Guarding the Crossroads: Nonproliferation in the Age of Terrorism

From the Editors…

This issue of The Monitor takes as its organizing theme the notion of a “crossroads of radicalism and technology,” as laid out in the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America. In his foreword to the National Security Strategy, President George W. Bush observed that the enemies of America had “openly declared that they are seeking weapons of mass destruction, and evidence indicates that they are doing so with determination. The United States will not allow these efforts to succeed.” To prevent terrorist networks such as al Qaeda from striking at the United States, its allies, and friends, the Bush administration announced that it would pursue a balanced, tripartite strategy. “Proactive counterproliferation efforts” would “deter and defend against the threat before it is unleashed,” using a combination of detection, passive defense, and, most controversially, counterforce capabilities. “Strengthened nonproliferation efforts” would help keep dangerous materials, technologies, and know-how out of the hands of terrorists and their benefactors in rogue regimes. And “effective consequence management” would help the United States fight through an unconventional attack on its soil or on its interests overseas, adding a layer of deterrence in the process.

Several questions arise. First, does the concept of a “crossroads of radicalism and technology” rest on sound premises? Would Iran or North Korea, the principal foci of American strategy, really turn over mass-destuction weaponry to al Qaeda, in light of their lack of ideological affinity with Osama bin Laden and his cohort of international terrorists? Would al Qaeda or kindred groups use weapons of mass destruction against the West if they had the means and the opportunity? Second, how should the United States go about executing the multifaceted strategy envisioned in the National Security Strategy? And third, will the broad international coalition currently arrayed against terrorism endure? Why are other nations supporting the counterterrorist effort? Are the partners of the United States likely to stay the course in a campaign that could span years, or even decades, as Washington has foretold?

The contributors to this issue take on all of these questions and more. Sam Nunn, a long-time senator from Georgia and a former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, throws his weight behind the concept of the crossroads,

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observing that the “gravest danger in the world today is the threat from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and terrorists are the people most likely to use these weapons. Leaders from around the globe,” insists Senator Nunn, “must come together and address this danger now.” He welcomes last year’s decision by the Group of Eight (G-8) industrialized nations to form a $20 billion Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction. Yet he questions why, in the year since the G-8 agreed to help safeguard fissile materials, “not a single kilogram of material has been taken” from the over 100 unsecured sites in Russia. Senator Nunn urges each government involved in the G-8 Global Partnership to state explicitly how much it is willing to spend on nonproliferation and when it is willing to spend it; appoint one individual to superintend the nation’s programs to combat catastrophic terrorism; and work with the rest of the Global Partnership members to devise a prioritized timetable for safeguarding at-risk nuclear materials. In short, the G-8 leaders need to back their lofty words with deeds, lest history “judge them harshly.”

Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, takes the long view of the problem of proliferation. In contemporary world politics, he says, actions taken on one side of the globe have a way of reverberating across to the other side almost instantaneously, producing unforeseen consequences. Dr. ElBaradei observes that people typically think globally in terms of trade while continuing to think locally about matters of poverty and repression, war and peace. That mindset needs to change, allowing the vision of “a planet with peace and justice as its hallmark” to be realized. He outlines several steps the international community needs to take to bring a new world order to fruition. Realigning the UN Security Council to conform to today’s realities, reasserting the UN rules on the use of force, addressing the chronic disputes that give rise to efforts to obtain weapons of mass destruction, and forging a comprehensive multinational regime to keep this frightening weaponry out of the hands of terrorists are some of the actions prescribed by Dr. ElBaradei. Invigorated export controls on the national level and more robust collaborative efforts on the international level are the key to meeting the nonproliferation challenge. He closes with a plea to the developed world to boost financial assistance to the developing world, and to national governments and international institutions to nurture mutual understanding among peoples.

Dr. James Holmes of the University of Georgia and Dr. Janne Nolan of Georgetown University probe the workings of the U.S. government in an effort to predict whether the results of Operation Iraqi Freedom will empower the advocates of counterproliferation within the Bush administration at the expense of nonproliferation - skewing the administration’s avowed approach to the nexus of radicalism and technology. The answer, they say, lies in large part in the intricacies of bureaucratic politics. They examine two cases to discover how entrenched bureaucratic interests have deflected American strategy from the policies enunciated by top political leaders in the past. In Vietnam the U.S. Army misapplied the lessons of World War II and Korea, waging a conventional war of attrition in the most unconventional of settings. During the 1993 Nuclear Posture Review, the Pentagon hierarchy, perhaps unwittingly, transformed what was supposed to be a fundamental rethinking of nuclear deterrence into a struggle over the minutiae of force structure and doctrine. They conclude that the as-yet uncertain results of Iraqi Freedom will not hand
counterproliferation proponents a trump card in interagency politics. Still, they warn nonproliferation proponents that it is up to them to salvage the battered reputation of their own approach to proliferation.

Dr. Steve Flynn of the Council on Foreign Relations observes that the hallmarks of the post-Cold War world - open societies, liberalized economies, and new technologies - also provide terrorists with new opportunities to target or exploit transportation networks to smuggle weapons or the technologies and materials to manufacture them. If the nonproliferation community does not focus on this emerging reality, the international export control regime which was painfully constructed in the twentieth century may quickly unravel in the twenty-first. An ambitious, comprehensive strategy is necessary to raise awareness, advance standards of security, promote private-public partnerships, and invest the necessary resources to enhance the ability to police the international flows of people and goods for dangerous weapons. Fortuitously, notes Dr. Flynn, this same agenda has become a new priority in Washington due to America’s newfound preoccupation with homeland security. Thus, there is common ground upon which the nonproliferation and homeland-security communities can meet.

Dr. Guillaume Parmentier, director of the French Center on the United States, offers a European outlook on the “radical overhaul” of U.S. national security strategy undertaken since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Dr. Parmentier identifies several points of difference between the European and American perspectives on the threat of catastrophic terrorism. First, having themselves weathered decades of terrorism, Europeans tend to think of this problem as something that requires “patience and negotiation” to resolve. Second, and closely related, Europeans do not tend to think of Islamist terrorism as a mortal threat to their nations. For these reasons, they are wary of the forceful approach envisioned in the 2002 National Security Strategy. Third, because of their post-World War II tradition of negotiation and consensus building, Europeans find the Bush administration’s often brusque, go-it-alone approach to foreign policy jarring. Fourth, and perhaps most worrisome, Europeans have strong misgivings about Washington’s attempt to codify the doctrine of preemption as a response to the terrorist challenge. They point to the ambiguities pervading the argument for war in Iraq as evidence that preemption can undercut American leadership and sap American resources. Finally, Europeans wonder whether the National Security Strategy, which speaks of maintaining “defenses beyond challenge,” will eventually apply to them as they pursue a common foreign and defense policy. Dr. Parmentier closes on a hopeful note, averring that the estrangement of recent months is “neither insurmountable nor irreparable.” Yet much remains to be done on both sides to mend the transatlantic relationship.

Dr. James Auer of Vanderbilt University assesses the perspective of Japan, another key U.S. ally, on the global campaign against terrorism. He observes that Japan lost more than twice as many lives in the September 11 attacks than it did in the 1995 nerve-gas attack in the Tokyo subway system - an event that itself shook the foundations of Japanese politics. Nonetheless, the Japanese government is going along with the war on terror less because it embraces the reasoning underpinning the U.S. National Security Strategy than because it is in Japan’s own interest to do so. For geopolitical reasons, Japanese citizens worry more about the threat from North Korea, which is pursuing nuclear weapons and has lobbed ballistic missiles over their heads, than they do about al Qaeda. Because of widespread feelings of vulnerability, the Japanese populace and leadership continue to stand behind the security alliance with the United States. Japanese naval vessels have deployed to the Indian Ocean on support missions, and Tokyo has taken the first steps towards fielding missile defenses. Still, the “peace” constitution implanted by the Allies after World War II remains a major impediment to a more realistic security policy. Dr. Auer concludes that the health of the U.S.-Japanese security alliance will depend on whether the two nations can develop the kind of shared values that sustain the Anglo-American relationship, or whether Japan is prone to “check in and out of the counterterrorist coalition according to its political needs of the moment.”

Hailing as they do from different nations and backgrounds, the contributors to this issue of The Monitor look differently at the great issues of the day. Yet they all evince a concern for international security, a determination to defeat the threat posed by weapons-of-mass-destruction-armed terrorist organizations, and a dedication to international amity and cooperation. If policing the crossroads of radicalism and technology is now the chief task of the international community, this agreement in principle gives grounds for confidence that the policemen will ultimately prevail. ◆

Global Partnership Needed to Stem Proliferation

Sam Nunn

Co-Chairman, Nuclear Threat Initiative

The gravest danger in the world today is the threat from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and terrorists are the people most likely to use these weapons. Leaders from around the globe must come together and address this danger now.

Preventing the spread and use of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons should be the central organizing security principle for the twenty-first century. Statements made at the Group of Eight (G-8) meeting last year in Canada suggest our leaders understand this. They established the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of
Mass Destruction, pledged $20 billion over 10 years to the task, and declared, “We commit ourselves to prevent terrorists, or those that harbor them, from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons.”

So far, terrorists have failed to acquire the fissile materials necessary to make nuclear weapons. Yet tons of poorly secured plutonium and highly enriched uranium - the raw materials of nuclear terrorism - are spread around the world. While much progress has been made over the last decade toward securing this material, we have not yet begun work to secure more than 120 metric tons of plutonium and highly enriched uranium in the former Soviet Union, enough to make thousands of nuclear weapons. In addition, there are more than 130 nuclear research reactors in more than 40 countries that are fueled with highly enriched uranium.

The effort in August 2002 by the former Yugoslavia, Russia, and the United States to remove two and a half bombs’ worth of at-risk nuclear weapons materials from Belgrade showed the way. The U.S. State Department and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy, which have announced that removing nuclear material is a top priority for both countries, have identified more than 20 other facilities with such material that urgently needs to be removed and secured. Yet in the year since the G-8 meeting in Canada, not a single kilogram of material has been taken from the other unsecured sites. Our leaders must ask why not.

The chain of global security is only as strong as its weakest link. That is why the fight against terrorism must be global and why it must be undertaken with force and speed.

It is urgent that the G-8 Global Partnership take the following steps now: pronounce what countries are committing how much money and by when; appoint a high-level person in each government to be responsible for programs to combat catastrophic terrorism; establish what materials are most vulnerable and where, and develop a timetable for securing all of them; and agree that the $20 billion pledged over 10 years is a floor, not a ceiling. (If analysts from other planets were to infer our security priorities from our budget priorities, they would conclude that preventing a terrorist strike with weapons of mass destruction was a low priority, not a high one.)

This worldwide task cannot be completed by one nation or eight nations. It needs all nations. If G-8 leaders do not turn their pledges into concrete actions and resources and give real substance to a global partnership to keep weapons of mass destruction out of terrorist hands, history will judge them harshly.

On the other hand, if the nations of the world act now to share intelligence, track terrorists, intercept communications, dry up sources of terrorists’ revenue, and, most importantly, secure all weapons and materials everywhere, our sons and daughters have a good chance to survive this age of terror and build a better, safer world for their own children.

Sam Nunn is co-chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a public charity working to reduce the global threats from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. He represented Georgia in the United States Senate from 1972 to 1996, serving as chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Security in an Interdependent World
Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei
Director General
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In this third millennium, the world is globalized and interdependent as never before. We live on a planet characterized by what some chaos theorists have called the “butterfly effect,” connoting a natural world so interactive and interdependent that butterflies flapping their wings in China may cause a storm as far away as New England. The notion of a butterfly effect applies equally to the realm of human activity. Indeed, I recently experienced this phenomenon firsthand, when a remark I made to a reporter in Tehran was misquoted on a European television station and created a diplomatic row in Washington only hours later.

But more seriously, this interdependence has become the defining feature of our modern world. Many aspects of modern life - global warming, Internet communication, the global marketplace, the war on terrorism, even the outbreak of SARS - all point to the fact that the human race has walked through a door that cannot be reopened. With the rapid movement of people, goods, capital, and ideas, the world has become interconnected like never before. The decisions individuals make - their votes, career choices, and civic work - are felt not only by their immediate neighbors, but possibly in many parts of the globe.

Yet with all the strides we have made to connect on so many levels, we continue to be disconnected on many others. We think globally in terms of trade, but we continue to think locally in terms of violent conflicts. We cherish our connectivity on the Web, but our solidarity is less visible in matters of extreme poverty and repression. This is a mindset we need to change, and the sooner we make the transition - in recognition that
human security is global and interdependent - the sooner we will achieve our goal of a planet with peace and justice as its hallmark.

Seventy years after the Great Depression, a time of despair, we still face many of the same questions and the same challenges. Do we live in a world in which the values of peace and human dignity reign supreme, or in a world plagued by perpetual conflicts and intolerable inequities? In the wake of the Second World War, the framework of the United Nations was put in place to promote certain fundamental values and principles, including respect for human rights and basic human dignity, economic and social development for all, the settlement of disputes through peaceful means, and prohibition of the use of force except in self-defense or as a collective security measure authorized by the Security Council.

This international project was interrupted for many decades by the long shadow of the Cold War, which led us at least twice to the brink of nuclear holocaust, and during which the lives and liberties of millions of people were sacrificed at the altar of brutal repression. But over a decade ago, with the self-destruction of the old Soviet empire, the gloom started to lift. Hundreds of millions of people were emancipated, and the prospect of self-annihilation has drastically diminished.

Still, the rising generation must reflect on a series of questions: Are we there yet? Does our planet live in peace and harmony? Do our neighbors around the globe live in a world free from want and in control of their own destiny? Do we treat our differences with mutual respect, and enrich ourselves through diversity? We all know the answers to these questions.

Clearly, we need to comprehend how to change course. Once the diagnosis is clear, it will be up to the new generation of social engineers, equipped with the tools of law and diplomacy, to work towards the remedy - to superintend the healing process. Men and women skilled in law can adjust the structure of our interdependent world; diplomats can put the necessary adjustments into practice.

More than a decade ago, the birth of a much-vaunted “new world order” was heralded on the heels of the Cold War. Yet a new order, unfortunately, has yet to take shape. New dangers and challenges, ranging from ethnic conflicts and cultural disputes to terrorism and the further proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, have risen to the fore, supplanting the superpower rivalries of the Cold War. And in this new landscape, nuclear weapons have continued to have a position of prominence, as the currency of ultimate power.

Although a number of countries such as South Africa and Ukraine have given up their nuclear weapons or their ambitions to field nuclear weapons, the nuclear umbrella of NATO and other alliances continues to expand. At the same time, the objectives embodied in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, developed in the late 1960s to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons and to move us towards nuclear disarmament, are under growing stress. Several thousand nuclear weapons continue to exist, and more countries - at least eight or nine by the last count - are in possession of nuclear weapons, with others suspected of working to acquire them.

Still other countries have opted for the “poor man’s alternative” by pursuing the acquisition of chemical and biological weapons. And in the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001, the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction gained a new dimension: the prospect of subnational terrorist groups seeking to acquire and use these weapons.

Must we conclude that the preemptive use of force to smother perceived threats to security is the new norm and model to pursue? Must we conclude that it is futile to rely on a collective, rule-based system of peace and security? I certainly hope not. But reliance on a system of collective security, in which international law is the organizing principle, will require bold thinking, a willingness to work together, and sustained effort - and it will require states and societies to see, think, and act multilaterally.

Let me highlight for you some principal actions that will be essential to our success:

First, we must modernize and revamp the collective security system of the United Nations Charter, in terms of both preventive diplomacy and enforcement action. To start, the Security Council should be reconstituted to include the major political and economic powers of today’s world. In addition, new working concepts, tools, and methods are needed to ensure that the council can effectively discharge its role as the body with “the primary responsibility” for the maintenance of international peace and security. For example, mechanisms are needed for early intervention to settle emerging disputes, and forces should be at the disposal of the Security Council that are adequate to deal with the myriad post-Cold War situations and disputes, ranging from supervising elections to maintaining law and order to controlling borders.

“Smart” sanctions should also be developed that target gov-
ernments - particularly authoritarian governments such as the 
one that existed in Iraq - rather than the governed, in order to 
avoid adding to the misery of the people while sparing their 
 tormentors. I had the misfortune to witness the plight of Iraqi 
citizens firsthand. And use of the veto power should be sub-
ject to agreed limitations, possibly only those situations in 
which the use of force is to be authorized. This would help 
prevent having the entire council fall victim to disagreements 
among its permanent members - another situation I witnessed 
firsthand on the eve of the Iraq war.

And the Security Council should include efforts to acquire 
weapons of mass destruction, as well as the brutal suppression 
of human rights, among the “threats to international peace and 
security” that fall under its jurisdiction. The council should 
intervene early and effectively in these two situations, which 
are the cause of growing insecurity and instability in many 
parts of the world.

Second, we must create an environment in which - as fore-
seen in the UN Charter - the use of force is limited to situations 
of self-defense or enforcement measures authorized by the 
Security Council. Preemptive strikes, however tempting, can 
send the global community into uncharted and dangerous ter-
ritory. Only an action authorized by the council will bring 
international legitimacy and support to such a measure. More 
importantly, these limitations will restrict the use of force to 
those situations where force is indeed the last and only alternative.

Third, we must take concrete steps to delegitimize the acqui-
sition and use of weapons of mass destruction. Clearly, a new 
approach is needed - an approach that applies to all weapons 
of mass destruction, and would include universal adherence to 
conventions that ban such weapons; robust and intrusive systems 
of verification for all related weapons conventions; a clear 
road map and the determination to eliminate these weapons in 
all states, thus abolishing over time the divide between the 
nuclear “haves” and “have-nots”; new doctrines of security 
that do not rely on the deterrent effect of nuclear weapons; and 
reliable enforcement measures, under the aegis of the Security 
Council, to effectively counter efforts by any country to illic-
itly acquire nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.

Fourth, we must develop a comprehensive regime to ensure 
that weapons of mass destruction and their components do not 
fall into the hands of terrorists. This demands an effective 
global approach to the physical protection of nuclear and other 
radioactive material and associated facilities, better controls 
for chemical and biological agents, and an effective approach 
to export controls worldwide.

Fifth, we must have the foresight to address decisively the 
chronic disputes that create the greatest incentives to acquire 
such weapons. It is instructive that so many of the suspected 
efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction are to be found 
in the Middle East, a hotbed of instability for over half a cen-
tury. In any future Middle East settlement, it is essential that 
regional security arrangements - including the establishment 
of a region free from such weapons - be pursued as part-and-
parcel of such a settlement. The same should apply in any 
future settlement of such disputes, including the one currently 
in the spotlight on the Korean Peninsula. We must understand 
that peace and security are indivisible.

Finally, we must work collectively to address the root caus-
es of insecurity and instability, including the widening divide 
between rich and poor, in which two-fifths of the world’s pop-
ulation lives on less than two dollars per day; the chronic lack 
of good governance and respect for human rights, with despot 
in many parts of the world taking cover under the cloak of sov-
ereignty; and the increasingly perceived schisms between cul-
tures and civilizations.

Effective amelioration of these causes of insecurity will 
require adequate financial assistance by the developed coun-
tries. The level of assistance currently stands at a shameful 
level, less than one-quarter of one percent of the combined 
gross national income of the developed countries - about half 
the cost of the war in Iraq. Improving our performance in this 
“global distributive justice” will go a long way towards 
addressing many of the social ills that affect our planet. 
Global respect for human rights should be the overarching 
norm, irrespective of any considerations of political expediency 
or short-term interest.

In addition, an effective remedy for these ills will require 
international institutions, governments, and civil society to 
focus increasingly on encouraging interaction among cultures 
and peoples in order to promote mutual appreciation of our 
differences. More importantly, we must appreciate that what 
unites us is far, far greater than what divides us, and equally 
that we should take pride in what separates us in terms of our 
beliefs, customs, and traditions. We should cherish these dif-
fferences, not scorn them. None of us as mortals holds a 
monopoly on the ultimate truth, and yet all of us should con-
tinue to seek it, each in his or her own way.

This is a tall order. But if our aim is to spare future genera-
tions the prospect of conflicts and wars in which humanity 
could self-destruct, we have no other alternative. As President 
Kennedy said in 1963, “The pursuit of peace is not as dramat-
ic as the pursuit of war - and frequently the words of the pur-
suer fall on deaf ears. But we have no more urgent task.” The 
metaphor of the butterfly effect shows us that our choices, our 
actions - and even our inaction - will have consequences not 
only for us, but also for our fellow human beings across the 
globe. It is our duty to summon up the vision and the courage 
to make the correct choices. ✪
Operation Iraqi Freedom and the Future of Nonproliferation

Dr. James R. Holmes and Dr. Janne E. Nolan

Will Operation Iraqi Freedom strengthen the hand of counterproliferation advocates at the expense of nonproliferation? The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States of America suggests not. “The gravest danger our Nation faces lies at the crossroads of radicalism and technology,” declared the document. To counteract this danger, the United States would deploy a comprehensive strategy built on: (1) proactive counterproliferation efforts that used military power to deter and defend against the use of weapons of mass destruction; (2) vigorous action using the full panoply of non-military tools to stave off proliferation; and (3) consequence-management preparations that would enable the United States to swiftly recover from the effects of major terrorist attacks. The prominence accorded nonproliferation in the National Security Strategy implied that the Bush administration considered it equal to counterproliferation as an implement to wage the war on terror.

But policy and strategy often deviate from policy statements, no matter how sincere the framers of those statements may be.

Whether the administration follows the balanced, multifaceted approach to proliferation outlined in the National Security Strategy will have as much to do with bureaucratic politics as with the rational decision-making efforts of key officials. Over the past three years, much has been made of the supposed divide between the Bush State Department and Defense Department. The reality is even more complex than that. Government officials “represent” the interests not only of their constituencies, but also of their agencies or departments. Policy arises from a political process, with various interests tugging this way and that, yielding a resultant that, in all likelihood, differs from the vision of any of the protagonists. “Foreign policy,” observe Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, is “the extension of politics to other realms.” Allison and Zelikow liken foreign policy to a collage - an amalgam of bargains struck, compromises reached, and coalitions formed on a variety of issues, often under pressure. The Bush administration is no exception.

Case No. 1: “Bureaucracy at War” in Indochina

A common trait of bureaucratic organizations is their penchant for routine, which helps them excel at the repetitive tasks for which they are designed. It also leads them to stubbornly resist change, and to try to handle atypical situations using standard procedures that worked in the past. Under these circumstances, it takes a catalytic event - defeat or unambiguous victory, in the case of the national security community - to shift the culture of large organizations. Consider the Vietnam War. American arms had been dominant since 1945, and indeed remained so in Vietnam. Yet the war effort came up short by the only standard that counts - the political one. Why? The failure stemmed in large part from the efforts of the military bureaucracy to impose a traditional American conception of war on a conflict that differed radically from anything the United States had faced since the half-forgotten “banana wars” of the 1920s. The U.S. Army, in short, sought to wage conventional war on this most unconventional of battlefields.

The resulting strategy, predicated on conventional battles and attrition, yielded a series of spectacular tactical victories that were strategically and politically ineffectual. The Pentagon pursued a military strategy at odds with the formal policy framed by President Lyndon B. Johnson, who had informed South Vietnamese leaders that the purpose of the United States was to “enable your government to protect its people from the acts of terror perpetrated by Communist insurgents from the north.” Military leaders saw things differently. Drawing on the experience of Korea, they were convinced that a North Vietnamese invasion, not the insurgency raging throughout the country, posed the greatest danger to the South. Robert W. Komer, who spearheaded the Johnson administration’s pacification efforts, attributed this myopia to the “standard organizational repertoire,” or worldview, that prevailed in the armed forces. Not guerrilla wars but the conventional battlefields of World War II and Korea had shaped the U.S. military repertoire.

Komer identified several factors that kept organizations from adapting to new circumstances:

- **Bureaucracy excelled at routine, standard tasks...and tried to fit non-standard tasks into its institutional repertoire.** Franklin Delano Roosevelt, who as assistant secretary of the navy was in a position to know, often voiced frustration at the ability of the U.S. Navy hierarchy to withstand the efforts of administration officials to impose change. As one Vietnam-era White House staffer observed, “bureaucracy as a form of organization tends to contort policy to existing structures rather than adjusting structures to reflect changes in policy.”

- **Bureaucracies measured success in their own terms.** Of Vietnam, Henry Kissinger decried “the degree to which our heavy, bureaucratic, and modern government creates a sort of blindness in which bureaucracies run a competition with their own programs and measure success by the degree to which they fulfill their own norms, without being in a position to judge whether the norms made any sense to begin with.” Body counts, a macabre measure of effectiveness used by the military in Vietnam, were one symptom of this malady.
The Center for International Trade and Security

• **Bureaucracies slanted information to fit their worldview.** Rewards tend to be doled out for behavior that conforms to the organization’s values, punishment for behavior that deviates from those values. Military officials, spurred on by the pressures of political leaders, including the president and the secretary of defense, repeatedly asserted optimistic assessments of progress in Vietnam. Bernard Brodie observed that it was upon “thoroughly doctored information, generally overoptimistic and quickly proved such by events, that our entire Vietnam policy was based for at least the decade following 1961.” Organizations tend to insulate themselves from reality.

The army, then, disregarded the Clausewitzian admonition not to engage in any war without first understanding its nature and determining what was to be accomplished. It pursued a strategy of attrition in the belief that Hanoi would be unable to sustain the casualties inflicted by U.S. forces. That belief turned out to be misguided. What for the United States was a limited war in a theater of secondary importance was an unlimited war - justifying unlimited sacrifice - for the communists. Steeped in the theories of protracted war set forth by Sun Tzu and Mao Zedong, the latter of whom sneered at “the so-called theory that ‘weapons decide everything,’” the North and its Viet Cong allies waged an effective unconventional war that denied the United States victory and, over the long term, sapped its will to fight.

**Case No. 2: The 1993 Nuclear Posture Review**

In the aftermath of Vietnam, the U.S. military underwent a period of introspection, and, to its credit, remade itself as the lethal, ultra-high-tech force of the 1980s and 1990s. Defeat applied the stimulus necessary to induce a course change. Not so twenty years later, when the end of the Cold War handed the incoming administration of Bill Clinton a seemingly golden opportunity to superintend drastic reductions to the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Clinton’s predecessor, George H. W. Bush, had ordered dramatic changes to the nation’s nuclear policy, removing nearly all tactical nuclear weapons from Europe, taking older missiles off alert, terminating a variety of weapons programs, and retiring several weapons systems. When Clinton took office, many observers assumed he would continue and perhaps even accelerate the transformation of U.S. nuclear doctrine. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin seemed to confirm those assumptions when, in October 1993, he announced that the upcoming Nuclear Posture Review would “incorporate reviews of policy, doctrine, force structure, operations, safety and security, and arms control in one look.”

The early days of the Clinton administration witnessed bold talk about overhauling U.S. nuclear policy. President Clinton and Russian president Boris Yeltsin issued a joint statement vowing to take “concrete steps to adapt the nuclear forces and practices on both sides to the changed international security situation.” And there was reason to believe resistance to dramatic reform had abated within the military services. Operation Desert Storm had ushered in the primacy of conventional weaponry. Senior officers and officials increasingly viewed nuclear weapons as a drag on their budgets at a time of fiscal austerity. Indeed, by the time of the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, the professional military was urging the administration to consider implementing the lower force levels envisioned in the START III accord, whether or not the Russian Duma ratified START II. Under these seemingly auspicious circumstances, Aspin, known in Washington as a “defense intellectual,” believed it would be possible to create a tabula rasa - a fundamental review of nuclear policy that reexamined the assumptions underlying the policy of deterrence and matched force structure and doctrine to policy.

Nonetheless, problems soon cropped up. Despite the free-wheeling, everything’s-up-for-grabs spirit in which the Clinton political appointees approached the review, it quickly became obvious that the process would not be so simple or collegial as the administration had hoped. Over the ten-month course of the Nuclear Posture Review, the following dynamics became apparent:

• **The Pentagon insulated itself against outside involvement.** The Clinton administration, unlike its predecessor, delegated the review largely to the Defense Department, where military officers and career bureaucrats could resist the involvement of other agencies, “amateur” political appointees, and outside experts. “We certainly weren’t about to invite any weirdos” from the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, declared one Pentagon participant. As a result of such attitudes and the absence of White House interest in and oversight of the process, no meaningful interagency or outside review ever took place; and there was little challenge to the reigning Cold War orthodoxy.

• **Career Pentagon officials massaged the process.** Especially striking was the role played by senior career bureaucrats who served as deputies to Assistant Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, the supervisor of the posture review. It is a common dynamic for veteran “players” in bureaucracies to try to temper the sometimes-brash tendencies of political appointees and interpret tasking orders from the appointees in terms the bureaucracy can understand. This can result in tinkering with the wording and emphasis of the written documents produced in a review. In the case of the Nuclear Posture Review, the result was a positive spin on policy options favoring the status quo and a negative spin on options likely to upset the status quo.

• **Career Pentagon officials changed the subject.** Resentful of the intrusive approach of the Clinton appointees, and failing to appreciate the political dimensions of nuclear deterrence, career military officers and civil servants, however...
unwittingly, shifted the terms of debate. What was supposed to be an analytical process joining policy and strategy metamorphosed into a struggle over the details of the nuclear force structure. Military officers churned out stacks of viewgraphs supporting the status quo. In these presentations the metric remained the same as during the Cold War years, namely the ability to hold at risk and destroy Russian launch sites. A new posture was never seriously considered.16

- The workings of bureaucracy escaped the political appointees. Beguiled by their conviction that dispassionate analysis could trump the regnant orthodoxy, the Clinton appointees were unprepared for the rearguard action waged by career officers and bureaucrats in the Defense Department. Open confrontation, and serious tensions in civil-military relations, ultimately ensued. Senior officers stymied the momentum towards innovation and, when no high-level officials took the time to defend the process, the posture review reached its effective end. The final report recommended some modest force reductions while leaving the Cold War doctrine intact.17

As in Vietnam, then, bureaucracy intervened, deflecting national policy from the course chosen by a president and his appointees. In both cases the chief executive was reluctant to expend political capital taming entrenched bureaucratic interests. Both President Johnson and President Clinton viewed their primary mission as enacting changes to domestic policy. Cowed by his seeming lack of clout with the uniformed military, however, Clinton remained more remote than Johnson from any infighting at the Pentagon. In short, the ambiguous way the Cold War had ended did not provide a Vietnam-like jolt to the system of sufficient magnitude to induce a rethinking of Cold War assumptions. The Soviet-built weaponry that had preoccupied the United States throughout the Cold War was still there, albeit in diminishing numbers. Because military professionals think in terms of capabilities rather than intentions, they continued to think about nuclear strategy in their habitual way.18

The Fallout of Operation Iraqi Freedom

Will the second Gulf War codify the apparent shift towards counterproliferation that has worried advocates of the more traditional, diplomatic, and multinational approach to proliferation? Not necessarily. For one thing, the ultimate outcome certainly ratified the U.S. armed forces’ approach to warfighting, an approach premised on speed, lethality, and dominant “situational awareness.” The political results of the war are another matter. At this writing, a team of investigators is scouring Iraq for chemical and biological arms and ferreting out evidence of the former regime’s nuclear programs. There is no doubt that the Iraqi military possessed a fearsome arsenal at one time. Still, advocates of a more forceful approach to proliferation will find it difficult to point to Iraqi Freedom as a successful instance of counterproliferation, unless and until remnants of the Iraqi arsenal are unearthed. In themselves, abstract weapons “programs” and reports from years-old UN inspections will carry little political weight in persuading allies and publics that a predominantly military approach to countering the diffusion of advanced weapons is an optimal or certainly sufficient strategy.

Yet the reputation of traditional nonproliferation approaches has also taken a beating in recent years, undermining the ability of nonproliferation officials and specialists to shape attitudes within the U.S. government. To name two obvious examples, both Iran and North Korea appear poised to construct nuclear weapons. Iran has done so covertly, insisting that its nuclear programs are for civilian purposes; North Korea has openly boasted of its plans to reprocess spent nuclear fuel into weapons-grade plutonium. These events come on the heels of the 1998 nuclear tests in South Asia, which had already cast doubt on the efficacy of this approach to the weapons-of-mass-destruction dilemma. For the moment, then, neither the proponents of counterproliferation nor the proponents of nonproliferation seem to have much of an edge in the battles over policy and resources. It will be up to the nonproliferation community to press the Bush administration and its successors, not to mention Congress, to implement the balanced approach to proliferation enshrined in the 2002 National Security Strategy, devoting the proper amount of attention and resources to nonproliferation, export controls, and threat-reduction programs across a complex continuum of policy instruments.

And it will be up to President George W. Bush and his successors to use their power to ensure that the bureaucratic competition that inevitably emerges in efforts to achieve policy innovation is managed carefully and not allowed to undermine their vision of national policy. By matching policy with strategy, and politics with policy, the pitfalls exemplified by Vietnam and the failed Nuclear Posture Review can be avoided - allowing the American interest to prevail. ♦
Against this backdrop, the nonproliferation community has been hard at work trying to pigeonhole states with known arsenals to reduce or eliminate their stockpiles of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. For the weapons that remain, the goal has been to lobby for stronger safeguards to ensure they don’t get into the wrong hands. Additionally, the community has been busy identifying precursors and dual-use technologies and negotiating agreements with the aim of limiting the opportunities for weapons to be manufactured and find their way into dangerous hands. The underlying assumption of most of these exertions was that nonproliferation was primarily an issue of political will. If states could be convinced of the urgency of keeping the age’s most destructive weapons from spreading, presumably they would take the measures within their respective jurisdictions to accomplish this end.

One of the more important means of reining in proliferation has always been a system of export controls. Governments who participate in the regime incur the obligation to police their commerce to ensure prohibited items don’t find their way offshore. This approach is certainly attractive in theory, but historically, governments never have been particularly vigilant about what leaves their borders. To the extent they exercise any measure of effective controls, it is over what comes in versus what goes out. The movement in the post-Cold War world towards greater levels of free trade only compounded the task of monitoring these cross-border flows while diminishing the incentives for trafficking in dangerous materials. As states became less reliant on collection of duties as a source of public revenue, they started to have less of an interest in diligent oversight over what entered and left their markets. Trade facilitation was the 1990s’ Holy Grail. The European Union’s decision to eliminate internal borders among member states is the most prominent illustration of this trend.

In the face of this increasing reluctance by governments to do anything which might interfere with the growing velocity and volume of cross-border flows, members of the nonproliferation community had good cause to worry that advancing their agenda was getting more and more difficult. That was before September 11, 2001. Today, many undoubtedly see America’s new preoccupation with homeland security as yet another setback. Some bemoan that the United States seems to be drifting away from attending to the root causes of global instability as it diverts attention and resources towards addressing its domestic vulnerabilities and its ability to manage the consequences of catastrophic attacks. But those committed to containing the spread of weapons of mass destruction would be shortsighted to view homeland security in strictly adversarial terms. This is because both the means and ends of the United States’ struggle to deal with the threat of catastrophic terrorism on its soil have a substantial bearing on the future of proliferation.

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Potential Strange Bedfellows?
Homeland Security and Nonproliferation in the Post-9/11 World
Dr. Stephen E. Flynn*

Introduction

Upon reflection, an unsettling thing happened as globalization gathered steam these past two decades. We busily constructed modern infrastructures with worldwide reach and became increasingly reliant on sophisticated and interconnected networks to support the growing volume and velocity of international commerce. But in our zeal to improve the efficiency and reliability of those systems, and to drive down their cost, we did not pay much attention to security. To the extent there was periodic evidence that these networks were vulnerable to being exploited or targeted by nefarious elements, the reaction was much the same as how most major retail stores view shoplifting - as a cost of doing business.

Against this backdrop, the nonproliferation community has been hard at work trying to pigeonhole states with known arsenals to reduce or eliminate their stockpiles of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. For the weapons that remain, the community has been busy identifying precursors and dual-use technologies and negotiating agreements with the aim of limiting the opportunities for weapons to be manufactured and find their way into dangerous hands. The underlying assumption of most of these exertions was that nonproliferation was primarily an issue of political will. If states could be convinced of the urgency of keeping the age’s most destructive weapons from spreading, presumably they would take the measures within their respective jurisdictions to accomplish this end.

One of the more important means of reining in proliferation has always been a system of export controls. Governments who participate in the regime incur the obligation to police their commerce to ensure prohibited items don’t find their way offshore. This approach is certainly attractive in theory, but historically, governments never have been particularly vigilant about what leaves their borders. To the extent they exercise any measure of effective controls, it is over what comes in versus what goes out. The movement in the post-Cold War world towards greater levels of free trade only compounded the task of monitoring these cross-border flows while diminishing the incentives for trafficking in dangerous materials. As states became less reliant on collection of duties as a source of public revenue, they started to have less of an interest in diligent oversight over what entered and left their markets. Trade facilitation was the 1990s’ Holy Grail. The European Union’s decision to eliminate internal borders among member states is the most prominent illustration of this trend.

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*Homeland Security as a Deterrent

What the world witnessed on September 11, 2001 was how
warfare will likely be conducted against the United States for the foreseeable future. The lesson that America’s current and potential adversaries inevitably have learned from the attacks on the World Trade Center towers and the Pentagon, as well as the anthrax mailings, is the extent to which the U.S. homeland is unprotected. They will also have observed that catastrophic terrorist attacks directed at civilian targets can inflict profound disruption to the critical foundations of the U.S. economy and to American civil society.

One must also presume that America’s enemies know that they have little hope coming out on top in a skirmish with America’s conventional military might. There is good cause for them to be pessimistic. As a nation, the United States spends more treasure on its military muscle than the next 30 countries combined. Compared to the remaining two members of what President George W. Bush labeled the axis of evil, the United States spends 43 times more on defense than Iran and 304 times more than North Korea. If there is any doubt about the kind of capability that investment buys, one has only to look to the April 2003 invasion of Iraq, and to the earlier routing of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Both campaigns put on a dramatic public display the unmatchable prowess of America’s high-tech military, with the result that present and future U.S. adversaries will become increasingly dissuaded from going toe-to-toe with American soldiers, sailors, and airmen. It follows that either they will have to capitulate on any issue that puts them at odds with the United States or they will have to garner the means to deter America from stepping up to a fight. For Iran and North Korea, the means to that end appears to be acquiring a stockpile of nuclear weapons as rapidly as possible. Non-state actors will likely be similarly inclined to attempt to acquire a weapon of mass destruction, not as a deterrent but as a means to take their battle to the American people.

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Once a weapon of mass destruction is acquired, delivering it against the United States does not require a ballistic missile. Trains, trucks, and ships can be converted into weapon delivery devices as well. In fact, by using these low-cost conveyances, a terrorist is likely to get a bonus that would be absent from a ballistic-missile attack. A missile can reap nightmarish destruction wherever it lands. But when a weapon goes off in something like a container, there is more than localized destruction. There also will be profound public anxiety that other containers, trucks, trains, or vessels might also have weapons. Immediately in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. government grounded all aviation and spent the next three days going through every plane to confirm that the fleet was free of terrorists or means of terror. If the U.S. government had had to carry out that kind of inspection regime within the surface or maritime transportation systems, the process would have required many months, not days. During that interim period, American and international commerce would have been brought to its knees.

In short, as long as mobilizing a defense against U.S. conventional military forces is not a viable option, there will be an incentive for states to explore possible asymmetric options. If the American homeland remains open and susceptible to mass disruption, the enemies of the United States will likely be driven to acquire deadly weapons, either as a defensive measure should Washington threaten to attack them or as an offensive measure to be incorporated as a part of a catastrophic terrorist attack. It follows that bolstering America’s means of managing this threat and effectively responding to an attack, should preventive measures fail, weakens the military value of embracing catastrophic terrorism as a means of warfare. If carrying out this kind of an attack only reaped localized damage and loss of life, but had no real overall effect on U.S. power, America’s adversaries would have to think twice about acquiring and using these weapons. This is because they would risk certain global condemnation and an almost certainly lethal U.S. response without having much to show for it. Thus, getting homeland security right has a potentially important support role in countering the motivation for acquiring these highly destructive weapons. And getting nonproliferation right will certainly help to lower the risk of the most horrific kinds of weapons getting into the hands of enemies who are keen to deploy them against the United States and its allies.

Homeland Security as an Export Control Opportunity

Bolstering the means to enforce nonproliferation agreements could be another important beneficiary of the United States’ newfound interest in protecting its homeland. After years of an increasingly laissez faire approach to border management, overnight America has become deeply concerned about what enters its jurisdiction, and what leaves other jurisdictions. This newfound interest has translated into a growing focus on transportation and supply-chain security, with a particular emphasis on transparency which should be viewed with real interest by the nonproliferation community. Fear of another 9/11-style attack may be the driving force behind America’s zeal to build a robust capacity to filter the bad from the good among the people and goods that move throughout the international system. But, whatever the motives behind it, this agenda holds out the prospect of reversing trends that have
made the system to control the export of proscribed items more of a fiction than reality.

For instance, prior to September 11, 2001, virtually anyone in the world could arrange with an international shipper or carrier to have an empty intermodal container delivered to his home or workplace. The recipient of the container could then load it with up to 30 tons of material, declare in only the most general terms what the contents were, “seal” it with a 50-cent lead tag, and send it on its way to any city or town in the United States. The job of transportation providers was to move the box as expeditiously as possible. Exercising any care to ensure that the integrity of a container’s contents was not compromised may have been a commercial practice, but it was not a requirement.

The responsibility for making sure that goods loaded in a box were legitimate and authorized was shouldered almost exclusively by the importing jurisdiction. But as the volume of containerized cargo grew exponentially, the number of agents assigned to police that cargo stayed flat or even declined in most trading nations. The rule of thumb in the inspection business is that it takes five agents three hours to conduct a thorough physical examination of a single full intermodal container. In 2002, nearly 20 million containers washed across America’s borders via a ship, train, or truck. Front-line agencies had only enough inspectors and equipment to examine one to two percent of that cargo.

Thus, for would-be terrorists - and those interested in circumventing export controls - the global transportation and logistics system has provided an extraordinary opportunity to move across borders with little risk of detection. This opportunity flowed from the twin facts that there has been almost a complete absence of any security oversight in the loading and transporting of freight from its point of origin to its final destination, and the fact that the growing volume and velocity at which this cargo moves around the planet create a daunting needle-in-a-haystack problem for inspectors.

Thanks to its new interest in homeland security, the U.S. government has begun to realize that the only way to improve the security of global trade lanes is to dramatically improve the visibility and accountability of goods, operators, and transportation conveyances moving throughout the international system. This is because of the central role transparency plays in effectively policing cross-border commerce.

Front-line inspectors need to have a credible basis for concluding that cargo and conveyances destined for their jurisdiction are legitimate and authorized. They must also have the means to intercept a shipment when there is specific intelligence that it may pose a risk. The aim must be to do this in a surgical way so as not to cause widespread collateral disruption to other benign participants in the sector. But in most instances authorities will not have specific intelligence. They will instead need to use pattern-recognition and anomaly-detection techniques to determine whether a criminal or terrorist is trying to exploit the trade system. Because legitimate commercial actors strive to optimize efficiencies in the marketplace, evidence of wasteful activities, such as long delays in transit or the use of circuitous or non-standard routes, is a helpful red-flag for inspectors. Similarly, documentation irregularities may suggest that someone other than a professional is trying to operate in the trade or transportation system.

A credible targeting system to support inspection and enforcement activities requires that there be a robust means to track conveyances and cargo in near real time. It also requires that the data about the contents and movements of trade and conveyances be of sufficient quality, timeliness, and integrity to support a credible pre-arrival risk analysis. The foundation for this approach is being constructed as a part of how the United States is going about meeting its homeland-security imperative.

One important first step that the U.S. government has taken towards improving its ability to monitor what is heading towards its jurisdiction is to require 24-hour advance presentation of cargo manifests before freight is loaded on a ship destined for its shores. Another has been to undertake a program of deploying inspectors overseas to work with their counterparts in targeting and inspecting shipments at the points of embarkation. All 20 of the world’s largest ports have agreed to participate in a program called the Container Security Initiative (CSI). The agreement allows for reciprocity, meaning that participant countries can send their inspectors to U.S. ports to inspect cargo destined for their jurisdictions. CSI represents a real regime change that both provides geographic depth and deepens the level of operational cooperation in policing exports.

The next step in elevating the ability to monitor the flows of commerce has been efforts to develop a “smart” container. Two initiatives, one funded by the federal government and another bankrolled by the private sector, have been piloting new sensor and tracking technologies along with the software to support better handling of the data associated with cargo management. In mid-2003, the U.S. government announced that it would be providing $58 million in grants to the nation’s three largest terminal complexes, the ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach, New York and New Jersey, and Seattle and Tacoma. The ports will use this money to recruit retailers, manufacturers, terminal operators, ocean carriers, and other intermediaries into deploying and assessing a system of off-the-shelf and near-off-the-shelf technologies that aims to improve the oversight of cargo movements from the factory to their final destination. The private Smart and Secure Tradelane (SST) initiative has a similar objective. A group called the Strategic Council on Security Technology has
entered into a partnering relationship with the International Standards Organization (ISO). They are undertaking a pilot program with the aim of arriving at standards for improving the security of supply chains.

The impetus for this sea change in the monitoring of trade flows has come from America’s new preoccupation with homeland security. The success to date of getting other nations and multinational corporations to cooperate with these initiatives has been inspired primarily by a hard fact of modern life: No one wants to see international commerce to and from the world’s dominant economy slowed down or disrupted because of another 9/11-style attack. While America’s new sense of vulnerability and marketplace anxiety over the bottom line may be spawning these changes, the nonproliferation community should see itself as an unintended beneficiary. Anything that improves the transparency of global trade and transportation flows also provides the operational foundation for monitoring compliance with international agreements governing the control of precursors, dual-use technologies, and weapons. Thus, advocates for nonproliferation should lend their voice and energy to moving this agenda forward.

Next steps include developing a commercially viable means for routinely monitoring the loading of containers or conveyances at their point of origin to ensure that only authorized goods are being shipped. Additionally, there must be a move towards improving the timeliness and accuracy of documentation associated with international trade. This includes requiring that data be submitted electronically, and that customs inspectors move away from their emphasis on reviewing cargo manifests and towards gathering and examining data that goes back to an importer’s purchase order. Also important is deploying non-intrusive inspection (NII) and radiation portals at key nodes of the intermodal transportation system, such as maritime terminals and rail and truck depots. Images of container contents should be made in digital format and transmitted to all the jurisdictions through which they pass. With the technology currently available, these images can be created in 30 seconds. The universal use of NII technologies would serve both as a deterrent and as a means to better detect and intercept shipments which have been intercepted and compromised by terrorists.

At the end of the day, there is an extraordinary opportunity for real overlap between the homeland-security imperative to transform conventional border-management practices and the goal of the nonproliferation community of preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The United States cannot afford to become a nation of twenty-first-century moats and castles as it tries to rein in the mounting risk that it will be targeted by enemies armed with biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. It must work with the international community to manage that threat within the context of ensuring the smooth operation of the global trade and transportation system. That reality should translate into providing the means to achieve the very important end of managing the mounting risk of proliferation. Over time, hopefully homeland security and nonproliferation won’t seem to be such strange bedfellows after all! ♦

The New American Strategic Doctrine: European Perspectives and Responses

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Over the course of the two years following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States, the Bush administration has embarked upon a radical overhaul of the United States’ foreign-policy objectives and strategies. Although present in prior formulations of U.S. policy, efforts to combat terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction have taken a central role. The September 11 attacks highlighted the potential for devastation created by terrorist use of unconventional methods, thus focusing Washington’s attention on the potential destructiveness of the confluence of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The Bush administration cited the danger of such a confluence of terrorism and WMD as the primary justification for “regime change” in Iraq.

Although many European countries share the Bush administration’s concern regarding the threat posed by WMD and terrorism, appropriation for the strategies adopted by the United States in neutralizing that threat has been largely absent. Some European countries’ reluctance to accept American strategies for confronting terrorism stems from several factors. First, many European countries have substantial experience dealing with terrorism, both from domestic sources in the cases of the Basque country, Corsica, and Northern Ireland, and from foreign sources, such as Islamic fundamentalists’ exporting wars such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict or the Algerian civil war. In view of their long history dealing with terrorism, these countries therefore tend to view America as inexperienced, impatient, and prone to overreacting in dealing with problems which require decades of patience and negotiation to resolve.

Second, most Europeans do not perceive Islamic terrorism as an existential threat in the same way that America does. While Europeans are certainly cognizant of the magnitude of the September 11 attacks in terms of human and material...
The Center for International Trade and Security

intensified the ensuing bitterness when the United States identification with the United States throughout Europe only September 12. The deep degree of sympathy, support, and ening the French flag at half mast at the Elysée Palace on President Jacques Chirac taking the unprecedented step of fly-

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ing the French flag at half mast at the Elysée Palace on September 12. The deep degree of sympathy, support, and iden-
tification with the United States throughout Europe only intensified the ensuing bitterness when the United States

Many of the strategies and tactics employed by the United States in prosecuting its “war on terrorism” have generated genuine concern in European countries. Aside from issues such as human-rights concerns about the treatment of detainees at Guantanamo Bay and the treatment of aliens in the United States, the American antiterror strategy often conflicts with the prevailing European conception of international relations. The development of intra-European relations during the last fifty years has centered on the construction of multilateral institutions with an emphasis on negotiation and consensus building as decision-making techniques. In this spirit of multilateral solidarity, America’s European allies in NATO rallied to the side of the United States by invoking Article 5 of the NATO charter following September 11. This was done on European initiative, without an American request, and with a strong role played by France. France offered the United States its total support immediately following September 11, with President Jacques Chirac taking the unprecedented step of flying the French flag at half mast at the Elysée Palace on September 12. The deep degree of sympathy, support, and identification with the United States throughout Europe only intensified the ensuing bitterness when the United States

snubbed European offers of assistance. Many Europeans were not only disappointed by America’s cool response, but were further irritated leading up to the Iraqi war by perceived American efforts to divide the European Union, which had been so painstakingly constructed since the end of World War II. The Bush administration’s Manichean admonition that “you’re either with us or against us,” Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s remarks about “new” and “old” Europe, and America’s newfound preference for forming “coalitions of the willing” rather than maintaining formal alliances, all resonate harshly in contrast to European values such as negoti-
tiation and consensus building.

Perhaps most troubling from the European point of view is the current administration’s efforts to establish a doctrine of preemption. An important legal distinction must be made between preemption and prevention. The doctrine of preemp-
tion is so troubling because it asserts the United States’ right to attack another sovereign state in anticipation of a theoreti-
cal future attack against its own interests. The current admin-
istration’s theory of preemption actually implies reciprocal use of the means expected to be used against the United States and suggests the inevitability of conflict. Conversely, prevention, which seeks to eliminate a future threat either by negotiation, deterrence, coercion, or other obstacles, seeks to avoid conflict altogether. Europeans understand that preemption is not necessarily an absurd concept; in cases where conflict does indeed appear to be inevitable, prevention has obviously lost all util-
ity. The German reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 serves as an excellent example of a legitimate need for preemption. During the period of German rearmament prior to World War II, a majority of French politicians sought to act preemptively against the clearly aggressive Nazi threat, unfortunately to be stymied by Great Britain.

The United States’ most recent application of preemptive war against Iraq appears significantly less legitimate to most external observers. If preemption is to be employed, it must be based on reasonably certain grounds. Evidence supporting preemptive action need not be so explicit and convincing as to be judicially unassailable; however, it must stand up in front of world public opinion in order to confer the requisite legitima-
cy for preemptive strikes. In cases such as the UTA and the Lockerbie airliner bombings, long processes of evidence gath-
ering developed a robust and convincing case for Libyan responsibility. Libya was also clearly implicated in the night-
club bombing in Berlin in 1986, which killed two American servicemen and a Turkish woman. While the American bomb-
ing raid personally targeting Libyan leader Colonel Moammar Gaddafi was neither strictly preemptive nor a particularly nuanced response, it was at minimum justified by a clear record of Libyan state sponsorship of terrorism targeting the United States and Europe.

In the case of Iraq, the United States made the argument for

The Bush administration’s Manichean admonition that “you’re either with us or against us,” Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld’s remarks about new and old Europe, and America’s newfound preference for forming coalitions of the willing rather than maintaining formal alliances, all resonate harshly in contrast to European values such as negotiation and consensus building.
preemptive action based on that country’s development of weapons of mass destruction. This argument has also so far proven to be largely inadequate. Very few in Europe would question the idea that the Iraqi regime was repugnant, that it had developed weapons of mass destruction and used them against civilians within Iraq, and that the regime’s disarmament under UN monitoring was absolutely necessary. The fact that Iraq was unable to account for the thousands of tons of biological and nerve agents present when UN inspectors departed in 1998 but supposedly destroyed in their absence before their return in 2002 was troubling, and was cause for lengthened and strengthened weapons inspections. Indeed, many recognize that American military pressure upon Iraq played a constructive role throughout 2002 in coercing Iraq to allow the return of United Nations weapons inspectors. However, those weapons inspectors were unable to find any evidence that Iraq continued to possess weapons of mass destruction or development programs prior to their departure from Iraq in anticipation of the commencement of hostilities in early 2003. American forces have failed to produce any evidence of stocks of weapons or active weapons programs since their occupation of Iraq. In July the American White House was embarrassed by its use in President Bush’s January 2003 State of the Union speech of a British intelligence report alleging that Iraq had attempted to procure uranium oxide from Africa. This report turned out to have been based on an amateurish forgery rejected by both the U.S. State Department and the Central Intelligence Agency.

The second major justification for the preemptive war against Iraq, the purported convergence of that country’s support for the al Qaeda terrorist network and its development of weapons of mass destruction, was used by the Bush regime domestically rather than internationally. In the eyes of the majority of the international community, however, evidence supporting American preemptive action was clearly lacking. While few would dispute that Saddam Hussein’s regime supported terrorism, the link between his regime and the al Qaeda network was extremely poor. Saddam Hussein’s regime openly supported Palestinian terrorists, publicly making support payments to the families of suicide bombers “martyred” in the Palestinian struggle against Israel. While terrorist attacks against civilians can never be morally justified, the Palestinian cause itself is a legitimate one, and does not directly threaten the security of the United States. Al Qaeda, on the other hand, does pose a significant and direct threat to American security. However, the link between al Qaeda and the Iraqi regime was tenuous at its best and was eventually discredited. Aside from a purported meeting between an al Qaeda operative and an Iraqi intelligence officer in Prague in April 2001, now believed not to have occurred, and the presence of a member of al Qaeda in Iraq for medical treatment in 2002, no evidence has been produced definitively linking the Baathist regime to the Wahhabite terrorist network. Despite the fact that more than 40 percent of Americans believe that Saddam Hussein’s regime was implicated in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the rest of the world, particularly Western Europe and the Islamic world, remains largely skeptical. Even more troubling is the possibility that the war in Iraq may have in fact heightened the threat from terrorists armed with weapons of mass destruction. Weapons which Iraq was known to have possessed prior to the war have since disappeared, with some reports indicating that they may be under the control of Hezbollah in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley. If the U.S. goal was to keep WMD out of the hands of terrorists, then it would be most unfortunate if the war against Iraq produced precisely the opposite effect.

While certain preemptive actions may be legitimate, their use must be applied pragmatically. The concern in Europe is thus less centered on the idea that preemption is invalid than it is on the concept of transforming preemption into a theory of action. Given the United States’ traditional reputation for pragmatism, many Europeans are not only concerned but somewhat surprised by the shift in power within the Bush administration to the unstable and temporary alliance between neoconservatives and neorealist nationalists. There are two alternative interpretations of the shift in U.S. policy. First, it is possible that the United States will not make preemption into a doctrine. According to this interpretation of the U.S. application of preemptive theory in Iraq, the United States instrumentalized a doctrine of preemption for specific use in justifying the Iraqi intervention, but will not attempt to systematically apply similar justifications in confronting future crises. Preemptive doctrine inherently suffers from two critical theoretical weaknesses. If made into a doctrine of action, it tends to exacerbate the threat of violent conflict by frightening and provoking those who already feel threatened. Secondly, due to the high political, military, and financial costs of preemptive action, it is unlikely to be used, and thus diminishes U.S. credibility. Although the United States used the theory of preemption to justify the war against Iraq, neither Iran nor North Korea will be the targets of preemptive attacks because the military and political cost would be too high. North Korea and Iran present a far more sophisticated military threat than did Iraq or Afghanistan. Furthermore, the U.S. military is already stretched to its limit resolving the aftermath of its campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan and would be incapable of confronting either Iran or North Korea at this point.

The second interpretation of the new American application of the theory of preemption is more troubling. The 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS) pronounces that no country will be allowed to compete militarily with the United States. Republicans have long argued for this kind of commitment; however, it was added only in 2001. While this statement may be dismissed as primarily directed towards China and Russia, it is nonetheless frightening to Europeans, who are currently developing a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) under the auspices of the European Union. Should Europeans...
interpret the NSS as a harbinger of a cold war between the United States and a militarily unified and resurgent Europe? At the extreme, should Europeans contemplate the possibility of U.S. strikes should they approach military parity with the United States? If Europeans are to believe the sincerity of the NSS, then both of these scenarios, however unlikely, are possible.

Resolving the conflict between these two varying interpretations of the theory of preemption requires a response to the fundamental question of whether the NSS should be taken seriously. With relatively few data points following the announcement of the new application of the theory of preemption, it would be imprudent to base the answer to that question solely on the U.S. action in Iraq. Rather, it is more instructive to examine U.S. intentions in introducing preemption as a doctrine to gauge the likelihood of its application. Realistically, the language laying out the revised theory of preemption was most likely added for domestic political consumption rather than as a threat to other world powers. It would be ridiculous for the United States to broadcast such a threat to allies and competitors alike, but in the post-September 11 domestic political calculus it is absolutely essential for the Bush administration to be perceived as aggressively defending U.S. security interests.

However, if the NSS is serious, then its implications are worrisome. Does it signal that the United States simply intends to continue to outpace the rest of the world in spending and development, or could it also signify that the United States intends to forcefully oppose the ascendance of any military competitors? As noted above, if the latter case is true, Europe should expect U.S. opposition to the creation of a unified European military force because such a force would represent a competitor to U.S. military dominance. The failure of the NSS to distinguish between allies such as Europe and competitors such as China and Russia calls into question not only the validity of the NATO alliance but of the concept of the West itself. From this perspective the NSS appears to contribute to the process of fragmentation within the West and its replacement by a concept of the “North.”

The lack of opposition to the war inside the United States only contributed to European concerns about the new direction of American foreign policy. Whereas lively debate took place within parliaments, universities, the media, and the streets across Europe, the perception prevailed in Europe that within the United States it was considered unpatriotic to oppose the war and thus very few voices of opposition were being heard. Reports that influential media outlets such as CNN scaled down coverage of the few antiwar protests that did take place due to ratings competition with sensationalist conservative competitor Fox News were met with dismay. European intellectuals were particularly unsettled by the American left’s failure to react critically to the Bush administration’s march to war. While those Democrats that voiced opposition to the war six months ago, such as Howard Dean, are now reaping political benefits as the security situation in Iraq deteriorates and casualties mount, other influential Democrats who have reversed their previous prowar positions, such as Ted Kennedy and Bob Graham, risk losing credibility.

The divide between Europe and the United States is neither insurmountable nor irreparable. Europeans have long lived under the threat of terrorist attacks, and are genuinely concerned about weapons proliferation and the risks that it presents to international stability. However, a real challenge persists in realigning the divergent concepts of international action as perceived by Europeans and Americans. This will require both Europe and the United States to reexamine their policies and strategies to promote greater coordination and understanding. Many of the challenges confronting the United States today cannot be effectively resolved through the preemptive use of force. On the other hand, the diplomatic strategies favored by Europe have limits beyond which effective use of force becomes necessary. Before talking about making Europe a strong international power, its members need to strengthen and unify their military means. America’s commitment to maintaining military dominance must be flexible enough to differentiate between allies and competitors to allow Europe to develop its military without the threat of American retaliation. At the same time, the United States must not become a prisoner of its military might, but must strengthen its capacity to contribute to crisis solutions by other means. Should America continue to dominate the world militarily while ceding to Europe the more mundane task of reconstructing the devastated battlefields left by increasingly unprovoked and unilateral actions, U.S. leadership will lose its moral basis and become even more contentious and fragile. ◆

Why Is the Rising Sun Flying in the Indian Ocean?
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Japan clearly has a stake in the global effort to combat terrorism. More than twice as many Japanese were killed in the al Qaeda attacks on the World Trade Center in 2001 than in the sarin attack launched by Aum Shinrikyo in the Tokyo subway system in 1995: The former incident claimed 24 Japanese lives, the latter “only” 11. Unlike the Persian Gulf War of 1990-91, when Japan did little other than send money, Tokyo responded quickly and dispatched forces following 9/11. Nonetheless, it cannot be said that Japan today sees itself as participating in a global war against terrorism in exactly the
same terms as the Bush administration does.

There is no doubt that Japan feels threatened today, but it worries primarily about North Korea rather than al Qaeda. Because of that feeling of vulnerability and owing to their military’s lack of capability, the Japanese government and public continue to stand foursquare behind their alliance with the United States. But Japan’s security policy, while continuing to evolve in a more realistic fashion, continues to be affected by its cataclysmic experience in World War II and the still-existing legacy of Japan’s American-authored “peace” constitution, which outlawed war, the “right of belligerency,” and indeed land, sea, and air forces for the purpose of settling international disputes.

Thus understanding Japan’s surprisingly positive and substantive reaction to 9/11 requires the examination of a considerable amount of historical background.

In 1946, when Major General Courtney Whitney, chief of the Government Section of the Office of the Supreme Commander of Allied Powers, handed Japanese government officials a copy of a “model” constitution his staff had prepared at the direction of General Douglas MacArthur, the two sections of the American draft which most shocked the Japanese were the sections outlining the role of the emperor and prohibiting war and military forces. Despite the fact that the previous Meiji constitution stated that the emperor’s power was supreme politically and militarily, in reality the emperor’s power was symbolic. Nonetheless, the Japanese were still embarrassed to see his role defined in more human terms.

What became Article 9 of the Japanese constitution forbidding war and military forces, however, was real and, despite the shock of those who received the document from Whitney, turned out to prove very popular, especially among women who lost their husbands, sons, and other loved ones during World War II, academics and the mass media, and the formerly banned communist and socialist parties. The latter came to support Article 9 enthusiastically once they discovered that the proscription of war and military forces was truly being implemented. The aftereffects surrounding the enactment of Article 9, accompanied by the American security guarantee provided to Japan in 1952, made even some conservative politicians willing to publicly embrace pacifism without thinking through what that really implied.

The United States, which had begun the disarmament of Japan in 1945 and mandated the no-war article of the constitution to codify Japan’s future (lack of) security policy, soon found itself engaged in a Cold War with the Soviet Union. Japan was prized in this global struggle for two reasons. First, there was geography. The United States wanted to deny this strategic location to the USSR while using Japan as a staging base for U.S. operations throughout East Asia. Second, Japan was a useful ally for America, contributing substantially to burden sharing vis-à-vis the Soviet threat. This close cooperation in security affairs laid the groundwork for Japanese participation in today’s “coalition of the willing” against terror.

For nearly 20 years, Japan had little choice other than to accept the American security guarantee. Tokyo wanted to end the U.S.-led occupation, despite its relatively benevolent character. It was hardly necessary for Washington to say explicitly that it would prolong the occupation unless Japan agreed to allow the United States to maintain bases in the country, and to contribute at least minimal forces for its own defense. As it was, the occupation was terminated in 1952. When the U.S.-Japan alliance was revised in 1960 to give the appearance of reciprocity which the Japanese government said was necessary for its own domestic legitimacy, the United States made only minimal concessions. Washington agreed to consult with Tokyo before using its Japanese bases to support combat operations in East Asia. It also pledged to reduce the U.S. force presence in Japan, provided Japan reciprocated by increasing its own defense efforts and guaranteeing that the security treaty would remain in force for at least 10 years.

Japan benefited from many reforms introduced by the American occupation and particularly from American procurement from Japanese firms during the Korean War. Although large majorities of Japanese were then, and remain today, anti-communist, most of the populace did not feel threatened by the Soviet Union for at least the first two decades of the Cold War. Three prominent reasons for this were the devastated condition of the Japanese economy, the fact that the conventional Soviet threat was primarily to Europe in the 1950s and 1960s, and the U.S. security umbrella, which offset any perceptions of vulnerability.

Japan also profited from U.S. procurement during the Vietnam War. From the outset, however, many Japanese had doubted whether the U.S. involvement in Vietnam was warranted - a feeling that many in Washington probably came to wish they had shared. They understood and supported the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam. But then President Richard Nixon enunciated his famous “Nixon Doctrine.” Never again would the United States fight alone in Asia, declared the president. Rather, it would rely primarily on the countries in the region to provide for their defense, perhaps augmented by U.S. naval and air support. Taken aback at Nixon’s tone, Japanese officials began to worry that the United States would withdraw not only from Southeast Asia, but from Northeast Asia - including Japan - as well.

The expansion of Soviet forces into Asia was the main catalyst for this turnaround in Japan’s perspective on the U.S. force presence. Japan’s few security experts were understandably alarmed when Moscow based some 100 Soviet submarines in Vladivostok, less than 300 miles across the Sea of Japan from
the main island of Honshu. Over a third of these were nuclear powered, and many were equipped with short- and long-range ballistic missiles. Adding to Japanese anxieties, some 3,000 aircraft, among them state-of-the-art MiGs and Backfire bombers, operated from airfields in and around Vladivostok.

One might have expected anxiety to take hold among the sophisticated Japanese public as the Soviet threat waxed. After all, Japan was far more vulnerable to Soviet conventional power than was the United States. But Japan had not been at war since 1945, and the legacy of Article 9 was still alive. In the early 1980s, however, the Soviets made two ill-conceived moves that, although insignificant from a military standpoint, garnered enormous media coverage and heightened the Japanese sense of peril. First, Moscow based first one, and then a second, relatively modest aircraft carrier at Vladivostok. Second, it stationed an army division in the Japanese Northern Territories illegally occupied by the USSR since 1945. The carriers Minsk and Leningrad added little to the capabilities of the massive Soviet Pacific Fleet; nor was a Soviet division in the Northern Territories much to lose sleep over, in view of the 50 divisions already poised in the Far East. Still, these shifts in the Soviet military posture resonated with Japanese citizens.

In 1981, President Ronald Reagan proposed to his Japanese counterpart, Zenko Suzuki, that the two nations share their defense roles. Reared on Article 9, Suzuki accepted but hesitated to take action. When he was replaced by Yasuhiro Nakasone later that year, however, the “Ron-Yasu” relationship was born. America’s defense buildup was complemented by a surge in Japan’s defense efforts, particularly in the areas of antisubmarine warfare and air defense. By the latter half of the 1980s, 25 U.S. and 100 Japanese antisubmarine aircraft able to communicate securely - indeed, directly from onboard computer to onboard computer - were taking turns flying daily missions over the Sea of Japan and other areas of the Northwest Pacific. These patrols, which represented the most outstanding example of combined military operations between the two nations, kept track of virtually every Soviet submarine which entered or departed from Vladivostok. The huge investment of the Soviet Union in its Far Eastern forces, consequently, paid few political dividends while contributing mightily to the eventual collapse of the USSR.

Americans failed to appreciate the true worth of Japan’s contribution to the common defense during the 1980s, but the Japanese public was utterly oblivious. The end of the Cold War, consequently, did little to disturb the pacifist status quo that had endured since the 1950s. When Iraqi forces overran Kuwait in August 1990, Japan’s “conservative,” i.e., Liberal Democratic Party, headed by Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu, was extremely reluctant to offer even token military forces to Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm - this despite the fact that Japan is more dependent on oil from the Middle East than almost any other developed country. Instead, Japan chipped in funding for the coalition military operations. Kaifu’s government even took the politically courageous step of raising $9 billion of its $13 billion contribution by a special tax increase. But despite the war’s being unexpectedly brief duration, and despite Japan’s impressive monetary outlay, Tokyo’s efforts were derided as “checkbook diplomacy” in the United States, Europe, friendly Persian Gulf states, and even by many in Japan.

Japan’s current prime minister, Junichiro Koizumi, took a lesson from foreign, especially American, criticism of Japan’s failure to “show the flag” until after the Gulf War. Koizumi, whose relationship with President George W. Bush has come to rival the friendship between Reagan and Nakasone, quickly drafted an Anti-Terrorism Bill in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States. The bill, passed by the Diet with little opposition, has resulted in Japan’s maintaining a contingent of destroyers and oil tankers in the Indian Ocean continuously since November 2001. These ships provide air defense and refueling services to coalition warships supporting operations in Afghanistan.

In July 2003, Koizumi sought and gained passage of new legislation authorizing Japanese support operations in Iraq. In September he was reelected to another two years as president of the Liberal Democratic Party, which will allow him to continue as prime minister for the same period. The dispatch of Japanese defense units to Iraq has been postponed to late 2003 or early 2004 owing to lower-house elections expected in November; however, the antiterrorism legislation, which is scheduled to lapse in November, is expected to be extended. Japanese military aircraft are already providing transport services into the region and will likely become more active once the Iraq legislation is implemented.

Regimes matter to the Japanese, who were repelled by Saddam Hussein. Individuals matter as well, as the change of prime ministers from Kaifu to Koizumi attests. But Koizumi has been able to sell his brand of realpolitik to a wary public because Japanese citizens have grown increasingly conscious of the ugly realities of their neighbor, North Korea. The shift in public sentiment recalls the Cold War, when the presence of the Minsk and a nearby Soviet army division alerted ordinary Japanese to the danger they faced. Al Qaeda poses a more remote threat to Japan, and thus is of secondary concern.

In early March 2003, at a U.S.-Japan seminar in Tokyo, Professor Akihiko Tanaka, a respected and moderate scholar from Tokyo University, asked three questions: (1) Is the use of force in Iraq by the United States justified? (2) Is a UN resolution specifically authorizing military action necessary for a U.S.-led operation to change the regime in Iraq? And (3) If the United States decides to use force in Iraq without the blessing of the UN, what should Japan do? Tanaka replied: (1) Yes. (2) A resolution was desirable, but not necessary. And (3) Japan
should support the United States, even if it meant defying the UN. His answers reflected the policy followed by Prime Minister Koizumi when the coalition commenced operations in Iraq shortly thereafter. Public-opinion surveys, then and now, showed that majorities of Japanese citizens disapproved of the U.S. action in Iraq; but larger majorities found Koizumi’s policies to be necessary or inevitable.

Both in March 2003 and again in July, I interviewed senior officials of the Koizumi government officials, as well as members of the Diet. Virtually all of these dignitaries averred that North Korea’s arsenal of 175-200 Nodong missiles, which are capable of delivering conventional, chemical, biological, and possibly even nuclear warheads anywhere in Japan, commands far more public attention than did the Soviet military during the 1980s. Koizumi’s popularity started out at the stratospheric level of 80 percent when he assumed office on a platform of economic reform, but fell into the 40s when he fired his publicly popular but quixotic foreign minister, Makiko Tanaka. Spurred by the public sense of peril, however, his approval ratings have climbed back to the mid- to upper 50s - far higher than any of his predecessors since Nakasone in the 1980s. A North Korean spy ship which was either sunk or scuttled while fleeing from Japanese naval and coast guard units last year has recently gone on display in Tokyo; tellingly, turnout has been heavy and has included Prime Minister Koizumi.

In sum, the no-war constitution of Japan remains in force but is wearing thin, largely because it is out of sync with political reality. The Japanese defense budget ranks among the top three or four in the world in monetary terms; Japan contributed significantly to deterring the Soviets in the Pacific in the 1980s and is contributing significantly today in the Indian Ocean. But Article 9 is not dead. Since 1972 Japan has denied itself even the prerogative of exercising its right of collective self-defense. Under these hyper-restrictive rules of engagement, the Japanese vessels in the Indian Ocean today can only fire if fired upon. They can refrain coalition warships, but they cannot fight to defend them owing to the 1972 policy.2 Missile defense, which Japan desperately needs today to blunt the North Korean menace and may need in the future to offset the Chinese missile threat, may finally change Japan’s position - especially since the current policy is viewed as precluding the sharing of targeting information with the United States.

Japanese still think positively of General Douglas MacArthur, the U.S.-led occupation, and the U.S.-Japan alliance in general, and they feared the Soviet Union and Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. But it has taken a galvanizing event, such as the ill-conceived Soviet military deployments of the early 1980s or a demonstration of the frighteningly proximate capabilities of Kim Jong-II today, to reinforce the Japanese public’s feeling of vulnerability and reinforce public support for close security ties with the United States. Japan will go along with the war on terror less because it shares the Bush administration’s exact assessment of the security milieu than because its own interests prod it in that direction. Japan’s postwar history, the Aum Shinrikyo attacks, the Nodong and Taepodong threats from North Korea, the inability to accurately forecast the future policy course of China, and the imperative to preserve the security alliance with the United States have shaped Tokyo’s view of the security environment. Still, Tokyo’s newly assertive foreign policy has met with a warm reception in Washington, whatever the reasoning behind it. In October 2000 a National Defense University commission headed by Richard L. Armitage, then a private citizen but today a U.S. deputy secretary of state, proposed elevating the status of the U.S.-Japan alliance to that of the U.S.-UK alliance. The Bush administration seems very pleased with Japan’s unprecedented deployment of forces outside local waters to support the efforts in Afghanistan and (indirectly) in Iraq. Indeed, Koizumi was treated as a special friend of the president when he visited the ranch in Crawford.

The real question for the future is whether cooperation between the United States and Japan can produce the kind of shared values that exist between the United States and the United Kingdom, or whether Japan can be expected to check in and out of the counterterrorist coalition according to its political needs of the moment.

1. Submitting to pressure from within his own government, a request from the Gulf states, and American encouragement, Kaifu did reluctantly dispatch a small flotilla of Japanese minesweepers and support ships to the Gulf following Desert Storm. The public reaction to the heroic efforts of Japanese sailors, seen sweating profusely while conducting the first overseas military operations in Japan’s postwar history, was so positive that Kaifu’s successor, Kiichi Miyazawa, offered a Peacekeeping Operation (PKO) Bill. Speedily passed by the Diet, the bill authorized the deployment of Japanese soldiers to Cambodia for election monitoring in 1992, and subsequently to other locations for non-combat operations.

2. The prohibition on the exercise of Japan’s right to collective self-defense arose from a policy statement of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau (CLB), an organ of the Prime Minister’s Office, and was enacted without legislation. Although the CLB maintains that its 1972 statement is based on a legal interpretation of Article 9, numerous Japanese LDP and other conservative politicians and critics, who say the issue is political rather than legal, disagree. The passage of guiding legislation in 1999, authorizing the kind of non-combat support presently being rendered in the Indian Ocean, as well as the antiterrorism law of 2001, has been viewed as eroding the logic of the 1972 policy statement.
CITS on Current Events

“That kind of lax attitude towards proliferation must go….How can the United States help stem the flow of illicit arms? As the past couple of weeks have shown, it can wage costly wars to topple rogue regimes. But it can do other things that, while less sexy than cruise missiles and Joint Direct Attack Munitions, also are more humane than waging war to oust Western-armed dictators.

“First, America should put its own affairs in order. The Bush administration should prod Congress to pass a new Export Administration Act. This legislation, which has languished for more than a decade now, would modernize and rationalize U.S. and international nonproliferation export controls.

“Second, Bush and his successors must do more than pay lip service to export controls. A victorious war in Iraq will boost the prestige of the president; he should translate some of that political capital into pressure on governments tempted to peddle questionable hardware overseas. This would slow the diffusion of technology to rogue regimes while showing that war isn’t America’s only solution to proliferation.

“Finally, the administration should push the international community to fuse the four multinational bodies that coordinate national export controls - the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group and the Wassenaar Arrangement - into a more cohesive and effective organization. The current outdated arrangements cannot hold offenders accountable, and their diffuse structures let dangerous exports fall through the cracks.

“None of this will happen without aggressive American leadership. The United States and its European partners already have egg on their faces for helping arm Saddam Hussein in the 1980s. Western inactivity now could herald more than embarrassment.

“Tightening controls and clamping down on illegal arms exports will inhibit future Saddams from wreaking damage that would dwarf the Sept. 11 attacks. That’s easier than waging eternal war, isn’t it?”


“As policymakers move to identify strategies for dealing with the post-Saddam Iraq, many experts believe the U.S. search for weapons of mass destruction will also unearth information that Western and non-Western sources contributed to Iraq’s nuclear, biological and chemical programs, either deliberately or inadvertently. Similar concerns have been aroused by the revelation of Iran’s nuclear enrichment facility at Natanz and reports that Pakistan has swapped enrichment technology for North Korean missiles and technology. These developments underscore the need for multilateral strategies to prevent proliferation of weapons.

“Most of those who have studied the issue and those who deal with it in government agencies agree on the need for a bold new initiative on multilateral export controls. It is up to the visionary leaders in the political community, especially in the U.S., to see the long-term benefits of a new global nonproliferation regime and to lend their resources to such an enterprise. Military options are the last line of defense, but they will be needed more frequently if we fail to construct and maintain effective regimes - the first line of defense.”


Job Openings at CITS

The Center for International Trade and Security (CITS) is looking for professionals to contribute to its research, teaching, and outreach programs on strategic trade issues, nonproliferation, export controls, and WMD security. CITS is part of the new School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Georgia and has strong ties with many other departments and programs at the University. Salary and benefits for all positions are highly competitive. Nominations and applications should be sent to Gary Bertsch, Director, 120 Holmes/Hunter Academic Building, University of Georgia, Athens, GA 30602. Candidates should send a curriculum vitae and a letter of application outlining their interests and experience. CITS and the University of Georgia are Equal Opportunity/Affirmative Action Employers.

CITS TO HOLD WORKSHOP ON STRENGTHENING MULTILATERAL EXPORT CONTROLS

CITS will hold a workshop on November 10-11 in Copenhagen, Denmark on strengthening multilateral export controls. The objective of the workshop is to set forth models or options for restructuring multilateral export controls to meet emerging proliferation threats, including threats posed by terrorist groups seeking dangerous materials. Participants in the workshop will include leading government and non-government experts. If you would like more information on the workshop and the resulting reports, please contact Michael Beck at Mikebeck@uga.edu.