

Why the World Needs G8 and G20 Summitry: Prospects for 2010 and Beyond

John Kirton, G8 and G20 Research Groups, University of Toronto
john.kirton@utoronto.ca

Paper prepared for the Center for Dialogue and Analysis on North America (CEDAN), Tecnologico de Monterrey (ITESM), Mexico City Campus, Mexico City, March 11-12, 2010. Draft of April 8, 2010.

Introduction

On November 14-15, 2008, the leaders of the world's 20 systemically significant countries held their first summit in Washington DC in response to the great made-in-America financial crisis that had erupted in full force two months before. Within six months of their Washington gathering they met again, on April 1-2, 2009, in London. A mere six months later, they met for a third time, on September 24-25, 2009, in Pittsburgh. There they proclaimed that their summit would become a permanent institution, to serve as the primary centre of global economic governance for the indefinite future, long after the crisis that had created it had passed.

The birth of institutionalized Group of Twenty (G20) summitry gave rise to much assumption, argument and advocacy that the G20's time had come and that the older, smaller Group of Eight (G8) major market democracies would and should quickly fade away. The claim was based overwhelmingly on the simple logic that relative capability in the world had passed from the G8 countries to China, India, Brazil and others only in the G20, and that to be effective a global governance centre must reflect in its membership the configuration of relative capability in the world. A second claim was that to be legitimate, even in a fast-paced, fluid globalizing age, such a centre of global governance had to contain, as full members, fixed territorially grounded countries from all major geographic regions of the world.

Amidst the celebration and classic logic there seemed little need to subject the new G20 summit to the same systematic scrutiny that the G8 had attracted over many years. During this time many had regularly attacked the G8 for its presumed lack of power, legitimacy, geographic representativeness and ensuing effectiveness. Such claims have been carefully assessed through the theoretically grounded frameworks, concepts, indicators and methods that flowed from, connected with and contributed to the study of international relations and international institutions as a whole. This same proven scholarly arsenal can, with minimal adaptation, now be applied to the new G20 summit as well.

This study thus conducts the first, systematic, analytically grounded comparison of the G8 and G20 summits to answer two questions: Why does the world need the G8 and G20 summits? And what will their relationship be? It argues that the world needs both for the foreseeable future, because they do different jobs, because the G8 has proven it can do the job of both if need be, while the G20 has not yet shown it can do even its own job

well. Rather than compete to have one replace the other, or compete with each other, they need to — and will — cooperate, not just by passively dividing up the global policy terrain but by actively coordinating to advance the intensely interlinked agenda each has.

To develop this argument, this study first compares the two evolving institutions in their creation, mission, institutionalization, membership, participation, agenda, accountability, and durability, and finds that on most of these key institutional components, the G8 thus far has a superior claim. Second, it examines how well each institution has worked in accomplishing its core mission and in providing domestic political management, deliberation, direction, decisions, delivery and the development of global governance. Here again the G8 has the edge overall. Third, it looks ahead to identify what the two institutions are likely to do at the G8 Muskoka Summit on June 25-26, the G20 Toronto Summit on June 26-27, and the G20 Seoul Summit on November 11-12. It suggests the first two events are likely to succeed in providing timely and badly needed global public goods in their core domains. Fourth and finally, it looks at the prospective relationship between the two institutions, both now and beyond this year. The study concludes that they will work increasingly well with each other, for the greater global good.

In addressing these questions, the focus will be on the role of the three North American partners — the established United States as the inventor of G20 summitry, Canada as the host of the G8 and co-host of the G20 in 2010, and Mexico as a leading “emerging” member and participant in each and the host of the G20 sherpa meeting in January 2010 at which the appropriate architecture for this new institution was assessed.

While the approach in this study is evidence-based, analytical and comparative, it is also useful to keep in mind the larger questions: Would we want the world to have a G8 and a G20, even if Canada and Mexico were not members or participants, to provide global governance and provide global public goods? And why do we need either when the members of the North American community already have so many shared regional, hemispheric, plurilateral and multilateral institutions through which to act (see Appendix A).

What Have the G8 and G20 Become?

First, what have the G8 and G20 — each an elite, exclusive, summit club of the world’s top tier powers — become as international institutions since they sprung to life?

Their creation commonly came from a shock to the international order that none of the existing international institutions could adequately address. Both flowed from made-in-America financial shocks — the G8 from Nixon’s end of the gold-dollar link on August 15, 1971, and the G20 from the failure of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008. But the G8’s seminal shock was a conscious, controlled, narrowly targeted, state-delivered one from a still hegemonic United States. The G20’s was from an unconscious, uncontrolled, untargeted shock from non-state actors within America, spreading with unpredictable speed and scope to damage most of the world. Moreover, the G8 was born from multiple shocks across many interlinked domains — finance and trade with the surcharge in 1971, war in the Middle East and energy with the accompanying oil

embargo in 1973, nuclear proliferation with India's explosion in May 1974, the final defeat of the U.S. in Vietnam in April 1975 and the prospective bankruptcy of New York City by the time of the first summit in November 1975. The G20, in contrast, sprang from a shock in the single sphere of finance, both for its first summit in November 2008 and for its first finance ministers' meeting in December 1999 before. The G8 was thus created to guide global order overall. The G20 was created to react in a single, economic sphere.

Their respective missions reflect well these different shocks that led to their birth. Both are explicitly global in their geographic reach. But the G8 was created with the broad, pre-eminently political, offensive, indeed transformational mission to intervene in the internal affairs of its members and other states to promote open democracy, individual liberty and social advance. The G20 was created to defensively provide financial stability among Westphalian sovereign states and the markets that connected them.

The institutionalization of the G8 and G20 summits showed similarities: both began from finance ministers' forums followed by summits that were quickly repeated to become a permanent feature of international political life. But it took only two years for the G8 to leap to the leaders' level to produce a body that leaders personally and directly control, deliver and jealously guard as their own. It took a full decade for the G20 to do so, with the result that it remains much heavily driven by its finance ministers and officials, with the leaders appearing briefly in public to present heavily prepared scripts. Foreign as well as finance ministers were at the G8 summits from the start and when leaders started meeting alone in 1998, these ministers continued to meet separately, along with G8-centred forums for most ministers that member and participating governments have. G20 leaders still meet with their finance ministers by their side, and thus far only ministers of tourism (from all members but America) and ministers of labour seem ready to join the G20 governance game. Among government officials, the G8 has spawned more than 100 subject-specific, task-oriented groups, some of which live on to this day. The G20 still relies on only a few, very temporary working groups. And in its relationship with civil society, the G8 has developed links with the legislative, nongovernmental, media, academic, faith, indigenous, youth and business communities. The G20 remains restricted to consultations with experts from the field of economics.

The membership of both the G8 and G20 remains a tiny fraction of the Westphalian world of 200 sovereign states, if slightly larger than the Permanent Five (P5) members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the permanent members of the executive boards of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. But while these UN-Bretton Woods bodies have remained essentially unchanged since their formation in 1944–45, G8 membership has quickly expanded and now more than doubled, from the four Atlantic countries (United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany) that attended the first ministerial library group gathering in 1973 to the eight countries at present (including Japan from Asia) and the ever expanding European Union too. This has brought substantial expansion in combined capability, internal equality, global reach and internal diversity on many dimensions. In contrast, the G20's membership has been frozen at 19 countries and the European Union since 1999, at the levels of ministers as well as leaders. This stark difference between a more inclusive and

a permanently closed global governance club offsets the well-recited apparent advantage of a G20 that has more than twice as many members, representing more diversity on many dimensions, than the G8 currently has. This advantage has not stopped the G20 from being subject to the same “closed club” criticisms long levelled at the G8.

The participation, short of full membership, by others has long been a feature of both the G8 and the G20. The oldest, most universal multilateral organizations, led by the UN, the IMF and the World Bank, have been the first and faithful choice of preferred guests of both. In sheer numbers and thus combined capability, internal diversity and the presumed effectiveness and diversity that thus flow, the G8 has surpassed the G20, with the 40 leaders at the G8’s most recent L’Aquila Summit in 2009, compared to the G20’s high of 32 at its most recent summit in Pittsburgh in September 2009. The G8’s lead here is consistent with the broader mission and agenda that it has, and the resulting subject-specific, variable-geometry formula that it employs. To be sure, more participants can produce effectiveness-reducing transaction costs, but also increase representativeness and legitimacy-enhancing effects.

It is useful to compare how Mexico has fared in its involvement in the two clubs (see Appendix B). In the G8 Mexico is not involved at the top tier, just as it and Canada remain excluded from the UNSC-P5, and just as Canada was excluded from the first G8 summit in 1975. But Mexico started participating in G8 summit governance at the leaders’ level in 1989, did so again in 2003 and has done so continuously since 2005. It has participated as an equal at the ministerial level, starting with the Global Health Security Initiative since 2001, and at the official level in the Heiligendamm Process since 2007. Although Mexico has been a full member of the G20 at all levels from the start, with the very recent emergence of an inner pentarchy, replacing the troika, as the steering group for the G20 summits and thus system, Mexico is not a member of this inner grouping while Canada is, by virtue of hosting the G20 summit in June 2010. And both Canada and Mexico must ask the basic arithmetic question of whether their voices are heard more influentially as one of 14 in the G8 with the EU and the Group of Five (G5) — the grouping of Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa, which have participated in the G8 summits since 2005 — or as one of 22-plus in the G20, with the Netherlands and Spain and the IMF and World Bank always there as well. One attractive answer is to choose both, rather than to rely on only one, and thus add the distinctive opportunities that each offers.

The agendas of the G8 and the G20 offer more differences than similarities. Since its start in 1975 the G8 summit has comprehensively governed finance and economics (including commercial bank lending and cumulative exposure and risk in 1976), global-transnational issues and political-security ones of both an old and new sort. The G20 finance forum started in 1999 with finance and economics, expanded in 2001 to take up terrorist finance and later to do climate change, but has largely ignored most global social issues such as health and almost all political-security ones. The G20 summit has been similarly selective at its first three summits, an appropriately focused approach for a gathering that lasts less than a full day. There are thus no good empirical grounds for concluding that the G20 summits could expand to embrace the G8’s comprehensive agenda, and deal

synergistically with the inter-issue links to produce big package deals the way the G8 has. Such claims are largely a leap of faith.

The accountability of each institution displays a difference. In recent years the G8 has, with increasing frequency and credibility, sought to report through separate issue-specific documents how it is achieving the many expansive collective commitments it has made. The G20 has done so through appending to its communiqués lengthy catalogues of how it is progressing toward the specific items and largely future timetables it has set from the start. Neither has been particularly frank in identifying where it has failed, which members have done so, why this failure has happened, and what remedial actions or adjustments will be taken as a result.

The durability of each institution offers the greatest contrast of all. The G8 has lasted 36 years, surviving many moments of massive and internal systemic change, through stagflation, recession, non-inflationary growth, the advent of intense globalization, the eruption of the new cold war and the post-Cold War victory in its wake. Thus far the G20 summit, while proclaiming its permanence in September 2009, has lasted less than two years, while the reality and the memory of the unprecedented financial and economic are very fresh, and while the central imperative and accomplishment combine in everyone spending massive amounts of public money in a short time. The tough test for G20 governance is still to come. It is thus understandable that in September 2009 the G20 modestly claimed to be a permanent global institution for only economic governance, and even here refers to itself only the primary rather than the exclusive forum.

How Well Have They Worked Thus Far?

The second component of a comparative assessment moves from institutional composition to consider how well each summit system has performed, both in realizing its distinctive mission and on the six standard dimensions of global governance that all such international institutions share (see Appendix C).

On the central criterion of “mission accomplished,” the G8 has been a striking success, as the democratic revolution and the associated respect for human rights have swept the world. The democratizing achievements that the G8 actively produced start with the surprisingly peaceful destruction of the Soviet Union, bloc, empire and model since 1989, continue with the end of apartheid in South Africa, and come to the prevention of genocide in Kosovo in 1999. The G20 at the ministerial level has assisted, as with the democratization of Indonesia after 1999. But it has clearly failed in its core mission of ensuring financial stability, with the 2007–09 outbreak of a much greater crisis than that of 1997–99. It is too soon to tell how well the G20 will prevent the next crisis, contain its contagion and save the system’s stability when critical firms fail.

Domestic Political Management

On the first specific dimension of domestic political management, the G8 has long been used, at times successfully, by its democratically and popularly elected leaders to win re-election and to forward their policy priorities at home (see Appendix D). The G8 is

referred to in the national policy addresses regularly and heavily in Japan, if less so in the U.S. and other members as well.¹

The G20 summits have also been used to help leaders manage their domestic politics (see Appendix E). Indeed, Canadian prime minister Stephen Harper explicitly used the G20 summit consensus to justify, just after a successful re-election campaign where he had promised he would not take Canada into deficit, why he had to do just that.² As in the G8, G20 leaders seek and sometimes secure specific favourable references to themselves or their countries in the summit communiqués in hopes that their voters and others will notice them and give them an electoral or other domestic political reward (see Appendix F).

Deliberation

On the second dimension of deliberation, in real and recorded discussions the G8 has dealt with a great many issues in the economic, social and political domains. It has taken up such issues arising within and outside the G8, and in regard to the internal and international behaviour of countries in the world. There is virtually no subject that the G20 has thus far discussed that the G8 has not, including at the most recent L'Aquila Summit in the summer of 2009. In contrast, there are a large number of issues that the G8 has addressed but the G20 has not, as the G20 has concentrated on its finance and development core (see Appendix G). It is the G8 that thus still “owns” the strong majority of issues subject to “Gx governance” in the world.

Direction Setting

On the third dimension of direction setting, the G8 has recurrently reaffirmed its core principle of open democracy, applied it to specific issues, and expanded and detailed it in many ways. The G20 summits have stuck with financial stability, but added development to this core. Thus far the G20 summit has not explicitly endorsed political openness or democracy as a global good. In contrast, the G8 has repeatedly and recently done so for financial stability and development and much more in the economic domain.

Decision Making

On the fourth dimension of decision making, the G8 has produced more than 3,000 commitments, with close to 300 made at each summit in recent years. The G20 summit average is about 100, or one third as many as the G8.

¹ Recent cases include Silvio Berlusconi's popular and successful last-minute shift of the Italian-hosted 2009 G8 summit from La Maddalena to earthquake-ravaged L'Aquila to help raise international attention and money for its reconstruction.

² The most recent cases include Harper's extensive references to both the G8 and G20 in his Speech from the Throne on March 3, 2010, and federal budget released the following day, and British prime minister Gordon Brown is heavily using his role as host at the G20 London Summit in April 2009 as a reason to re-elect him in May 2010.

Delivery

On the fifth dimension of delivery, as assessed by the compliance by the members with their collective decisional commitments, the G8's record has risen to a level of about 75% in recent years. The available comparable evidence for the G20 gives it a grade of 62%, with the G20's G8 members doing notably better than its non-G8 ones (see Appendix H).

Developing Global Governance

On the sixth dimension of developing global governance, the G8 has evolved into a full-strength system, at the leaders' level (with special summits), many ministerial, official-level and civil society forums, and a defined, long-term hosting order, frequency, timing and format. The G20 has not done so yet, making it still an institutionally slight and fragile global governance club.

What Will They Do in 2010?

The next opportunity for the G8 and G20 to perform on these dimensions, and to further define their mutual relationship arises in 2010, with the G8 Muskoka Summit, the G20 Toronto Summit and the G20 Seoul Summit. The prospects are that the first two Cdn summits will produce clear achievements in their distinct domains, while the third faces more challenges on its unavoidable tasks.

G8 Muskoka: From Friday, June 25, to Saturday, June 26, 2010

As a country that has always placed a priority on G8 summitry and taken a strategic approach to its role as host, Canada began considering the shape of its 2010 summit almost three years in advance. Following its traditional approach, and the model it used as host at Montebello in 1981 and Kananaskis in 2002, Canada emphasized minimalism, so the leaders themselves would have the maximum opportunity to engage together alone. Thus the summit would be held in a single hotel, the Deerhurst Inn, a resort in a small city in vacation country two hours away from the closest big city, Toronto. There would be few lead-up ministerial meetings beyond the basic finance and foreign ministers' ones, with the development ministers' meeting in Halifax added at a last stage. In addition to the G8 leaders, a few African leaders would likely be invited to participate in the summit session most closely related to their concerns. The G8 summit, long scheduled for the traditional three days, was reduced to two days, June 25–26, when the G20 summit in Toronto was added on June 26–27. While the G8 summit would take place first, over the opposition of several G20 members who would not attend, the sharp separation in the agenda of the two summits would reduce any impression that the G8 had pre-decided what the larger G20 would do the next day.

When Prime Minister Harper announced in the summer of 2008 the time and place of the G8 summit, he declared that its agenda would focus on economic growth, climate change, and the peace and security values of freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. A year later he added development as a fourth pillar, including education but focused on health and particularly maternal and children's health (Harper 2009). By late January 2010, in an opinion editorial in Canada's largest circulation daily newspaper and

at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Harper declared that his “top priority” for the summit would be maternal and children’s health (Harper 2010a, 2010b). The Speech from the Throne delivered on March 3, 2010, and federal budget delivered on March 4, 2010, specified that the maternal and children’s health initiative would focus on reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) through the simple, affordable solutions of “training for healthcare workers, vaccines, better nutrition and clean water” and that Canada would “work to secure increased global spending on this priority” (Department of Finance 2010). The budget also identified, as G8 and G20 priorities, accountability “by honouring its international commitment” as a “defining feature” of both summits, the economic crisis, immediate and long-term recovery in Haiti, maternal and children’s health, and food security. Available to support these priorities was an additional increase in official development assistance (ODA) of 8%, or \$364 million for the 2010–11 fiscal year.

The prospects are promising for the Muskoka Summit to produce four clear achievements. Maternal and children’s health should have strong support from Britain and the U.S., and from civil society throughout the G8 countries, even if some G8 partners might wish to emphasize other health issues, such as G8 perennials HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria and the need to replenish the Global Fund to Fight HIV, Tuberculosis and Malaria. Haitian relief and recovery will build on the donor conferences already hosted in Montreal and New York and will receive strong support from the U.S. and France to start. Food security flows well from both these initiatives and from Canada’s accountability agenda, long strongly supported by the U.S., the UK and the EU. It should produce more comprehensive reporting across all G8 agenda areas, conducted according to a consistent, analytical framework that all stakeholders can accept.

Elsewhere on the G8 agenda, useful advances could well come in the political-security realm, most prominently in supporting nuclear non-proliferation and the struggling democracy movement in Iran. Other issues include the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction, nuclear non-proliferation, including North Korea, post-conflict peacebuilding, counterterrorism in vulnerable states such as Yemen and Afghanistan, and, possibly, promoting democracy and human rights in Myanmar and Zimbabwe.³ The latter issue, along with adaptation to climate change in the least developed states, could be dealt with usefully in the outreach session with African leaders.

G20 Toronto: On Saturday, June 26, and Sunday, June 27, 2010

Late on Saturday, June 26, or very early on Sunday, June 27, the G8 leaders will travel from Huntsville to Toronto for their G20 summit at the Metro Toronto Convention Centre, appropriately located at the epicentre of Canada’s largest city and one of the leading financial centres in the world. This fourth G20 summit, initially to be hosted in South Korea in April, was chosen to be jointly hosted by South Korea and Canada in June as a summit separate from — but held close in time and space to — the long scheduled G8 summit. It is due to have fewer participants than its predecessors, and

³ Other regional security issues that some might suggest are Ukraine and Honduras.

follow a standard agenda confined to economics and finance. The 19 country leaders and the EU will thus address macroeconomic stimulus and exit strategies, financial regulation, the Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth, reform of international financial institutions (IFIs), trade, development and climate change, and also probably employment and fossil fuel subsidies.

Canada's priorities flow from its prime minister's desire to put first things first, all the more so with a second G20 summit set for November 2010 in Korea, when some issues will be more ripe for resolution. This means limiting the agenda to core financial and economic subjects, with a focus on macroeconomic policy, financial regulation, trade and the response to the reports and deadlines set by previous G20 summits.

The prospects for success are promising with this focused approach. The first achievement from Toronto will likely be a clear consensus on exit strategies, setting a framework for when which kinds of countries will withdraw their financial support, monetary and discretionary fiscal stimulus. Economic conditions allowing, most G20 members will move down this path in 2011. Prime Minister Harper spoke out about the need for an exit strategy at the first G20 summit in Washington, and most G20 members and markets are now worrying about the large debt burdens many leading countries have acquired, so conditions are right for a strong success here. On financial regulation, at Canada's insistence, there will likely be a clear consensus on stronger, internationally consistent levels and ratios of banking capital and liquidity, based on agreed definitions. A third success could come on open trade, with a stronger anti-protectionist pledge backed by improved accountability mechanisms, trade finance, more action against fossil fuel subsidies and, conceivably, serious support to complete the Doha Development Agenda of trade negotiations.

Elsewhere on the Toronto G20 agenda, the leaders will easily endorse stimulus for another year as a way to generate jobs. The agenda then becomes increasingly challenging, as it moves to international review of implementing new, domestic financial regulations, through the other built-in issues and into climate finance. The agenda could also be disrupted by populist demands to impose bank levies, if not transaction taxes, and to act immediately against derivatives, beyond central clearing, transparency, position limits and market transparency.

G20 Seoul: From Thursday, November 11, to Friday, November 12, 2010

In Seoul, South Korea, from November 11 to 12, the fifth G20 summit will have a more difficult challenge to deliver clear success, especially given the host's large ambitions for the first major global governance event it will host. The South Koreans seek to use their summit to affirm their new status as a top-tier global power and player, one that has graduated from developing to developed country ranks. They will use it to promote a global Korea, including to advance their business interests abroad. As host of the first G20 summit held in Asia, they seek to strengthen their credentials as representatives of a rising Asia, and have already begun their extensive outreach program and invited Vietnam to the summit in its capacity as chair of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN). They further seek to bridge north and south and to include a broad,

global community through pre-summit outreach beyond Asia. For their summit, the South Koreans plan to stick to a finance and economics agenda, despite the temptation to use the occasion to address their problems with nuclear-armed, famine-ridden North Korea next door, beyond seeking action on terrorist finance. They will work in close tandem with Canada's G20 summit and with the meeting of the leaders of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum that Japan will host immediately afterward on November 13–14. The Koreans have started vigorously with extensive consultation and an elaborate, internal institutional infrastructure dedicated to the summit as well as detailed preparations. They have joined the steering group of G20 summit hosts (with America, Britain, Canada and France) to ensure cumulative progress is made.

The Seoul Summit confronts several difficult built-in challenges that must be met at that time. The first challenge is the Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth, which will require China to revalue the yuan. It may be that for domestic reasons China will be ready to do so, and may find it easier to make the move at a moment when a summit is being held in Asia rather than in an Atlantic country. A second challenge is to meet the 2011 deadline for voice and vote reform at the IMF, by having the continental Europeans decide how they will give up some of their share to make possible the agreed-upon 5% shift to rising powers. It will also be ripe for replenishing the International Development Association (IDA) fund. And many other issues on the standard agenda remain, with climate change becoming acute in advance of the 16th Conference of the Parties and Meeting of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, which will be held in Cancun, Mexico, immediately after the Seoul Summit.

In addition, the South Koreans already have several ambitious new initiatives of their own. These begin with a financial safety net through multilateral currency swaps and other measures, an international organization for cyber security, ways to foster green growth and promote development given their new status as a member of the Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and commitment to triple their ODA in the coming years. The electronic economy and education are also domestic strengths that the South Koreans may want to use their summit to advance.

How Will They Co-Evolve in the Years Ahead?

Eight Fundamental Facts that Produce a Pattern

Looking beyond 2010, the prospects for the G8 and G20 summits and the relationships between them begin on the basis of eight fundamental facts that taken together constitute a trend (Kirton 2009).

First, at L'Aquila in July 2009 the G8 leaders all chose to hold subsequent G8 summits, and do so not just in Canada in 2010 to complete their standard hosting cycle, but to meet again in France in 2011, where a new now eight-year hosting cycle would naturally begin.

Second, the new American president Barack Obama, attending his first G8 summit at L'Aquila, agreed with this decision. He did so even though at the G20 London Summit in April — his first such encounter — he had publicly noted at the end that there might be too many summits in the world.

Third, at the Pittsburgh Summit that Obama chose to host in September, he and all his fellow G20 leaders, knowing there would be G8 summits in 2010 and 2011, agreed that their newly proclaimed permanent G20 summit would hold two meetings in 2010, in Canada in June and again in South Korea in November. They would thus do two a year, two years in a row, one in spring-summer and a second one in the fall.

Fourth, Obama also announced he would host a G20 summit-like encounter on the topic of nuclear non-proliferation, in Washington on April 12–13, 2010. A very busy president had become quickly addicted to Gx-like plurilateral summitry, the record of his revealed preference reveals.

Fifth, in terms of the timing and location of their next G20 summit, the Pittsburgh leaders agreed that the first meeting of the newly permanent body would adjust to meet in tandem with the G8, on the temporal and geographic platform already established by the G8.

Sixth, as hosts of their next G20 summit, the Pittsburgh leaders chose Canada, as it was already the G8 host, and South Korea to co-host in 2010. In doing so they predictably if slowly moved from a G8 to a non-G8 member as G20 host. But unlike past G20 finance history or current relative capability and growth configurations, the leaders chose as their first non-G8 member host not distant India or booming China but democratic South Korea on the Pacific Rim, very close to Japan, which would host the APEC leaders at almost the same time that South Korea would host the G20.⁴ The preference for tying G20 hosting to established plurilateral summits, and to the democratic Pacific powers of Canada and Japan as hosts, stands out.

Seventh, as for 2010 so for 2011, the G20 leaders chose as their host, France, the country already scheduled to host the G8. They further revised the G20 finance's long-established hosting rotation to make it consistent with the new G20 summit one and thus for two years running with the G8 one. French president Nicolas Sarkozy's public remarks suggest he intends to host separate summits for the G8 and G20. He may be tempted to repeat the 2010 formula and do two G20 summits in his year as host.

Eighth, under the G8's hosting order in effect since 1976, the U.S. is due to host the G8 in 2012. It is likely that President Obama would see the advantages in doing so at the usual time in mid summer, a few months before his intended re-election day in November that year.

⁴ Korea has previously secured the support of Japan, which had offered to host the second G20 summit, and China, for Korea's bid to host the fourth G20 summit in Seoul in April 2010.

The outstanding question is whether President Obama would also host the G20 summit in 2012, given that the U.S. has already hosted it twice in the recent past, and that the G8–non-G8 member hosting rotation for the G20 may be established by then. If the U.S. does not, given that a democratic Asian country has already hosted, might it be appropriate to have as G20 host in 2012 a democratic non-G8 member from the Americas, such as Mexico, located so conveniently close to the United States.

From Four Possibilities to One Cooperative Probability

This cadence of summits makes it unlikely that the G20 will replace the G8, or that the G8 will replace the post-crisis G20, at least in the short to medium term. Their continuing coexistence could breed competition for the key issues, or over different approaches to the issues that both address. But this is unlikely, with G8 members having such a large minority presence and leadership role within the G20, and with the cleavages within the G20 seldom arising on G8 versus non-G8 members lines.⁵ The G7 members control the capital, financial centres and comprehensive expertise on financial regulation that is a core component of the agenda of the G20. They also control the executive boards of the IMF and the World Bank, and thus any of the many issues — such as the Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth, peer review for financial regulation, trade finance, development and IFI reform — that the G20 wish to do at or through the Bretton Woods twins.

The most likely outcome is thus cooperation between the G8 and G20. But such cooperation could take several forms. One is minimal mutual co-existence, with a sharp division of the global policy agenda, with each institution sticking strictly to the issues it has been assigned. This seems unlikely, if only because so many issues, starting with development, microfinance, food security and energy are already on the agenda of each. Moreover, so many others unite the two, such as the climate-health connection. Finally, the demands of each body to mobilize new funding packages will require tradeoffs and cooperation from largely the same donor pool. With integration so epistemically and financially necessary, active coordination will be given a powerful thrust in the years ahead.

In assessing the likely path of this active coordination between the two summit-level institutions of global governance, it is noteworthy that the G8, at its 2009 L'Aquila Summit, often acted in explicit reference to the work of the G20 summit. Moreover, the G8 here offered the G20 both leadership guidance and followership support. The G20, in contrast, at its first three summits, has largely ignored what the G8 has done. Explicit connection and cooperation at least in public are thus still largely a one-way street.

⁵ At the height of the financial crisis in October 2008, it was the G7 finance ministers, at their regular meeting, who tore up their prepared communiqué and produced a new one that served as the guide for what the G20 subsequently did. During that time, the G7 finance deputies held many conference calls usually first thing in the morning, although on bad days adding one in the evening and terrible days adding another in the middle of the night. The intensity and sequence of G7/G8 preparatory meetings at the ministerial and official levels show no signs that the G7/G8 will fade away (see Appendix I).

Prospects for a Democratic G20

Looking further ahead, it is likely that the G8's defining principles of open democracy, including accountability and transparency, will slowly diffuse through the G20, even with financially rich, non-democratic Saudi Arabia being equal members of this enlarged club. This diffusion took place within the G20 finance from 1999 to 2004 (Kirton 2005a, 2005b). The selection of the hosts for the first five G20 summits, and the move from a rotating troika to pentarchy composed of all democratic polities should propel this trend. And it could be furthered in 2012, when a new, younger, more internationally experienced and aware leadership in China takes the reins of that state. Should that happen, and the G20 summit come to operate like the G8 plus long has, than in the longer term, the two may become one.

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Appendix A: The Plurilateral Summit Institutions Network

G20	G8+5	MEM-16	CHOGM	FRA	ASEM	OSCE	APEC	SOA	SCO	NATO
United States	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	+	-	+
Japan	+	+	-	-	+	-	+	-	-	-
Germany	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	+
United Kingdom	+	+	+	-	+	+	-	-	-	+
France	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	-	-	+
Italy	+	+	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	+
Canada	+	+	+	+	-	+	+	+	-	+
Russia	+	+	-	-	-	+	+	-	+	-
EU	+	+	-	-	+	-	-	-	-	-
China	-	+	-	-	+	-	+	-	+	-
India	-	+	+	-	+	-	-	-	+ observer	-
Brazil	-	+	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-
Mexico	-	+	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-
South Africa	-	+	+	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Indonesia	-	+	-	-	+	-	+	-	-	-
Korea	-	+	-	-	+	-	+	-	-	-
Australia	-	+	+	-	-	-	+	-	-	-
Argentina	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Saudi Arabia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Turkey	-	-	-	-	-	+	-	-	-	+
Spain	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	+
Netherlands	-	-	-	-	+	+	-	-	-	+

Notes:

APEC = Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation; ASEM = Asia-Europe Meeting; CHOGM = Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting; FRA = Francophonie; G8+5 = G8 plus Brazil, China, India, Mexico and South Africa; MEM-16 = Major Economies Meeting/Forum; NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OSCE = Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe; SCO = Shanghai Cooperation Organization; SOA = Summit of the Americas.

Appendix B: Mexico's Membership and Participation in G8 Governance

Leaders Level

1989 Paris Dinner
 2003 Lyon outreach
 2005 G8 plus Five
 2007 Major Economies Forum/Meeting Summit on Climate Change

Ministerial Level

2001 Global Health Security Initiative
 2005 Gleneagles Dialogue on Clean Energy and Climate Change
 2007 Heiligendamm Process/Heiligendamm-L' Aquila Process

Appendix C: G8 and G20 Governance Functions

A. Overall Performance

- Achievements (Bayne grade, Kirton grade)
- Objectives obtained (G8 Research Group assessments, government self-evaluation)
- Professional consensus (sherpas, scholars)
- Mission accomplished, lives saved
- Process (forward or backward looking, crisis response and prevention, timely, tailored)

B. Governance Functions

The Domestic Political Summit

- Prestige (presence, domestic demonstration, communiqué compliments)
- Media attention and approval (news coverage and editorials)
- Popularity: support for domestic policies, parties, politicians (public opinion)
- Election (re-election, ongoing election campaign or for incoming host)
- National satisfaction (legislative reports, national policy addresses)
- Regime confidence and national unity

The Deliberative Summit

- Mutual enlightenment (length of summit, number of sessions and attended)
- Personal relationships (on-site bilaterals, spontaneous encounters, informality)
- Agenda setting (number of words in communiqués, number of subjects)
- Attention getting (number of communiqués, chapeau or chair's summary)
- Epistemic learning (participants' reports)
- Interest and identity formation (subsequent participant self-descriptions)

The Directional Summit (Fact, Causation, Rectitude)

- Issue and issue area legitimation (new issues and issue areas added)
- Facts affirmed (new facts affirmed)
- Priority value identification (democratic principles priority placement and pervasive)
- Causal relationship specification (changes in causal claims from last summit)
- Priority linkage specification (synergies identified)

The Decisional Summit

- Number of commitments, by precision, obligation, delegation
- Breadth of commitments, by policy domain, issue area and geographic reach
- Ambition-significance of commitments
- Instruments employed: rewards (money mandated), inclusion, sanctions

The Delivery Summit

- Compliance catalysts (confirmed catalysts included: priority, timetable, core international organization)
- Member compliance (interim and final compliance scores)
- Member expectations and behaviour altered
- Outside actors behaviour altered

The Development of Global Governance Summit

- Outreach: summit membership/participation
- In-reach: G8 ministerial institutions created, adjusted affirmed
- In-reach: G8 official institutions created, adjusted, affirmed
- Outreach: instructions to outside intergovernmental institutions
- Down-reach: civil society involvement

Appendix D: G8 Performance, 1975–2009

Year	Grades		Domestic Political Management		Deliberative			Directional	Decisional	Delivery	Development of Global Governance		Attendees
	Bayne	Kirton	Members	References (average)	Days	Statements	Words	References to Core Values	Commitments	Compliance	# Bodies	Ministerial/ Official	Countries/ International Organizations
1975	A–		33%	0.33	3	1	1,129	5	14	57.1	0/1	4/6	0/0
1976	D		33%	1.00	2	1	1,624	0	7	08.9	0/0	7	0/0
1977	B–		50%	1.50	2	6	2,669	0	29	08.4	0/1	8	0/0
1978	A		75%	3.25	2	2	2,999	0	35	36.3	0/0	8	0/0
1979	B+		67%	3.33	2	2	2,102	0	34	82.3	½	8	0/0
1980	C+		20%	0.40	2	5	3,996	3	55	07.6	0/1	8	0/0
1981	C		50%	3.75	2	3	3,165	0	40	26.6	1/0	8	0/0
1982	C		75%	1.75	3	2	1,796	0	23	84.0	0/3	9	0/0
1983	B		60%	3.00	3	2	2,156	7	38	–10.9	0/0	8	0/0
1984	C–		25%	0.50	3	5	3,261	0	31	48.8	1/0	8	0/0
1985	E		33%	1.00	3	2	3,127	1	24	01.0	0/2	8	0/0
1986	B+		80%	4.40	3	4	3,582	1	39	58.3	1/1	9	0/0
1987	D		25%	6.00	3	7	5,064	0	53	93.3	0/2	9	0/0
1988	C–		25%	0.50	3	3	4,872	0	27	–47.8	0/0	8	0/0
1989	B+		50%	1.00	3	11	7,125	1	61	07.8	0/1	8	0/0
1990	D		33%	0.67	3	3	7,601	10	78	–14.0	0/3	8	0/0
1991	B–		20%	2.80	3	3	8,099	8	53	00.0	0/0	9	1/0
1992	D		33%	1.33	3	4	7,528	5	41	64.0	1/1	8	0/0
1993	C+		33%	1.00	3	2	3,398	2	29	75.0	0/2	8	1/0
1994	C		40%	1.80	3	2	4,123	5	53	100.0	1/0	8	1/0
1995	B+		25%	0.25	3	3	7,250	0	78	100.0	2/2	8	1/0
1996	B		40%	0.40	3	5	15,289	6	128	41.0	0/3	8	¼
1997	C–		40%	0.40	3	4	12,994	6	145	12.8	1/3	9	1/0
1998	B+		60%	1.00	3	4	6,092	5	73	31.8	0/0	9	0/0
1999	B+		80%	1.60	3	4	10,019	4	46	38.2	1/5	9	0/0
2000	B		25%	9.50	3	5	13,596	6	105	81.4	0/4	9	4/3
2001	B		40%	1.20	3	7	6,214	3	58	55.0	1/2	9	0
2002	B+		17%	0.17	2	18	11,959	10	187	35.0	1/8	10	0
2003	C		75%	1.25	3	14	16,889	17	206	65.8	0/5	10	12/5
2004	C+		33%	0.67	3	16	38,517	11	245	54.0	0/15	10	12/0
2005	A–		50%	0.50	3	16	22,286	29	212	65.0	0/5	9	11/6
2006			25%	0.25	3	15	30,695	256	317	47.0	0/4	10	5/9
2007			75%	1.25	3	8	25,857	651	329	51.0	0/4	9	9/9
2008		B+	33%	1.33	3	6	16,842	TBC	296	48.0	1/4	9	15/6
2009		B	NA	NA	3	10	31,167	62	254	NA	TBD	NA	28/10
Total					98	206	345,082	1,105	3,369		13/92	289	74/43
Average	B–	B/B+	43%	1.74	2.8	5				41.35	0.38/2.71	8.5	2.17/1.26
1975–81	B–		47%	1.94	2.1	2.9	2,526	1.1	29	32.46	0.14/0.71	7.43	0/0
1982–88	C–		46%	2.45	3	3.3	3,408	1.3	34	32.39	0.29/1.14	8.43	0/0
1989–96	C+		33%	1.26	3	4	6,446	4.4	56	47.54	0.58/1.29	8.14	0.57/0
1997–2002	B		43%	2.04	2.9	6.7	10,880	5.7	106	42.17	0.58/3.57	9.00	0.86/1.00
2003–09	B–	B/B+	49%	0.88	3	12.5	25,181	177	255.67	56.56	0.17/6.16	9.50	10.67/6.0

Notes:

NA = not available; TBC = to be calculated. Grades up to and including 2005 are determined by Nicholas Bayne; from 2006 on are determined by John Kirton, using different frameworks and methods.

Domestic Political Management: Members is the percentage of G8 countries measured that referred to the G7/8 at least once that year in their national policy addresses; References refers to the countries measured. *Deliberative:* Days is the duration of the summit. Statements refers to the number of documents issued at the summit. # Words refers to the number of words in those documents. *Directional:* Number of references to the G8's core values of democracy, social advance and individual liberty contained in the communiqué's chapeau or chair's summary. *Decisional:* Number of total commitments for the year in question, as counted by the G8 Research Group. *Delivery:* Compliance scores from 1990 to 1995 measure compliance with commitments selected by Ella Kokotsis; compliance scores as of 1996 measure compliance with G8 Research Group's selected commitments. *Development of Global Governance:* Bodies is the number of new G7/8-countries institutions created at the ministerial and official levels at or by the summit, or during the hosting year, at least in the form of having one meeting take place. *Attendees:* the number of leaders of G8 members, including those representing the European Community from the start, and the number of invited participants from countries or from international organizations. Russia started as a participant in 1991 and became a full member in 1998. In 1975, the G4 met without Japan and Italy; later that year the G6 met.

Appendix E: G20 Performance, 1999–2009

G20 Finance Ministers

Year	Deliberation			Decisional	Delivery	Development of G20 Governance				Development of Global Governance														
	Words	Doc	Days			G20	G20 B	Dep Mtgs	Work-shops	Other Institutions Noted at Meetings														
										BWI	IMF	WB	WTO	FSF	FATF	UN	BCBS	OECD	IFI	IEF	IOSCO	FSB	Other	
1999	402	1	2	4	TBC	2	1	1	NA	2	1	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
2000	2,455	1	2	8	TBC	0	0	2	NA	0	12	4	1	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
2001	1,631	2	2	24	TBC	0	1	2	1	0	4	3	2	3	8	6	1	0	2	0	0	0	2	
2002	958	1	2	2	TBC	0	1	2	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	2	
2003	1,185	1	2	6	TBC	1	2	2	1	0	6	3	1	0	2	1	0	1	2	0	0	0	1	
2004	1,392	1	2	10	TBC	2	0	2	3	0	4	4	0	0	5	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	
2005	1,683	2	2	8	TBC	0	0	2	3	15	8	4	2	0	0	2	0	1	0	1	0	0	0	
2006	2,048	1	2	10	TBC	1	0	2	3	1	13	10	1	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	
2007	2,236	1	2	20	TBC	1	0	2	3	3	10	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	
2008 ^a	259	1	2	4	TBC	0	0	-	-	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
2008	1,744	1	2	27	TBC	5	0	2	3	3	8	3	0	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	2	
2009 ^a	1,669	3	1	18	TBC	0	0	2	0	0	5	2	0	3	0	0	0	0	3	0	1	0	2	
Total	17,662	16	23	92	TBC	12	5	19	18	24	74	39	8	9	17	10	1	4	11	1	1	0	16	

G20 Leaders

Year	Deliberation			Decisional	Delivery (catalysts)	Development of G20 Governance			Development of Global Governance														
	Words	Doc	Days			G20 OI	G20 B	Working Groups	Other Institutions Noted at Meetings														
									BWI	IMF	WB	WTO	FSF	FATF	UN	BCBS	OECD	IFI	IEF	IOSCO	FSB	Other	
2008 Nov	3635	2	2	95	139 (39, 1Y [+]; 14, CIO [+]; 13, OIO [-])	1	2	4	TBC													0	TBC
2009 April	6228	3	2	88	65 (6, 1Y [+]; 19, CIO [+]; 10, OIO [-])	0	1	1	0	35	8	2	5	3	2	8	2	12	0	3	20	TBC	
2009 Sept	TBC																						
Total	9863	5	7	183	204	1	3	5															

Source:

International Organizations Research Institute of the State University Higher School of Economics in cooperation with the National Training Foundation of the Russian Federation.

Notes:

Includes only meetings at which communiqués were issued. Domestic political management has not yet been assessed and is therefore omitted here.

^aEmergency or special meeting held outside regular annual schedule.

TBC = to be calculated. Catalysts: 1Y = one-year time table; CIO = delegation to core international organization; OIO = delegation to other international organization.

BCBS = Basel Committee of Banking Supervisors; BWI = Bretton Woods institutions; FATF = Financial Action Task Force; FSB = Financial Stability Board; FSF = Financial Stability Forum; IEF = International Energy Forum; IFI = international financial institutions; IMF = International Monetary; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; UN = United Nations; WB = World Bank; WTO = World Trade Organization.

Deliberation: Words is the number of words in documents issued at the annual meeting. Doc is the number of documents issued at the annual meeting. Days is the duration of the meeting. *Decisional:* Number of total commitments made for the year in question, including commitments as they relate to the G20 as a whole and excluding country-specific commitments. *Delivery:* Total number of compliance catalysts embedded in commitments for the year in question. Catalysts highlighted in parentheses affect compliance either positively (+) or negatively (-). *Development of G20 Governance:* Documents issued for the year in question, excluding titles and subtitles. One unit of analysis is one sentence. G20I is the number of references to G20 as an institution; G20B is the number of references to G20 official-level bodies, including seminars; Dep Mtgs refers to the number of deputies meetings. *Development of Global Governance:* Number of times an international institution is mentioned in the documents for the year in question, excluding titles and subtitles. One unit of analysis is one sentence. If more than one institution is mentioned within a sentence, each institution is accounted for; if one institution is mentioned more than once in a sentence, it is only counted once.

Appendix F: Communiqué Compliments: G20 Summits

Country	# of compliments April 2009
Spain	1
European Union	1
Mexico	4
Poland	2
Colombia	2
Japan	2
China	2

Compiled by Zaria Shaw, G20 Research Group.

Appendix G: G20 Leaders Communiqué Conclusions, 2008–09

Financial Crises

Summit	# Words	% Total Words	# Paragraphs	% Total Paragraphs	# Documents	% Documents	Total Dedicated Documents
Washington 2008	1865	50.9	25	35.2	1	100	1
London 2009	2135	34.1	30	32.6	3	100	3
Pittsburgh 2009	3118	33.4	33	30.2	1	100	1
Average	2372	39.4	29.3	32.6	1.6	100	1.6

Development

Summit	# Words	% Total Words	# Paragraphs	% Total Paragraphs	# Documents	% Documents	Total Dedicated Documents
Washington 2008	651	17.8	9	12.6	1	100	0
London 2009	1726	27.6	28	30.4	3	100	1
Pittsburgh 2009	2292	24.5	20	18.3	1	100	0
Average	1556	23.3	19	20.4	1.6	100	0.33

Climate Change

Summit	# Words	% Total Words	# Paragraphs	% Total Paragraphs	# Documents	% Documents	Total Dedicated Documents
Washington 2008	64	1.7	2	2.8	1	100	0
London 2009	64	1	2	2.1	1	100	0
Pittsburgh 2009	911	9.7	10	11.7	3	100	0
Average	247.3	4.1	4.6	5.5	1.3	100	0

Energy

Summit	# Words	% Total Words	# Paragraphs	% Total Paragraphs	# Documents	% Documents	Total Dedicated Documents
Washington 2008	29	0.79	1	1.4	1	100	0
London 2009	0	0	0	0	3	0	0
Pittsburgh 2009	1259	13.4	12	11	1	100	0
Average	419	4.7	4.3	4.1	1.6	66.6	0

Notes:

Data are drawn from all official English-language documents released by the G20 leaders as a group. Charts are excluded.

of Words: Number of issue-specific subjects for the year indicated, excluding titles and references. Words are calculated by paragraph because the paragraph is the unit of analysis. *% of Total Words*: Total number of words in all documents for the year indicated. *# of Paragraphs*: Number of paragraphs containing issue-specific references for the year indicated. Each point is recorded as a separate paragraph. *% of Total Paragraphs*: Total number of paragraphs in all documents for the year indicated. *# of Documents*: Number of documents that contain issue-specific subjects and excludes dedicated documents. *% of Total Documents*: Total number of documents for the year indicated. *# of Dedicated Documents*: Number of documents for the year that refer to the specified issue in the title.

Appendix H: G20 Compliance, London Summit 2009

Member	Sept 2008	April 2009
	N=1	N = 5
France		+100
Germany		+100
United Kingdom		+100
Australia		+80
Canada		+80
European Union		+80
Russia		+40
United States		+40
Brazil		+20
Japan		+20
Saudi Arabia		+20
Turkey		+20
Italy		00
Mexico		00
South Africa		00
South Korea		00
China		-40
India		-40
Indonesia		-40
Argentina		-60
All Average		+23
G8 Average (9)		+62
Non-G8 Average (11)		-03

Note: G8 members are in bold.

Appendix I: Critical Path 2009–12

2009

April 1-2	G20 Summit, London, England
April 17-19	Summit of the Americas, Trinidad and Tobago
April 25-26	World Bank/IMF annual meetings, Washington DC
April 28-29	Arctic Council, Tromsø, Norway
July 8-10	G8-Plus and Major Economies Forum, L'Aquila, Italy
October 6-7	World Bank/IMF annual meetings, Istanbul, Turkey
November 12-14	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, Singapore
November 27-29	Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting, Trinidad and Tobago
Nov 30-Dec 11	COP-15/MOP-5, Copenhagen, Denmark

2010

January 13-14	G20 sherpa meeting, Mexico
January 25-26	G20 labour sherpas, Washington DC, United States
February 5-6	G7 finance ministers, Iqaluit, Canada
February 8-9?	G8 sherpas and foreign affairs sous-sherpas, Yellowknife, Canada
February 22-24	T20 tourism ministers, Johannesburg, South Africa
February 27-28	G20 deputy finance ministers, Incheon, South Korea
March 1-2	G8 deputy foreign ministers (political directors?), Victoria, Canada
March 18-19	G20 sherpas, Ottawa, Canada
March 29-30	G8 foreign ministers, Gatineau, Canada
April 12-13	Obama's nuclear summit, Washington DC, United States
April 20-21	G20 labour ministers, Washington DC, United States
April 24-25	World Bank/International Monetary Fund spring meeting, Washington DC, United States
April 26-28	G8 development ministers, Halifax, Canada
May 3-28	Non-proliferation Treaty Review Conference, New York, United States
May 5	Canada-EU Summit
May 20-22	G8 University Summit, Vancouver, Canada
May 24-25	G20 sherpas, Canada
May 27-28	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development ministerial, Paris, France
June 3-5	G20 finance ministers and central bank governors, Busan, South Korea
June 18	G8 People's Summit, Toronto, Canada
June 21-23	World Religions Summit, Winnipeg, Canada
June 24-25	G20 sherpas, Canada
June 25-26	G8 Summit, Huntsville, Canada
June 26-27	G20 Summit, Toronto, Canada
July (mid)	G20 sherpas, South Korea
September ?	North American Leaders Summit, Prince Edward Island, Canada
September (mid)	G20 sherpas, South Korea
September 20-22	United Nations Millennium Development Goals Summit, New York, United States
Sept 21-Oct 1	United Nations General Assembly, New York, United States
October 9-11	World Bank/International Monetary Fund, annual meeting
October 22-24	La Francophonie Summit, Montreaux, Switzerland
November (early)	G20 sherpas, South Korea
November ?	T20 tourism ministers, South Korea
November 11-12	G20 Summit, Seoul, South Korea
November 13-14	Asia Pacific Economic Forum, Yokohama, Japan
Nov 29-Dec 10	Conference/Meeting of the Parties to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change, Cancun, Mexico

2011

April 4-8	Arctic Council, Greenland
April 16-17	World Bank/International Monetary Fund spring meeting, Washington DC, United States
September 24-26	World Bank/International Monetary Fund fall meeting, Washington DC, United States
Nov 28-Dec 9	Conference/Meeting of the Parties to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change
Unknown	G8, France
Unknown	G20, France
Unknown	Commonwealth Heads of Government meeting, Perth, Australia