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Compliance with G8 Commitments:
Ascertaining the degree of compliance With Summit debt and international trade commitments
For Canada and the United States 1996-1999

Diana Juricevic
POL 495Y
Professor John J. Kirton
Department of Political Science
Centre for International Studies
University of Toronto

[Document Contents] [Next]

Empirical Analysis
Compliance with G7/8 International Trade and Debt Relief Commitments

Since the first Summit meeting in Rambouillet in 1975, international trade and development issues have been consistently addressed in the texts of final communiqués and collectively endorsed through subsequent proposals by member states. With respect to developing country debt,"the annual summits have historically provided if not a complete solution, then at least a pragmatic response to the burden of debt carried by both the poorest of the poor and lower income developing countries."1 Starting with the debt relief terms introduced at the 1988 Toronto Summit, subsequent attempts to reduce the burden of debt on developing countries have been made at the summits.2 The 1991 enhanced Toronto terms (which called for a 50% forgiveness of the present value of debt-service payments), the Trinidad terms, and the Naples terms (which called for a further reduction in the stock of developing country debt by 67%) have been introduced to further the pursuance of this goal.3

Like the issue of debt relief, international trade has continued to dominate the summit agenda in the 1990s despite the fact that attention has been shifting away from traditional issues of macroeconomic policy coordination since the ending of the Cold War.4 Whether through the endorsement of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations and targeted initiatives to comply with its agreements, the broadening of the WTO agenda, improving market accessibility, or the integration of developing countries into the global trading system, trade issues have continued to shape the course of economic negotiations. The 1995 Halifax summit for instance was awkwardly straddled by a tense bilateral exchange between the United States and Japan over tariffs on luxury cars.5 The following year in Lyon, Summit leaders responded to this development by reaffirming their commitment to work towards strengthening"the confidence in and credibility of the multilateral trading system by avoiding taking trade and investment measures that would be in contradiction with WTO rules and OECD codes, and by using and complying with any applicable provisions for consultation and dispute settlement when differences arise."6

The analysis in this section focuses on the extent to which Canada and the United States have substantively implemented their most significant G7/8 debt relief and international trade commitments from 1996-1999. The argument advanced in this paper is that no single theory on international cooperation accounts for either summit compliance in general or cross-country and cross- issue variations in particular. Compliance with summit debt commitments is higher due to the overall institutionalization of the G7 and important national and international institutional variables while compliance with summit trade commitments is primarily due to the direct participation of heads of state and common party allegiances. The following section will be divided according to summit: Lyon 1996, Denver 1997, Birmingham 1998, and Cologne 1999. In each sub- section, the most significant international trade and debt-relief commitments will be introduced and the extent to which Canada and the United States have complied with such commitments will be examined. An investigation of the overall pattern and theoretical implication of these results will be conducted in subsequent sections of this paper.

The 1996 Lyon Summit

The 1996 Lyon Summit made significant advances in the nature as well as the scale of debt relief, extending agreements reached in earlier summits in Toronto, London, and Naples. Through the leadership of French President Jacques Chirac, Lyon became the first Summit to host a meeting and issue a joint statement between the G7 leaders and the heads of the World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), United Nations (UN), and World Trade Organization (WTO).7 The presence of Camdessus from the IMF and Wolfenshohn from the World Bank facilitated agreement on a number of key development issues.8 Of the four recognizable debt relief commitments,9 the most significant was the HIPC debt initiative, a comprehensive and flexible framework for action to resolve the debt problems of the heavily indebted poor countries.10 Within the framework of this new partnership, the leaders pledged that the priority must be to implement more effectively targeted policies, with four complementary objectives:

(i) We will concentrate resources on [Sub Saharan African] countries that need them most and that can use them effectively, reflecting the fact that their policy program is credible and that their Government is fully committed to implement it. Grants and concessional financing should be directed primarily to meet the financial requirements of the poorest countries which have no or limited access to the international capital markets, once they can demonstrate their commitment to create the conditions to use them effectively;

(ii) [We will] give more explicit priority to sustainable development and the alleviation of poverty. This should mean adequate ODA funding of essential sectors such as health and education, basic infrastructures, clean water schemes, environmental conservation, micro-enterprises, agricultural research and small-scale agriculture, with for example the help of IFAD;

(iii) We should support the establishment of a dynamic and competitive private sector in developing countries based on small and medium scale enterprises.

(iv) lastly, further integrating the Least and Less Developed Countries into the global economy, using the full range of policy instruments having an impact on development. Within the multilateral environment which has emerged from the Uruguay Round Agreement, this should be an essential objective. We will support the LLDCs' efforts to achieve such integration, for example, by responding favourably to requests for technical assistance in the fields of investment, privatization and export diversification, and encouraging international organisations and programs to do likewise. We will implement the provisions of the Marrakech Decision on Measures in Favour of Least Developed Countries. In this context we will examine what each of us could do to improve their access to our markets and we encourage others to do the same, including other developing countries."11

The Lyon communiqué also contained nine trade-related commitments,12 the most significant of which addressed market accessibility. In the second section of the communiqué, entitled"Promoting Strong and Mutually Beneficial Growth of Trade and Investment", the leaders noted:

We also believe that there is more to be done in areas where other obstacles still seriously impede freer access to markets, in particular: by encouraging more convergence between national standards and international norms, by further regulatory reform and by mutual recognition of procedures for testing and for certification; by enhancing the disciplines of and expanding the number of countries subscribing to the Agreement on government Procurement and, in furtherance of this goal, by developing an interim arrangement on transparency, openness and due process in government procurement practices; by effectively enforcing and further developing intellectual property disciplines.13

Follow-up to Lyon

Following the Lyon Summit, Michel Camdessus, Managing Director of the IMF, delivered a speech on 9 July 1996 at the Summit of the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity in which he acknowledged what progress was being made to implement the HIPC commitment:

At the same time, we are continuing to work with the World Bank to finalize a framework for action to resolve the external debt problems of the heavily indebted low-income countries (HIPCs). The objective is to reduce these countries' external debt burden to sustainable levels through a concerted effort on the part of all major creditors to provide debt relief beyond currently available mechanisms. It has been agreed in principle that the Fund will contribute to this initiative via ESAF, and our Executive Board has recently discussed the modalities of such a contribution.14

Although no documents were found to show that either American or Canadian government officials publicly reaffirmed their commitment to implement the terms of the HIPC initiative, there is nevertheless substantial evidence that progress was made in terms of initiating and altering programs. In a letter to the Chairmen and ranking members of the House Committees and the Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Finance on 18 February 1997, the President submitted the second of five annual reports on the Administration's comprehensive trade and development policy for Africa.15 In it he summarized the status of ongoing programs discussed in the previous African trade and development report and introduced several initiatives designed to spur development in the region.

Evidence of Canada's program initiatives was even more substantial. Although there were significant budgetary cuts to official development assistance programs in Canada, funds were still made available for key projects. In spite of reducing contributions to international financial institutions by 7.3% and funding of Canadian non-governmental organizations by 7.1%, the Minister of International Cooperation nevertheless announced a $7 million contribution to support UNICEF's efforts to promote child education in Africa.16 In a news release issued in September 1996, it was also announced that the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) had just allocated 5 million dollars worth of funds to advance legal training in South Africa.17 Additionally, the Export Development Corporation initiated a line of credit for Ghana, an estimated cost of as much as US $20 million.18

Canada made similar substantive progress in its implementation of its most significant international trade commitment. While there is no evidence that an internal bureaucratic review was conducted on improving market accessibility, the Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister did head a delegation of over 30 Canadian companies to North Africa to participate in the 3rd Middle East and North African Economic Summit held from 12 to 14 November 1996.19 It was here that the Minister announced the creation of a $2 million fund financed by CIDA and an offer of export funding of up to $100 million through the Export Development Corporation (EDC).20 In reporting on the Corporate Partnering Program, the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade provided further evidence of Canada's attempt to implement programs that improved market accessibility. The program-which gives"a unique strategic opportunity for small and medium- sized enterprises (SMEs)" to access new markets, exchange technology, develop new products and attract financing-introduced over 100 Canadian technology-based SMEs to pre-selected partners in 11 countries.21

Although efforts were made to implement the Lyon market accessibility initiative in the United States, there was little evidence that American leaders allocated substantive budgetary resources to fund its initiatives. Nevertheless, the commitment was officially reaffirmed and significant program proposals were introduced. Daniel Tarullo, Deputy Assistant to the President for Economic Policy, spoke about developments in America's trade initiatives at a press briefing on 14 November 1996. Tarullo remarked that the President hopes to use the regional discussions at the APEC process to give a boost to US efforts to achieve an international technology agreement within the world trade organization.22 This agreement would eliminate all import duties on a broad range of items in the information technology area."23 In noting that the final offer lists were not in yet, Tarullo nevertheless announced that there will be some tariff reductions and some harmonization of non-tariff barriers, a"concrete start on what is going to be an extended period of step-by-step liberalization."24

Initiatives aimed at fulfilling the most significant international trade and debt relief commitments reached at the 1996 Lyon Summit for both Canada and the United States are as follows. The Canadian government complied with its agreement to"implement more effectively-targeted development policies" by investing in African education initiatives and extending a credit line for African countries. Additionally, it fulfilled its summit trade commitment of"improving market accessibility" through its export funding project and Corporate Partnering Program. As such, Canada receives a positive score for the near fulfillment of these two summit commitments. The United States, on the other hand, did not make as many substantive initiatives in both debt relief and market accessibility. Although initiating programs in the two areas, there was no evidence of any significant budgetary resource allocation. Hence, although resolutions had been initiated by the United States, they had not been sufficiently completed within the one-year time frame. As such the United States' attempt to implement these two summit commitments constitutes a"work in progress", receiving a score of"0" in accordance with the compliance scoring methodology.

The 1997 Denver Summit

In contrast to Lyon which made substantive progress on several issues including debt relief, Denver proved to be a disappointing Summit, most notably in its chosen topics of African development and the global environment.25 In the lead up to Denver, the Americans"adopted a tune of triumphalism which irritated the Europeans especially", and this tension between European and American officials was reflected in the negotiated settlements on help for Africa.26 As Nicholas Bayne points out,"the outcome [on help for Africa] was on balance a disappointment...the extensive communiqué paragraphs were an uneasy blend of the US approach, which required all beneficiaries to meet conditions, and the European and Canadian approach, which focused on greatest need."27 Although Denver generated twice as many debt-related commitments as Lyon, those commitments were by far less significant, averaging a significance score of 2.94 on a ten-point scale as compared to Lyon's average of 4.25. In addition to the issue of debt and development, little progress was made in the two principal objectives of summit reform: lighter preparations and shorter documents.28 In fact the summit agenda seemed to grow even longer, producing 29 pages of documents, most of which contained reaffirmations of summit commitments made in previous years.29 Of the eight debt relief commitments identified at Denver, the most significant was simply an extension of the Partnership for Development initiative introduced at Lyon:

This year, we aim to translate the principles of that Partnership into new concrete action to support the efforts of African countries to participate fully in the expansion of global prosperity and to spread the benefits throughout their societies. Our objective is not only to facilitate the progressive integration of African countries into the world economy, but also to foster the integration of poor populations into economic, social and political life of their countries.30

Even the most significant trade commitment reached at the Summit was a reaffirmation of previous initiatives:"We each will continue to improve, through various means, access to our markets for African exports."31

Follow-up to Denver

In the aftermath of the Summit the United States was by far the most active in implementing its debt and trade strategy initiatives. Although there was no evidence of an internal policy review on the Partnership for Development initiative, there was substantial evidence of budgetary allocations and new program initiatives. This was evidenced in a letter to the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the Senate and House Committees on 23 December 1997, in which the President submitted the third of five annual reports on the Administration's Comprehensive Trade and Development Policy for Africa. In it he urged Congress to pass the African Growth and Opportunity Act, a collective American effort to"help fulfill the promise of a stable, prosperous, and democratic Africa".32 He also pledged budgetary resources to increase private investment in Sub-Saharan Africa:

Through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), we have created a new $150 million equity fund to finance increased private investment, and will create funds up to $500 million for infrastructure investment. We also are undertaking an initiative to strengthen the transportation infrastructure in Africa.33

In the area of education, the President further called for approximately $120 million in funding to launch the Education for Development and Democracy Initiative, a collective attempt to boost African integration into the global community by expanding technological resources and improving the quality of education in Africa.34 To achieve all this, the President submitted a request to Congress to increase development assistance from $700 million to $730 million in the coming year.35

In contrast to the United States, there was little evidence that Canada allocated budgetary resources or introduced programs to further the implementation of the Partnership for Development initiative. The Prime Minister did, however, collectively reaffirm his commitment to"work towards a comprehensive solution of the debt problem, and pursue vigorously the rapid implementation of the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative" at the Edinburgh Commonwealth Summit.36 There he also alluded to the Partnership for Development initiative by collectively pledging to establish a Trade and Investment Access Facility under the Commonwealth umbrella to assist developing countries to adjust and take advantage of the opportunities of globalization.37 While there was an official reaffirmation of the commitment in an international context and diplomatic initiatives were launched to further its implementation, there was little evidence of any significant budgetary allocations. The only way in which Canada attempted to"facilitate the progressive integration of African countries" was through its Direct Investment to the region, which increased from $42 million in 1993 to $172 million in 1997 in South Africa alone.38

On the trade front, Canada did worse. Although Jean Chretien did officially reaffirm Canada's commitment to improve market accessibility at the Edinburgh Summit, the reaffirmation made no explicit mention of Africa and was therefore only tangentially connected to the commitment made in Denver. In the Edinburgh Communiqué, the commonwealth countries including Canada resolved to"strengthen the multilateral trading system within the framework of the WTO, in order to prevent regional arrangements from becoming exclusive trading blocs and provide for the greatest flow of international trade on the basis of agreed rules which are fair and equitable."39 There was also little evidence of any attempts by the national government to establish a formal policy task force on this initiative, introduce new programs, or allocate sufficient budgetary resources for implementation, suggesting that Canada did not make a substantive attempt to honour its international trade commitment.

The United States, on the other hand, made concerted efforts to comply with this market accessibility initiative. In a letter to the Chairmen and Ranking members of the House Committees and Senate Committees on 23 December 1997, the President reiterated America's commitment"to provide increased access to [American] markets for African exports."40 Three months later at the Entebbe Summit for Peace and Prosperity, the United States pledged to implement as quickly as possible President Clinton's Partnership for Economic Growth and to legislate the African Growth and Opportunity Act, an enactment that will explicitly allow for broader market access for African goods.41 Although there was little direct evidence that budgetary resources were allocated to fund this initiative, it may be inferred that such an allocation of funds was forthcoming in light of the program initiatives introduced.

Canadian and American attempts aimed at fulfilling debt and development and international trade commitments in the post-Denver period are summarized as follows. The Canadian government made an effort to comply with its Partnership for Development commitment, initially through an official reaffirmation at the Edinburgh Summit and subsequently through investment initiatives in the region. Since there was little evidence of newly established programs or budgetary funds directed to the Partnership for Development pledge, Canada is granted a score of"0" for a"work in progress." It did not do as well, however, in its international trade initiative. In failing to fund or initiate programs geared towards improving market accessibility for African exports, Canada receives a score in the negative range. The United States, on the other hand, complied fully with both its trade and development commitments. Through its African Growth and Opportunity Act, OPIC initiatives, and Education for Development and Democracy initiatives, the United States fulfilled its summit commitment to"support the efforts of African countries to participate fully in the expansion of global prosperity and to spread the benefits throughout their societies." Additionally, through its Partnership for Economic Growth, The United States honoured its trade commitment by"continu[ing] to improve, through various means, access to [its] markets for African exports." As such the United States receives a score in the positive range for its most significant debt- related and trade-related Summit commitments.

The 1998 Birmingham Summit

In contrast to Denver, Birmingham was the first Summit to address directly popular anxieties about globalization and make significant progress in the area of summit reform. Indeed the British hosts were largely successful in creating a summit that facilitated more informal discussions and generated shorter and simpler documents. This did not mean that G7/8 activity was reduced or simplified. Rather quite the opposite occurred. Birmingham was preceded by more intense preparatory work than before, with specialist groups and other ministerial meetings largely occupying the pre-summit bureaucratic agenda.42 In attempting to return the Summits to a 'library group' format, Birmingham inevitably focussed attention on the leaders themselves and their personal contribution to negotiated agreements.43 Coupled with the leftward political shift in Western governments-with Clinton and Chretien in North America, Blair in Britain and Jospin in France-the Birmingham Summit became increasingly responsive to pressure from public opinion, with the leaders being on balance more interventionist and generally more concerned with social issues than before.44 This trend was most notable with respect to the issue of debt relief to the poorest, where the Summits made significant progress in getting better debt relief for low-income countries.45 Although other measures intended to benefit poor countries were briefly discussed, they fell short of the expectations raised at Denver, especially for development initiatives in Africa.46 In spite of this, while Birmingham only generated half as many debt relief commitments as Denver, they were nevertheless twice as significant, averaging a score of 4.667 as compared to a 2.813 the previous year. Of the three debt relief commitments identified in the communiqué, the most significant did not address development assistance to Africa but rather debt relief for the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC):

The substantial debt relief already given under Naples terms and the results achieved, with six countries already declared definitely eligible for HIPC debt relief and a further two countries likely to be declared eligible shortly. We encourage all eligible countries to take the policy measures needed to embark on the process as soon as possible so that all can be in the process by the year 2000.47

On the trade front Birmingham generated ten identifiable commitments, four more than in the previous year. More importantly, the average significance score of these ten international trade commitments was 4.850 on a ten-point scale, a full two points higher than in Denver. The most significant trade commitment was a pledge to simplify custom procedures:

[We] urge our experts to reduce that data [a harmonized and simplified data set for import and export procedures] to a minimum consistent with customs responsibilities by the end of this year. We ask our experts to complete their work, including the development of standardised electronic declarations and to encompass the related import and export data requirements of other government departments and agencies.48


Follow-up to Birmingham

In the aftermath of the Summit, the United States made concerted efforts to comply with its HIPC commitment. In a press release on 16 March 1999, the President unveiled a new US initiative on debt, calling on"the international community to pursue a comprehensive approach to debt relief for the heavily indebted poor countries-the HIPCS."49 If fully implemented by creditors and credit-receiving governments, this American initiative could result in the forgiveness of an additional $70 billion in debt through early cash flow relief by international financial institutions and complete forgiveness of bilateral concessional loans. The President further pledged to seek an international commitment to provide at least 90% of this new aid to HIPC countries on a grant basis, channelling resources from debt service into education or environmental protection.50 In addition to these program initiatives, the President announced a budget submission to Congress, asking for"additional funds to cover the cost of relieving another $237 million in African debt on top of the $245 million covered in this year's appropriation."51

Canada too made significant attempts to honour its pledge on the HIPC initiative.

There was strong evidence of bureaucratic review, with the department of Finance being heavily involved in examining options to extend the so-called HIPC initiative.52 During a Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade on 15 April 1999, Donald Campbell remarked that Canada would be providing additional debt relief:"I don't have a dollar figure on that, although compared to other countries, as I said who are significantly behind us in terms of their HIPC initiatives, it will not be anywhere in the order that other countries will be providing." A month and a half later, in a subsequent interview, Campbell suggested that the Prime Minister's recent proposal would extend the range of countries who would be in a position at an early date to receive debt relief provided that there were the appropriate reforms in governance.53

On the trade front, Canada was equally as successful. The trade negotiations committee reached agreement in December"to concentrate initial efforts in the area of customs procedures and harmonization."54 The committee pledged to reconvene at the end of April to examine the work of the individual negotiating groups and to begin to delineate a package of proposals for addressing business costs and simplified and harmonized customs procedures.55 Although beyond the one-year compliance period, it should be noted that by November 1999 Canada led efforts to promote and support efficient customs administration worldwide-through the standardization of customs forms, harmonization of classification systems, streamlined procedures and codes of conduct for customs officials, as well as urging the adoption of electronic data interchange between customs authorities.56 Canada's leadership in this area"garnered 217 proposals, which have been further refined to 51 customs measures" in accordance with the wishes of the World Customs Organization.57

Although G7/8 Customs Experts did fulfill their commitment to reduce a harmonized and simplified data set for import and export procedures to a minimum consistent with customs responsibilities by the end of the year, it is not clear how supportive the United States was in implementing this initiative domestically. American G7/8 Customs Experts agreed that the World Customs Organization would be the appropriate international body to take over the management of the G7/8 results for the purposes of incorporating them into a valid and implemented standard.58 They were further supportive of the WCO initiative to start its own WCO Common Customs Data Model project in which the G7/8 results could be integrated.59 What is not clear, however, is whether the American government was prepared to initiate changes in its legislation to implement these commitments domestically since there was no evidence to suggest that it did. For this reason, the United States' attempt to implement this commitment is considered a"work in progress" and therefore receives a score of"0" in accordance with the compliance-scoring scheme.

Thus in the Post-Birmingham period, initiatives aimed at furthering the HIPC program and customs procedures are summarized as follows. Canada receives a score in the positive range (+1) for both initiatives aimed at implementing the HIPC framework and complying with customs agreements. The United States too receives high marks for its HIPC implementation initiatives, and in particular for its pledge for additional funds to cover the cost of relieving another $237 million in African debt on top of the $245 million already allocated for the year. With respect to simplifying customs procedures, however, the United States only receives a score of"0" for a"work in progress". Although visibly supporting international initiatives at custom standardization, there was little evidence that actual attempts were made domestically to initiate and implement appropriate legislation.

The 1999 Cologne Summit

Although simpler than the pre-summit meetings at Birmingham, preparations60 before Cologne were less organized and coordinated. There were no preparations for the summit before the German elections, which brought in the new government headed by Chancellor Schroeder, and even after the elections, differences between Schroeder and his first finance minister Oskar Lafontaine impeded preparatory progress.61 Unlike Birmingham, Cologne was not as successful in facilitating more informal discussions and generating shorter and simpler documents. Consequently, Schroeder was unable to organize a leader's retreat similar to the one conducted a year earlier.62 In spite of these shortcomings, however, Cologne was a very significant summit. It carried forward work on financial architecture and debt, in addition to formulating an approach to 'human security' and crisis prevention that addressed the root causes of conflict and threats to human rights.63 Indeed the G8 communiqué contained a commitment to increase the volume of official aid-the first such commitment from the summit for many years.64 In addition to ranking as the most significant debt-related commitment, if fully implemented, the Cologne Debt initiative will rank as a major summit achievement:65

To this end we welcome the 1999 Koln Debt Initiative, which is designed to provide deeper, broader and faster debt relief through major changes to the HIPC framework. The central objective of this initiative is to provide a greater focus on poverty reduction by releasing resources for investment in health, education and social needs...We are aware that new proposals will require additional substantial financing. While several means of financing are under consideration, credible progress in identifying additional funding possibilities is needed, and we stand ready to help with financing solutions.66

On the international trade front, the Cologne communiqué generated eleven trade commitments, by far the greatest number in the series and one greater than at Birmingham. Like debt relief, these commitments were of a higher quality, averaging a significance score of 5.091, marginally higher than the score of 4.850 found in Birmingham. Of these eleven pledges, the most significant addressed biotechnology and trade:

Because trade is increasingly global, the consequences of developments in biotechnology must be dealt with at the national and international levels in all the appropriate fora. We are committed to a science-based, rules-based approach to addressing these issues.67


Follow-up to Cologne

In the aftermath of the Summit, both Canada and the United States reiterated their commitment to the Cologne Debt Initiative at the G24 Meeting in September:

Ministers are concerned about the difficulties being encountered in securing the necessary funding for the enhanced HIPC framework. The call for an equitable burden sharing among all creditors. Funding for the enhanced HIPC should not be at the expense of non-HIPC developing countries, including those borrowing from multilateral and regional development banks, nor the development and poverty-reduction needs of the HIPC countries themselves. In this connection, they express their serious concerns about using IDA resources in any form to fund the Initiative. Many developing countries have already made pledges and contributions-some in excess of what industrialized countries have already made in relation to their capacity to contribute. Industrialized countries-particularly the G7 countries should provide more resources than those currently pledged.68

The United States did make concerted efforts to implement funding for debt relief initiatives. In October 1999, Samuel Berger, assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, pledged America's involvement and urged other governments to work at the WTO Ministerial next month to push for debt relief and for higher standards on labour rights and the environment.69 American initiatives at financing debt relief were rather substantial. The President announced a month earlier America's plans to"up the debt relief to the HIPC countries to 100 percent. The announced budget amendment would be worth $850 million, amending an initial $120 million request, resulting in a seven-fold increase for a total of $970 million.70 By October, however, the President vetoed the Foreign Operations Bill, the vehicle for much of America's international resources, because it was about 49% below what America spent on international engagement in 1985 and two billion below what the President requested. More importantly, however, it did not allocate any funding for America's initiative to help relieve the debts of impoverished countries that are restructuring their economies.71 Hence, although programs were initiated, budgetary funds were not made readily available due to constraints imposed by Congress.

Canada too experienced budgetary restraints in its implementation of its debt initiative. But here the Federal government's executive branch initiated this, not external forces. The aid budget fell one-third from an aid program exceeding $3 billion at the beginning of the 1990s to a $2 billion program in 1999.72 In spite of this, however, in a recent announcement by the Prime Minister made during his trip to Africa, the government announced that it is contemplating a significant increase in the aid budget-around at least 8% to 10% per year-and sustained over several years.73 Indeed, Mats Karlsson from the World Bank remarked that he"was very happy to hear that your Prime Minister, on his visit to Africa, signalled an increase in development cooperation."74 Therefore, although Canada faced some budgetary constraints, there is evidence to support the view that funding will be made available to implement its debt commitment.

On the trade front, Canada made substantive progress. In a report on Agriculture and the Agri-food Sector, the federal government's initial position on agriculture for WTO negotiations was stated, based on a certain consensus reflecting the general commercial interests of the agriculture and agri-food sector."75 In November, Ian Shugart reported that a small group was established to integrate and coordinate much of the regulation setting for biotechnology.76 There was strong evidence of budgetary funding for these biotechnology research projects, as evidenced by the Federal Government's reinvestment of $50 million into the Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada research centre.77 In addition to general funding, Canada will also request the creation of a WTO Working Group, which would be responsible for reviewing the various aspects related to trade in biotechnology products and counselling negotiators of those aspects which deserve a place in the MTN.78

The United States does not yet support Canada's study group approach. As FAS Administrator Timothy Galvin explains, the United States"would prefer to go directly into negotiations on the issue, but only along the lines of the targeted concept, a more focussed discussion of the issues at hand."79 There is strong evidence of task forces being set up to address the issues of biotechnology and trade. In late September, the Joint Economic Committee (JEC) chaired by Senator Connie Mack (R-FL), held a one-day Summit focussing on the social implications of Biotechnology research.80 A few weeks later, hearings were held on the Science of Biotechnology to the Senate Committee on Agriculture.81 Indeed, Federal agencies went further by agreeing to develop a labelling plan for food products made from genetically modified crops in order to market American products in European markets."82 Indeed, as Sally McCammon remarked:

the appropriate scientifically based standards, guidelines, and recommendations for transgenic products and other products as they move into the international marketplace are being developed by the representatives of national governments at working groups and task forces devoted to these issues under the standard-setting bodies-Codex Alimentarius, the International Plant Protection Convention, and Office des International Epizooties.83

Overall, initiatives aimed at identifying and securing additional funding for the HIPC initiative, as well as addressing the consequences of biotechnology using a science-based approach, were met with positive resolve on the part of both Canada and the United States in the post-Cologne period. As a result, both Canada and the United States receive a score in the positive range for both their debt-related and trade-related initiatives.

1 Kokotsis, p. 154
2 Bayne, p. 45
3 Kokotsis, p. 154
4 Von Furstenberg and Daniels, Undertakings p. 279
5 Bayne, p. 134
6 Lyon Communiqué
7 Bayne, p. 130.
8 Ibid.
9 For a list of all four identifiable debt relief commitments, please see the Appendix.
10 Ibid.
11 Lyon Communiqué. []. January 2000.
12 For a list of all nine trade-related commitments, please see the Appendix.
13 Lyon Communiqué.
14 []. 10 January, 2000.
15 []. 10 January 2000.
16 Canadian International Relations Chronicle: October to December 1996. Canada, the Middle East and North Africa. []. 10 January 2000.
17 Canadian International Relations Chronicle: July to September 1996. Development Assistance Policy. []. January 2000.
18 Ibid.
19 Canadian International Relations Chronicle: October to December 1996. Canada, the Middle East and North Africa. []. January 2000.
20 Ibid.
21 []. January, 2000
22 Press Briefing by Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security affairs Samuel Berger, and Deputy Assistant to the President for Economic Policy Daniel Tarullo. []. January 2000.
23 Press Briefing by Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security affairs Samuel Berger, and Deputy Assistant to the President for Economic Policy Daniel Tarullo. []. January 2000.
24 Ibid.
25 Bayne, p. 135
26 Bayne, p. 120; p. 127
27 Bayne, p. 130
28 Bayne, p. 122
29 Bayne, p. 123
30 []
31 Denver 1997 Communiqué; Bayne, p.130
32 Letter From President to Chairmen and Ranking members of the House Committees and Senate Committees. December 23, 1997. []. January 2000.
33 Letter From President to Chairmen and Ranking members of the House Committees and Senate Committees. December 23, 1997. []. January 2000.
34 Fact Sheet: Investing in the Future of Africa's Children. March 24, 1998. []. January 2000.
35 []. January 2000.
36 Edinburgh Commonwealth Economic Declaration: Promoting Shared Prosperity October 25, 1997. []. January 2000.
37 Ibid.
38 Sub-Saharan Africa Trade and Investment Facts. December 18, 1998. []. January 2000.
39 Edinburgh Commonwealth Economic Declaration: Promoting Shared Prosperity October 25, 1997. []. January 2000.
40 Letter From President to Chairmen and Ranking members of the House Committees and Senate Committees. December 23, 1997. []. January 2000.
41 Communiqué Entebbe Summit for Peace and Prosperity. March 25, 1988. []. January 2000.
42 Bayne, p. 158
43 Bayne, p. 159
44 Bayne, p. 158
45 Bayne, p. 161; 163
46 Bayne, p. 164
47 Birmingham Communiqué
48 []
49 President Clinton Announces New US Initiative on Debt. Press Release: March 16, 1999. []. January 2000.
50 Ibid.
51 Remarks by the President to Conference on US Africa Partnership March 16, 1999. []. January 2000.
52 Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. April 15, 1999. []. January 2000.
53 Transcript: Interview with Donald Campbell, Deputy Minister of Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of the Government of Canada.
54 Sub-Committee on International Trade...of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade. March 3, 1999 []. January 2000.
55 Ibid.
56 The Opportunities and Challenges of an FTAA (Nov. 2, 1999)
57 Ibid.
58 Harmonization and standardization of Customs Data requirements. []. January 2000.
59 Ibid.
61 Bayne, p. 159
62 Bayne, p. 160
63 Bayne, p. 166
64 Bayne, p. 164
65 Ibid.
66 Cologne Communiqué.
67 Cologne Communiqué.
68 Group of 24 Communiqué. Development Financing. []. January 2000.
69 Remarks by Samuel R. Berger. Assistant to President for National Security Affairs. Council of foreign relations as prepared for delivery. Oct. 21, 1999. []. January 2000.
70 Press Briefing by Joe Lockhart. Sept. 29, 1999. []. January 2000.
71 Remarks by Samuel R. Berger. Assistant to President for National Security Affairs. Council of foreign relations as prepared for delivery. Oct. 21, 1999. []. January 2000.
72 Standing Committee on Finance. Nov. 30, 1999. [www.inforcomDoc/36/2/FINA/Meetings?Evidence/finaev35-e.htm.]. January 2000. 73Ibid.
74 Standing Committee on FAIT. Nov. 18, 1999. []. January 2000.
75 Agriculture and Agri-Food Sector Report Number 01. November 2, 1999. []. January 2000.
76 Standing Committee on Health []. Nov. 16, 1999. January 2000.
77 Standing Committee on Finance. Nov. 24, 1999. []. January 2000.
78 Agriculture and Agri-Food Sector Report Number 01. November 2, 1999. []. January 2000.
79 An Interview with Timothy J. Galvin, Administrator of the Foreign Agricultural Service, US Department of Agriculture. []. January 2000.
80 Ibid.
81 []. January 2000.
82 Policy.Com: News and Events: labels for Genetically Modified Food a Possibility. September 27, 1999. []. January 2000.
83 McCammon, Sally. Regulating the Products of Biotechnology.

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