nutrition-sensitive, resilient and sustainable food systems.
2019-10: We support the Scaling Up Nutrition (SUN) movement which facilitates cross-sectoral work and helps raise political leadership.

2019-11: We, G5 Sahel countries, will speed up the implementation of our national multi-sectoral nutrition action plans.

2019-12: We, the G7 members, will improve the coherence of our actions for nutrition in the region, including through multi-donor approaches.

2019-13: We, the G5 Sahel countries will work with our G7 partners to address the drives of rural unemployment among young people.

2019-14: We support the broadening of fiscal space for health and encourage Sahel countries to increase public investments in primary health care, especially to create jobs in the health workforce, in line with the African Union “Call to Action.”

2019-15: We commit to improving the well-being of women and girls and contribute to potential social and economic benefits in the Sahel region, through regional partnership, such as the Ouagadougou partnership.

2019-16: We commit to supporting the success of the sixth Replenishment Conference of the Global Fund for AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, which France is pleased to be hosting in Lyon on 10 October 2019, aimed at raising at least $14 billion to fight the three diseases over the 2020-2022 period, including through building resilient and sustainable health systems (RSSH).

**Financing for Sustainable Development: Improving Measurement, Mobilizing Resources and Realizing the Vision of the 2030 Agenda & SDGs**

2019-17: We reiterate our commitment towards financing for sustainable development as endorsed in the Addis Ababa Action Agenda (AAAA) in realizing the vision of the 2030 agenda and the SDGs.

2019-18: Building on G7 discussions in Whistler, we continue to affirm the need to consider financing for sustainable development in a holistic and gender responsive manner, taking into account public and private, domestic and international flows, originating from developed and established countries.

2019-19: We reaffirm our commitment to international cooperation to support efforts to build capacity in developing countries, including through enhanced domestic resource mobilization, which is the primary source of financing for development across all country classifications.

2019-20: Taking into account the growing complexity of the development landscape, we firmly commit to support initiatives aimed at better measuring and increasing transparency on resources contributing to sustainable development, including quality sex-disaggregated data.

2019-21: We look forward to the establishment of an inclusive governance mechanism within the United Nations to oversee TOSSD as a global framework that will transparently present all types of official support for sustainable development.

2019-22: We support the ongoing efforts of the international community to define a common framework for measuring impact investing based on the work done by the members of the Impact Management Project (IMP).
2019-23: Following the G20 Osaka Leaders’ declaration which recognized the importance of innovative financial mechanisms, we express our support to mobilize additional resources for development and help increase the impact of existing resources.

2019-24: We support the implementation of the OECD DAC Blended Finance Principles for Unlocking Commercial Finance for the SDGs.

2019-25: Building on the growing international experience around these instruments, we express our support to Development Impact Bonds (DIB) as one of the several promising results-based approaches to improve the performance of international development initiatives.

2019-26: In this regard, we encourage the commission of the design of a results-based partnership structure in the field of health and human development, such as Menstrual Hygiene Management, in pilot countries in Sub-Saharan Africa to empower women and girls by improving their health and education.

**G7 Declaration: Talking Fragilities and Preventing Crises in Developing Countries**

2019-27: We, members of the G7, commit to strengthening our collective responses and, as appropriate, our coordination in multilateral forums.

2019-28: We commit to work with development country partners in tackling in priority the main drivers of fragility, in order to prevent the outbreak of new crises.

2019-29: We fully support the World Bank Group’s endeavor to formulate a strategy on Fragility, Conflict and Violence (FCV).

2019-30: We commit to promoting local ownership and solutions when tackling the main drivers of fragility.

2019-31: Peer-learning and South-South cooperation are key: in this respect, we support the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS).

2019-32: We commit to providing locally-owned, harmonized and aligned development assistance in fragile countries, supported by mutual accountability, in line with the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), Accra Agenda for Action (2008), Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation (2011), and new Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (2011).

2019-33: We commit to supporting developing countries’ efforts to adapt and build resilience to shocks and stresses, including those resulting from climate change, food insecurity, conflicts, health emergencies and lack of access to energy.

2019-34: In that context, we encourage in particular Multilateral Development Banks and the private sector to strengthen investment in climate adaptation and resilience-building activities within developing countries, consistent with country plans.

2019-35: We support the implementation of effective, legitimate and rights-respecting justice and security services in order to establish an environment conducive to sustainable peace and development.
2019-36: We commit to increasing emphasis on programmes aimed at strengthening democratic governance in the justice and security sectors, keeping in mind an objective to incorporate the Women, Peace and Security Agenda into our SSR support programmes, building on the efforts started in 2018, notably by the G7 WPS Partnerships Initiative as well as the UN SG’s agenda for sustaining peace.

2019-37: We commit to further exploring linkages between national and international initiatives relating to women, youth, inequality, peace and security: in particular, supporting the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 and associated resolutions on Women, Peace and Security, as well as and “Youth, Peace and Security” Agendas.
Appendix H: G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors’ Commitments, 2019 (27)

Chair’s Summary, July 17–18, 2019, Chantilly, France

Addressing Risks in the Global Economy and the Financial System

Global Economy
2019-1: Ministers and Governors agreed to continue to address these risks, including by taking further action if and when appropriate, and to strengthen international cooperation and frameworks.

2019-2: They reaffirmed their commitment to use all policy tools to achieve strong, sustainable, balanced and inclusive growth, and safeguard against downside risks.

2019-3: They recalled their commitment to ensure resilience of the financial sector and limit spillovers and contagion.

2019-4: They recalled the conclusion of the G20 Osaka Leaders’ Summit on the necessary reform of the World Trade Organization and reaffirmed their commitment to further strengthening the global financial safety net with a strong, quota-based, and adequately resourced IMF at its center.

Cybersecurity in the Financial Sector
2019-5: Ministers and Governors underlined the importance of deepening their engagement in three areas: on preparation, they agreed to draw the lessons of the G7 joint crisis management exercises both for national and coordinated future exercises and to establish a programme or exercises for the coming years.

Stablecoins and Other Various New Products
2019-6: Regarding regulatory concerns, Ministers and Governors agreed that possible “stablecoin” initiatives and their operators would in any case need to meet the highest standards of financial regulation, especially with regards to AML/CFT, in order to guarantee they do not affect the stability of the financial system, or consumer protection.

2019-7: Ministers and Governors agreed however that [projects such as Libra] underline the need for cross-border payment systems to be significantly improved and less costly for consumers.

Addressing New Challenges

International Taxation
2019-8: Considering the need to improve the current international tax framework, without undermining its principles, Finance Ministers agreed that it is urgent to address the tax challenges raised by the digitalization of the economy and the shortcomings of the current transfer pricing system.

2019-9: Under the first pillar [of the two-pillar solution to be adopted by 2020 through the work programme endorsed by the G20 Leaders], new nexus rules should be developed to address new business models, such as highly digitalized business models, allowing companies to do business in a territory without any physical presence.
2019-20: In addition, tax certainty should be reinforced and aggressive tax planning should be limited, in particular for the transfer pricing of distribution activities.

2019-21: The new taxing rights under pillar one [of the two-pillar solution to be adopted by 2020 through the work programme endorsed by the G20 Leaders] could be determined by reference to criteria reflecting the level of businesses’ active participation in a customers’ or users’ jurisdiction, such as valuable intangibles or employment of a highly digitalized model, on which ministers agreed that the OECD should further reflect.

2019-22: Ministers also agreed that, in order to avoid double taxation and ensure the stability of the international tax system, robust and effective tax dispute resolution through mandatory arbitration must be a component of this global solution.

2019-23: Under the second pillar [of the two-pillar solution to be adopted by 2020 through the work programme endorsed by the G20 Leaders], ministers agreed that a minimum level of effective taxation, such as the example for the U.S. GILTI regime, would contribute to ensuring that companies pay their fair share of tax.

**Competition and the Digital Economy**

2019-24: Building on this work, Ministers and Governors reaffirmed that competition rules and their enforcement can and should adapt as appropriate to new challenges, including those raised by the digital transformation or new economic understanding, while keeping their guiding principles.

**Climate and Green Finance**

2019-25: Those Ministers and Governors that are members of the Network for Greening the Financial System encouraged the implementation of the recommendations listed in the comprehensive report of the Networking for Greening the Financial System, which aim at enhancing the role of financial actors in managing environmental risks and mobilizing capital for green and low-carbon investments.

**Fighting Inequalities Within and Between Countries**

**Inequalities in Advanced Economies**

2019-26: Policy discussion on equality of opportunities, including through exchanging on good practices and sharing experiences, including on pay transparency, will remain an important part of the international agenda.

**Financing for Development**

2019-27: They reiterated their support to the G20 Compact with Africa and agreed to encourage strong implementation of this initiative to help accelerate achievement of Compact objectives.