

Accountability Report on Arms Control and Non-proliferation: The G8's Compliance Record, 1975–2009

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Introduction

On April 8, 2010, U.S. president Barack Obama and Russian president Dmitry Medvedev met in Prague to sign a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). The leaders pledged to reduce the number of nuclear weapons that they deploy, cut their delivery vehicles in half and to build a comprehensive verification regime (White House 2010).

On April 12-13, more than 40 countries, including all members of the Group of Eight (G8) and the Group of Twenty (G20), will meet in Washington DC for the nuclear summit that President Obama called for at the 2009 G8 summit in L'Aquila, Italy.² The United Nations, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the European Union will participate as well. The countries will discuss “concrete steps that can be taken to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials around the world in four years” (White House 2010). President Obama has stated that the purpose of the nuclear summit is “to achieve the highest levels of nuclear security” and that the agenda will focus on substantial reductions in the United States and Russian nuclear arsenals, U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and strengthening of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) (Kellerhals 2009). The summit participants are expected to issue a communiqué that will pledge to bolster efforts to make nuclear materials secure (Horner 2010).

An Overview of the G8's Performance on Arms Control and Non-proliferation

The G7/8, founded in 1975, has deliberated on arms control and non-proliferation from an early stage. It first did so explicitly in 1977, when the G7 stated in its concluding statement that it would place more emphasis on nuclear energy “while reducing the risks of nuclear proliferation” (G7 1977). It made similar statements in following years and expanded its

¹ The authors gratefully acknowledge the research contributions of Kalyna Kardash and Zaria Shaw and other colleagues in the G8 Research Group.

² The G7, which began meeting in 1975, consists of Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, along with the European Union. The G8 includes Russia, which began meeting at the leaders' level in 1998. For the purposes of this report, G7 is used only when referring to action taken before 1998. The G20 began in 1999 at the level of finance ministers and central bank governors from the G8 and the EU, along with Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Korea, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and Turkey. The G20 leaders began meeting in 2008.

agenda to include issues of arms control, reduction and disarmament, chemical and biological weapons, anti-personnel landmines and the NPT. Over the years the G8 also created several bodies to help govern the issue, including the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1987, the G8 Non-proliferation Experts Group in 1993 and the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Material of Mass Destruction in 2002. It has worked with the UN Security Council and the IAEA to govern the issue. And the members have worked with additional countries to improve G8 performance.

Deliberation: Conclusions

The G7/8 has deliberated on arms control and non-proliferation at almost every summit and done so in an expansive way. In 1977, the leaders declared that they would increase nuclear energy “while reducing the risks of nuclear proliferation” (G7 1977). In 1981 the leaders deliberated on arms control and disarmament agreements (G7 1981). In 1987 a commitment was made to totally eliminate chemical weapons (G7 1987). In 2002 the G8 established the Global Partnership to help eliminate weapons of mass destruction. And in 2009 the G8 members stated that they looked “forward to the development of the initiative announced by the President of the United States of America regarding a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world” (G8 2009).

The amount of attention given to arms control and non-proliferation reached a new high in 2007, with 4,267 of the G8 leaders’ words referring to arms control and non-proliferation (see Appendix A). There was a steady increase in attention from 1977 to 2007, with the summits in 1981, 1983, 1988, 1990, 1991, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 issuing more words on the topic than before. The number of related between 1975 and 2009 averaged 881. Twelve of 35 summits have exceeded that average.

In 1991, the G8 leaders devoted the highest proportion of their overall attention to the issue, with 22.8% of their communiqué referring to the topic. This was an increase from previous highs in 1983 (18.7%), 1981 (8.0%) and 1977 (7.4%). The average percentage of words devoted to arms control and non-proliferation is 7.5%, and 15 summits have been above average (see Appendix A).

While the 2006 St. Petersburg Summit produced the highest number of paragraphs on the topic (45), the 2003 Evian summit the greatest proportion of dedicated text at 34.6% of overall paragraphs.

Ten summits produced separate documents on the subject, with the Evian Summit issuing the most, at three (see Appendix A).

Since 2002 — the first summit following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, on the United States — there has been sustained high attention on the issue of arms control and non-proliferation, with dips only in 2004 and 2008. Previously the peaks in conclusions were much briefer — the “new cold war” in 1983 and the Gulf war victory in 1991–92, followed by the Global Partnership in 2002–03 and the peak relating to terrorism and weapons of mass destruction since 2005.

Decision Making: Commitments

In 1977 the G7/8 issued its first specific, measurable, future-oriented collective decision, or commitment, on arms control and non-proliferation (see appendices B and C). Since then through to 2009, it has made 269 such commitments, for an annual average of nine commitments over these 30 years.

The G8's commitments on arms control and non-proliferation, in a ratchet-like rise, peaked first at the U.S.-hosted Williamsburg Summit in 1983, again at the UK-hosted London Summit in 1991 and then at the U.S.-hosted Denver Summit in 1997. It peaked at even higher levels at Canada's 2002 Kananaskis Summit and then at Germany's Heiligendamm Summit in 2007, before declining at the most recent summits in 2008 and 2009.

The last seven summits account for over half of all the arms control and non-proliferation commitments made by the G8, indicating that arms control and non-proliferation have remained important in G8 decision making. However, the all-time high of 38 arms control and non-proliferation commitments made in 2007 fell far and fast to only 11 in 2009 (see Appendix B).

As Appendix B shows, these commitments have covered an ever-broadening range of component issues. The cumulative number of individual arms control and non-proliferation issues covered reached 27 by 2009. The greatest broadening, or bursts of decisional expansion and innovation in adding new arms control and non-proliferation issues, came at the 1991 London Summit, the 2002 Kananaskis Summit, the U.S.-hosted 2004 Sea Island Summit and at Germany's 2007 Heiligendamm Summit. In contrast, other summits, such as the French-hosted Evian Summit in 2003 and the Japan-hosted Hokkaido-Toyako Summit in 2008 generated numerous commitments but did less to extend the range of arms control and non-proliferation topics where decisional promises were made.

Over these 30 years, the G7/8 has concentrated its arms control and non-proliferation decision making on the core issues of the Global Partnership (32), non-proliferation in general (26), the IAEA (22), nuclear non-proliferation (18), the NPT (17), arms reduction and disarmament (16), arms control (15), and arms trade and transfer (15). It has also reacted to security, terrorism, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), anti-personnel landmines, biological weapons, chemical weapons, chemical and biological weapons combined, the CTBT and Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC), Iran and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). It has given very little attention to fissile material, funding, enrichment and reprocessing, the Non-proliferation Experts Group, the Nuclear Safety and Security Group and the MTCR.

Delivery: Compliance

There has long been good reason to believe that G7/8 members comply with their arms control and non-proliferation commitments and do so quickly, within a year after the summit that made them was held. By way of background, the pioneering study of compliance with G7 summit decisions, conducted by George von Furstenberg and Joseph

Daniels (1991), examined the compliance record of G7 members on their economic and energy commitments from 1975 to 1989. This study found that overall compliance was positive. Compliance with energy commitments, the area most related to nuclear nonproliferation due to the link to nuclear energy, scored very high.

Subsequently, Ella Kokotsis (1999) examined the compliance record of the United States and Canada — the G7's most and least powerful members, respectively — from 1988 to 1995 on commitments in the areas of assistance to the former Soviet Union, climate change, biodiversity and debt relief for developing countries. With regard to the last three Kokotsis found that G7 members' compliance was generally positive, with a net score of +0.26 on a scale from +1 to -1. The U.S. produced less impressive results, with a compliance rate of only +0.11, while Canada did much better, with a compliance rate of +0.50. Overall compliance was much higher on developing country debt at +0.73% than for climate change at +0.34 and biodiversity at -0.13.

Since 1996 the G8 Research Group has conducted compliance assessments of a selection of the G8's priority commitments. As with the Kokotsis study, these assessments assign each country a score of +1 if a country complies completely or almost completely with the commitment; 0 if a country partially complies or is a "work in progress"; and -1 if a country makes no effort to comply or if it does the opposite of what the commitment states.

Of the 269 commitments made between 1977 and 2008, the G8 has complied with its 16 currently measured commitments on arms control and non-proliferation at an overall score of +0.56, or more than three quarters of the way up the scale from -1 to +1 (see appendices D and E). Compliance has always been positive.

But it has varied widely from year to year, with scores ranging from +0.25 to 1.00. The most recent summits produced overall compliance scores of +0.30 in 2007 and +0.31 in 2008, with results much lower than average. This wide variation in compliance has persisted since the 2002 Kananaskis Summit, from a low of +0.25 in 2002 to a high of +1.00 in 2005. The G8's compliance on arms control and non-proliferation is by no means routine or guaranteed. Rather, it seems inconsistent, moving up and down sporadically.

However, as Appendix D shows, there is a longer term trend of rising compliance since 1996, peaking in 2005 and slowly falling off since then.

On the component issues where the G8 has generated a large number of commitments, its compliance record has varied a great deal (see Appendix E). The G8 has done best on IAEA commitments (+1.00), the NPT (+0.88) enrichment and processing (+0.78) and anti-personnel landmines (+0.73). It has done less well, but still positively, on the HCOC (+0.56), the Global Partnership (+0.53), the CTBT and FMCT (+0.39), chemical and biological weapons (+0.33) and terrorism (+0.31).

All G8 members, old and new, have compliance scores in the positive range (see appendices D and E). Compliance has been led by the above-average performance of Germany, the UK

and Canada at +0.75. They have been followed by the below-average performance of Italy at +0.53, France at +0.50, the U.S., Japan and the EU at +0.44 each, and Russia at +0.36.

Delivery: Compliance Catalysts

Preliminary research has shown that particular “cocktails” of compliance catalysts can help to improve G8 compliance in several areas of prominent G8 concern. For example, compliance with finance and development commitments increases when G7 finance ministers deal with the issue before and after the leaders make a commitment (Kirton 2006). On climate change, compliance increases when leaders give a commitment priority placement and when they do not invoke international law (Kirton and Guebert 2009). On health, invoking the core international organization — the World Health Organization — improves compliance (Kirton et al. 2010, Kirton and Guebert 2010). Similar “cocktails” likely exist in the area of arms control and non-proliferation.³

Conclusion

These conclusions should be treated tentatively, given that compliance has only been assessed on a small number of 16 commitments, relative to the much larger 269 that have been made on arms control and non-proliferation. However, the preliminary evidence suggests that G8 arms control and non-proliferation governance has been worth doing, even though the results have varied widely from year to year, from issue to issue, and from country to country.

Further work needs to be done to come to more confident conclusions about the G8’s comprehensive record on arms control and non-proliferation and what can be done to improve compliance with the related commitments the G8 make, particularly as this subject will be high on the agenda when Barack Obama, Dmitry Medvedev and the other G8 leaders meet again in Muskoka, Canada, on June 25–26, 2010.

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³ The authors are currently exploring what compliance catalysts might improve arms control and proliferation compliance. The perfect compliance score for the one assessed commitment on the IAEA suggests that, as in health and finance development, reference to a core multilateral organization can increase compliance, with the IAEA serving as the core multilateral organization in this case.

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Appendix A: G8 Conclusions on Arms Control and Non-proliferation

Year	# of Words	% of Total Words	# of Paragraphs	% of Totals Paragraphs	# of Documents	% of Total Documents	# of Dedicated Documents
1975	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1976	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1977	200	7.4	2	18.2	1	100	0
1978	128	4.2	1	1.9	1	50	0
1979	25	1.2	1	2.7	1	50	0
1980	179	4.4	2	3.9	1	20	0
1981	255	8.0	3	5.7	2	50	0
1982	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1983	405	18.7	7	17.5	1	50	1
1984	147	4.5	1	2.5	1	20	1
1985	174	5.5	1	3.0	1	50	0
1986	181	5.0	1	3.2	1	25	0
1987	215	4.2	2	3.0	1	14.2	0
1988	446	9.1	5	8.3	2	66.6	0
1989	151	2.1	1	0.9	1	20	0
1990	605	7.9	10	8.0	2	50	1
1991	1,847	22.8	21	15.1	4	80	1
1992	1,163	15.4	15	12.1	4	100	0
1993	210	6.1	1	1.5	3	100	0
1994	372	9.0	2	2.4	2	100	0
1995	613	8.4	5	5.8	1	33.3	0
1996	1,429	9.3	16	9.7	2	40	0
1997	1,083	8.3	11	7.8	1	25	0
1998	167	2.7	1	1.7	1	20	0
1999	367	3.6	5	4.5	1	25	0
2000	547	4.0	7	4.8	3	60	0
2001	62	0.9	1	1.2	1	14.2	0
2002	1,430	11.9	29	25.4	3	42.8	2
2003	1,863	11.0	27	34.6	5	83.3	3
2004	2,176	5.6	27	27.2	2	16.6	1
2005	2,743	12.3	31	17.5	5	38.4	1
2006	3,613	11.7	45	20.0	4	30.7	2
2007	4,267	16.5	33	13.3	3	37.5	2
2008	1,072	6.3	13	9.4	1	16.6	0
2009	2,700	16.3	24	7.3	4	33.3	1
Average	881	7.5	10.0	8.5	1.8	41.7	0.45

Notes:

of Words: Number of issue-specific subjects for the year indicated, excluding titles and references. Words are calculated by paragraph because the paragraph is the unit of analysis.

% of Total Words: Total number of words in all documents for the year indicated.

of Paragraphs: Number of paragraphs containing issue-specific references for the year indicated. Each point is recorded as a separate paragraph.

% of Total Paragraphs: Total number of paragraphs in all documents for the year indicated.

of Documents: Number of documents that contain issue-specific subjects and excludes dedicated documents.

% of Total Documents: Total number of documents for the year indicated.

of Dedicated Documents: Number of documents for the year that refer to the specified issue in the title.

Appendix B: G8 Arms Control and Non-proliferation Commitments by Issue

Year	Compliance	Total Commitments	Nuclear Non-proliferation	Non-proliferation General	Arms Control	Arms Reduction and Disarmament	Chemical Weapons	Arms Trade and Transfer	Chem. and Bio. Weapons	Biological Weapons	Iran	Non-proliferation Treaty	IAEA	Nuclear Suppliers Group	CTBT and FMCT	Anti-personnel Landmines	Fissile Material	NEG	Funding	MTCR	Terrorism	Global Partnership	Security	Treaties General	PSI	Enrichment and Reprocessing	NSSG	HCOC	
1977	NA	3	2	1																									
1978	NA	1	1																										
1980	NA	1	1																										
1981	NA	1	1																										
1983	NA	4			1	3																							
1986	NA	1				1																							
1987	NA	3				3																							
1988	NA	2				1	1																						
1989	NA	2				1		1																					
1990	NA	4					2		1	1																			
1991	NA	12	1				2	3			1	2	2	1															
1992	NA	5	1		1	1		1					1																
1993	NA	1						1																					
1994	NA	5				1		1	1						1	1													
1995	NA	4			1	1		1	1																				
1996	54 (2)	7						2	1			2			1	1													
1997	75 (1)	16						1	2	1		1				7	2	2											
1998	NA	3		2				1																					
1999	NA	3		1												1			1										
2000	88 (2)	8					1	1		1		1			1					2	1								
2002	25 (1)	30		1	2	2								1		1	1					1	17	4					
2003	100 (1)	22		1	3	1							6									2		8	1				
2004	78 (1)	24	2	3			1	1		3	1	1	2	3									4			2	1		
2005	100 (1)	14		2			1			1		2	2	1									3		1		1		
2006	56 (1)	21	4	3	1					2		1	2									1	3		1	1		1	1
2007	30 (3)	38	3	10	5	1			1		1	2	1	2	2							2	4			1		1	2
2008	35 (3)	23	1	2	1		1	1			1	4	4		1							2	1			1	1		2
2009	NA	11	1								1	1	2	2								3							1
Tot./Ave.	NA/57 (16)	269/9	18	26	15	16	9	15	7	9	5	17	22	10	6	10	4	2	3	1	11	32	12	3	5	3	2	6	

Notes:

There were no arms control or non-proliferation commitments made at the G8 leaders' level in the years that do not appear.

Under compliance, the number in parentheses refers to the number of commitments that were measured for the year in question.

Bio = Biological; Chem = Chemical; CTBT = Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; FMCT = Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty; HCOC = Hague Code of Conduct; IAEA = International Atomic Energy Agency; MTCR = Missile Technology Control Regime; NEG = Non-proliferation Experts Group; NSSG = Nuclear Safety and Security Group; PSI = Proliferation Security Initiative.

Appendix C: Arms Control and Non-proliferation Commitments

N=269

The following list of commitments is drawn from official documents released by the G7/8 leaders at their annual summits, as determined by the G8 Research Group. A full list of commitments is available on the G8 Information Centre website at <www.g8.utoronto.ca/compliance>.

1975: No commitments

1976: No commitments

1977: 3 commitments

1977-6 [We agree on the need to increase nuclear energy to help meet the world's energy requirements.] We commit ourselves to do this while reducing the risks of nuclear proliferation.

1977-7. [We commit ourselves to (increase nuclear energy to help meet the world's energy requirements) while reducing the risks of nuclear proliferation.] We are launching an urgent study to determine how best to fulfill these purposes.

1977-23. We are also agreed that, in order to be effective, nonproliferation policies should as far as possible be acceptable to both industrialized and developing countries alike. To this end, we are undertaking a preliminary analysis to be completed within two months of the best means of advancing these objectives, including the study of terms of reference for international fuel cycle evaluation.

1978: 1 commitment

1978-21. To promote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation, the nuclear fuel cycle studies initiated at the London Summit should be pursued.

1979: No commitments

1980: 1 commitment

1980-26. We reaffirm the importance of ensuring the reliable supply of nuclear fuel and minimizing the risk of nuclear proliferation.

1981: 1 commitment

1981-25. In most of our countries progress in constructing new nuclear facilities is slow. We intend in each of our countries to encourage greater public acceptance of nuclear energy, and respond to public concerns about safety, health, nuclear waste management and nonproliferation.

1982: No commitments

1983: 5 commitments

1983-34. As leaders of our seven countries, it is our first duty to defend the freedom and justice on which our democracies are based. To this end, we shall maintain sufficient military strength to deter any attack, to counter any threat, and to ensure the peace. Our arms will never be used except in response to aggression.

1983-35. We wish to achieve lower levels of arms through serious arms control negotiations. With this statement, we reaffirm our dedication to the search for peace and meaningful arms reductions.

1983-36. We are ready to work with the Soviet Union to this purpose and call upon the Soviet Union to work with us.

1983-37. Our nations are united in efforts for arms reductions and will continue to carry out thorough and intensive consultations.

1984: No commitments

1985: No commitments

1986: 1 commitment

1986-37. To that end, each of us supports balanced, substantial and verifiable reductions in the level of arms; measures to increase confidence and reduce the risks of conflicts; and the peaceful resolution of disputes.

1987: 3 commitments

1987-37. We reaffirm our commitment to peace and increased security at lower levels of arms.

1987-38. We seek a comprehensive effort to lower tensions and to achieve verifiable arms reductions.

1987-39. Thus, we each seek to stabilize military competition between East and West at lower levels of arms; [to encourage stable political solutions to regional conflicts; to secure lasting improvements in human rights; and to build contacts, confidence and trust between governments and peoples in a more humane world.]

1988: 2 commitments

1988-18. Since our last meeting, progress has been made between the United States and the Soviet Union in agreeing to reduce nuclear weapons in a manner which accords fully with the security interests of each of our countries. The INF [IntermediateRange Nuclear Forces] Treaty, the direct result of Western firmness and unity, is the first treaty ever actually to reduce nuclear arms. It sets vitally important precedents for future arms control agreements: asymmetrical reductions and intrusive verification arrangements. We now look for deep cuts in U.S. and Soviet strategic offensive arms. We congratulate President Reagan on what he has already accomplished, along with General Secretary Gorbachev, towards this goal.

1988-19. We seek the early establishment of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable, and truly global ban on chemical weapons.

1989: 2 commitments

1989-39. This repression has led each of us to take appropriate measures to express our deep sense of condemnation to suspend bilateral Ministerial and high-level contacts, and also to suspend arms-trade with China, where it exists.

1989-41. In order to hasten the advent of a world in which the weight of arms and military strength is reduced, we recommit ourselves to the urgent pursuit of a global ban on chemical weapons, a conventional forces balance in Europe at the lowest possible level consistent with our security requirements, and a substantial reduction in Soviet and American strategic nuclear arms.

1990: 4 commitments

1990-74. With regard to chemical and biological proliferation, we commit ourselves to pursue efforts to prevent the diversion of chemical precursors at a national level, as well as in the relevant Western fora.

1990-75. We similarly commit ourselves to be vigilant about the danger of potential diversions in the field of biological technologies.

1990-76. We endorse a complete ban on chemical weapons, through an effective and verifiable treaty, as the only long-term guarantee against the proliferation of chemical weapons.

1990-77. We reiterate our determination, first expressed at the 1989 Paris Conference on Chemical Weapons, to redouble the effort at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to resolve the remaining issues and to conclude the Convention at the earliest date.

1991: 12 commitments

1991-42. The principle of transparency should be extended to international transfers of conventional weapons and associated military technology. As a step in this direction, we support the proposal for a universal register of arms transfers under the auspices of the United Nations, and will work for its early adoption.

1991-43. The principle of consultation should now be strengthened through the rapid implementation of recent initiatives for discussions among leading arms exporters with the aim of agreeing a common approach to the guidelines which are applied in the transfer of conventional weapons. We welcome the recent opening of discussions on this subject. These include the encouraging talks in Paris among the Permanent Members of the United Security Council on 8-9 July; as well as ongoing discussions within the framework of the European Community and its Member States. Each of us will continue to play a constructive part in this important process, in these and other appropriate fora.

1991-44. The principle of action requires all of us to take steps to prevent the building up of disproportionate arsenals. To that end, all countries should refrain from arms transfers which would be destabilising or would exacerbate existing tensions. Special restraint should be exercised in the transfer of advanced technology weapons and in sales to countries and areas of particular concern. A special effort should be made to define sensitive items and production capacity for advanced weapons, to the transfer of which similar restraints could be applied. All states should take steps to ensure that these criteria are strictly enforced. We intend to give these issues our continuing close attention.

- 1991-45. Iraq must fully abide by Security Council Resolution 687, which sets out requirements for the destruction, removal or rendering harmless under international supervision of its nuclear, biological and chemical warfare and missile capabilities; as well as for verification and long-term monitoring to ensure that Iraq's capability for such weapon systems is not developed in the future. Consistent with the relevant UN resolutions, we will provide every assistance to the United Nations Special Commission and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) so that they can fully carry out their tasks.
- 1991-46. [In the nuclear field, we:] reaffirm our will to work to establish the widest possible consensus in favour of an equitable and stable nonproliferation regime based on a balance between nuclear nonproliferation and the development of peaceful uses of nuclear energy;
- 1991-47. [In the nuclear field, we:] reaffirm the importance of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and call on all other nonsignatory states to subscribe to this agreement;
- 1991-48. [In the nuclear field, we:] call on all other nonnuclear weapon states to submit all their nuclear activities to IAEA safeguards, which are the cornerstone of the international nonproliferation regime;
- 1991-49. [Each of us will also work to achieve:] our common purpose of maintaining and reinforcing the NPT regime beyond 1995;
- 1991-50. [Each of us will also work to achieve:] a strengthened and improved IAEA safeguards system;
- 1991-51. [Each of us will also work to achieve:] new measures in the Nuclear Suppliers Group to ensure adequate export controls on dual use items.
- 1991-52. We welcome recent announcements by the United States which we believe will contribute to the swift conclusion of such a convention. We hope that the negotiation will be successfully concluded as soon as possible.
- 1991-53. We reaffirm our intention to become original parties to the convention.

1992: 6 commitments

- 1992-33. We shall continue through bilateral contacts and the International Science and Technology Centres in Moscow and Kiev our efforts to inhibit the spread of expertise on weapons of mass destruction.
- 1992-34. We will support reference by the IAEA of unresolved cases of proliferation to the UN Security Council.
- 1992-35. We reaffirm our willingness to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology with all other States, in accordance with our nonproliferation commitments.
- 1992-36. Each of us will continue our efforts to improve transparency and consultation in the transfer of conventional weapons and to encourage restraint in such transfers.
- 1992-38. We support Russia in its efforts to secure the peaceful use of nuclear materials resulting from the elimination of nuclear weapons.

1993: 1 commitment

- 1993-23. In the field of conventional arms, we will work to ensure the effectiveness of the UN Register of Conventional Arms as an important step toward improving transparency and restraint in their transfers.

1994: 5 commitments

1994-44. We underline the importance of continuing nuclear arms reduction, and confirm our commitment to achieve universal, verifiable and comprehensive treaties to ban nuclear tests and the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons.

1994-45. We reaffirm our commitment for the earliest possible entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention and welcome the Special Conference of States parties to the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

1994-46. We support full implementation of the UN Register of Conventional Arms. We agree to cooperate to prevent nuclear smuggling.

1994-47. We assign priority to the problems of anti-personnel landmines, including efforts to curb their indiscriminate use, halt their export, assist in their clearance worldwide.

1994-48. We shall work together and with others for effective export controls to ensure that trade in armaments and sensitive dual-use goods is carried out responsibly.

1995: 4 commitments

1995-63. We support the safe and secure dismantlement of the nuclear weapons eliminated under START I and we welcome the work of the United States and Russia on measures to ensure that the fissile material from these weapons is rendered unusable for weapons purposes.

1995-64. Recognizing the continuing dangers posed worldwide by criminal diversion and illicit trafficking of nuclear materials, and drawing on the decisions taken in Naples and the practical work undertaken by our experts since then, we resolve to work together to strengthen systems of control, accounting and physical security for nuclear materials; to expand our cooperation in the area of customs, law enforcement and intelligence and to strengthen through venues such as the IAEA and INTERPOL the international community's ability to combat nuclear theft and smuggling.

1995-65. We emphasize the importance of bringing the Chemical Weapons Convention into force at the earliest possible date, and call for rapid progress in developing verification systems for the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

1995-66. We shall work with others for effective and responsible export controls on arms and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies.

1996: 7 commitments

1996-xx. We call upon all States to spare no effort in securing a global ban on the scourge represented by the proliferation and the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines and welcome the moratoria and bans already adopted by a number of countries on the production, use and export of these weapons, unilateral reductions in stockpiles as well as initiatives to address this urgent problem.

1996-76. We affirm our undertaking to conclude a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) so as to enable its signature by the outset of the 51st session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, this coming September.

1996-77. We reaffirm our commitment to the objectives set out in the document on Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament adopted on 11 May 1995 at the conclusion of the NPT Review and Extension Conference.

- 1996-78. We are determined to contribute to the effectiveness of the strengthened NPT review process before the next Review Conference in 2000, the first preparatory committee for which will meet in 1997.
- 1996-79. We reiterate the importance we attach to the entry into force of the Convention on Chemical Weapons. We will continue to work hard to implement the Convention on Prohibition of Biological and Toxin Weapons, including the establishment of an effective verification mechanism.
- 1996-83. {In order to ensure rapid and efficient follow-up of the decisions regarding non-proliferation issues adopted at the Moscow Summit, we have taken the following initiatives:] on our behalf, France will undertake demarches in order to encourage more countries to adopt the “Programme for preventing and combatting illicit trafficking in nuclear material”;
- 1996-84. [In order to ensure rapid and efficient follow-up of the decisions regarding non-proliferation issues adopted at the Moscow Summit, we have taken the following initiatives:] a meeting dedicated to the implementation of this Programme, with the participation of agencies and ministries involved in the prevention and fight against illicit trafficking will be held as soon as possible.
- 1997: 16 commitments
- 1997-xx. We reaffirm the UN General Assembly resolution, approved overwhelmingly, calling for concluding an effective, legally binding international agreement to ban anti-personnel landmines as soon as possible.
- 1997-67. Since the Moscow Summit on Nuclear Safety and Security, we have taken important steps to implement the agreed “Programme for Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear Materials.” We will expand participation in this program to include countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and in Central Asia and the Caucasus.
- 1997-68. Further regarding the safe and effective management of fissile material, with respect to such materials no longer required for defense purposes, we will continue our cooperation through concrete initiatives, in particular the French-German-Russian project to build a pilot plant in Russia to produce MOX fuel from weapons plutonium, which is open to additional states, and the related U.S.-Russian cooperation on the conversion of weapons plutonium.
- 1997-69. Recognizing that enhancing confidence in compliance would reinforce the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, we reaffirm our determination to complete as soon as possible through negotiation a legally-binding and effective verification mechanism.
- 1997-70. We reaffirm our unwavering commitment to full implementation of the objectives set forth in the Non- Proliferation Treaty. To that end, we welcome the IAEA’s recent adoption of a program on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system.
- 1997-71. We reaffirm our commitment to the immediate commencement and early conclusion of a convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
- 1997-72. We recognize that global security and stability are strengthened by promoting international responsibility in the transfer of arms and sensitive technologies, and to that end reaffirm our support for the Wassenaar Arrangement.

- 1997-73. We encourage the work of the UN Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms to identify the ways and means to prevent and reduce the excessive and destabilizing transfer of small arms and light weapons and we will continue to work together to curb illegal trafficking in firearms.
- 1997-76. In order to sustain and build upon the momentum generated by these initiatives, developed in the wake of the Moscow Summit, the Non-Proliferation Experts Group should begin discussion of possible arrangements for coordinating and implementing plutonium management efforts.
- 1997-77. The Non-Proliferation Experts Group should submit a report to the Heads by next year's Summit in Birmingham.
- 1997-78. Our Governments will continue to participate in efforts to conclude an effective anti-personnel landmine ban to address this urgent problem.
- 1997-79. Consistent with last year's decisions at Lyon, our Governments are committed to universal adherence to the Convention on Conventional Weapons and to the 1996 Protocol on Mines, Booby Traps, and Other Devices, which strengthens restrictions on the use and transfer of anti-personnel landmines.
- 1997-80. Our Governments will continue their efforts to secure ratification of the amended Protocol by all countries that have not completed their ratification efforts.
- 1997-81. We will endeavor to ensure that our various bans on the export of anti-personnel landmines become permanent.
- 1997-82. In the coming year, we will continue our efforts to develop the most promising mine detection and clearing technology and to share this technology, as appropriate, with the international community.
- 1997-83. We will also continue our active demining assistance programs.

1998: 3 commitments

- 1998-60. Our countries have been in the forefront of efforts to prevent proliferation, and we have worked closely together to support international non-proliferation regimes. We pledge to continue and strengthen this co-operation. As a key element of this co-operation, we reaffirm our commitment to ensure the effective implementation of export controls, in keeping with our undertakings within the non-proliferation regimes.
- 1998-61. We will deny any kind of assistance to programmes for weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.
- 1998-62. To this end, we will where appropriate undertake and encourage the strengthening of laws, regulations and enforcement mechanisms.

1999: 3 commitments

- 1999-35. Strengthening the international non-proliferation regime and disarmament measures is one of our most important international priorities. We are committed to increased resources for these purposes and encourage all other interested countries to join us.
- 1999-36. We affirm our intention to establish arrangements for the safe management of fissile material.
- 1999-37. We strongly support the concrete initiatives being undertaken by G8 countries and others for scientific and technical cooperation necessary to support future large-scale disposition programs. We recognize that an international approach to financing

will be required involving both public and private funds, and we will review potential increases in our own resource commitments prior to the next G8 Summit.

2000: 8 commitments

2000-94. We invite the international community to exercise restraint in conventional arms exports, and are committed to work jointly to this end.

2000-95. We are determined to implement the conclusions reached at this Conference, including the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the immediate commencement and the conclusion within five years of negotiations for the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.

2000-96. We remain committed to promoting universal adherence to and compliance with the NPT.

2000-97. Our goal for the next Summit is to develop an international financing plan for plutonium management and disposition based on detailed project plan, and a multilateral framework to coordinate this cooperation.

2000-98. We will expand our cooperation to other interested countries in order to gain the widest possible international support, and will explore the potential for both public and private funding.

2000-99. We strongly support the important work of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and will consider the proposal for a Global Monitoring System.

2000-100. We will work to increase the level of international contributions to the Russian chemical weapons destruction programme.

2000-101. We commit ourselves to work with others to conclude the negotiations on the Verification Protocol to strengthen the Biological Weapons Convention as early as possible in 2001.

2001: 0 commitments

2002: 30 commitments

2002-5. We agreed on a set of six non-proliferation Principles aimed at preventing terrorists — or those who harbour them — from acquiring or developing nuclear, chemical, radiological and biological weapons; missiles; and related materials, equipment or technologies.

2002-6. We launched a new G8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, under which we will undertake cooperative projects on the basis of agreed guidelines. We committed to raise up to US\$ 20 billion to support such projects over the next ten years.

2002-28. [Supporting African efforts to resolve the principal armed conflicts on the continent –including by:] Assisting with programmes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; at the appropriate time,

2002-34. [Supporting efforts by African countries and the United Nations to better regulate the activities of arms brokers and traffickers and to eliminate the flow of illicit weapons to and within Africa - including by:] Developing and adopting common guidelines to prevent the illegal supply of arms to Africa;

2002-35. [Supporting efforts by African countries and the United Nations to better regulate the activities of arms brokers and traffickers and to eliminate the flow of

- illicit weapons to and within Africa - including by:] Providing assistance in regional trans-border cooperation to this end.
- 2002-36. [Supporting efforts by African countries and the United Nations to better regulate the activities of arms brokers and traffickers and to eliminate the flow of illicit weapons to and within Africa - including by:] Supporting African efforts to eliminate and remove antipersonnel mines.
- 2002-42. Encouraging more effective coordination and cooperation among donors and international institutions in support of peace-building and conflict prevention efforts - particularly with respect to the effective disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants, the collection and destruction of small arms, and the special needs of women and children, including child soldiers.
- 2002-146. We have also decided today to launch a new G8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.
- 2002-147. Under this initiative, we will support specific cooperation projects, initially in Russia, to address non-proliferation, disarmament, counter-terrorism and nuclear safety issues.
- 2002-148. Among our priority concerns are the destruction of chemical weapons, the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, the disposition of fissile materials and the employment of former weapons scientists.
- 2002-149. We will commit to raise up to \$20 billion to support [Global Partnership] projects over the next ten years
- 2002-150. We will review over the next year the applicability of the guidelines to existing projects.
- 2002-151. We will review progress on this Global Partnership at our next Summit in 2003.
- 2002-152. Promote the adoption, universalization, full implementation and, where necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties and other international instruments whose aim is to prevent the proliferation or illicit acquisition of such items; strengthen the institutions designed to implement these instruments.
- 2002-153. Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and secure such items in production, use, storage and domestic and international transport; provide assistance to states lacking sufficient resources to account for and secure these items.
- 2002-154. Develop and maintain appropriate effective physical protection measures applied to facilities which house such items, including defence in depth; provide assistance to states lacking sufficient resources to protect their facilities.
- 2002-155. Develop and maintain effective border controls, law enforcement efforts and international cooperation to detect, deter and interdict in cases of illicit trafficking in such items, for example through installation of detection systems, training of customs and law enforcement personnel and cooperation in tracking these items; provide assistance to states lacking sufficient expertise or resources to strengthen their capacity to detect, deter and interdict in cases of illicit trafficking in these items.
- 2002-156. Develop, review and maintain effective national export and transshipment controls over items on multilateral export control lists, as well as items that are not identified on such lists but which may nevertheless contribute to the development, production or use of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and missiles, with

particular consideration of end-user, catch-all and brokering aspects; provide assistance to states lacking the legal and regulatory infrastructure, implementation experience and/or resources to develop their export and transshipment control systems in this regard.

- 2002-157. Adopt and strengthen efforts to manage and dispose of stocks of fissile materials designated as no longer required for defence purposes, eliminate all chemical weapons, and minimize holdings of dangerous biological pathogens and toxins, based on the recognition that the threat of terrorist acquisition is reduced as the overall quantity of such items is reduced.
- 2002-158. Mutually agreed effective monitoring, auditing and transparency measures and procedures will be required in order to ensure that cooperative activities meet agreed objectives (including irreversibility as necessary), to confirm work performance, to account for the funds expended and to provide for adequate access for donor representatives to work sites;
- 2002-159. [Global Partnership Cooperation] projects will be implemented in an environmentally sound manner and will maintain the highest appropriate level of safety;
- 2002-160. Clearly defined milestones will be developed for each project, including the option of suspending or terminating a project if the milestones are not met;
- 2002-161. The material, equipment, technology, services and expertise provided will be solely for peaceful purposes and, unless otherwise agreed, will be used only for the purposes of implementing the projects and will not be transferred. Adequate measures of physical protection will also be applied to prevent theft or sabotage;
- 2002-162. All governments will take necessary steps to ensure that the support provided will be considered free technical assistance and will be exempt from taxes, duties, levies and other charges;
- 2002-163. Procurement of goods and services will be conducted in accordance with open international practices to the extent possible, consistent with national security requirements;
- 2002-164. All governments will take necessary steps to ensure that adequate liability protections from claims related to the cooperation will be provided for donor countries and their personnel and contractors;
- 2002-165. Appropriate privileges and immunities will be provided for government donor representatives working on cooperation projects; and
- 2002-166. Measures will be put in place to ensure effective protection of sensitive information and intellectual property.
- 2002-167. Given the breadth and scope of the activities to be undertaken, the G8 will establish an appropriate mechanism for the annual review of progress under this initiative which may include consultations regarding priorities, identification of project gaps and potential overlap, and assessment of consistency of the cooperation projects with international security obligations and objectives.
- 2002-168. With respect to nuclear safety and security, the partners agreed to establish a new G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group by the time of our next Summit.

2003: 22 commitments

- 2003-185. We reaffirm our commitment to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, and we urge all states which have not yet joined to do so.
- 2003-186. We reaffirm our support for the IAEA, which should be granted the necessary means to implement its monitoring tasks.
- 2003-187. it undertakes to promote the application of the Code of Conduct, collectively or individually, when the revisions to the Code have been completed and approved, and to encourage States to request the assistance of the Agency in this sphere.
- 2003-188. They will exchange information and consult to review progress achieved in this sphere.
- 2003-189. The G8 undertakes to carry out a long term review of the means to strengthen control over radioactive sources and international co-operation in this sphere.
- 2003-190. Political commitments by States producing, possessing, using, importing or exporting radioactive sources to uphold the <<principles of safe and secure management of radioactive sources>>, inspired by the relevant sections of the IAEA Code of Conduct.
- 2003-191. Identification of the elements of the completed Code of Conduct that are of the greatest relevance in preventing terrorism and encouragement to implement them world-wide.
- 2003-192. The G8 members will promote - individually and collectively - the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources when the revisions to it have been completed and approved, and invites States to work through the Agency for its application.
- 2003-193. The G8 will direct a working group to identify those elements of the IAEA Code of Conduct that are of greatest relevance to prevent terrorists from gaining access to radioactive sources and to develop recommendations for national consideration on the implementation of those elements, in close connection with the IAEA.
- 2003-194. Establishing a national register to track sources throughout their life-cycle.
- 2003-195. Setting up an outline for creating a national mechanism for the recovery and securing of <<orphan>> or poorly-controlled sources within their national territory.
- 2003-196. Establishing a series of guidelines with respect to the control of exports of sources, conditions attaching to them, and mechanisms (e.g. notifications) for monitoring these exports.
- 2003-197. Developing national measures as necessary to combat malevolent acts involving radioactive sources.
- 2003-198. Identifying possible measures to be taken by the State in order to safeguard and restrict access to sources.
- 2003-199. Identifying measures that the state could take regarding the conditioning and/or encouraging the recycling of sources at the end of their life.
- 2003-200. Putting in place a system which aims to detect the passage of radioactive sources at strategic points such as border crossings.
- 2003-201. Consultations should be conducted, after the Evian Summit, with the main States concerned in order to give substance to the initiatives launched.
- 2003-202. Consideration will also be given to the need to launch campaigns to secure poorly-controlled radioactive sources, and to search for, locate and secure "orphan"

radioactive sources, with international funding (mainly via the G8 Global Partnership and IAEA Nuclear Security Fund.)

2003-203. Consolidating the IAEA's international efforts with regard to radioactive sources.

2003-204. Evaluating the main projects in progress.

2003-205. Preparing a provisional assessment of the campaigns to secure poorly-controlled sources.

2003-206. This conference would be attended by all of the aforementioned operational actors concerned by this issue.

2004: 24 commitments

2004-xx. for the intervening year [between Sea Island and Gleneagles Summits], we agree that it would be prudent not to inaugurate new initiatives involving transfer of enrichment and reprocessing equipment and technologies to additional states. We call on all states to adopt this strategy with prudence.

2004-E1. We reaffirm our commitment to the NPT and to the declarations made at Kananaskis and Evian, and we will work to prevent the illicit diversion of nuclear materials and technology.

2004-E2. To allow the world to safely enjoy the benefits of peaceful nuclear energy without adding to the danger of weapons proliferation, we have agreed to work to establish new measures so that sensitive nuclear items with proliferation potential will not be exported to states that may seek to use them for weapons purposes, or allow them to fall into terrorist hands.

2004-E3. We shall work to amend appropriately the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines, and to gain the widest possible support for such measures in the future.

2004-E4. We aim to have appropriate measures in place by the next G8 Summit.

2004-E5. We will also develop new measures to ensure reliable access to nuclear materials, equipment, and technology, including nuclear fuel and related services, at market conditions, for all states, consistent with maintaining nonproliferation commitments and standards.

2004-E6. We seek universal adherence to IAEA comprehensive safeguards and the Additional Protocol and urge all states to ratify and implement these agreements promptly. We are actively engaged in outreach efforts toward this goal, and ready to offer necessary support.

2004-E7. The Additional Protocol must become an essential new standard in the field of nuclear supply arrangements. We will work to strengthen NSG guidelines accordingly. We aim to achieve this by the end of 2005.

2004-E8. To enhance the IAEA's integrity and effectiveness, and strengthen its ability to ensure that nations comply with their NPT obligations and safeguards agreements, we will work together to establish a new Special Committee of the IAEA Board of Governors. This committee would be responsible for preparing a comprehensive plan for strengthened safeguards and verification.

2004-E9. We will continue our efforts to build effective PSI partnerships to interdict trafficking in weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and related materials.

- 2004-E10. We also will prevent those that facilitate proliferation from engaging in such trafficking and work to broaden and strengthen domestic and international laws supporting PSI.
- 2004-E11. We will further cooperate to defeat proliferation networks and coordinate, where appropriate, enforcement efforts, including by stopping illicit financial flows and shutting down illicit plants, laboratories, and brokers, in accordance with national legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international law.
- 2004-E12. Directly, and through the relevant international mechanisms, we will work actively with states requiring assistance in improving their national capabilities to meet international norms.
- 2004-E13. We recommit ourselves to raising up to \$20 billion for the Global Partnership through 2012.
- 2004-E14. Expanding the Partnership to include additional donor countries is essential to raise the necessary resources and to ensure the effort is truly global. Today we welcome the decisions of Australia, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, the Republic of Korea, and New Zealand to join.
- 2004-E15. We will continue to work with the other Soviet states to discuss their participation in the Partnership.
- 2004-E16. We reaffirm that we will address proliferation challenges worldwide. We will, for example, pursue the retraining of Iraqi and Libyan scientists involved in past WMD programs.
- 2004-E17. We also support projects to eliminate over time the use of highly-enriched uranium fuel in research reactors worldwide, secure and remove fresh and spent HEU fuel, control and secure radiation sources, strengthen export control and border security, and reinforce biosecurity. We will use the Global Partnership to coordinate our efforts in these areas.
- 2004-E18. [We remain united in our determination to see the proliferation implications of Iran's advanced nuclear program resolved. Iran must be in full compliance with its NPT obligations and safeguards agreement.] To this end, we reaffirm our support for the IAEA Board of Governors' three Iran resolutions.
- 2004-E19. [Bioterrorism poses unique, grave threats to the security of all nations, and could endanger public health and disrupt economies. We commit to concrete national and international steps to:] expand or, where necessary, initiate new biosurveillance capabilities to detect bioterror attacks against humans, animals, and crops; improve our prevention and response capabilities;
- 2004-E20. [Bioterrorism poses unique, grave threats to the security of all nations, and could endanger public health and disrupt economies. We commit to concrete national and international steps to:] increase protection of the global food supply;
- 2004-E21. [Bioterrorism poses unique, grave threats to the security of all nations, and could endanger public health and disrupt economies. We commit to concrete national and international steps to:] and respond to, investigate, and mitigate the effects of alleged uses of biological weapons or suspicious outbreaks of disease.
- 2004-E22. We support full implementation of the CWC, including its nonproliferation aspects.

2004-E23. We have agreed to export and import control guidance for high-risk radioactive sources, which should only be supplied to authorized end-users in states that can control them.

2005: 14 commitments

2005-A17. We reaffirmed our commitments and called on all States to uphold in full international norms on non-proliferation and to meet their arms control and disarmament obligations.

2005-H1. Multilaterally agreed norms provide an essential basis for our non-proliferation efforts. We strongly support universal adherence to and compliance with these norms. We will work to strengthen them, including through improved verification and enforcement.

2005-H2. We call on all States not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, an IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the Hague Code of Conduct Against the Proliferation of Ballistic Missiles, to accede without delay. We remain ready to assist States to this end.

2005-H3. We emphasise that the NPT remains the cornerstone of nuclear non-proliferation. We reaffirm our full commitment to all three pillars of the Treaty.

2005-H4. For our part, we pledge ourselves to redouble our efforts to uphold and strengthen the Treaty.

2005-H5. We will continue to work together to strengthen NSG guidelines accordingly.

2005-H6. We continue to agree, as we did at Sea Island, that it would be prudent in the next year not to inaugurate new initiatives involving transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies to additional states.

2005-H7. We welcome the efforts of the Expert Group, established by the Director-General of the IAEA, which has recently reported on possible Multinational Approaches to the Fuel Cycle. We will work together with all interested partners for a way forward which provides genuine access while minimising the risks of proliferation.

2005-H8. We reaffirm our strong commitment to strengthening our defences against biological threats. Over the last year, our efforts have focussed on enhancing protection of the food supply. We will continue efforts to address biological threats and support work in other relevant international groups.

2005-H9. We continue to support full implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention, including its non-proliferation aspects. While acknowledging the obligation to destroy chemical weapons within the time limits provided for by the chemical weapons convention and to destroy or convert chemical weapons production facilities, we recall that States Party agreed in 2003 to an Action Plan which requires all to have national implementing measures in place by the time of the Conference of States Party scheduled for this November. We urge those States Party who have not yet done so to take all necessary steps to ensure the deadline is met. We stand ready to provide appropriate assistance.

2005-H10. We will work to build on the considerable progress we have made to implement co-operative projects to which the G8 and thirteen other countries now contribute.

2005-H11. We renew our pledge to raise up to \$20 billion over ten years to 2012 for Global Partnership priorities, initially in Russia.

2005-H12. In this context, we will embark on new projects according to these priorities.

2005-H13. We welcome the IAEA endorsement of the international import and export framework for the control of radioactive sources. We will work towards having effective controls applied by the end of 2005, in a harmonized and consistent manner.

2006: 21 commitments

2006-127. [We are committed to:] further reduce the risks associated with the safe use of nuclear energy. It must be based on a robust regime for assuring nuclear non-proliferation and a reliable safety and security system for nuclear materials and facilities;

2006-128. [We are committed to:] ensure full implementation of the international conventions and treaties in force today which are a prerequisite for a high level of safety and a basis to achieve a peaceful and proliferation-resistant nuclear energy use.

2006-129. [We are committed to:] continue to consider nuclear safety and security issues in the Nuclear Safety and Security Group (NSSG).

2006-130. We reaffirm the objective set out in the 2004 G8 Action Plan on Non-Proliferation to allow reliable access of all countries to nuclear energy on a competitive basis, consistent with non-proliferation commitment and standards.

2006-131. Building on that plan, we intend to make additional joint efforts to ensure reliable access to low enriched uranium for power reactor fuel and spent fuel recycling, including, as appropriate, through a multilateral mechanisms provided that the countries adhere to all relevant international non-proliferation commitments and comply with their obligations.

2006-218. [Our key steps over the next decade include:] tackling the undesirable illicit proliferation of conventional arms including by strengthening existing mechanisms;

2006-266. [We reaffirm our commitment to collaborative work, with our international partners, to combat the terrorist threat, including:] suppressing attempts by terrorists to gain access to weapons and other means of mass destruction;

2006-289. We rededicate ourselves to the re-invigoration of relevant multilateral fora, beginning with the Conference on Disarmament. These efforts will contribute to the further reinforcement of the global non-proliferation regime.

2006-290. We call on all states not Party to the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the 1925 Geneva Protocol to accede to them without delay and those states that have not yet done so to subscribe to the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.

2006-291. We reaffirm our full commitment to all three pillars of the NPT.

2006-292. We urge all states that have not yet done so, to sign, ratify and implement [the IAEA safeguard] instruments promptly.

2006-293. We will also work together vigorously to establish the Additional Protocol as an essential new standard in the field of nuclear supply arrangements.

2006-297. We will facilitate adoption by the Review Conference of decisions aimed at strengthening and enhancing the implementation of the BTWC.

2006-298. We call upon all States Parties to take necessary measures, including as appropriate the adoption of and implementation of national legislation, including

penal legislation, in the framework of the BTWC, in order to prohibit and prevent the proliferation of biological and toxin weapons and to ensure control over pathogenic micro organisms and toxins.

2006-299. We urge all states to implement fully UNSC Resolution 1540, including reporting on their implementation of the Resolution.

2006-300. We intend to continue working actively at national and international levels to achieve this important aim, and stand ready to consider all requests for assistance in this regard.

2006-301. We reaffirm our commitment to work toward the, universalisation of the Hague Code of Conduct Against Ballistic Missile Proliferation, and the full implementation of its confidence-building measures.

2006-302. We reaffirm our commitment to the Proliferation Security Initiative, which constitutes an important means to counter trafficking in WMD, their delivery means and related materials.

2006-304. We reaffirm our commitment to the full implementation of all G8 Global Partnership objectives.

2006-305. We also reaffirm our openness to examine the expansion of the Partnership to other recipient countries and donor states which support the Kananaskis documents and to embrace the goals and priorities of all Partnership members.

2006-306. We remain committed to our pledges in Kananaskis to raise up to \$20 billion through 2012 for the Global Partnership, initially in Russia, to support projects to address priority areas identified in Kananaskis and to continue to turn these pledges into concrete actions.

2007: 38 commitments

2007-94. We are committed to the paramount importance of safety, security and non proliferation in using nuclear power.

2007-95. We remain committed to a robust regime for assuring nuclear non-proliferation as well as a reliable safety and security system for nuclear materials, radioactive wastes and nuclear facilities.

2007-96. Considering the above mentioned challenges, the G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group (NSSG) will continue in its work to consider nuclear safety and security issues.

2007-218. [The AU and the African sub-regional organizations have identified the uncontrolled proliferation and excessive accumulation of small arms and light weapons as a matter of continental concern and have taken a number of initiatives.] We welcome those efforts and will provide our support to such programs.

2007-219. [We commit ourselves:] to assist in building the capacities of the AU and sub regional organizations to combat the unauthorized proliferation and the misuse of illicit small arms and light weapons as well as to identify, collect and destroy illicit, excess, and/or obsolete small arms and light weapons.

2007-220. We will accompany these activities by supporting the development and the implementation of integrated policies.

2007-221. [We commit ourselves:] to cooperate with the AU, sub-regional organizations, and individual states through technical and staff support when appropriate, in drafting an African Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, which would include

- measures for secure and safe management of state stockpiles of Small Arms and Light Weapons and ammunition.
- 2007-222. In this regard, we strongly support the ratification and implementation of existing international, regional and sub-regional instruments.
- 2007-267. We, the Leaders of the G8, remain resolute in our shared commitment to counter the global proliferation challenge and continue to support and implement all the statements on non-proliferation issued on the occasion of previous summits of the G8.
- 2007-268. To be successful we need to work jointly with other partners and through relevant international institutions, in particular those of the United Nations system, to strengthen all instruments available for combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.
- 2007-269. We will also continue to promote a stable international and regional environment in order to address the underlying factors for proliferation activities.
- 2007-270. We reaffirm our commitment to the multilateral treaty system which provides the normative basis for all non-proliferation efforts.
- 2007-271. We place particular emphasis on urging the adoption of effective measures to combat illicit trafficking in WMD materials and their means of delivery, in particular through capacity building related to law enforcement and the establishment and enforcement of effective export controls, as well as through the Proliferation Security Initiative.
- 2007-272. We reaffirm our commitment at Gleneagles to develop cooperative procedures to identify, track and freeze financial transactions and assets associated with WMD proliferation networks.
- 2007-273. We remain firmly committed to completing the Kananaskis goals.
- 2007-274. We will discuss in due course whether the Partnership should be extended beyond 2012 and if so how to allocate the means for expanding its scope to address threat reduction and nonproliferation requirements worldwide, including those mandated by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540.
- 2007-275. We will discuss how other states, both donors and recipients, could be included in an expanded Global Partnership.
- 2007-276. We strongly support the endeavours underway to overcome the stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament.
- 2007-277. We reaffirm our support to the early commencement of negotiations on a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty.
- 2007-278. To that end we need to strengthen verification and enforcement.
- 2007-279. We are committed to continue our efforts to make the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement together with an Additional Protocol the universally accepted verification standard for the peaceful use undertakings of the NPT.
- 2007-280. We will also work towards rendering the implementation of the CWC and BTWC more effective, in particular by promoting full and effective national implementation by all States Parties and full compliance with their obligations with regard to both Conventions.
- 2007-281. We are also committed to enhancing the effectiveness of the UNSC in meeting the challenge of proliferation and effectively fulfilling its role as the final arbiter of the consequences of non-compliance.

- 2007-282. We therefore reaffirm our full commitment to the objectives and obligations of all three pillars of the NPT and we will continue to work for its universalisation.
- 2007-283. We will undertake all efforts to achieve a positive outcome of the review process with a view to maintaining and strengthening the authority, credibility and integrity of the treaty regime.
- 2007-284. We urge the NSG to accelerate its work and swiftly reach consensus.
- 2007-285. We agree to continue to undertake previously agreed actions on the understanding that should the NSG not reach consensus on appropriate criteria by 2008, we will seriously consider alternative strategies to reduce the proliferation risks associated with the transfer of enrichment and reprocessing goods and technologies.
- 2007-286. In this context, we reaffirm our commitment to ensure that the highest possible non-proliferation, safety and security standards for the peaceful use of nuclear energy are observed.
- 2007-287. We are committed to resolving regional proliferation challenges by diplomatic means.
- 2007-288. We remain united in our commitment to resolve the proliferation concerns posed by Iran's nuclear programme.
- 2007-290. We are therefore committed to broaden participation in and further develop the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism that was launched last year at St. Petersburg.
- 2007-291. We are committed to fully comply with the decisions taken by that conference and to work for successful outcomes of the meetings during the intercessional period leading to the next Review Conference in 2011.
- 2007-292. We will continue to promote efforts to address the threat posed by proliferation of means of delivery of weapons of mass destruction.
- 2007-293. In this regard we remain committed to implementing the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation and call upon other subscribing States to follow suit.
- 2007-294. We also intend to render it more effective and urge all states which have not done so, to subscribe to the Code without delay
- 2007-302. Therefore, today, in Heiligendamm, we pledge to do everything in our power to counter the conditions that terrorists exploit, to keep the world's most dangerous weapons out of the hands of terrorists, to protect critical transport and energy infrastructures, to combat the financing of terrorism and illicit procurement networks and to remain watchful of the ways that terrorists and criminals exploit modern communication and information technologies.
- 2007-328. We reaffirm our commitment to the Global Partnership against the Proliferation of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction as set out in the 2002 Kananaskis G8 Summit documents.
- 2007-329. We reaffirm our commitment to support priority projects under this initiative, initially in Russia.

2008: 23 commitments

- 2008-63. We reiterate that safeguards (nuclear nonproliferation), nuclear safety and nuclear security (3S) are fundamental principles for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Against this background, an international initiative proposed by Japan on 3S-based nuclear energy infrastructure will be launched.

- 2008-64. We affirm the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in [the 3S] process.
- 2008-167. We are determined to make every effort to overcome the danger of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery means and to prevent acquisition of WMD by terrorists, by upholding, strengthening and universalizing all relevant multilateral non-proliferation and disarmament instruments.
- 2008-168. We are committed to resolving regional proliferation challenges by diplomatic means.
- 2008-171. We will work collectively to achieve a successful outcome of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.
- 2008-172. In this context, we reaffirm our full commitment to all three pillars (non-proliferation, peaceful uses of nuclear energy and disarmament) of the NPT
- 2008-173. [We] pledge ourselves to redouble our efforts to uphold and strengthen the [non proliferaton] Treaty.
- 2008-174. We strongly support immediate commencement and early conclusion of negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty in the Conference on Disarmament.
- 2008-175. We welcome the current progress of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), namely the successful outcome of the CWC 2nd Review Conference and reiterate the vital importance of their full and effective implementation.
- 2008-176. We stress the importance of and remain committed to the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation and urge all states to subscribe to the Code without delay.
- 2008-177. We will redouble our efforts to work together to that end in a more harmonized and coordinated manner.
- 2008-178. In this context we welcome the extension of the mandate of the 1540 Committee and stress the importance of full implementation of UNSCR 1540.
- 2008-179. [We further stress the importance of] effective export controls
- 2008-180. [We further stress the importance of] strengthening of IAEA safeguards and the universalization of the IAEA Additional Protocol
- 2008-181. [We further stress the importance of] the IAEA Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources
- 2008-182. [We further stress the importance of] supporting the activities of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative which has just celebrated its 5th anniversary.
- 2008-183. We are determined to accomplish priority projects under the Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction that was launched at the Kananaskis Summit in 2002.
- 2008-184. Since the risks of the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction exist worldwide, we agree that the Partnership will address these global challenges particularly in areas where the risks of terrorism and proliferation are greatest.
- 2008-185. We reaffirm the inalienable right of all parties to the NPT to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy in conformity with all their Treaty obligations.

- 2008-186. We are committed to and promote the highest possible standards on nuclear non-proliferation, safeguards, safety and security (3S) including the IAEA Additional Protocol.
- 2008-190. Additionally, we agree that transfers of enrichment equipment, facilities and technology to any additional state in the next year will be subject to conditions that, at a minimum, do not permit or enable replication of the facilities; and where technically feasible reprocessing transfers to any additional state will be subject to those same conditions.
- 2008-192. We will strengthen our cooperation, including experience-sharing, to fight against transnational organized crime, including trafficking in persons, smuggling of migrants, illicit manufacturing of and trafficking in firearms, illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances, cybercrime and money laundering.
- 2008-282. We expressed serious concern over Iran's failure to comply with its international obligations under successive UNSCRs, in particular to suspend all enrichment-related activities. We remain committed to a diplomatic solution to the issue through the dual track approach.
- 2009: 11 commitments
- 2009-97. Considering the above mentioned challenges, the G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group (NSSG) will continue in its work to consider nuclear safety and security issues.
- 2009-174. We remain committed to finding a diplomatic solution to the issue of Iran's nuclear program and of Iran's continued failure to meet its international obligations.
- 2009-192. We will work together so that the 2010 NPT Review Conference can successfully strengthen the Treaty's regime and set realistic and achievable goals in all the Treaty's three pillars.
- 2009-193. We confirm our full support for the IAEA and are committed to continuing our efforts towards the universal acceptance of the IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol as the verification standard.
- 2009-194. We will also work to establish the Additional Protocol as an essential standard in the field of nuclear supply arrangements.
- 2009-195. While noting that the NSG has not yet reached consensus on this issue, we agree that the NSG discussions have yielded useful and constructive proposals contained in the NSG's "clean text" developed at the 20 November 2008 Consultative Group meeting. Pending completion of work in the NSG, we agree to implement this text on a national basis in the next year.
- 2009-196. We will further promote the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), which plays an important role in developing its participants' capacity to confront this global threat on a determined and systematic basis, consistent with national legal authorities and obligations under relevant international legal frameworks.
- 2009-197. We will continue to uphold the importance of the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC), by promoting its universalization and full implementation.
- 2009-198. Regarding nuclear safety, we acknowledge the progress made since the last Summit meeting in ongoing projects at the Chernobyl site and, while noting that additional financial resources will be needed for their completion, we reassert our

commitment to undertake joint efforts with Ukraine to convert the site into a stable and environmentally safe condition. We are committed to promoting nuclear non-proliferation, safeguards, safety and security in cooperation with the IAEA and welcome new initiatives in emerging nuclear energy countries on nuclear education and training as well as institutional capacity building in these fields.

2009-201. We commit ourselves to continue promoting targeted initiatives - by providing capacity building and other forms of technical assistance - to disrupt all possible links between these two phenomena, especially in those countries characterized by a weak institutional context that provides a fertile ground for other destabilizing challenges, such as trafficking in arms, humans and illegal narcotics: as has been highlighted by experts during the G8 Conference on Destabilizing Factors and Transnational Threats (Rome, 23-24 April 2009), these criminal activities can have a multiplier effect on terrorism.

2009-202. We will intensify our efforts in tackling the widest variety of threats, such as chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism (CBRN), and attacks on critical infrastructure (including critical information infrastructure), sensitive sites, and transportation systems.

Appendix D: G8 Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Compliance by Year

Commitments	United States	Japan	Germany	United Kingdom	France	Italy	Canada	Russia	European Union	Average
1996	-0.5	0	1	1	0.5	1	1	NA	NA	0.54
1996-xx	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	NA	NA	0.71
1996-79	-1	0	1	1	0	NA	1	NA	NA	0.33
1997	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	NA	0.75
1997-xx	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	NA	0.75
2000	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	NA	0.88
2000-95	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	NA	0.88
2000-96	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	NA	0.88
2002	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	NA	0.25
2002-5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	NA	0.25
2003	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00
2003-186	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00
2004	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-1	1	0.78
2004-xx	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-1	1	0.78
2005	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00
2005-H11	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00
2006	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0.56
2006-306	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0.56
2007	0.67	0.33	0.67	0	0.33	0	0.33	0.33	0	0.30
2007-277	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	-1	0	0.11
2007-293	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0.56
2007-329	1	-1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.22
2008	0.67	0	0.33	1	0	0.33	0.67	-0.33	0.50	0.35
2008-174	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	-1	1	0.33
2008-183	1	-1	1	1	-1	0	1	1	0	0.33
2008-184	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	-1	NA	0.38
2009*	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0.55
Overall	0.44	0.50	0.75	0.75	0.50	0.53	0.75	0.36	0.44	0.57

Notes:

*refers to interim score for 2009. It is not included in the overall averages. NA means not available.

Detailed reports on each of these scores is available at the G8 Information Centre at www.g8.utoronto.ca/evaluations.

Appendix E: G8 Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Compliance by Issue

Commitments	United States	Japan	Germany	United Kingdom	France	Italy	Canada	Russia	European Union	Average
Landmines	0	0.5	1	1	1	1	1	0	NA	0.73
1996-xx	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	NA	NA	0.71
1997-xx	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	NA	0.75
Chemical and biological weapons	-1	0	1	1	0	NA	1	NA	NA	0.33
1996-79	-1	0	1	1	0	NA	1	NA	NA	0.33
CTBT and FMCT	0	1	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.33	0.33	-0.33	0.50	0.42
2000-95	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	NA	0.88
2007-277	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	-1	0	0.11
2008-174	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	-1	1	0.33
NPT	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	NA	0.88
2000-96	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	NA	0.88
Terrorism	1	0	0	0.5	0	0.5	0.5	0	NA	0.31
2002-5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	NA	0.25
2008-184	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	-1	NA	0.38
2009-202*	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0.55
IAEA	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00
2003-186	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00
Enrichment and Reprocessing	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-1	1	0.78
2004-xx	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	-1	1	0.78
Global Partnership	0.75	0	1	0.75	0	0.25	0.75	1	0.25	0.53
2005-H11	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00
2006-306	0	1	1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0.56
2007-329	1	-1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.22
2008-183	1	-1	1	1	-1	0	1	1	0	0.33
HCOC	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0.56
2007-293	1	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0.56
Overall	0.44	0.50	0.75	0.75	0.50	0.53	0.75	0.36	0.44	0.57

Notes:

xx indicates a commitment identifier is not available. *refers to interim score for 2009. It is not included in the overall averages.

CTBT = Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; FMCT = Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty; HCOC = Hague Code of Conduct; IAEA = International Atomic Energy Agency; NPT = Non-proliferation Treaty.

Detailed reports on each of these scores is available at the G8 Information Centre at <www.g8.utoronto.ca/evaluations>.