

Japan's Contribution to G8, G20 and Global Governance

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Introduction

At first glance, Japan has had a truly tough time this past year and indeed, during the two decades before. Its tale of woe is all too well known (Evans-Pritchard 2012).

Japan was struck by a destructive and deadly natural, nuclear and economic disaster on March 11, 2011, in Fukushima. The painful memories of this unprecedented triple disaster were reawakened when another earthquake erupted in northern Japan on March 13, 2012.

Japan's gross domestic product (GDP) contracted in 2011 and did so again in the most recent quarter. Its output remains far below its peak before the collapse of Lehman Brothers, even as much of its production devastated by the triple disaster comes back on line.

Japan's fiscal deficit has soared, reaching 7.6% of GDP this year, with tax revenues covering only about half of government spending. This deficit has been reinforced by a severe structural deficit, since the March 11th disastrous shutdown most of Japan's nuclear industry and gave rise to enormous government relief and reconstruction costs.

Japan's public debt will rise to a global record of 238% of GDP this year.¹ This threatens to overwhelm Japan's investment income from its formidable \$2.4 trillion stash of net assets abroad.

Japan's export-dependent economy has been hit by a soaring yen, an undervalued Chinese yuan and dropping dollar.

Japan's trade deficit has re-appeared after 31 years. The Fukushima disaster and closed reactors have increased Japan's dependence on imported fuel. Before Fukushima had relied on nuclear power for about 29% of its electricity and had planned to go to 50% by 2030. After Fukushima it suddenly switched to large scale imports of liquefied natural

¹ Or 260% if one includes the bonds of the Fiscal Investment and Loan Program.

gas and other fossil fuels. There has been a fourfold increase in its utilities' demand for oil over this period.

Confidence in Japan's economy is eroding. Tokyo's Ratings and Investment Information removed Japan's triple A credit rating in December 2011, just as the sovereign debt crisis in Europe made many more sensitive to such risks.

Japan's population size has been shrinking since 2005 and will fall from 127 million now to an estimated 90 million by 2050.

Japan's population is aging. Its median age is already the world's highest at 44.5 years. Its rising army of retirees is drawing down its life savings and dropping Japan's legendary household savings rate from 16% 20 years ago to a mere 2% now.

Japan's political stability has suffered. Its prime ministers have recently changed almost every year. The popularity of the current incumbent, Yoshiro Noda, has plummeted to new lows. A new regional party out of Osaka threatens both of the traditional national ones.

Japan's regional rival China surpassed it as the world's second strongest global economic power last year, as China routinely produced annual GDP growth of over 8%.

Neighbouring North Korea and China are presenting new threats in the political security sphere.

However this tale of woe is not the whole story of Japan's changing power and place in the world. It is not even the most important part. Amidst all these challenges, Japan's involvement and influence in global governance have grown. They have done so most clearly within the two summit-level institutions that stand at the centre of global governance now. These are the annual G8 summit that began in 1975 and the more recent G20 system that started after the great global financial crisis in 1999 and that leapt to the leaders' level after the much greater crisis that erupted in 2008.

To be sure, within both groups Japan, as with other members, occasionally acts as an accommodating American ally and as a mediating bridge builder between the Asian and Atlantic sides. However, Japan increasingly acts as a power that primarily protects its own interests and that leads the G8 and G20 into providing the global governance that Japan prefers.

Defensively, Japan has secured enhanced access to its special America ally, obtained exemptions for its exceptional needs, and helped veto others' initiatives that it does not like. Offensively, it has served as an Asian advocate, as a leader in reforming old multilateral organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), as a provider of global public goods, and in giving the G20 and the global community the financial resources and institutional initiatives it now badly needs.

In all, Japan has succeeded in shaping the old G8, the new G20 and thus global governance as a whole, in its own and in its partners' preferred way.

Japan's Presumed Painful Choice and Preference

This is not, of course, the prevailing portrait of Japan's performance in the G8 and G20 at the present time. Indeed, most observers assume that Japan, and the world, confront a painful choice between a retreating, 20th-century G8 and a rising, 21st-century G20, as the two G gladiators battle to be the central forum for global governance now. Japan, it is said, has chosen the losing G8 rather than the winning G20. However, the record shows that Japan has increasingly chosen both, and has exercised effective influence within each.

To be sure, Japan, along with Canada and perhaps now Russia, remains the most devoted member of the G8. It is easy to see why. At the first proto-G8 summit Japan was left out, when the leaders of the so-called Berlin Dinner Four of the United States, Britain, France and Germany gathered in the British embassy in Helsinki on the margins of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

But Japan then joined the Berlin Dinner Four, along with Italy as a full founding member for the first real G8 summit, at Rambouillet, France in November 1975. This marked Japan's elevation to the top tier of great power global governance. This new status stood in sharp contrast, then and now, to its treatment by the United Nations Security Council. At Rambouillet, Japan as a rather lonely Asian democracy, suggested that the group tell the world what it stood for. Thus was created the G8's core, charter-like mission of protecting among its members and promoting globally the values of "open democracy, individual liberty and social advance."

When the larger G20 system arose in 1999 and its summit in 2008, Japan's attachment to the G8 rationally remained. It is easier for Japan to exercise influence in the smaller, more intimate, G8 composed only of fellow democracies than in the larger, more formal, more diverse G20 where two non-democracies – China and Saudi Arabia – have an equal and important place. In the G8 Japan is the second-ranked power, whereas in the G20, its regional rival China is. In the G8, Japan is the sole Asian regional representative, whereas in the G20 it shares that status with China, Korea, Indonesia and Australia too. And Japan has hosted the G8 summit and finance ministers meetings every seven or eight years since its 1975 start, whereas it never been allowed to host one of the many G20 finance ministers' meetings held since their 1999 start, or any of first nine G20 summits held or scheduled since 2008. It remains to be seen if it will, when Asia is again due to host the G20 after Mexico this June, then Russia, Australia and Turkey, and when the G20 will then chose among China, Indonesia or Japan.

This would be the end of the story, if the world was still the way it was in Westphalia in 1648, where static, territorial sovereigns in a system of anarchy were forced to compete. But in the 21st-century world, intensely, interconnected, open, penetrated polities are forced to co-operate and create collectively global governance for the complex adaptive

system the globe has become. As a result, Japan needs and succeeds in both the 20th-century G8 and the 21st-century G20 too.

Japan's G8 Success

Japan's durable dedication to the G8 is reinforced by the fact that the G8 has done much for Japan since the start in 1975, and Japan has done much for the world through the G8.

Japan's Summits

Standing out among the highlights are the successes at the five summits that Japan has hosted over the years.

In 1979 in Tokyo, at the first G7 summit hosted by an energy dependent Japan hosted, the leaders confronted the second oil shock erupting from an oil exporting but now revolutionary Iran. They ended such oil shocks to this day. The Tokyo Summit also invented global governance in climate change, constructing the most ambitious and fully complied with regime that world has seen since that time. In the first sign of Japan's instinct for expanded Asian participation, Japan sought to add Australia as its democratic Asian neighbour, to the summit, but failed to convince its partners to agree.

In 1986 in Tokyo, at the second G7 summit Japan hosted, Japan's instinct for inclusiveness succeeded. Leaders agreed to bring Canada and Japan into a new G7 finance ministers' forum that soon replaced the old G5 one. The summit also launched the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations that had so divided and almost ended the G7 summits the year before in Bonn.

In 1993 in Tokyo, at the third summit Japan hosted, the leaders and their trade ministers did the deal on market access that successfully concluded the Uruguay Round. This stands in sharp contrast with the fate suffered by the still unfinished Doha Round from 2001 until now.

In 2000 in Okinawa, at the fourth summit Japan hosted, the leaders produced the Global Fund against AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. They included civil society in the summit as never before. Japan tried to expand summit participation, by inviting a few Asian leaders including China. Here it failed. But it succeeded in having the heads of a few of the world's major multilateral organizations come on the eve of the event.

In 2008, at the Hokkaido-Toyako Summit, Japan secured a consensus for its preferred "bottom up" approach to controlling climate change. Its instinct for expanded Asian participation flourished when the 17 leaders of the Major Economies Meeting, including China, met for the first time, for the G8's discussions on climate change. But it was on the margins of this summit that the leaders of the BRICs of Brazil, Russia, India and China, also met, by themselves, for the first time.

Japan's Successes at Others' Summits

Japan has also produced several striking successes at the G7 and G8 summits that others have hosted and designed.

In 1992 at the Munich Summit, held just as post–Cold War world was starting to be shaped. Japan had all its G7 partners essentially support Japan's desire to secure its claim to the Northern Territories, still under Soviet/Russian occupation since the end of the Second World War.²

In 2004 at the Sea Island Summit hosted by George W. Bush, Japan induced the US to place its invasion of Iraq in 2003 under the legitimacy of the United Nations and had environmental issues added to the outcomes agreed in the communiqué.

In 2010 at the Muskoka Summit, it argued as the only Asian member for a harsh condemnation of North Korea for its sinking of the South Korean frigate the *Cheonan*.

Japan's Successes in the Bigger G8 System

Most broadly, Japan has maintained a privileged place in its preferred G7 system along with its longstanding all democratic friends.

Japan has been a full member from the start in all G7 centered clubs. Rival Russia but not Japan, is still left out of the G7 finance ministers' forum, the trade ministers' quadrilateral and the Global Health Security Initiative created in 2011.

These close-knit clubs of those one can count on have come through for Japan in its hour of need. When the March 11th triple disaster unleashed the mania of the marketplace, irrationally driving the value of the Japanese yen to historic highs, the G7 quickly produced its first co-ordinated exchange rate intervention in a decade to bring the value of the yen down.

Japan's G20 Success

Japan's G8 achievements have not come at the expense of Japan's success in the G20, for here it has succeeded too.

Japan's Initial G20 Vision

The story of G20 governance is framed by two global financial crises: the Asian initiated one from 1997–2001 and the American/Atlantic initiated one from 2008 to now. Only a handful of G20 members – who all must be systemically significant states – went through both, not as consumers but as providers of financial security, with none of their major

² Munich's Political Declaration in paragraph nine stated: "We welcome Russia's commitment to a foreign policy based on the principle of law and justice. We believe that this represents a basis for full normalization of the Russian-Japanese relationship through resolving the territorial issue."

financial firms going bust. One was Japan, along with China, Canada, Australia and South Africa (Mexico had gone down in the prelude in 1994).

The crisis afflicting its Asian neighbours from 1997 to 1999 catalyzed the creation of the G20 as a finance minister's forum in 1999. Since the start, Japan has welcomed the advent and strengthening of the G20 and expanded its influence within this larger, more diverse group.

When in 1999 Canadian finance minister Paul Martin, with support from U.S. treasury secretary Lawrence Summers, suggested a broader, more institutionalized, consultative group that became the G20 and proposed Martin as its chair, Japan was among the most enthusiastic advocates within the G7. It sought very strongly to have robust Asian representation in the new group. It succeeded. The new G20 contained five Asian countries – Japan, China, Korea, Indonesia and Australia – and only four European ones – Germany, Britain, France and Italy (or five including the European Union). Unlike the G8, and the UN and the IMF, in the G20 Asia was finally on top. An energy-dependent Japan also saw the advantages of including Saudi Arabia, an American favourite, from which Japan imported much of its oil.

Japan simultaneously supported the US thrust to raise the weight of Asians and emerging countries, and reduce that of the declining Europeans in the IMF and its Executive Board by reconfiguring the quotas to reflect the new weight of developing countries. This reconfiguration would come at the expense of a relatively declining France, Britain, Italy and the smaller European countries, in favour of a rising Japan, Korea, China and Germany.

When the Canadians initially considered holding the second G20 meeting in Toronto in June 2000, a mere six months after the first one in Berlin in December 1999, there were fears that this could detract from the lead-up to the G7 finance ministers meeting and G7/8 Okinawa Summit in Japan in July. Japan won, as its G8 summit in Okinawa went first, and the new G20 ministerial came second in November.

Japan's G20 Achievements

Since the start of the G20 summits in 2008, Japan has secured important successes along several fronts.

First, the G20 has given Japan enhanced access to its special American ally, through the addition of several summits, surrounding bilaterals, preparatory meetings and many more G20 ministerial meetings that have now spread from finance to involve agriculture, labour, development, foreign affairs and prospectively tourism too. This has been especially important for a Japan with its steady succession of rookie prime ministers and the reluctance of busy US presidents to make space in his crowded schedule for a stand-alone summit with a Japanese leader who may not last much more than a year. It is thus

overwhelmingly in Japan's interest to further institutionalize the G20 system in this way, especially as the G8 has been having far fewer ministerial meetings of late.³

Second, Japan has been able to secure exemptions for its exceptional needs. At the 2010 Toronto summit, all advanced members agreed to cut their fiscal deficits as a percent of GDP in half by 2013 and halve the growth in their debt as a percent of GDP by 2016. The G20 easily recognized that Japan was a special case and gave it an exemption from the start. Japan has since moved at its own initiative to adopt these "Toronto terms."

Third Japan has joined others to veto initiatives it does not like, even those coming from the Europeans and even the United States. When Europe and America proposed a global bank levy, Japan joined with all other members to reject it, on the ground that its banks had performed well and did not deserve to be punished by a new tax. It was the same story for the most recent French call for an international financial transaction tax at its Cannes summit in November 2011. The veto worked again when all members but America combined to stop the US effort to have the G20 condemn Iran by name, and support sanctions against it that would cripple its ability to secure a nuclear bomb.

A fourth success has been producing a more Asian and less European reformed International Monetary Fund. This was a task that the IMF itself and the G8 had long tried but failed to pull off. But the G20 succeeded, first at the ministerial level in 2005 and then at the Seoul Summit in 2010. Japan was one of the long institutionally disadvantaged rising powers that thereby secured an enhanced share of voice and vote. The G20 summit also expanded the membership of the old, small Financial Stability Forum into a more powerful Financial Stability Board to which all G20 members belonged, thus giving rising Asian powers greater "voice and vote" in this field of finance. It do so within the G20 itself, when at Pittsburgh members proclaimed it to be their permanent premier forum, reducing the chance that a new "Gx" or "G2" would arise from which Japan would be left out. The G20 summit also agreed that the exclusive head of the IMF and World Bank should henceforth be selected on the basis of global merit, not 1940s nationality. This is a promise still struggling to be put into practise at the present time.

A fifth success has seen Japan use the G20 to inspire its powerful colleagues to swiftly provide on a massive scale the global public goods required by today's tightly wired world. Here Japan stands out as a reliable first responder in crisis and responsible global power all the time, bearing more than its fair share of the global burden in bad times and good. Within the G20, Japan is thus in the first rank in what it gives as well as in what it gets.

When the Asian-turned-global financial crisis first erupted in Thailand in 1997, Japan was there with financial support for its smaller Asian neighbour. It was there again on October 7, 2008 as part of the massive liquidity injection by the G7's big four central banks, with China in support. On the road to the Washington Summit in 2008, Japan

³ The G20 similarly gives Japan greater access to Chinese leaders and helps socialize China into a more responsible rise.

offered a \$100 billion loan, the same as the US and the EU, while China eventually came through with on a \$40 billion one. At London in April 2009 Japan supported its share of the SDR increase of \$250 billion, an eightfold increase, using the current currency basket in which the yen not the yuan was one of the big four currencies used. Japan with the massive foreign exchange reserves has recently been ready to financially assist an afflicted Europe, but only along with other G20 partners, and after Europe does what is needed to help itself.

Institutionally Japan was also ready to contribute from the start. It offered to host both the second and the third G20 summits, just as it had done for the G7 ones a long time ago. But when it was clear that the G20 and the world needed Gordon Brown's Britain and then Barack Obama's US as host, Japan readily backed off. It then supported its fellow Asian democratic neighbour, Korea, in its bid to host the fifth G20 summit in Seoul in November 2010.

Japan's Compliance with G8 and G20 Commitments

Japan has also increasingly induced other G8 and G20 members to comply with their collective commitments, while being a reliable complier itself (see Appendices A and B).

G8 Compliance

The G8 summits from 1996 to 2008 saw members comply at an average level of 75%, showing that this is the international club that counts in terms of constraining the independent behaviour of otherwise autonomous, highly powerful member states. Japan's compliance score of 71% came in just under the G8-wide average, and well ahead of Italy at 65% and Russia at 64%.

As a G8 summit host, Japan produced the highest complying summit in G8 history – Okinawa in 2000 with a compliance score of 89%. Toyako-Hokkaido in 2008 came in at a still respectable 74%.

G20 Compliance

The five G20 summits from 2008 through 2010 have seen members comply at a level of 68%. They began on a high note at crisis-catalyzed Washington in 2008 at 61%, then dropped at the next three summits but bounced back at Seoul in November 2010 to 75%

Japan's compliance at 79% has been well above the G20 members' five-summit average of 68%. It is ahead of the US at 76% and China at 65%. Japan is a country the G20 can count on to come through in turning promises made into promises kept.

Conclusion

In conclusion, in the broadest terms, what has been Japan's role in fostering, and its resulting fate from, the three great initiatives in global governance that shape our world

order today: the United Nations system of 1944–45, the G8 of 1975, and the G20 of 1999 and 2008?

In the UN in 1945, an American occupied Japan had no role as it was the defeated, devastated victim of the world's first nuclear war. It was labelled an enemy, alien, aggressor state in a legal Charter that prohibited international interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, that did not recognize even the existence of the natural environment, and that excluded Japan from a Security Council Permanent Five (P5) where the only representative was China. Japan saw P5 status go only to powers that became and remained nuclear weapons states, in part to cement their status in the P5. This institution matched poorly the position of a Japan that became the second and now third most powerful country in the world, that remains a nuclear-free state, and that has been an environmental pioneer in combating climate change.

In the G7 in 1975 Japan was a fully equal founding member. The only Asian representative of a group that contained four non nuclear and only three nuclear powers that recognized in its informal charter the environmental value of “conservation” and that dedicated itself to spread globally the values of “open democracy, individual liberty and social advance,” and do so by international interference in others internal affairs if need be. Here Japan flourished, in inventing global governance of climate change, containing oil shocks and nuclear proliferation, combating infectious disease, and including others in the compact club. In return Japan secured G7 recognition of its claim to its Northern Territories, and effective help in containing North Korean nuclear proliferation and aggression and in controlling Japan's soaring exchange rate in 1985 and 2011 so its export dependent economy could work.

In the G20 in 1999 Japan was an enthusiastic, fully equal founding member of a club that contained more Asian members than European ones. Safe from, but scarred by the Asian-turned-financial crisis of 1997–99, Japan cast aside a regional response in favour of a global governance one to create a new institution dedicated to financial stability and to making globalization work for all. Here it sought and finally secured the reform of the Eurocentric IMF from 1944 to give a rising Japan and other Asian powers their equivalent, enhanced voice and vote. It saw the G20 address Japan's priorities of aging populations, volatile energy markets, and fossil fuel subsidies, reverse the greatest plunge in the internationally integrated Japanese and global economy since the 1930s and work toward strong sustainable and balanced growth. It also helped veto bad ideas, for itself and others, such a global bank levy or financial transaction tax and, to some degree, the extraterritorial application of America's “Volker rule.”

With such a resonance with, and record of achievement in, the G8 and G20, it is understandable that Japan would value both, and will increasingly exercise influence in both for its own and the greater global good in the years ahead.

References

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Appendix A: G8 Compliance by Country, 1996–2008

Annual Assessment only, N = 234

Year	US	JAP	GER	UK	FRA	ITA	CAN	RUS	EU	Overall
1996	+0.41	+0.23	+0.64	+0.41	+0.29	+0.38	+0.55	NA	NA	+0.42
1997	+0.25	+0.38	+0.63	+0.50	+0.13	-0.50	+0.13	-0.17	+1.00	+0.19
1998	+0.67	+0.50	+0.29	+0.75	+0.43	+0.75	+0.60	+1.00	-1.00	+0.53
1999	+0.75	+0.63	+0.63	+0.50	+0.38	+0.75	+0.33	+0.33	+0.55	+0.75
2000	+0.77	+0.77	+0.84	+0.85	+0.81	+0.78	+0.81	+0.50	+0.71	+0.77
2001	+0.28	+0.33	+0.50	+0.56	+0.56	+0.44	+0.72	-0.08	NA	+0.43
2002	+0.31	0.00	+0.19	+0.50	+0.56	-0.07	+0.75	0.00	NA	+0.29
2003	+0.54	+0.46	+0.54	+0.62	+0.62	+0.46	+0.69	+0.31	+0.80	+0.54
2004	+0.83	+0.43	+0.60	+0.60	+0.47	+0.47	+0.63	+0.21	+0.63	+0.54
2005	+0.81	+0.52	+0.86	+0.95	+0.57	+0.29	+0.81	+0.14	+0.89	+0.65
2006	+0.60	+0.40	+0.55	+0.60	+0.40	+0.05	+0.60	+0.45	+0.58	+0.47
2007	+0.91	+0.30	+0.57	+0.70	+0.52	+0.17	+0.65	+0.30	+0.48	+0.51
2008	+0.80	+0.30	+0.60	+0.80	+0.20	+0.15	+0.75	+0.20	+0.45	+0.47
Average	+0.58	+0.41	+0.57	+0.65	+0.46	+0.29	+0.65	+0.27	+0.49	+0.49

Appendix B: G20 Country Averages by Summit

N = 49

	AVE	ARG	AUS	BRA	CAN	CHI	FRA	GER	IND	INDO	ITA	JAP	KOR	MEX	RUS	SAR	SAF	TUR	US	UK	EU
Washington, November 2008 (N=3)	0.61	0.00	0.67	1.00 (2)	0.67	0.00	0.67	1.00	0.33	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.50 (2)	0.33	0.33	0.50 (2)	1.00	0.50 (2)	0.67	1.00	1.00
London, April 2009 (N=6)	0.18	-0.67	0.50	0.00	0.50	-0.17	0.67	0.67	-0.50	-0.33	0.00	0.17	0.33	0.00	0.17	0.17	0.33	0.00	0.33	0.83	0.67
Pittsburgh, September 2009 (N=14)	0.30	-0.25 (12)	0.38 (13)	-0.31 (13)	0.57 (14)	0.23 (13)	0.79 (14)	0.67 (13)	-0.15 (13)	-0.23 (13)	0.09 (12)	0.67 (12)	0.67 (12)	0.31 (13)	0.14 (14)	-0.23 (13)	0.67 (12)	-0.08 (13)	0.71 (14)	0.86 (14)	0.33 (12)
Toronto, June 2010 (N=13)	0.33	0.20 (10)	0.67 (12)	0.40 (10)	0.67 (12)	0.45 (11)	0.50 (12)	0.45 (10)	0.00 (10)	-0.09 (12)	0.58 (12)	0.45 (11)	0.58 (12)	-0.10 (10)	0.10 (10)	-0.22 (9)	-0.10 (10)	0.00 (9)	0.33 (12)	0.67 (12)	0.70 (10)
Seoul, November 2010 (N=13)	0.49	-0.08 (12)	0.85 (13)	0.42 (12)	0.69 (13)	0.42 (12)	0.77 (13)	0.54 (13)	0.42 (12)	0.33 (12)	0.77 (13)	0.54 (13)	0.83 (12)	0.23 (13)	0.58 (12)	0.08 (12)	0.25 (12)	0.17 (12)	0.38 (13)	0.77 (13)	0.83 (12)
Overall Country Average	0.36	-0.03	0.64	0.38	0.65	0.28	0.68	0.66	0.15	0.17	0.53	0.58	0.65	0.19	0.29	0.03	0.45	0.15	0.52	0.82	0.72

*Total N = the number of total compliance reports

*N in parenthesis is the number of compliance reports for the indicated Summit

*not all countries have been monitored for every compliance report – the number in parenthesis indicates the number of compliance reports if it differs from the norm.

Appendix C: G20 Country Averages by Summit

	AVE	ARG	AUS	BRA	CAN	CHI	FRA	GER	IND	INDO	ITA	JAP	KOR	MEX	RUS	SAR	SAF	TUR	US	UK	EU
Washington, November 2008 (N=3)	0.61	0.00	0.67	1.00 (2)	0.67	0.00	0.67	1.00	0.33	0.67	0.67	0.67	0.50 (2)	0.33	0.33	0.50 (2)	1.00	0.50 (2)	0.67	1.00	1.00
London, April 2009 (N=6)	0.18	-0.67	0.50	0.00	0.50	-0.17	0.67	0.67	-0.50	-0.33	0.00	0.17	0.33	0.00	0.17	0.17	0.33	0.00	0.33	0.83	0.67
Pittsburgh, September 2009 (N=14)	0.30	-0.25 (12)	0.38 (13)	-0.31 (13)	0.57 (14)	0.23 (13)	0.79 (14)	0.67 (13)	-0.15 (13)	-0.23 (13)	0.09 (12)	0.67 (12)	0.67 (12)	0.31 (13)	0.14 (14)	-0.23 (13)	0.67 (12)	-0.08 (13)	0.71 (14)	0.86 (14)	0.33 (12)
Toronto, June 2010 (N=13)	0.33	0.20 (10)	0.67 (12)	0.40 (10)	0.67 (12)	0.45 (11)	0.50 (12)	0.45 (10)	0.00 (10)	-0.09 (12)	0.58 (12)	0.45 (11)	0.58 (12)	-0.10 (10)	0.10 (10)	-0.22 (9)	-0.10 (10)	0.00 (9)	0.33 (12)	0.67 (12)	0.70 (10)
Seoul, November 2010 (N=15)	0.48	-0.07 (14)	0.87 (15)	0.43 (14)	0.67 (15)	0.50 (14)	0.73 (15)	0.53 (15)	0.43 (14)	0.36 (14)	0.73 (15)	0.47 (15)	0.71 (14)	0.20 (15)	0.43 (14)	0.01 (14)	0.29 (14)	0.21 (14)	0.47 (15)	0.73 (15)	0.79 (14)
Overall Country Average	0.37	-0.13	0.63	0.18	0.62	0.30	0.68	0.60	0.04	0.02	0.45	0.49	0.61	0.15	0.23	-0.05	0.36	0.07	0.50	0.78	0.64

*Total N = the number of total compliance reports

*N in parenthesis is the number of compliance reports for the indicated Summit

*not all countries have been monitored for every compliance report – the number in parenthesis indicates the number of compliance reports for that summit if it differs from the norm.

Appendix D: G20 Country Averages by Issue

N=51

	AVE	ARG	AUS	BRA	CAN	CHI	FRA	GER	IND	INDO	ITA	JAP	KOR	MEX	RUS	SAR	SAF	TUR	US	UK	EU
Macroeconomic (N=8)	0.59	0.40 (5)	1.00 (7)	0.25 (4)	1.00 (7)	0.40 (5)	0.71 (7)	0.86 (7)	0.25 (4)	0.40 (5)	0.57 (7)	0.50 (6)	0.67 (6)	0.00 (4)	0.60 (5)	0.40 (5)	0.75 (4)	0.50 (4)	0.29 (7)	0.86 (7)	0.80 (5)
Trade (N=6)	0.32	-0.17	0.67	-0.17	0.67	0.17	0.50	0.67	0.00	-0.33	0.67	0.50	1.00 (5)	0.17	-0.33	0.60 (5)	0.33	0.40 (5)	-0.17	0.83	0.67
Finance (N=8)	0.39	-0.25	0.63	0.14 (7)	0.50	0.25	0.88	0.88	0.13	0.13	0.50	0.63	0.50	0.13	0.38	-0.13	0.13	0.00	0.63	0.88	0.88
Development (N=8)	0.23	-0.63	0.63	0.00	0.63	0.25	0.63	0.75	-0.25	-0.38	0.13	0.50	0.13	-0.25	0.14	-0.13	0.13	-0.13	0.75	0.88	0.75
Climate Change (N=6)	0.41	0.33 (3)	0.60 (5)	0.20 (5)	0.50	0.80 (5)	0.50	0.40 (5)	0.40 (5)	0.00 (5)	0.50 (4)	0.40 (5)	0.75 (4)	0.33	0.17	-0.33 (3)	0.00 (4)	0.25 (4)	0.50	0.67	1.00 (4)
Energy (N=6)	0.42	0.00	0.50	0.67	0.33	0.33	1.00	0.40 (5)	0.17	0.33	0.60 (5)	0.83	0.83	0.67	0.00	-0.33	0.67	0.00 (5)	0.67	0.67	0.00 (5)
Corruption (N=3)	0.18	0.00	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33	-0.67	-0.33	0.33	0.33	-0.67	0.67	0.67	0.67	-1.00	0.67	0.00	0.33	0.67	0.33
IFI reform (N=3)	0.31	-0.67	0.33	-0.33	1.00	-0.33	1.00	1.00 (2)	-0.33	-0.33	0.33	1.00 (2)	1.00	-0.33	0.33	0.00	1.00	-0.33	1.00	1.00	0.33
Food & Agriculture (N=1)	0.20	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	-1.00	1.00	0.00	1.00
Socioeconomic (N=1)	0.90	0.90	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	0.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
International Cooperation (N=1)	0.05	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	1.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Overall Average	0.37	-0.13	0.63	0.18	0.62	0.30	0.68	0.60	0.04	0.02	0.45	0.49	0.61	0.15	0.23	-0.05	0.36	0.07	0.50	0.78	0.64

*Total N = the number of total compliance reports

*N in parenthesis is the number of compliance reports analyzed in the issue area

*not all countries have been monitored in every compliance report – the number in parenthesis indicates the number of compliance reports for that country if it differs from the norm.