

The G8-G20 Roles and Relationship

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Introduction

Now that the Group of Twenty (G20) summit has arisen as the self-proclaimed permanent, premier forum for international economic governance, a lively debate has erupted about its relationship with the old Group of Eight (G8) and the role of both bodies in the years ahead. Many assume or argue that the G8 will and should fade away, fast, and the G20 assume all the broad agenda and functions the former has long had. Far fewer assert openly that that the new and diverse G20 may itself fade away along with the galvanizing economic crisis that gave it birth, leaving the G8 with its inner Group of Seven (G7) finance ministers to continue as the global steering group that counts. Given the durability of international institutions, it is more likely that both, rather than either or neither, will continue for the foreseeable future, in a relationship that could take several forms. The major possibilities are competition, passive mutual coexistence by dividing up the global policy agenda and governance functions, or active cooperation that brings the comparative advantage of each to reap the global governance synergies that await (Kirton 2009).

After less than two years of G20 summitry, it is still too soon to conclude with complete confidence which scenario will spring to life. But there is already substantial evidence to suggest that the system is moving toward synergistic cooperation between the two G's that will strengthen each and both in the medium term. The global demand for governance is pulling the system in that direction and the old G8 great powers and new G20-only systemically significant ones are starting to supply that demand by working together in this way. However, its realization will take smart, strategic leadership from the G8 and G20's coming hosts and chairs, starting with Canada in June 2010. And if they provide it properly, in the longer term, the G8 and its G20 creation could become one, united above all by the values that the G8 has successfully pioneered since its start.

The Strengthening Success of the G8 and G20 Summits

The prospect that both the G8 and G20 summits will continue rests in the first instance on the fact that few international institutions, even informal plurilateral, globally-relevant summit-level ones, tend to fade away. As Appendix A exhibits, many such institutions show impressive longevity, dating back a century or more. The G8, born in 1975, is one of the oldest such bodies of global relevance and reach. After 36 years in operation, it is unlikely to disappear soon.

Moreover, as Appendix B indicates, the G8 shows a substantial and strengthening performance over these years on all six dominant dimensions of governance which such bodies are expected to perform. It has an improving and now respectable record in delivering its commitments, by having its members comply with them within the year after they are made. It has also become, from its summit centre, a full-strength governance system, with a broad array of G8-centred bodies at the ministerial, official and civil society levels below. There are no signs that it is a global governance system on the wane.

The G20, in its first two years of summit life, also shows signs of strengthening, even if it is still far less potent in its performance than the G8 has become. The G20 has beaten the G8 in the frequency of its summit meetings — having had five scheduled within its first two calendar years. Yet, as Appendix C shows, on all six dimensions of global governance, the G20 remains far behind the G8. G20 summits last about half as long as G8 ones, generate only one-third as many decisional commitments, and have a compliance record that, while still in the positive range, is well behind that of the G8 and of the G8 members within the G20 itself.

The future demand for global governance thus seems likely to be met by both bodies, rather than either or neither. In the case of the latter scenario, it is striking how the successful MEF/M-16 that arose as a core component of the last two G8 summits has disappeared from the 2010 one, even with the failure of the UN's Copenhagen COP-MOP to effectively deal with climate change. The traditional preference of France and a few others for a G13 is voiced far less frequently now, even as France's turn to host both the G8 and G20 summits in 2011 draws near. The group of Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC), now having had two summits, remain largely members of both the G20 and G8 and have expressed support for the G20 itself.

Shaping the G8-G20 Relationship

If both bodies seem likely to continue and even strengthen, then given their high similarity in membership/participation, top tier plurilateralism, informality, summit centricity and global governance orientation, they will increasingly need to define and develop the relationship between the two.

In the realm of competition there have been few substantial signs of rivalry. There is an ongoing desire on the part of several, largely Asian members that G20 summits precede G8 ones each year, to avoid any impression that the old G8 club is pre-defining or dictating to the newer, broader G20 one. But here the G7/8 has prevailed, in holding its June 2010 summit before the G20 one, in holding the G7 finance ministers meeting in late April 2010 just before the G20 one at the semi-annual Bank-Fund meetings in Washington, and thus far for 2011 in France, having the G8 summit in its normal summer slot preceding the G20 in newly normal (for leaders but not finance ministers) November one. There has been only minor competition over issues each wish to take up, with a Sherpa-level tussle over which group will speak about the Haitian earthquake on January 12, 2010, serving as the major case to date.

Passive mutual coexistence is more evident, especially in dividing up the global policy agenda so that the G20 governs finance and economics and the G8 social, political and security issues. It is striking how easily the G8 in 2010, if not in 2009 has abandoned its finance and economic agenda in favour of the G20. Also striking is the refusal and reluctance of the G20 to take up many social and all political and security issues in any direct way. Apart from the shared concern with development, the G20 has made only minor, if increasing, incursions into the food, health and human security issues at the heart of the recent G8's agenda.

Passive mutual co-existence has arisen far less where individual governance functions are concerned. Each Group operates as a full strength governance system across all the six dimensions of domestic political management, deliberation, direction-setting, decision-making, delivery and the development of global governance. While the G20 has lagged in the latter, it is now catching up, with a G20 labour ministers meeting on April 20-21, 2010, and several business summits set for Toronto and Seoul.

Skewed Synergy in Operation

Thus far, synergistic cooperation has dominated. It is bringing the comparative advantage of each Group together to reap the global governance synergies that await. This active cooperation has been led by the G8.

From the beginning it was the G8 summit and G7 finance ministers that formally created the G20 finance ministers' forum in 1999. The membership was decided jointly by the finance ministers of two G7 members, the United States and Canada (Kirton 2001, 2010a, Summers 2008). Much of the work of the G20 summits has been guided by the directions and decisions set by G7 finance ministers at their meeting held at the peak of the 2008 financial crisis in Washington in October 2008.¹ The countries that have to date hosted the G20 summits have assigned the same individual the task of continuing to serve not only as the G8 sherpa, but additionally as the G20 one, ensuring at this critical level co-ordination on a G8 core. There has been substantial and strengthening reciprocal reinforcing recognition in the communiqués of the two summit systems. The G8, at its 2009 L'Aquila Summit, often acted with explicit reference to the work of the G20 summit, offering the G20 both leadership guidance and followership support. The G20 increasingly reciprocated at Washington, London and Pittsburgh (Appendix H).

The sequence of co-evolving G summitry shows, in seven specific steps, how this reciprocal, reinforcing relationship is taking shape (Kirton 2009). First, the G8 leaders all chose at L'Aquila in July 2009 to hold subsequent G8 summits, and do so not just in Canada in 2010 to complete their standard hosting cycle, but also in France in 2011

¹ At the height of the crisis in October 2008, it was the G7 finance ministers, at their regular meeting, that tore up their prepared communiqué and produced a new one that served as the guide for what the G20 subsequently did. During that time, the G7 finance deputees had many conference calls, first thing in the morning, with bad days adding one in the evening and terrible days adding a third in the middle of the night. The intensity and sequence of G7/G8 preparatory meetings at the ministerial and official level show no signs that the G7/G8 will fade away.

where a new, now eight year, hosting cycle would naturally begin. Second, the new American president Barak Obama, attending his first G8 summit at L'Aquila, agreed with this decision. Obama did so even though at the G20 summit in London, his first such encounter, he had publicly noted at the end that there might be too many summits in the world. Third, at the Pittsburgh G20 summit that Obama chose to host in September 2009, he and all other G20 leaders, knowing that there would be G8 summits in 2010 and 2011, agreed that their newly proclaimed permanent G20 summit would hold two meetings in 2010, in Canada in June and again in South Korea in November. They would thus participate in two G20 summits a year, two years in a row, one in spring-summer and a second one in the fall. Fourth, Obama also announced he would host a G20 summit-like gathering on the topic of nuclear non-proliferation in Washington on April 12-13, 2010. The record reveals that a very busy new president had quickly come to prefer GX-like, plurilateral summitry as his favoured global governance approach.

Fifth, in terms of the timing and location of their next G20 summit, the leaders at Pittsburgh agreed that the first meeting of their newly, permanent body would adjust to meet in June 2010 in tandem with the G8, on the temporal and geographic platform already established by the G8. Sixth, as hosts of their next G20 summit, the Pittsburgh leaders chose Canada, as it was already the G8 host, with South Korea to co-chair twice in 2010. In so doing, they predictably, if slowly, moved from a G8 to a non-G8 member as G20 chair and host. However, unlike the past G20 finance cadence or current relative capability and growth configurations, they chose as their first non-G8 member to chair and host not big India, nor booming China, but democratic South Korea on the Pacific Rim, very close to a Japan that would host the Asia Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) leaders at almost the same time that South Korea would host the G20 in November.² The preference for tying G20 hosting to established plurilateral summits, and to the democratic Pacific powers of Canada and Japan as hosts stands out. Seventh, following the 2010 formula for 2011, the G20 chose as their host, France, the country already scheduled to host the G8. They further revised the G20 finance's long, established hosting rotation to make it consistent with the new G20 summit one and thereby for two years running, with the G8 one. Increasingly, French President Sarkozy's public remarks suggest he intends to host separate summits for the G8 and G20 and not move either to his earlier favoured G13.

Synergy on a G8 core has also arisen in the form of convergent similarity. At their first meeting in 2010, the G20 sherpas reached a consensus that for the G20 summits to work well, they must become much like the G8 summits have long been. This included an assured annual frequency, a leaders'-driven dialogue, a focused agenda and much more.

The Path to a Fused Future

These strong trends toward G8-centered cooperation synergy are likely to continue into the medium term for several reasons.

² Korea has previously secured the support of Japan, which had offered to host the second G20 summit, and China, for Koreans bid to host the fourth G20 summit in Seoul in April 2010.

The first is the comparative capabilities of the two clubs. G8 members have a large presence in the G20 and globally. The G7 members control the private sector capital, financial centers, and comprehensive expertise on financial regulation - a core component of the agenda of the G20. They also control the Executive Boards of the IMF and World Bank, and therein many issues addressed at or through the Bretton Woods twins, such as the Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth, peer review for financial regulation, trade finance, development, and international financial institution (IFI) reform. The G8 has had a large leadership role within the G20, even if the cleavages within the G20 seldom arise on G8 versus non-G8 members lines.

The second reason is the difficulties of a division of labour over the agenda in a club led by leaders who can and will talk about anything they want, and whose comparative advantage is to cover and combine the entire governance agenda in a coherent and synergistic way. So many subjects, including development, micro-finance, food security, energy, climate change, health and human security are already on the agenda of both groups (Kirton 2010b, 2010c, 2010d). Moreover so many others, such as the climate-health connection and the nuclear energy-nuclear proliferation link, inherently unite the two as the G8 experience has showed since 1997 and 1977. Finally the demands of each body to mobilize new funding packages will require tradeoffs and cooperation from largely the same donor pool. With integration so functionally and financially linked, active co-ordination will be given a powerful thrust.

The third reason for G8-centered cooperation is the likelihood that the G8's defining principles of open democracy, including accountability and transparency, will slowly diffuse through the G20, even with a financially rich, non-democratic Saudi Arabia and China being an equal member of this enlarged club. This diffusion took place within the Finance G20 from 1999 to 2004 (Kirton 2005a, 2005b). The selection of the hosts for the first five G20 summits, and the move for internal leadership from a rotating troika to a pentarchy composed of all democratic polities should propel this trend. And it could be furthered in 2012 when a new, younger, more internationally experienced and aware leadership in China comes to power. Should that happen, and should the G20 summit come to operate much like the G8 one, then the two groups may become one in the longer term.

The other outstanding question for 2012 is who will host the G8 and G20 summits in 2012? President Obama could well see strong advantages, in the realm of domestic political management, in hosting the G8 as America is due to do, at the usual time in mid-summer in the lead-up to the US presidential and congressional elections in November. But as the US has already hosted the G20 twice in the past few years, and as the G8 non-G8 member hosting rotation for the G20 will have been established by then, it is unlikely that the US will host the 2012 G20 as well.

If the United States hosts only the pre-ordained G8 and not a separate or fused G20 along with it, who will host the G20? Mexico, Turkey and China have indicated that they would be prepared to serve. If regional rotation rules, the democratic non-G8 member from the Americas, Mexico, located so conveniently close to the US, rather than Asia's China or

Europe's Turkey could well be chosen to host. If so, by the time the G20 hosting gets to China sometime later, that country could have a regime recognizably more politically open than it is now. The long term path could thus bring the G8 and the G20 together in one united, open political club.

The Canadian Contribution

In constructing this future, Canada has a critical role to play. This role arises from Canada's rising relevant capabilities, its character as the great connector, its conception of the evolving institutional architecture as a co-founder of the G20, its co-chairing with Korea of the first G20 summit since the decision to make the body permanent, and its longstanding commitment to good governance, freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law.

First, Canada's capabilities start with its overall rank and continue with its top-tier possession of the specialized capabilities that count for issues on the G20's agenda and in the evolving world at large. As Fareed Zakaria rightly recognizes, "Canada is becoming a major power," as a benign neighbour of America with better broadband, health care and automotive manufacturing, a troop contributor to the American-led, UN-endorsed mission in Afghanistan, and a core part of the global British Empire in its illustrious past (Zakaria 2008: 29). As an emerging energy superpower and an emerging clean energy superpower, as Canadian Prime Minister Steven Harper has accurately proclaimed, and number one in the world in windy coastlines and fresh water, conveniently located Canada has the capabilities a vulnerable America most needs, starting with the world's largest supplies of uranium and continuing with oil reserves second only to those of a distant, non-democratic, terrorist-afflicted Saudi Arabia. Canada has a democratic tradition dating back to the Magna Carta of 1215, and has been unscarred by invasion, serious civil strife or civil war for almost two centuries now. It also offers overall GDP growth that will lead the G8 in 2009 and 2010 and many of the non-G8 G20 ones such as Mexico too. Canada adds top tier capabilities in finance as one of the world's leading financial centers, has a permanent seat on the Executive Boards of the IMF and World Bank, and plays a major role as a contributor to the regional development banks. On the eve of the G20's Pittsburgh Summit, it unilaterally contributed C\$2.6 billion in callable capital to the credit-strapped African Development Bank.

Second, Canada's position as the great connector within the G20 begins, economically, as a country standing between large, old, relatively closed, established and newer, smaller, open, emerging economies, and between resource rich and manufacturing-service intensive ones. It continues geographically and demographically as both an Atlantic and Asia-Pacific country and a member of the Arctic and Americas as well. Demographically, Canada is increasingly becoming an Asian-Pacific country as Chinese is the third largest language (after English and French) spoken by its citizens at home. Canada's connectivity extends to international institutions through Canada's position as a founding and leading member of the global, plurilateral Commonwealth and Francophonie that together embrace half the countries in the world, and the summit-level trans-regional

institutions of the APEC forum, the North Atlantic Treaty organization (NATO), and Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and regional Summit of the Americas (SOA) and trilateral North American Leaders' Summit as well (Appendix A). In these institutions and thus in the G20, Canada is particularly sensitive to the concerns of emerging and outside economies, as a country that was not initially a member of the G8. Canada is also a country that has been excluded from permanent veto membership in the UNSC P-5, as half of its G8 partners and all but one of its non-G8 G20 partners are, and are likely to be for a rather long time.

Third, Canada has long had a long term conception for the G20, starting even before Canada co-created the institution with the United States in 1999 (Summers 2008). This vision continued with an effort, well before the 2008 crisis, to elevate the forum into a leaders' level club (Martin 2005). Canada's vision centered on the need to give the emerging powers, especially in Asia, an appropriate large and equal place at the centre of global economic, social and related governance through a club where open dialogue, learning, consensus and resulting commitment and compliance becomes the norm. It continues now with a desire to focus it on taking the tough decisions, and making it accountable for delivering them as promised to produce real results.

Fourth, Canada was selected to co-chair the fourth, first permanent G20 summit in June 2010 (and the first taking place after an interval as long as nine months). This was due in part to lower transaction costs by holding the G20 summit together at almost the same time and place, which were both conveniently located very close to Washington D. C. But it also reflected Canada's exceptional commitment to and competence in hosting past G8 summits and its contribution to the first three summits the G20 had held. Here its leading role on exit strategies and open trade and investment stood out. It also showed as early as the summer of 2009 that it was willingly to share the hosting and chairing with South Korea, where Canada's G8 and G20 Sherpa, Len Edwards, had served as Canadian Ambassador before.

Fifth, Canada has a longstanding commitment to good governance, freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and values the continuing G8. This is reinforced, in the experience of Canada's current and previous prime ministers, by the G8's configuration as an informal compact club of equals where anyone can carry the day on the basis of the quality of the arguments he or she make. Both features could come to characterize the G20 over the longer term, especially if the opening G20 2010 sherpa consensus for future G20 summits takes hold. A Canada with such confidence in its own capabilities, convictions and conversational persuasiveness, would thus not be overwhelmed by any simple logic of the country having less airtime in a summit group of twenty than it does in a group of eight, especially as that has not been Canada's experience in the G20 thus far. It knows that the aspect that counts is not how long or often a leader speaks, but on how much all the other leaders listen and learn from what he or she says. Canada would thus be a country that would welcome a long term fusion of the G8 and G20 into a fused, effective, open political, global governance club.

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Appendix A: The Plurilateral Summit Institutions Network

G20	G8+5	MEM-16	CHOGM	FRA	ASEM	OSCE	APEC	SOA	SCO	NATO
United States	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+
Japan	+	+	-	-	+	-	+	-	-	-
Germany	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	+
United Kingdom	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	-	+
France	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	-	-	+
Italy	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	+
Canada	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+
Russia	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	-
EU	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-
China	-	+	-	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
India	-	+	+	-	+	-	-	-	+ Observer	-
Brazil	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Mexico	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-
South Africa	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Indonesia	-	+	-	-	+	-	+	-	-	-
Korea	-	+	-	-	+	-	+	-	-	-
Australia	-	+	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Argentina	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Saudi Arabia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Turkey	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+
Spain	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	+
Netherlands	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	+

Notes:

APEC = Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation; ASEM = Asia-Europe Meeting; CHOGM = Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting; FRA = Francophonie; G8+5 = G8 plus Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa; MEM-16 = Major Economies Meeting/Forum; NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OSCE = Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; SCO = Shanghai Cooperation Organization; SOA = Summit of the Americas.

Appendix B: G8 Performance, 1975–2009

Year	Grades		Domestic Political Management		Deliberative			Directional	Decisional	Delivery	Development of Global Governance		Attendees
	Bayne	Kirton	Members	References (average)	Days	Statements	Words	References to Core Values	Commitments	Compliance	# Bodies	Ministerial/ Official	Countries/ International Organizations
1975	A-		33%	0.33	3	1	1,129	5	14	57.1	0/1	4/6	0/0
1976	D		33%	1.00	2	1	1,624	0	7	08.9	0/0	7	0/0
1977	B-		50%	1.50	2	6	2,669	0	29	08.4	0/1	8	0/0
1978	A		75%	3.25	2	2	2,999	0	35	36.3	0/0	8	0/0
1979	B+		67%	3.33	2	2	2,102	0	34	82.3	½	8	0/0
1980	C+		20%	0.40	2	5	3,996	3	55	07.6	0/1	8	0/0
1981	C		50%	3.75	2	3	3,165	0	40	26.6	1/0	8	0/0
1982	C		75%	1.75	3	2	1,796	0	23	84.0	0/3	9	0/0
1983	B		60%	3.00	3	2	2,156	7	38	-10.9	0/0	8	0/0
1984	C-		25%	0.50	3	5	3,261	0	31	48.8	1/0	8	0/0
1985	E		33%	1.00	3	2	3,127	1	24	01.0	0/2	8	0/0
1986	B+		80%	4.40	3	4	3,582	1	39	58.3	1/1	9	0/0
1987	D		25%	6.00	3	7	5,064	0	53	93.3	0/2	9	0/0
1988	C-		25%	0.50	3	3	4,872	0	27	-47.8	0/0	8	0/0
1989	B+		50%	1.00	3	11	7,125	1	61	07.8	0/1	8	0/0
1990	D		33%	0.67	3	3	7,601	10	78	-14.0	0/3	8	0/0
1991	B-		20%	2.80	3	3	8,099	8	53	00.0	0/0	9	1/0
1992	D		33%	1.33	3	4	7,528	5	41	64.0	1/1	8	0/0
1993	C+		33%	1.00	3	2	3,398	2	29	75.0	0/2	8	1/0
1994	C		40%	1.80	3	2	4,123	5	53	100.0	1/0	8	1/0
1995	B+		25%	0.25	3	3	7,250	0	78	100.0	2/2	8	1/0
1996	B		40%	0.40	3	5	15,289	6	128	41.0	0/3	8	¼
1997	C-		40%	0.40	3	4	12,994	6	145	12.8	1/3	9	1/0
1998	B+		60%	1.00	3	4	6,092	5	73	31.8	0/0	9	0/0
1999	B+		80%	1.60	3	4	10,019	4	46	38.2	1/5	9	0/0
2000	B		25%	9.50	3	5	13,596	6	105	81.4	0/4	9	4/3
2001	B		40%	1.20	3	7	6,214	3	58	55.0	1/2	9	0
2002	B+		17%	0.17	2	18	11,959	10	187	35.0	1/8	10	0
2003	C		75%	1.25	3	14	16,889	17	206	65.8	0/5	10	12/5
2004	C+		33%	0.67	3	16	38,517	11	245	54.0	0/15	10	12/0
2005	A-		50%	0.50	3	16	22,286	29	212	65.0	0/5	9	11/6
2006			25%	0.25	3	15	30,695	256	317	47.0	0/4	10	5/9
2007			75%	1.25	3	8	25,857	651	329	51.0	0/4	9	9/9
2008		B+	33%	1.33	3	6	16,842	TBC	296	48.0	1/4	9	15/6
2009		B	NA	NA	3	10	31,167	62	254	NA	TBD	NA	28/10
Total					98	206	345,082	1,105	3,369		13/92	289	74/43
Average	B-	B/B+	43%	1.74	2.8	5				41.35	0.38/2.71	8.5	2.17/1.26
1975–81	B-		47%	1.94	2.1	2.9	2,526	1.1	29	32.46	0.14/0.71	7.43	0/0
1982–88	C-		46%	2.45	3	3.3	3,408	1.3	34	32.39	0.29/1.14	8.43	0/0
1989–96	C+		33%	1.26	3	4	6,446	4.4	56	47.54	0.58/1.29	8.14	0.57/0
1997–2002	B		43%	2.04	2.9	6.7	10,880	5.7	106	42.17	0.58/3.57	9.00	0.86/1.00
2003–09	B-	B/B+	49%	0.88	3	12.5	25,181	177	255.67	56.56	0.17/6.16	9.50	10.67/6.0

Notes: NA = not available; TBC = to be calculated. Grades up to and including 2005 are determined by Nicholas Bayne; from 2006 on are determined by John Kirton, using different frameworks and methods. Domestic Political Management: Members is the percentage of G8 countries measured that referred to the G7/8 at least once that year in their national policy addresses; References refers to the countries measured. Deliberative: Days is the duration of the summit. Statements refers to the number of documents issued at the summit. # Words refers to the number of words in those documents. Directional: Number of references to the G8's core values of democracy, social advance and individual liberty contained in the communiqué's chapeau or chair's summary. Decisional: Number of total commitments for the year in question, as counted by the G8 Research Group. Delivery: Compliance scores from 1990 to 1995 measure compliance with commitments selected by Ella Kokotsis; compliance scores as of 1996 measure compliance with G8 Research Group's selected commitments. Development of Global Governance: Bodies is the number of new G7/8-countries institutions created at the ministerial and official levels at or by the summit, or during the hosting year, at least in the form of having one meeting take place. Attendees refers to the number of leaders of G8 members, including those representing the European Community from the start, and the number of invited participants from countries or from international organizations. Russia started as a participant in 1991 and became a full member in 1998. In 1975, the G4 met without Japan and Italy; later that year the G6 met.

Appendix C: G20 Performance, 1999–2009

G20 Finance Ministers

Year	Deliberation			Decisional	Delivery	Development of G20 Governance				Development of Global Governance														
	Words	Doc	Days			G20 I	G20 B	Dep Mtgs	Workshops	Other Institutions Noted at Meetings														
										BWI	IMF	WB	WTO	FSF	FATF	UN	BCBS	OECD	IFI	IEF	IOSCO	FSB	Other	
1999	402	1	2	4	TBC	2	1	1	NA	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
2000	2,455	1	2	8	TBC	0	0	2	NA	0	12	4	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
2001	1,631	2	2	24	TBC	0	1	2	1	0	4	3	2	3	8	6	1	0	2	0	0	0	2	
2002	958	1	2	2	TBC	0	1	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	2	
2003	1,185	1	2	6	TBC	1	2	2	1	0	6	3	1	0	2	1	0	1	2	0	0	0	1	
2004	1,392	1	2	10	TBC	2	0	2	3	0	4	4	0	0	5	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	
2005	1,683	2	2	8	TBC	0	0	2	3	15	8	4	2	0	0	2	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	
2006	2,048	1	2	10	TBC	1	0	2	3	1	13	10	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	
2007	2,236	1	2	20	TBC	1	0	2	3	3	10	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
2008 ^a	259	1	2	4	TBC	0	0	-	-	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
2008	1,744	1	2	27	TBC	5	0	2	3	3	8	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	
2009 ^a	1,669	3	1	18	TBC	0	0	2	0	0	5	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	3	0	1	0	2	
Total	17,662	16	23	92	TBC	12	5	19	18	24	74	39	8	9	17	10	1	4	11	1	1	0	16	

G20 Leaders

Year	Deliberation			Decisional	Delivery (catalysts)	Development of G20 Governance			Development of Global Governance																
	Words	Doc	Days			G20 I	G20 B	Working Groups	Other Institutions Noted at Meetings																
									BWI	IMF	WB	WTO	FSF	FATF	UN	BCBS	OECD	IFI	IEF	IOSCO	FSB	Other			
2008 Nov	3635	2	2	95	139 (39, 1Y [+]; 14, CIO [+]; 13, OIO [-])	1	2	4	TBC													0	TBC		
2009 April	6228	3	2	88	65 (6, 1Y [+]; 19, CIO [+]; 10, OIO [-])	0	1	1	0	35	8	2	5	3	2	8	2	12	0	3	20	TBC			
2009 Sept	TBC																								
Total	9863	5	7	183	204	1	3	5																	

Source: International Organizations Research Institute of the State University Higher School of Economics in cooperation with the National Training Foundation of the Russian Federation.

Notes:

Includes only meetings at which communiqués were issued. Domestic political management has not yet been assessed and is therefore omitted here.

^aEmergency or special meeting held outside regular annual schedule.

TBC = to be calculated. Catalysts: 1Y = one-year time table; CIO = delegation to core international organization; OIO = delegation to other international organization.

Deliberation: Words is the number of words in documents issued at the annual meeting. Doc is the number of documents issued at the annual meeting. Days is the duration of the meeting.

Decisional: Number of total commitments made for the year in question, including commitments as they relate to the G20 as a whole and excluding country-specific commitments.

Delivery refers to the total number of compliance catalysts embedded in commitments for the year in question. Catalysts highlighted in parentheses affect compliance either positively (+) or negatively (-).

Development of G20 Governance refers to the documents issued for the year in question, excluding titles and subtitles. One unit of analysis is one sentence. G20I is the number of references to G20 as an institution; G20B is the number of references to G20 official-level bodies, including seminars; Dep Mtgs refers to the number of deputies meetings.

Development of Global Governance refers to the number of times an international institution is mentioned in the documents for the year in question, excluding titles and subtitles. One unit of analysis is one sentence. If more than one institution is mentioned within a sentence, each institution is accounted for; if one institution is mentioned more than once in a sentence, it is only counted once.

BCBS = Basel Committee of Banking Supervisors; BWI = Bretton Woods institutions; FATF = Financial Action Task Force; FSB = Financial Stability Board; FSF = Financial Stability Forum; IEF = International Energy Forum; IFI = international financial institutions; IMF = International Monetary; OECD = Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development; UN = United Nations; WB = World Bank; WTO = World Trade Organization.

Appendix D: Communiqué Compliments: G20 Summits

Country	# of compliments April 2009
Spain	1
European Union	1
Mexico	4
Poland	2
Colombia	2
Japan	2
China	2

Compiled by Zaria Shaw, G20 Research Group.

Appendix E: G20 Leaders Communiqué Conclusions, 2008–09

Financial Crises

Summit	# Words	% Total Words	# Paragraphs	% Total Paragraphs	# Documents	% Documents	Total Dedicated Documents
Washington 2008	1865	50.9	25	35.2	1	100	1
London 2009	2135	34.1	30	32.6	3	100	3
Pittsburgh 2009	3118	33.4	33	30.2	1	100	1
Average	2372	39.4	29.3	32.6	1.6	100	1.6

Development

Summit	# Words	% Total Words	# Paragraphs	% Total Paragraphs	# Documents	% Documents	Total Dedicated Documents
Washington 2008	651	17.8	9	12.6	1	100	0
London 2009	1726	27.6	28	30.4	3	100	1
Pittsburgh 2009	2292	24.5	20	18.3	1	100	0
Average	1556	23.3	19	20.4	1.6	100	0.33

Climate Change

Summit	# Words	% Total Words	# Paragraphs	% Total Paragraphs	# Documents	% Documents	Total Dedicated Documents
Washington 2008	64	1.7	2	2.8	1	100	0
London 2009	64	1	2	2.1	1	100	0
Pittsburgh 2009	911	9.7	10	11.7	3	100	0
Average	247.3	4.1	4.6	5.5	1.3	100	0

Energy

Summit	# Words	% Total Words	# Paragraphs	% Total Paragraphs	# Documents	% Documents	Total Dedicated Documents
Washington 2008	29	0.79	1	1.4	1	100	0
London 2009	0	0	0	0	3	0	0
Pittsburgh 2009	1259	13.4	12	11	1	100	0
Average	419	4.7	4.3	4.1	1.6	66.6	0

Notes: Data are drawn from all official English-language documents released by the G20 leaders as a group. Charts are excluded. # of Words is the number of issue-specific subjects for the year indicated, excluding titles and references.

Words are calculated by paragraph because the paragraph is the unit of analysis.

% of Total Words refers to the total number of words in all documents for the year indicated.

of Paragraphs is the number of paragraphs containing issue-specific references for the year indicated. Each point is recorded as a separate paragraph.

% of Total Paragraphs refers to the total number of paragraphs in all documents for the year indicated.

of Documents⁷ is the number of documents that contain issue-specific subjects and excludes dedicated documents.

% of Total Documents refers to the total number of documents for the year indicated.

of Dedicated Documents is the number of documents for the year that refer to the specified issue in the title.

Appendix F: G20 Compliance, London Summit 2009

Member	Sept 2008	April 2009
	N=1	N = 5
France		+100
Germany		+100
United Kingdom		+100
Australia		+80
Canada		+80
European Union		+80
Russia		+40
United States		+40
Brazil		+20
Japan		+20
Saudi Arabia		+20
Turkey		+20
Italy		00
Mexico		00
South Africa		00
South Korea		00
China		-40
India		-40
Indonesia		-40
Argentina		-60
All Average		+23
G8 Average (9)		+62
Non-G8 Average (11)		-03

Note: G8 members are in bold.

Appendix G: Direct References to G20 from G8 Summit 2009

World Economy

14. Echoing the call of the **G-20**, an appropriate follow up framework is needed to fully benefit from this renewed emphasis on tax information exchange and transparency:
 - a. the OECD Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information must implement a peer-review process that assesses implementation of international standards by all jurisdictions and provides an objective and credible basis for further action;
 - b. since all countries monitored so far by the Global Forum have committed to implement international standards on exchange of tax information, efforts should now concentrate on implementing actual information exchange and increasing the number, quality and relevance of the agreements that adhere to these standards;
 - c. participation to the Global Forum should be expanded;
 - d. recognising the particularly damaging effects of tax evasion for developing countries, concrete progress needs to be made towards enabling developing countries to benefit from the new co-operative tax environment, including through enhanced participation in the Global Forum and the consideration of a multilateral approach for exchange of information;
 - e. criteria used to define jurisdictions which have not yet substantially implemented internationally agreed standards on tax information exchange and transparency should be revised as part of the peer review assessment process to ensure an effective implementation of international standards; and
 - f. a toolbox of effective countermeasures for countries to consider for use against countries that do not meet international standards in relation to tax transparency should be discussed and agreed.

We ask the OECD to swiftly address these challenges, propose further steps and report by the time of the next **G20** Finance Ministers' meeting.

Common Principles and Standards

27. For the market economy to generate sustained prosperity, fundamental norms of propriety, integrity and transparency in economic interactions must be respected. The magnitude and reach of the crisis has demonstrated the need for urgent action in this regard. Reform efforts must address these flaws in international economic and financial systems with resolve. This will require promoting appropriate levels of transparency, strengthening regulatory and supervisory systems, better protecting investors, and strengthening business ethics. To address these issues we have agreed on the objectives of a strategy to create a comprehensive framework, "the Lecce Framework", building on existing initiatives, to identify and fill regulatory gaps and foster the broad international consensus needed for rapid implementation. The Framework includes the areas of corporate governance, market integrity, financial regulation and supervision, tax cooperation, and transparency of macroeconomic policy and data. To ensure the effectiveness of the Lecce Framework, we will make every effort to pursue maximum country participation and swift and resolute implementation. We are committed to working with our international partners to make progress, with a view to reaching out to broader fora, including the **G-20** and beyond.

Concluding Report of the Heiligendamm Process, L'Aquila Summit, July 9, 2008

The Dialogue Partners recalled the commitment of G20 Leaders at the London Summit in April 2009 to refrain from raising new barriers to investment and to rectify promptly any such measures, as well as the call for the WTO and other international bodies, within their respective mandates, to monitor and report on adherence in this respect. They took note that OECD/UNCTAD/WTO/IMF cooperation had begun, welcomed this quick response, and look forward to the expected reports. Partners share the view that there is value in drawing on them in future discussions on how to keep markets open and resist protectionism, including measures that constrain capital flows particularly to developing countries.

Chair's Summary of the G8-Africa Session at the G8 L'Aquila Summit L'Aquila Summit, July 10,

The G8 and African partners agreed on the importance of continuing to reinforce their partnership, based on mutual accountability and respect, for the common good. In this spirit, they examined the issues on the agenda of their meeting, which are of particular relevance to Africa because of the current international context. Leaders:

- Agreed that the economic and financial crisis is hitting hardest the poorest and risk jeopardising progress made in the health, the eradication of hunger and poverty. Leaders underscored the need to act swiftly to restore growth and implement adequate measures to protect the most vulnerable. G8 countries reiterated their commitments, including those made in Gleneagles and more recently at the **G20 London Summit**, to support African efforts towards promoting development good governance and achieving the Millennium Development Goals.

G8 Experts Group on Global Food Security

G8 are highly committed to reach an urgent conclusion of an ambitious, comprehensive and balanced Doha Round considering that this will contribute to ensuring a better allocation of resources in the agricultural sector and improving global food security. G8 highlight the crucial importance of rejecting protectionism, including refraining from imposing new export restriction and implementing World Trade Organization inconsistent measures as agreed by **G20**, and encouraging the development of local, regional and internationally integrated agricultural markets. They also support a rules-based international trading system for agricultural trade through the reduction and phasing out of all forms of export subsidies, the substantial reductions of trade-distorting domestic support and real and significant improvements in market access, especially by small holder farmers. G8 have also been engaged in strengthening the capacity of developing countries to participate in international trade negotiations and to implement international trade agreements.

Canada is also fully engaged in the global response to address the financial and economic crisis, in line with Leaders' commitments made at the **London G20 Summit**. It is expected that the pledged funds will benefit developing countries, including indirect benefits to their agricultural sector. Amongst others, Canada announced its intention to establish a bilateral loan agreement with the IMF for US\$ 10 billion (almost doubling its resource commitment), committed \$US 20 million to the World Bank's Global Trade Liquidity Program, announced a temporary capital subscription of US\$ 4 billion to the InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB), and supported a 200% general capital increase for the Asian Development Bank.

Implementation Review of G8 Anti-Corruption Commitments

The UK is also funding the work of the International Centre for Asset Recovery and working closely with the World Bank/UNODC Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative (StAR) aimed at assisting international cooperation and capacity building in the recovery of corrupt assets, money laundering and prosecutions. The funding has allowed ICAR to assist many countries including Brazil, Indonesia, Thailand, Kenya, Tanzania, Brunei and the Philippines.

The UK has worked through the **G20** for strengthened financial regulation to address developing country priorities.

Appendix H: References to G8 in G20 Summits communiqués

Compiled by Heather Keachie, April 21, 2010

Washington, November 15, 2008

Declaration of the Summit on Financial Markets and the World Economy

(para. 9) “[...] The **Financial Stability Forum (FSF)** must expand urgently to a broader membership of emerging economies, and other major standard setting bodies should promptly review their membership. The IMF, in collaboration with the expanded FSF and other bodies, should work to better identify vulnerabilities, anticipate potential stresses, and act swiftly to play a key role in crisis response.”

(para. 14) “[...] We reaffirm the importance of the **Millennium Development Goals**, the development assistance commitments we have made, and urge both developed and emerging economies to undertake commitments consistent with their capacities and roles in the global economy. In this regard, we reaffirm the development principles agreed at the 2002 United Nations Conference on Financing for Development in Monterrey, Mexico, which emphasized country ownership and mobilizing all sources of financing for development.”

Action Plan to Implement Principles for Reform

- “Private sector bodies that have already developed best practices for private pools of capital and/or hedge funds should bring forward proposals for a set of unified best practices. Finance Ministers should assess the adequacy of these proposals, drawing upon the analysis of regulators, **the expanded FSF**, and other relevant bodies.”
- “The IMF, **expanded FSF**, and other regulators and bodies should develop recommendations to mitigate pro-cyclicality, including the review of how valuation and leverage, bank capital, executive compensation, and provisioning practices may exacerbate cyclical trends.”
- “**The Financial Action Task Force** should continue its important work against money laundering and terrorist financing, and we support the efforts of the World Bank - UN Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative.”
- “**The FSF** should expand to a broader membership of emerging economies.”
- “The IMF, with its focus on surveillance, and **the expanded FSF**, with its focus on standard setting, should strengthen their collaboration, enhancing efforts to better integrate regulatory and supervisory responses into the macro-prudential policy framework and conduct early warning exercises.”

London, April 2, 2009

Leaders' Statement

(para. 15) To this end we are implementing the Action Plan agreed at our last meeting, as set out in the attached progress report. We have today also issued a Declaration, *Strengthening the Financial System*. In particular we agree:

- to establish a new **Financial Stability Board (FSB)** with a strengthened mandate, as a successor to the **Financial Stability Forum (FSF)**, including all G20 countries, FSF members, Spain, and the European Commission;
- that the **FSB** should collaborate with the IMF to provide early warning of macroeconomic and financial risks and the actions needed to address them; [...]
- to endorse and implement the **FSF's** tough new principles on pay and compensation and to support sustainable compensation schemes and the corporate social responsibility of all firms [...]

(para. 16) “We instruct our Finance Ministers to complete the implementation of these decisions in line with the timetable set out in the Action Plan. We have asked the **FSB** and the IMF to

monitor progress, working with the **Financial Action Taskforce** and other relevant bodies, and to provide a report to the next meeting of our Finance Ministers in Scotland in November.”

(para. 25) “[...] we reaffirm our historic commitment to meeting the **Millennium Development Goals** and to achieving our respective ODA pledges, including commitments on Aid for Trade, debt relief, and the **Gleneagles commitments**, especially to sub-Saharan Africa”

(para. 26) “[...] We will build a fair and family-friendly labour market for both women and men. We therefore welcome the reports of the London Jobs Conference and the **Rome Social Summit** and the key principles they proposed. We will support employment by stimulating growth, investing in education and training, and through active labour market policies, focusing on the most vulnerable. [...]”

Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System

(six pages) The document, “Global Plan Annex: Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System,” (available at www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009ifi.html) is “a full progress report against each of the 47 actions set out in the Washington Action Plan.” The plan includes an outline of the mandate of the new FSB, and indicates how the FSB will interact with the G20 and other IFIs. The whole document is not reproduced here.

“We, the Leaders of the G20, have taken, and will continue to take, action to strengthen regulation and supervision in line with the commitments we made in Washington to reform the regulation of the financial sector. [...] We have agreed that the **Financial Stability Forum** should be expanded, given a broadened mandate to promote financial stability, and re-established with a stronger institutional basis and enhanced capacity as the **Financial Stability Board (FSB)**.”

Pittsburgh, September 25, 2009

Leaders' Statement

Preamble

(para. 19) “We designated the G20 to be the premier forum for our international economic cooperation. We established the **Financial Stability Board (FSB)** to include major emerging economies and welcome its efforts to coordinate and monitor progress in strengthening financial regulation.”

(para. 23) “Over four billion people remain undereducated, ill-equipped with capital and technology, and insufficiently integrated into the global economy. We need to work together to make the policy and institutional changes needed to accelerate the convergence of living standards and productivity in developing and emerging economies to the levels of the advanced economies. To start, we call on the World Bank to develop a new trust fund to support the new **Food Security Initiative** for low-income countries announced last summer. We will increase, on a voluntary basis, funding for programs to bring clean affordable energy to the poorest, such as the Scaling Up Renewable Energy Program.”

A Framework for Strong, Sustainable, and Balanced Growth

(para. 2) “[...]We task our Finance Ministers, working with input from the IMF and **FSB**, at their November meeting to continue developing cooperative and coordinated exit strategies recognizing that the scale, timing, and sequencing of this process will vary across countries or regions and across the type of policy measures. Credible exit strategies should be designed and communicated clearly to anchor expectations and reinforce confidence.”

(para. 11) “[...]We endorse the institutional strengthening of the **FSB** through its Charter, following its establishment in London, and welcome its reports to Leaders and Ministers. The **FSB's** ongoing efforts to monitor progress will be essential to the full and consistent implementation of needed reforms. We call on the **FSB** to report on progress to the G20 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors in advance of the next Leaders summit.”

- (para. 13) “[...] *Reforming compensation practices to support financial stability*: Excessive compensation in the financial sector has both reflected and encouraged excessive risk taking. Reforming compensation policies and practices is an essential part of our effort to increase financial stability. We fully endorse the implementation standards of the **FSB** aimed at aligning compensation with long-term value creation, not excessive risk-taking... We call on firms to implement these sound compensation practices immediately. We task the **FSB** to monitor the implementation of **FSB** standards and propose additional measures as required by March 2010.”
“[...] We ask the **FSB** and its relevant members to assess regularly implementation and whether it is sufficient to improve transparency in the derivatives markets, mitigate systemic risk, and protect against market abuse.”
“[...] The **FSB** should propose by the end of October 2010 possible measures including more intensive supervision and specific additional capital, liquidity, and other prudential requirements.”
- (para. 15) “[...] We welcome the progress made by the **Financial Action Task Force (FATF)** in the fight against money laundering and terrorist financing and call upon the **FATF** to issue a public list of high risk jurisdictions by February 2010. We call on the **FSB** to report progress to address NCJs with regards to international cooperation and information exchange in November 2009 and to initiate a peer review process by February 2010.”
- (para. 28) “Access to diverse, reliable, affordable and clean energy is critical for sustainable growth. Inefficient markets and excessive volatility negatively affect both producers and consumers. Noting the **St. Petersburg Principles on Global Energy Security**, which recognize the shared interest of energy producing, consuming and transiting countries in promoting global energy security, we individually and collectively commit to:
- Increase energy market transparency and market stability by publishing complete, accurate, and timely data on oil production, consumption, refining and stock levels, as appropriate, on a regular basis, ideally monthly, beginning by January 2010. [...]
- (para. 32) “As leaders of the world’s major economies, we are working for a resilient, sustainable, and green recovery. We underscore anew our resolve to take strong action to address the threat of dangerous climate change. We reaffirm the objective, provisions, and principles of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), including common but differentiated responsibilities. **We note the principles endorsed by Leaders at the Major Economies Forum in L’Aquila, Italy.** We will intensify our efforts, in cooperation with other parties, to reach agreement in Copenhagen through the UNFCCC negotiation. An agreement must include mitigation, adaptation, technology, and financing.”
- (para. 37) “We reaffirm our historic commitment to meet the **Millennium Development Goals** and our respective **Official Development Assistance (ODA) pledges**, including commitments on Aid for Trade, debt relief, and those made at **Gleneagles**, especially to sub-Saharan Africa, to 2010 and beyond.”
- (para. 39) “Sustained funding and targeted investments are urgently needed to improve long-term food security. We welcome and support the **food security initiative announced in L’Aquila** and efforts to further implement the Global Partnership for Agriculture and Food Security and to address excessive price volatility. We call on the World Bank to work with interested donors and organizations to develop a multilateral trust fund to scale-up agricultural assistance to low-income countries. This will help support innovative bilateral and multilateral efforts to improve global nutrition and build sustainable agricultural systems, including programs like those developed through the Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Program (CAADP). It should be designed to ensure country ownership and rapid disbursement of funds, fully respecting the aid effectiveness principles agreed in Accra, and facilitate the participation of private foundations, businesses, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in this historic effort. These efforts should complement the UN Comprehensive Framework for Agriculture. We ask the World Bank, the African Development Bank, UN, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Fund for Agricultural Development

(IFAD), World Food Programme (WFP) and other stakeholders to coordinate their efforts, including through country-led mechanisms, in order to complement and reinforce other existing multilateral and bilateral efforts to tackle food insecurity.”

(para. 42) “As we increase the flow of capital to developing countries, we also need to prevent its illicit outflow. We will work with the World Bank’s Stolen Assets Recovery (StAR) program to secure the return of stolen assets to developing countries, and support other efforts to stem illicit outflows. We ask the **FATF** to help detect and deter the proceeds of corruption by prioritizing work to strengthen standards on customer due diligence, beneficial ownership and transparency. We note the principles of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action and will work to increase the transparency of international aid flows by 2010. [...]”

(para. 46) “We agree on the importance of building an employment-oriented framework for future economic growth. In this context, we reaffirm the importance of the London Jobs Conference and **Rome Social Summit**. [...]”