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Analytical Studies > Analysis on the 2022 Elmau Summit
G7 Summits > 2022 Elmau Summit

The Performance of the 2022 G7 Brussels Summit on the Sidelines of the NATO Summit

Brittaney Warren, G7 Research Group
March 25, 2022

On March 24, 2022, G7 leaders went back to Brussels for their second summit there, once again to deal with Russia's invasion of Ukraine as they did in 2014. This time, for the first time ever, the G7, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European Union held summits in the space place, on the same day. With the G7 uniquely bringing in Japan, it was an impressive display of unity on a compelling global threat.

In Brussels, the G7 leaders, met in person under the 2022 German presidency on Thursday afternoon to consider and condemn Russia's war against Ukraine. They released a 20-paragraph statement of 1,538 words. In it, the G7 leaders expressed solidarity with the people of both Ukraine and Russia, stating that the invasion is Putin's war and that they held no grievances against the Russian people themselves. This article assesses the G7's performance across the major dimensions of summit performance applied to the leaders' statement.

Domestic Political Management

Domestic political management is measured by compliments and criticisms given to G7 and other leaders in the communiqué. The statement contained two compliments, one to Ukraine and one to states neighbouring Ukraine (see Appendix A). The G7 complimented Ukraine's "heroic resistance" against Russia's "unjustifiable and illegal aggression" and its neighbours "for their solidarity and humanity" in response. There were also six distinct criticisms or condemnations of Russia. These described Russia's actions as unjustifiable, unprovoked, illegal, unacceptable, aggressive, malicious and deplorable.

Direction Setting

Direction setting is measured as affirmations of the G7's two foundational missions of open democracy and individual liberty, as well as to the G20's two foundational missions of financial stability and globalization for all.

On the G7's mission to promote democracy there was one reference, "to bolster democratic resilience" in Ukraine and in neighbouring countries (see Appendix B). On its mission to promote individual liberty and human rights, there were two references, to uphold international law and to defend human rights in Ukraine and in neighbouring countries.

There were no references to the G20's missions to promote financial stability and to promote globalization for all.

Decision Making

Decision making tracks the number of collective, politically binding, future-oriented commitments made at the summit. At this meeting, G7 leaders made 28 such commitments, all on the war in Ukraine, but spanning six distinct policy areas (see Appendix C). The most, 12 (43%), were on regional security. These included commitments on investigating war crimes and imposing a sweeping range of sanctions. Next were five each (18%) on addressing the risk of a resulting global energy crisis and food crisis. Three commitments (11%) were made on the refugee crisis. Two (7%) were on trade and keeping global markets open. And one (4%) was on climate change, where the G7 leaders stated that "this crisis reinforces [their] determination to meet the goals of the Paris Agreement … by accelerating reduction of [their] reliance on fossil fuels and [their] transition to clean energy."

Development of Global Governance

Development of global governance is measured by the number of references to institutions inside the G7 and institutions outside it and, the reference to those external institutions, includes whether the G7 led or followed. In all there were 12 such references: two inside and 10 outside (see Appendix D).

The two inside included a reference to G7 sanctions against Russia and tasking the "relevant" G7 ministers to monitor these sanctions.

The 10 outside ones were one each to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), International Criminal Court (ICC), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), multilateral development banks (MDBs), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Trade Organization (WTO), the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and international financial institutions (IFIs), and two to the World Food Programme (WFP).

Of these, measured as expressions of support, G7 followed the UNGA, the ICC, the IAEA, the WFP, MDBs, IFIs and the WTO.

Measured by calls to action or direction given, the G7 led OPEC, the FAO and the WFP.

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Appendix A: Domestic Political Management ↩

We, the Leaders of the G7, met today in Brussels at the invitation of the German G7 Presidency, to further strengthen our cooperation in light of Russia's unjustifiable, unprovoked and illegal aggression and President Putin's war of choice against independent and sovereign Ukraine.

Following the United Nations General Assembly resolution on 2 March 2022, we will continue to stand with the overwhelming majority of the international community, in condemning Russia's military aggression and the suffering and loss of life it continues to cause.

We remain appalled by and condemn the devastating attacks on the Ukrainian population and civilian infrastructure, including hospitals and schools.

The siege of Mariupol and other Ukrainian cities, and the denial of humanitarian access by Russian military forces are unacceptable.

In this regard, we categorically denounce Russia's malicious and completely unfounded disinformation campaign against Ukraine, a state in full compliance with international non-proliferation agreements.

We are resolved in our support to the Ukrainian people in their heroic resistance to Russia's unjustifiable and illegal aggression.

We further commend neighbouring states for their solidarity and humanity in welcoming Ukrainian refugees and third country nationals from Ukraine.

We deplore the Russian leadership's attempt to deprive Russian citizens of access to unbiased information through censorship, and denounce its malicious disinformation campaigns, which we will not leave unaddressed.

Note: Coded by Gabrielle Regimbal.

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Appendix B: Direction Setting ↩

We will furthermore collaborate in our efforts to bolster democratic resilience and defend human rights in Ukraine and neighbouring countries.

We are united in our resolve to restore peace and stability and uphold international law.

Note: Coded by Sonja Dobson.

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Appendix C: Decision Making ↩

Note: Coded by Brittaney Warren and Ella Kokotsis.

2022-1: Following the United Nations General Assembly resolution on 2 March 2022, we will continue to stand with the overwhelming majority of the international community, in condemning Russia's military aggression and the suffering and loss of life it continues to cause. (regional security)

2022-2: We will work together to support the gathering of evidence of war crimes. (regional security)

2022-3: [Moreover, we urge all countries not to give military or other assistance to Russia to help continue its aggression in Ukraine.] We will be vigilant regarding any such assistance. (regional security)

2022-4: We will spare no efforts to hold President Putin and the architects and supporters of this aggression, including the Lukashenko regime in Belarus, accountable for their actions. To this end, we will continue to work together, along with our allies and partners around the world. (regional security)

2022-5: We underline our resolve to impose severe consequences on Russia, including by fully implementing the economic and financial measures we already imposed. (regional security)

2022-6: We will continue to cooperate closely, including by engaging other governments on adopting similar restrictive measures to those already imposed by G7 members and on refraining from evasion, circumvention and backfilling that seek to undercut or mitigate the effects of our sanctions. (regional security)

2022-7: We task the relevant Ministers in a focused initiative to monitor the full implementation of sanctions and to coordinate responses related to evasive measures, including regarding gold transactions by the Central Bank of Russia. (regional security)

2022-8: We stand ready to apply additional measures as required, continuing to act in unity as we do so. (regional security)

2022-9: We will continue efforts to support Ukraine in defending its networks against cyber incidents. (regional security)

2022-10: In preparation for any Russian malicious cyber response to the actions we have taken, we are taking steps to increase the resilience of the infrastructure in our respective nations by strengthening our coordinated cyber defences and improving our shared awareness of cyber threats. (regional security)

2022-11: We will also work to hold accountable those actors that engage in destructive, disruptive, or destabilising activities in cyberspace. (regional security)

2022-12: We highlight the need to further increase international assistance to countries neighbouring Ukraine, and, as a concrete contribution to this end, underline our commitment to receiving, protecting, and supporting refugees and displaced persons as a consequence of the conflict. (migration and refugees)

2022-13: We thus all stand ready to welcome them on our territories. (migration and refugees)

2022-14: We will take further steps to broaden our support to Ukraine and neighbouring countries. [refugees] (migration and refugees)

2022-15: We are taking further steps to reduce our reliance on Russian energy, and will work together to this end. (energy)

2022-16: At the same time, we will ensure secure alternative and sustainable supplies (energy)

2022-17: [we will]…act in solidarity and close coordination in the case of possible supply disruptions. (energy)

2022-18: We commit to actively support countries willing to phase out their dependency on Russian gas, oil and coal imports. (energy)

2022-19: [We call on oil and gas producing countries to act in a responsible manner and to increase deliveries to international markets, noting that OPEC has a key role to play.] We will work with them and all partners to ensure stable and sustainable global energy supplies. (energy)

2022-20: This crisis reinforces our determination to meet the goals of the Paris agreement and of the Glasgow Climate Pact and limit the rise in global temperatures to 1.5°C, by accelerating reduction of our reliance on fossil fuels and our transition to clean energy. (climate change)

2022-21: We remain determined to monitor the situation closely and do what is necessary to prevent and respond to the evolving global food security crisis. (food and agriculture)

2022-22: We will make coherent use of all instruments and funding mechanisms to address food security, and build resilience in the agriculture sector in line with climate and environment goals. (food and agriculture)

2022-23: We will address potential agricultural production and trade disruptions, in particular in vulnerable countries. (food and agriculture)

2022-24: We commit to provide a sustainable food supply in Ukraine and support continued Ukrainian production efforts. (food and agriculture)

2022-25: We will work with and step up our collective contribution to relevant international institutions including the World Food Programme (WFP), in parallel with Multilateral Development Banks and International Financial Institutions, to provide support to countries with acute food insecurity. (food and agriculture)

2022-26: We will avoid export bans and other trade-restrictive measures (trade)

2022-27: [we will] … maintain open and transparent markets (trade)

2022-28: [International organisations and multilateral fora should no longer conduct their activities with Russia in a business as usual manner.] We will work closely with our partners to act as appropriate, based on shared interests, as well as rules and regulations of respective institutions. (regional security)

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Appendix D: Development of Global Governance ↩

Note: Coded by Julia Kulik.

We are united in our resolve to restore peace and stability and uphold international law. Following the United Nations General Assembly resolution on 2 March 2022, we will continue to stand with the overwhelming majority of the international community, in condemning Russia's military aggression and the suffering and loss of life it continues to cause.

We welcome the investigations of international mechanisms, including by the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court.

We underline our resolve to impose severe consequences on Russia, including by fully implementing the economic and financial measures we already imposed. We will continue to cooperate closely, including by engaging other governments on adopting similar restrictive measures to those already imposed by G7 members and on refraining from evasion, circumvention and backfilling that seek to undercut or mitigate the effects of our sanctions.

We task the relevant Ministers in a focused initiative to monitor the full implementation of sanctions and to coordinate responses related to evasive measures, including regarding gold transactions by the Central Bank of Russia.

Russia must comply with its international obligations and refrain from any activity that imperils nuclear sites, allowing unhindered control by the Ukrainian authorities, as well as full access by and cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency.

We call on oil and gas producing countries to act in a responsible manner and to increase deliveries to international markets, noting that OPEC has a key role to play.

We will work with and step up our collective contribution to relevant international institutions including the World Food Programme (WFP), in parallel with Multilateral Development Banks and International Financial Institutions, to provide support to countries with acute food insecurity.

We call for an extraordinary session of the Council of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) to address the consequences on world food security and agriculture arising from the Russian aggression against Ukraine.

We call on all participants of the Agriculture Markets Information System (AMIS) to continue to share information and explore options to keep prices under control, including making stocks available, in particular to the WFP.

We will avoid export bans and other trade-restrictive measures, maintain open and transparent markets, and call on others to do likewise, consistent with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules, including WTO notification requirements.

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