

# **G8 Global Leadership: The Camp David Contribution in 2012**

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## **Introduction**

At first glance the Group of Eight (G8) summit taking place at Camp David on May 18-19, 2012, seems to show how much the G8 has shrunk as an effective centre of global governance in the 21st-century world. It will be a short summit of less than 24 hours, yielding only a five-page communiqué. It will be a secluded summit, having been moved from its long-scheduled downtown Chicago venue to the weekend presidential retreat near Washington DC. It has been a silent summit, with very little information offered about its agenda or the host’s ambitions there. It will be a small summit, with only the G8 and two European Union leaders participating throughout, joined by just four invited African leaders to discuss food security on the second day. It is thus easy to conclude that Camp David will produce only a small success at best.

Appearances, however, are deceiving. Camp David promises to produce a summit that shows the G8 is back, as a broader, bigger, bolder centre of effective global government than ever before. The G8’s Camp David summit, the 38th instalment of the annual event, will comprehensively cover the economic, development and security domains, focusing on critical issues in each and searching for the synergistic solutions that such a broad, integrated agenda allows (Kirton 2012; Harper 2012). It will address the biggest challenges and crises of the day — the newest instalments of the continuing Euro-crisis, the ongoing slaughter of civilians in Syria and the food crisis in Europe, as well as advancing democracy and development in post-war Afghanistan and a reforming North Africa and Middle East. It will give strategic direction to the larger summits that come in its immediate wake — those of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in Chicago on May 20-21, the Group of Twenty (G20) systemically significant countries in Los Cabos, Mexico, on June 18-19 and the United Nations “Rio+20” Conference on Sustainable Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, on June 20-21. Together Camp David’s prospective success should show that the G8 is, now more than ever, the genuine club at the hub of effective global governance in a summit-networked world.

Camp David’s strong performance will be propelled in the first instance by the presence of strong global shocks that match the particular agenda priorities that the summit has set. Further propelling performance is the failure of the other major international institutions, notably NATO, the G20 and the UN, to cope on their own with the current global crises and their consequent need for the G8 to guide and reinforce them in their response. Some

assistance comes from the G8 members' relative capabilities that enable them to combine as equals in order to craft solutions backed by their predominant collective resources in the world at large. Of greater salience is the direct connection between the G8's approach to its key agenda items on the one hand, and, on the other, the common democratic purposes of its members and its foundational core mission of promoting open democracy and individual liberty throughout the world. Much less thrust comes from the modest domestic political control, capital, continuity, competence and commitment of the leaders assembling at Camp David. Above all, however, the summit's strong success will be driven by the highly constricted, controlled participation in the leaders' compact interpersonal club that now stands at the hub of what has become a densely summit-network-governed world, especially with the NATO, G8 and UN summits coming in Camp David's immediate wake.

## **Economy**

Camp David's success is likely to be seen first on its economic agenda, which, in an unusual display of unity, all leaders regard as priority number one. Their central task is to design a G8 growth strategy that respects and guides the larger, more diverse G20 summit one month later, but remains distinct from it. In this task there is also notable unity, as all members, and the global community and markets as a whole, want both growth and fiscal consolidation. The challenge is to blend differing judgements about sequencing, speed, scale and components that are appropriate to the evolving conditions in each country, in order to provide a credible, creative combination of both to generate fiscally consolidating growth in the short, medium and long terms.

This global challenge and the G8's consequent centrality as a global economic governor are compounded by the latest instalment of the ongoing Euro-crisis sparked by the election results in Greece and France on May 6. Uncertain and concerned governments, publics and markets cannot wait six weeks for the G20 at Los Cabos for a convincing global governance response. They need the G8 to provide it within 11 days. Here the heavy Euro-centricity of the G8, with four of the eight country leaders from Europe (five if Russia is added to this regional category) plus the two heads of the EU, is a distinct advantage when the Euro-crisis is the financial and economic shock at stake. A G8-guided response is likely to come first from policy adjustments inside Europe, then from support from Group of Seven (G7) governments and central banks (without Russia), rather than raising or sending more money from the emerging economies of the G20 to save Europe from itself.

The G8 summit has been central to coping with the Euro-crisis since its start, when the first Greece installment erupted in the spring of 2010 (see Appendix A). When the G8 leaders arrived for their short, secluded, small summit in Muskoka, Canada, on June 25-26, 2010, they began by discussing the Euro-crisis in Greece and what is meant for their strategy for macroeconomic management blending fiscal stimulus, exit and consolidation in the short and medium terms. They moved toward a private consensus that was confirmed and proclaimed at the G20 summit in Toronto on June 26-27. In sharp contrast, the Camp David Summit will announce its own G8 growth strategy by its end. It will thus become the public as well as the private centre of global economic governance

once again. The division of labour offered in 2010, whereby the G20 would be the premier forum for its members' international economic cooperation while the G8 would do development and security, has become a short-lived relic.

## **Development**

A similar situation arises in regard to development. Camp David will focus on food security in Africa as its featured, focused theme, enriching a G8 legacy that began at its first summit in 1975 (see Appendix B). Food security is not a pro forma, bureaucratic, built-in choice but one to which U.S. president and host Barack Obama is deeply committed, and a G8 issue in which he is deeply engaged. This engagement flows directly from the fact that at the first summit he attended as a newly elected president — the 2009 G8 summit — the centrepiece achievement was the L'Aquila Food Security Initiative, for which he personally received credit for raising the new money mobilized from \$15 billion to \$22 billion on the summit's final day.

As all that money is due to be delivered this year, at Camp David the G8 leaders will take stock of how well they have complied with their commitment, how well their investments have had the intended results, and how best they and their committed African partners can build on this foundation in the years ahead. They will not do so by mobilizing new money again, for here, as elsewhere, they are conscious of the need for fiscal consolidation within the G8 and thus the enhanced need to focus on aid effectiveness, along with their partners outside. Above all, they and their African partners believe that food security is importantly a home-grown affair. They have thus selected for their food security discussion at Camp David those Africa leaders who have advanced the most in taking ownership of their country's and continent's food security and pursuing it in a way that puts local governments, working with the private and non-profit sectors, in first place. In the same spirit, the G8 leaders will invite a few representatives of the private sector who are similarly self-starters in fuelling food security in Africa.

Food security is arguably a key component of fostering development as a whole. It is also a subject that the G20 summit has dealt with ever more fulsomely, and will do so again at its Los Cabos Summit, where the specialized component of commodity price volatility will be the focus. The G8's broader, deeper engagement with food security at Camp David is thus likely to guide the G20 at Los Cabos and the UN's sustainable development summit in Rio immediately afterward.

## **Security**

It is in the security domain that the centrality and comprehensive coverage of the G8 will be most pronounced. G8 leaders will focus on Afghanistan, their Deauville Partnership for North Africa and the Middle East, and the current crises in Iran, Syria and on the Korean peninsula — especially the latter should a desperate North Korea detonate another nuclear bomb on the summit's eve. They may also take up other regional security subjects such as Sudan and Burma/Myanmar. This is an agenda that covers both responding to immediate crises on a global scope and, broadly, how to win the wars and

the post-war peace by advancing democracy and development in two of the most difficult regions of the world.

On Afghanistan, a subject that the G8 began addressing in 1980, the G8 leaders on their summit's final day will discuss and help design the civilian components of the transformation decade that is about to start (see Appendix C). They will start by considering the schedule for the withdrawal of their troops, especially as France's newly elected president François Hollande has promised to pull French troops out faster than his predecessor Nicolas Sarkozy did. The G8 leaders will also privately pledge among themselves their respective financial and other contributions over the long haul, so that they can responsibly and self-confidently count on the required resources to support the civilian strategy they construct. In this way Camp David will provide the necessary foundation for meeting the military dimensions of the Afghanistan challenge that will take centre stage at NATO's Chicago Summit immediately after. They will also provide the necessary critical mass and momentum for the global pledging conference for Afghanistan in Tokyo in July. Thus on both the military and civilian components, the G8 summit is the central, catalytic club at the hub of the larger summits and meetings that will follow in its wake.

On the Middle East and North Africa, which the G8 has addressed since 1981, the leaders will follow up their 2011 Deauville Partnership with the pioneering reformers in the region. They will emphasize concrete actions and projects that produce results in the short term. While some may be tempted to capture the headlines for a day by grandly announcing the opening of negotiations for free trade agreements with countries in the region, few believe that such agreements among the large countries can be concluded in less than five years. The emphasis will thus be on more practical, even prosaic steps such as facilitating trade, harmonizing standards and certification, and helping regional partners take advantage of the market access they already have available in G8 countries through the General System of Preferences of the World Trade Organization. One key step, sitting at the top of the regional partners' demands, is the return of assets seized by the dictators who have now been deposed (Merkel 2012). Despite the frustration from some in the region that the \$38 billion in assistance announced at Deauville has not yet arrived, the G8 will emphasize the need for its regional partners to be willing and able to ask for the large amount of money that the International Monetary Fund, and thus the World Bank, African Development Bank and many others has had waiting for them for the past year. One broad solution the G8 will adopt is to have the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development extend its mandate and activities even further to support the region, on the assumption that it will have the surplus resources required to take on this task as well as meet the formidable need that currently exists and that could soon arise within its historic core continental European home (Mirow 2012).

On Iran, the G7 leaders in their intense, intimate discussions above all need to convince Vladimir Putin, returning to Russia's presidency and the G8 summit after an absence of several years, to support the next steps to ensure that Iran's nuclear weapons program and activity will be curtailed (Shorr 2012). As a front-line state Russia has a strong incentive to support G7-led efforts in this regard and has usefully moved in this direction under

Dmitry Medvedev in the recent past. Russia's response is also relevant on the integrally connected economic component, for if sanctions against or military action from Iran should send world prices soaring, Russia has the energy resources that are well connected to Europe to be part of the solution through a G8-wide "strategic petroleum reserve" response. Only the G8, with its comprehensive, interconnected agenda, recognizes that commodity price volatility can be caused and contained by security actions of the highest political sort.

On Syria, the Russians have also modestly moved, after Putin's election as president, toward the views of their G7 partners, to the point where the success and fate of the UN mission and regime brokered by former UN secretary general Kofi Annan are now at work but its future very much at stake. Russian resistance will make further G8-wide movement at Camp David difficult, even as Syria's violations of the Annan agreement mount. Here, however, those G8 countries that are also members of NATO, as well as Russia, Japan and the EU, will be well aware that NATO member Turkey is the key front-line state, that it has wondered about the need for NATO's Article 5 assistance for self-defence to be invoked, and that the NATO summit immediately after Camp David provides an easy venue for NATO to forge ahead on its own, as it did in Kosovo in 1999.

## **Accountability**

Another emphasis at Camp David is accountability (Larionova and Kokotsis 2012; Ndungane 2012). G8 accountability currently concentrates on food security and development but potentially cuts across all the economic, development and security domains. It is of particular importance at a time when the credibility of the G8 is in question and when, in the absence of new money to be mobilized, it is essential to ensure the faithful delivery of what has already been promised and its effectiveness in achieving the intended and desired results. At Camp David the G8 will focus on its food and health commitments, and receive a report from the G8 Accountability Working Group. It is possible that, looking ahead to the British-hosted G8 summit in 2013, the G8 could extend its accountability work to cover all of the issues in the development domain that the British favour as a summit theme, and to allow outsiders to contribute more to the G8's own accountability reports.

## **Causes of Camp David's Performance**

The success of the G8 leaders at Camp David in seizing this potential to produce a standout success depend critically on their recognition of the severe interconnected shocks they and the world face, the need of the G20, NATO and the multilateral organizations of the UN family for leadership from the G8, and how the G8's core mission and common purpose of promoting democracy are directly at stake in the critical economic, development and security priorities it has chosen to address. Less potent but still positive propellers of performance are the stable or slightly improving collectively predominant and internally equal relative capabilities of G8 members and the modest political control, capital, continuity, competence and commitment of their leaders at home. A highly powerful thrust comes from highly constricted, controlled participation in the leaders' compact interpersonal club that now stands at the hub of what has become a

densely summit-network–governed world, especially with the NATO, G8 and UN summits coming immediately after Camp David.

First, a strong success is suggested by the severity, scope and contagious synergy of the shocks at hand. They start with a new instalment of the Euro-crisis, a potential energy shock to drive oil prices well above their already elevated peak, a similar prospect for food price spikes, and the cluster of continuing security crises in Syria, nuclear-devoted Iran and nuclear-armed North Korea. The G8 leaders, led by their American host, fully recognize how food is integrally connected to nuclear proliferation on the North Korean front, and how energy is on the Iranian front. Similarly, a financial and economic crisis in Europe could cripple the G8 effort in the Middle East and North Africa under the Deauville Partnership and in Afghanistan in the transformation decade ahead.

Second, a substantial success is suggested by the failure of the other major international institutions to cope with these current, interconnected crises on their own and the consequent need for the G8 to guide and reinforce them in their response. In the economic domain, the G20, which in 2009 had proclaimed itself to be the primary forum for its members' international economic cooperation, was unable at its Cannes Summit on November 3-4, 2011, to solve — or even stave off until its next summit — the Euro-crisis, which had consumed all its fresh political energy at the time. In the field of food security, where the G20 along with the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Fund for Agriculture and Development and the World Food Programme had long been active, the G8's new energy and approach are needed once again to advance agriculture and development in Africa. In security, NATO also needs the G8 to generate the strategy and resources for the civilian dimension that would dominate in the decade ahead. The G20's Seoul Development Consensus does not extend into the key domains that Afghanistan or the reforming Middle East and North Africa face full on.

Third, a strong success is suggested by the direct connection between, on the one hand, the G8's approach to its key agenda priorities and, on the other, the common democratic purposes of its members and its foundational core mission of promoting open democracy and individual liberty throughout the world. The clearest connection came in North Africa and the Middle East, where the Deauville Partnership was designed to promote democratic reform after the dictators' demises and where one of the three pillars focused fully on governance with democratic values at its core. Democracy was similarly directly at stake in Afghanistan where, as in North Africa and the Middle East, it would take a generation to take root. Even in economically afflicted Europe, democracy was a clear concern, especially as far right-wing parties increased their electoral strength in France and Greece and where many remembered that Greece and Spain had only moved from dictatorship to democracy at about the time of the G8's birth. Should the G8 address Myanmar, it would be due to its nascent democratic revolution was at stake there. Syria is on the agenda largely because of its government's massive assault on its citizens' individual liberties there. Within the G8, even Russia shows signs possibly becoming more politically open than it has been for some time. Democratic renewal is also strengthened by two of the four new G8 leaders arriving at the summit with fresh democratic mandates from popular elections just held.

Fourth, a smaller success is suggested by the changing relative capabilities within the G8 and in the world. The G8's globally predominant capabilities have been sustained by the "flight to safety" strength of the U.S. dollar, the historic high value of the Japanese yen against the U.S. dollar, the appreciation of the Canadian dollar against the U.S. one and the stability of the British pound, even if the euro and ruble have declined a bit. Similarly, the return of the United States to steady mini-locomotive growth of its gross domestic product at 2-3% a year and the declining growth of China, India and above all Brazil have stabilized the G8's substantial share of global economy over the past year. Internal equality has also been largely stable, with growth among G8 members led by the largest U.S. and the smallest Canada and then energy-rich Russia, with the others lying in between.

Fifth, a smaller success is suggested by the modest levels of domestic political control, capital, continuity, competence and commitment of the leaders assembling at Camp David. Continuity is mixed, with France's François Hollande, Japan's Yoshihiko Noda and Italy's Mario Monti coming to their first summit, Russia's Vladimir Putin returning for his ninth after a gap of five years, Britain's David Cameron coming to his third, American host Barack Obama to his fourth, Germany's Angela Merkel to her sixth and Canada's Stephen Harper as the dean to his seventh in a row. Still, the four country newcomers (including Putin) and four country veterans will take some time to get to know one another and to bond. The leaders of France, Russia, Canada and Germany have a secure majority mandate and control of both their legislative houses, while the others could lose power through elections or coalition reshuffles within the year. Few of the leaders beyond Harper have professional competence in macroeconomic management, development or security. But Obama's personal commitment to food security and using the G8 to help stop Iran from getting the bomb will drive performance here.

Sixth, a very strong success is suggested by Camp David's constricted controlled participation in the compact interpersonal club that now stands at the hub of what has become a densely summit-network-governed world. Here the change to the Camp David format will have an important effect. With each country leader having only one cabin, most summit sessions taking place in the dining room, and spontaneous encounters springing up from the easily available walks in the woods, there is a strong chance that these leaders will quickly form the interpersonal bonds that inspire them to pull together for the greater G8 and global good (Fauver 2012). There is a firm foundation to build on, as Harper met Putin at the St. Petersburg Summit the latter hosted in 2006 and Merkel and Obama will have met Hollande before they arrive at Camp David. The limited number of invited leaders and the limited time they will be there, in sharp contrast to the 40 heads at L'Aquila on that summit's final day, will allow the eight leaders and their two EU colleagues the maximum chance to bond.

They will do so knowing that they have to get their act together if the larger summits coming immediately after are to succeed. A majority of G8 leaders will go on to Chicago for the NATO Summit. These countries are the core founders and current leaders of a NATO that just forcefully protected innocent civilians in Libya from death at the hands

of a dictator last year. All G8 leaders are due to attend the G20 summit in Los Cabos a month later, and all are invited to Rio+20 immediately afterward. Thus Camp David is the club at the hub of an expanding network of global summit governance in a very direct and timely way.

## **Conclusions**

The G8's Camp David Summit is importantly modelled after the original G7 summit at Rambouillet in 1975. But Rambouillet took place in a world where plurilateral summit institutions were rare, where NATO — one of the earliest such institution — was not at war at the time or in the recent past, and where financial crises were unlikely to erupt at any moment in a market-driven world. Camp David is also similar to the G8's Muskoka Summit in 2010, followed on the same day by the G20's summit in Toronto that confronted and contained the Euro-crisis at hand. But Toronto's summit the day after Muskoka did not do high, hard security, either by assisting Afghanistan or a North Africa and Middle East about to explode into reform. These are central and compelling security subjects that the G20 summit still does not do, even in regard to the key economic components that are integrally involved. Nor does NATO do economics, even when, as in Afghanistan, is vital to how the military campaign will be conducted in the months and years ahead. Only the G8 does security and economics and development, and only the G8 offers the comprehensive, combined, coherent global summit governance that no one else does. This is the unique contribution of the G8, as the Camp David Summit should strongly show.

Camp David promises to bring the G8 back, as a broader, bigger, bolder centre of effective global government than ever before. It will comprehensively and coherently cover and combine the biggest challenges and crises of the day — the newest instalments of the continuing Euro-crisis, the ongoing slaughter of civilians in Syria and the food crisis in Europe, as well as advancing democracy and development in post-war Afghanistan and reforming North Africa and Middle East. It will shape the larger summits that come in its immediate wake — NATO for security in its classic military sense, the G20 for economics and finance in a market-driven world, and the UN for development in an ecologically and socially sustainable way. In doing all of these things together in one place at one time, the Camp David summit should show that the G8 is, now more than ever, the genuine club at the hub of effective global governance in a summit-networked world.

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## Appendix A: G8 Conclusions on Macroeconomics, 1975-2011

Zaria Shaw, G8 Research Group, April 17, 2012

Year	# of Words	% of Total Words	# of Paragraphs	% of Totals Paragraphs	# of Documents	% of Total Documents	# of Dedicated Documents
1975	584	51.7	12	80	1	100	0
1976	569	35	7	28	1	100	0
1977	1015	38	14	25.8	2	100	0
1978	1095	36.5	15	30.6	1	50	0
1979	444	21.1	6	17.6	1	50	0
1980	526	13.1	6	12.5	1	20	0
1981	374	11.8	4	7.6	1	33.3	0
1982	862	47.9	5	25	1	50	0
1983	413	19.1	9	24.3	2	100	0
1984	606	18.5	8	16.3	1	20	0
1985	1040	33.2	21	50	1	50	0
1986	635	17.7	6	18.7	1	25	0
1987	677	13.3	8	10.9	1	14.2	0
1988	785	16.1	10	15.3	1	33.3	0
1989	484	6.7	8	6.6	1	9	0
1990	840	11	9	7.3	1	25	0
1991	441	5.4	7	12.5	1	20	0
1992	540	7.1	10	5.9	1	25	0
1993	699	20.5	12	28.5	1	33.3	0
1994	290	7	7	10.2	1	50	0
1995	423	5.8	7	5.2	1	33.3	0
1996	604	3.9	7	3	1	25	0
1997	396	3	4	2.8	1	20	0
1998	1089	17.8	11	17.1	2	50	0
1999	913	9.1	13	15.1	2	66.6	0
2000	534	3.9	7	4.8	1	20	0
2001	689	11	10	13.6	2	28.5	0
2002	111	0.92	2	1.3	1	12.5	0
2003	513	3	3	1.8	3	23	0
2004	243	0.63	4	1.2	1	4.7	0
2005	389	1.7	5	2.3	3	15	0
2006	66	0.2	1	0.4	1	5.8	0
2007	452	1.7	6	2.1	3	25	0
2008	335	1.9	3	1.7	1	9	0
2009	1436	8.6	21	6.4	4	30.7	0
2010	142	1.3	1	1	1	33.3	0
2011	959	5.2	15	7.0	4	80	0
Average	600.35	13.79	8.22	14.05	1.46	37.58	0

**Notes:**

Data are drawn from all official English-language documents released by the G8 leaders as a group. Charts are excluded.

"# of Words" is the number of macroeconomic-related subjects for the year specified, excluding document titles and references. Words are calculated by paragraph because the paragraph is the unit of analysis.

"% of Total Words" refers to the total number of words in all documents for the year specified.

"# of Paragraphs" is the number of paragraphs containing references to macroeconomics for the year specified. Each point is recorded as a separate paragraph.

"% of Total Paragraphs" refers to the total number of paragraphs in all documents for the year specified.

"# of Documents" is the number of documents that contain macroeconomic subjects and excludes dedicated documents.

"% of Total Documents" refers to the total number of documents for the year specified.

"# of Dedicated Documents" is the number of documents for the year that contain a macroeconomic-related subject in the title.

## Appendix B: G8 Conclusions on Food and Agriculture, 1975-2011

Zaria Shaw and Nadia Bucciarelli, G8 Research Group, June 9, 2011

Year	Total Words	% of Overall Words	Total Paragraphs	% of Overall Paragraphs	Total Documents	% of Overall Documents	Total Dedicated Documents
1975	70	6.2	1	6.6	1	100	0
1976	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1977	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1978	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1979	81	3.8	1	2.9	1	50	0
1980	202	5.0	2	4.1	1	50	0
1981	86	2.7	1	1.9	1	33.3	0
1982	290	16.1	1	5.0	1	50	0
1983	133	6.2	1	2.7	1	50	0
1984	126	3.8	2	4.0	1	20	0
1985	243	7.8	1	2.3	1	50	0
1986	294	8.2	2	6.2	1	25	0
1987	501	9.9	5	6.8	1	14.2	0
1988	767	15.7	5	7.7	1	33.3	0
1989	447	6.3	6	5.0	2	66.6	0
1990	486	6.4	5	4.0	3	27	0
1991	687	8.5	6	10.7	3	60	0
1992	455	6.0	7	4.1	2	50	0
1993	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1994	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1995	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1996	533	3.5	3	1.3	1	25	0
1997	75	0.5	3	2.1	1	20	0
1998	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
1999	100	1.0	1	1.6	1	33.3	0
2000	829	6.0	7	4.8	1	20	0
2001	574	9.2	6	8.2	2	28.5	0
2002	41	0.3	1	0.7	8	100	0
2003	2,850	17.0	32	19.1	9	69.2	0
2004	2,124	5.5	21	6.2	9	42.8	0
2005	2,274	10.2	26	12.2	4	20	0
2006	1,869	6.0	13	5.3	6	35.2	0
2007	395	1.5	4	1.4	2	16.6	0
2008	2014	12.0	29	9.5	2	18.2	1
2009	844	5.0	9	2.7	1	7.7	1
2010	852	8.0	6	6.1	0	33.3	0
2011	647	4.3	7	3.8	2	66.6	0
Ave.	564.57	5.47	5.8	4.3	1.92	32.86	0.05

**Notes:**

The chart draws on all official documents issued at G8 summits. Only English-language versions are included.

“Total Words” refers to the number of food and agriculture subjects within the official documents for the year specified. The words are calculated by paragraph because the paragraph is the unit of analysis. This number excludes document titles as well as references.

“% of Overall Words” refers to “Total Words” as a percentage of the total number of words contained in all official documents for the year specified.

“Total Paragraphs” refers to the number of paragraphs food and agriculture subjects are mentioned in the official documents for the year specified. Each point expressed is recorded as a separate paragraph.

“% of Overall Paragraphs” refers to “Total Paragraphs” as a percentage of the total number of paragraphs within the official documents for the year specified.

“Total Documents” refers to the number of documents that contain food and agriculture subjects.

“% of Overall Documents” refers to the “Total Documents” as a percentage of the total number of official documents contained in the year specified.

“Total Dedicated Documents” refers to the number of documents referring to food and agriculture in the title.

“% of Overall Sections” refers to “Total Dedicated Documents” as a percentage of the total number of sections within the official documents for the year specified.

## Appendix C: G8 Conclusions on the Broader Middle East, 1975-2011

Zaria Shaw, G8 Research Group, June 21, 2011

Year	# of Words	% of Total Words	# of Paragraphs	% of Totals Paragraphs	# of Documents	% of Total Documents	# of Dedicated Documents
1975	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1976	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1977	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1978	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1979	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1980	474	11.9	8	16.6	1	9.0	0
1981	273	8.6	3	5.7	1	11.1	0
1982	202	11.2	4	20	1	14.2	1
1983	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1984	194	5.9	5	10.2	1	20	1
1985	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1986	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
1987	378	7.5	8	10.9	2	28.5	1
1988	281	5.7	3	4.6	2	66.6	0
1989	352	5.0	8	6.6	2	18.2	2
1990	0	0	0	0	0	0	2
1991	577	7.1	6	10.7	1	20	0
1992	80	1.0	1	0.6	2	50	0
1993	135	4.0	3	7.1	1	33.3	0
1994	283	7.0	5	7.3	1	50	0
1995	325	4.5	4	2.9	1	33.3	0
1996	844	6.5	12	5.2	1	25	0
1997	445	3.4	5	3.5	1	20	0
1998	165	2.7	1	1.5	1	25	0
1999	386	3.9	7	8.1	1	33.3	0
2000	305	2.2	5	3.4	1	20	0
2001	88	1.4	3	4.1	1	14.2	1
2002	75	0.62	2	1.3	1	12.5	0
2003	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2004	2351	6.1	22	6.5	3	14.2	2
2005	1038	4.7	8	3.7	2	10	1
2006	964	3.1	20	8.1	2	11.7	1
2007	902	3.5	5	1.8	1	8.3	0
2008	378	2.2	3	1.7	1	9.0	0
2009	1546	9.2	14	4.2	2	15.3	0
2010	671	6.3	5	5.1	2	66.6	0
2011	4803	26.1	63	29.3	3	60	1
Average	500.41	4.36	6.30	5.15	1.05	18.9	0.35

**Notes:**

Data are drawn from all official English-language documents released by the G8 leaders as a group. Charts are excluded.

“# of Words” is the number of subjects related to the Broader Middle East (BME) for the year specified, excluding document titles and references. Words are calculated by paragraph because the paragraph is the unit of analysis.

“% of Total Words” refers to the total number of words in all documents for the year specified.

“# of Paragraphs” is the number of paragraphs containing references to the BME for the year specified. Each point is recorded as a separate paragraph.

“% of Total Paragraphs” refers to the total number of paragraphs in all documents for the year specified.

“# of Documents” is the number of documents that contain BME subjects and excludes dedicated documents.

“% of Total Documents” refers to the total number of documents for the year specified.

“# of Dedicated Documents” is the number of documents for the year referring to BME in the title.

This table catalogues all conclusions in official G8 documents related to the issue area of the Broader Middle East (BME). It refers to all official statements and annexes released by the leaders, as a group, at each annual G8 summit from 1975 to 2011.

BME is a region that includes southwestern Asia, southeastern Europe and northeastern Africa. The G8 has primarily been concerned with BME peace, stability and non-proliferation. G8 leaders have discussed BME issues since 1980, and have included the issue in official summit communiqués and political declarations in an effort to encourage increased and sustained cooperation in the region. Recent major civil unrest in Tunisia and Egypt has spread to Libya, Bahrain, Syria, Yemen and Iraq, and continues to spread throughout the surrounding area. It has focused increased attention on the process of democratization, the future of political leadership and systems, the availability of resources, and overall regional stability and peace in the BME.

At the 2011 G8 Deauville Summit, leaders released a dedicated document entitled 'Declaration of the G8 on the Arab Springs' in which they stated: "Today we launched the "Deauville Partnership" with the people of the region, based on our common goals for the future, in the presence of the Prime Ministers of Egypt and Tunisia, the two countries that originated the movement, and of the Secretary General of the Arab League. We stand ready to extend this long term global Partnership to all countries of the region engaging in a transition towards free, democratic and tolerant societies ("Partnership Countries"), beginning with Egypt and Tunisia, in association with countries wishing to support transition in the region. This Partnership enshrines common values of freedom and democracy and is founded on the respect for the sovereignty of States and peoples, whose protection is the common responsibility of governments. It builds on initiatives already undertaken by G8 members."

The following keywords were used for this report. Afghanistan, Afghanistan Compact, Arab, Arab League, Arab Peace Process, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative (BMENA), Committee of the three Arab Heads of State, Cyprus, Forum for the Future, Gaza Strip, Georgia, [the] Gulf, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Madrid Agreement, Middle East, Middle Eastern, Mideast, Mid Eastern, Middle East Quartet, Mitchell Report, Near East, Oman, Oslo Agreement, Partnership for Progress and a Common Future, Qatar, Roadmap for Peace, Saudi Arabia, Strait of Hormuz, Syria, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, United Nations Security Council Resolutions: 242, 338, 425, 1515, 1546, 1559, 1680, West Bank, Yemen. Exclusion were Egypt.