
A Summit of Significant Success: G8 Governance at Camp David in May 2012

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This article has been published in Russian in the *International Organizations Research Institute Journal*, Higher School of Economics, in issue 3 (Autumn 2012). Text in Russian is available at <http://iorj.hse.ru/data/2012/10/08/1244264585/2.pdf>. Published with permission.

Introduction

The Significance of the Summit

The 38th annual G8 summit, hosted by U.S. president Barack Obama at the presidential retreat in Camp David, Maryland on May 18-19, 2012, was a significant event in several ways. It took place in the lead-up to the U.S. presidential election in November 2012, where Obama would seek a second four-year term. It was held in tight tandem with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit in Chicago on May 20-21, the G20 summit in Los Cabos in neighbouring Mexico on June 18-19 and the United Nations (UN) Rio+20 sustainable development summit in Brazil on June 20-22. It was shaped along with preparations for the G20 summit. It was designed to return the G8 to a small, intimate, informal gathering, where leaders were alone to act as leaders, making the big decisions that only they could. The need for personal bonding was reinforced by the recent return of Vladimir Putin to Russia's presidency, and by the arrival of new leaders from Japan, Italy and France, whose presidential election came just two weeks before the summit's start.

Camp David was set to feature a broad but highly selective agenda and a short, action oriented communiqué. During their short summit, starting with an opening dinner on the evening of May 18 and continuing with working sessions until late afternoon on May 19, leaders would cover an American and global economy struggling to generate good growth and jobs, global development as the 2015 due date for the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) approached, and peace and security to advance the G8's core mission of promoting democracy and reform in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Afghanistan, Iran, Syria and North Korea.

The Debate among Competing Schools of Thought

Immediately after the summit, a debate arose among several competing schools of thought about how successful it had been.

The first school saw no silver bullet and few concrete moves to solve the two year old euro-crisis, despite the mounting financial shocks from Europe and Obama's re-election incentives, due to domestic political divisions in Germany and European states' reluctance to cede sovereignty for supranational solutions (Jiang 2012, Inman 2012)). The summit merely "papered over deep-seated divisions about how best to tackle the eurozone crisis" (Beatty 2012). Eswar Prasad concluded: "The language is cautious and guarded and leaves much room for difference of opinion ... Market expectations for the summit were quite low and those modest expectations

have been met” (McHugh 2012b). Others argued that “internal differences and people’s protests against the capitalist system have meant that this summit has also been unable to eliminate the challenges facing the crisis-ridden west” (Siyasat-e Ruz May 20).

The second school saw a security not economic success. Leaders struggled with little result on calming the eurozone debt crisis and fostering the fragile US recovery, but achieved more consensus on security issues, including providing a cushion for the Iranian oil embargo, as on security Obama had more control and thus American leadership could work (Lee, Reddy and Fidler 2012).

The third school saw a shift to growth from austerity at least on paper, due to Obama’s leadership and his concern about how a deep European recession and Greek exit from the eurozone could harm his presidential re-election bid (McHugh 2012a, Cooper 2012, Harding and McGregor 2012). Other causes were Obama’s alliance with new French president Francois Hollande, the latter’s election promises, and a new G8-wide consensus on the need for stimulus now (Lichfield 2012).

The Argument

At first glance the Camp David summit seemed to show how much the G8 had shrunk as an effective centre of global governance in the 21st-century world. It was a short summit of less than 24 hours over two days, yielding only a five-page communiqué. It was a secluded summit, having been moved from its long-scheduled downtown Chicago venue to the rustic presidential retreat near Washington DC. It was a silent summit, with very little information offered in advance about its agenda or its host’s ambitions there. It was a small summit, with only the G8 countries’ and two European Union (EU) leaders participating throughout, joined by just five invited African leaders to discuss food security on the second day. It also became a snubbed summit, with Putin choosing to stay at home, thus ending the G8’s perfect attendance record during its first 37 years. It thus seemed that Camp David would produce only a small success at best.

However, in the end Camp David showed that the G8 was back, as a broader, bigger, bolder centre of global governance than in the recent past. The summit comprehensively covered the economic, development and security domains, focusing on critical issues in each and producing the synergistic solutions that such a broad, integrated agenda allowed (Kirton 2012; Harper 2012). It responded effectively to the biggest crises and challenges of the day — the newest installments of the euro-crisis, the escalating slaughter of civilians in Syria and the food insecurity in Africa, and advanced democracy and development in post-war Afghanistan and in a reforming North Africa and Middle East. It gave strategic direction to the larger summits that came right after — those of NATO a day later, the G20 a month later and the UN immediately after that. Together Camp David produced a significant success, with its B+ performance showing that the G8 was, now more than ever, the personal club at the hub of effective global governance in a now summit-networked world.

Camp David’s significant success was primarily propelled by the strong global shocks that matched the summit’s priority agenda. A second thrust was the failure of the other major international institutions, notably NATO, the G20 and the UN, to control these shocks and

current global challenges on their own. The G8 members' configuration of relative capabilities enabled them to combine as equals to craft solutions made effective by their collectively predominant resources in the world at large. More important was the direct connection between the G8's approach to its agenda priorities and the common democratic purposes of its members and its foundational mission of promoting open democracy and individual liberty throughout the world. While the G8 leaders had only modest domestic political control, capital, continuity, competence and commitment, they were inspired above all by the highly constricted, controlled participation in their compact personal club that stood at the hub of what had become a densely summit-network-governed world.

Camp David's Policy Performance

On its eve, the Camp David summit faced several formidable global challenges that would ultimately require the will and skill of the leaders themselves alone together to solve (Kirton 2012a,b). In the end the summit delivered a significant success in its substantive policy performance, across most of its economic, development and security priorities.

Economy

Its first significant success came in producing a clear, credible G8 growth strategy to quell the current eurocrisis and thus reinvigorate European, G8 and global growth. The summit did so with a new strategy that put growth and jobs first and fiscal consolidation only fourth. The leaders also promised to take "all necessary measures" to strengthen growth and stability, through country-specific measures reflecting the different conditions in each member. They affirmed the global importance of a strong, cohesive Europe, with a committed Greece inside and promised to take "specific measures" to this end. They made fiscal consolidation a matter for structural assessment, taking account of country-specific conditions, and the need to underpin confidence and economic recovery. Instead of standard government stimulus spending they authorised productivity-boosting structural reforms, investment in education and modern infrastructure, leveraging the private sector, immediate credit growth, small business, public-private partnerships, open international trade and investment, and stronger intellectual property rights.

This package proved sufficient in the very short term to induce markets, European voters and others to give the G8 countries the benefit of the doubt, and the time to fill in the details about the promised "specific measures," starting at the European Council summit the following week. The G8's strong emphasis on growth and jobs, without much new government spending, was reassuring. Doubts did remain about whether the package would be enough to generate the large degree of growth and jobs demanded, in time to stop European voters from moving to extremes. The absence of any targets and timetables and of measures directly designed to deliver jobs for the young, reinforced these doubts. However, in all, the G8 strategy was enough to work on the ground in Europe in the coming weeks. But it would do so only if the G8's European leaders did their continental job, starting at their summit on May 23. Both the G8 and EU did so enough to have Greek voters on June 17, unlike on May 6, return a governing coalition supporting the existing Eurozone and Greece's austerity agreement with its European partners.

Oil Markets

A second, strong success came in the “Statement by the G8 on Global Oil Markets.” It showed the smart synergies that the G8, as a comprehensive policy forum can make. Camp David proactively and preventively identified the “substantial risk to global economic growth” that the “likelihood of further disruptions” in oil sales would bring. Knowing that the most likely disruption would come from Europe ending its imports of Iranian oil, the G8 diplomatically but firmly forged the energy-security link in an effort to dissuade Tehran from seeking the capability to acquire nuclear weapons. It provided reassurance to a recession-ridden oil-dependent Europe that it would not have high oil prices to add to its economic woes in the coming months, and that it could safely end its import of Iranian oil, as scheduled, in July. It similarly reassured Americans, worried about their economic growth and the high prices they might have to pay for gas at the pumps. It thereby gave a boost to Obama’s re-election campaign, as high gas prices reliably hurt the incumbent president’s popularity and re-election prospects a great deal. Russia, while not a member of the International Energy Agency (IEA), allowed the release of this G8 statement that called on the IEA to act if need be. Here the presence of prime minister Dmitri Medvedev rather than Putin as Russia’s representative seemed to be a plus. And the G8 prudently promised to “stand ready” to call upon the IEA to act, rather than lock all in by issuing a blank cheque in advance.

Food and Nutrition

Camp David’s performance on food and nutrition — the focus for extent of the summit’s development agenda — was a strong success. The summit launched an African-led, broadly multistakeholder New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition, with an ambitious, results-oriented target and timetable of lifting “50 million people out of poverty over the next decade.” It mobilized new money — \$1.3 billion in direct financial support over three years and \$3 billion in new investment from the 45 corporate partners, while promises to maintain the new high levels of official development assistance reached by G8 governments as their L’Aquila Food Security Initiative commitments were fulfilled by the end of 2012.

In doing so, G8 leaders explicitly aimed at achieving the UN MDGs by their due date in 2015. In effect they adopted one of the eight — the one on food — just as the G8 summit in Muskoka in 2010 had adopted the two that were furthest from being reached — those on child and maternal health. Leaders also reaffirmed their commitment to the Muskoka Initiative on Maternal, Newborn and Child Health (MNCH) through the release of the Camp David Accountability Report. Following the model of the 2010 Harper-Kikwete Commission on accountability for MNCH, the leaders created a leadership council to perform a similar task for their new alliance and actions on food and nutrition. They further confirmed that they would produce a comprehensive report on accountability under the United Kingdom’s presidency of the G8 in 2013, thus going well beyond Camp David’s report on health and food alone.

Behind these results lay an impressive and innovative process. The Camp David G8 had invited African leaders to participate in the summit session on development, as they had since 2001. But they invited a largely new set of African leaders — those who had already taken ownership of their food security challenge and started to address it by putting investment and multi-

stakeholders first and G8 financial assistance last. In this way, Camp David fulfilled the new vision launched in the G8 Africa Action Plan at the Kananaskis Summit ten years ago.

Energy and Climate Change

The summit also produced a sound success on energy and climate change. It appropriately put the emphasis on climate change, which received three paragraphs in the final declaration, compared to one on energy efficiency and two on energy alone. Even the energy paragraphs were framed within the overarching need to promote low-carbon policies to tackle climate change. The “all of the above” strategy on energy production that it endorsed was similarly conditioned by the need to proceed in an “environmentally safe, sustainable, secure and affordable manner.” Leaders further emphasized the need for “high levels of nuclear safety,” pursuant to the extreme weather event of the tsunami and consequent nuclear accident in Japan in March 2011. Simultaneously they promised to “reduce barriers and refrain from discriminatory measures that impede market access” for energy supplies, a boost for the G8’s big energy exporters of Russia and Canada.

On climate change, three advances stood out. The first was the affirmation of an “all-in” approach to a post-Kyoto climate change control regime and to deliver by 2015 “an agreed outcome with legal force applicable to all Parties, developed and developing alike.” The second was the agreement that all G8 countries would now join the Climate and Clean Air Coalition to Reduce Short-Lived Climate Pollutants — those that caused more than 30 percent of near-term global warming, 2 million premature deaths a year and much harm to human health. The third was the call, in synergistic support of the G20, for “efforts to rationalize and phase-out over the medium term inefficient fossil fuel subsidies.”

Deauville Partnership for the Middle East and North Africa

On MENA, G8 leaders firmly put the G8’s foundational values of open democracy and individual liberty first. They began by declaring “a year after the historical events across the Middle East and North Africa began to unfold, the aspirations of people of the region for freedom, human rights, democracy, job opportunities, empowerment and dignity are undiminished.”

If freedom came first, jobs wisely came second, in strong contrast to the economy section of the declaration. For MENA the G8 affirmed the importance of “job opportunities,” a “thriving private sector to provide jobs,” as an “essential foundation for democratic and participatory government,” “training and training programs and trade and investment ties for job creation.” In linking jobs and democracy in this way, the G8 got the recipe right. The G8’s conception of the human rights that were required for the region also was an expansive one. It embraced the gender dimension — “respect the rights of women and girls” and the “right to practise religious faith in safety and security,” a statement of solace to Coptic Christians whose lives were in danger in Egypt.

Once again the G8 put its money where its mouth was. It created a new transition fund, to be filled by its own and others’ finance. The G8 further showed it was with its MENA partners for

the needed long haul. And as a fast follow-up, it asked G8 foreign ministers meeting in September to review the progress being made.

Security

On global peace and security G8 leaders stood together in an impressively committed, comprehensive and innovative way. There was a striking degree of unanimity on difficult and divisive issues such as Iran, where Russia and its G8 partners had had distinctly different views. They comprehensively covered the regional security priorities of Syria, Iran, North Korea, Burma/Myanmar, Libya and the core conventional global security issues of transnational organized crime, terrorism, drug traffickers, and non-proliferation and disarmament. They innovatively raised women's rights in the context of security and forged the link between security, human rights, and MNCH.

The G8's core mission of open democracy formed the foundation for the Camp David approach to Syria, Iran, North Korea, Burma/Myanmar and Libya. In all cases, the leaders went beyond the current challenges to call for deeper political change to meet these ideals. On Syria they Summit called not only for an end to violence and access to UN monitors but also for a "Syrian-led, inclusive political transition leading to a democratic, plural political system" — a regime change of a particular sort by another name. On Iran they demanded an "exclusively peaceful" nuclear program as well as a government that would "uphold human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion, and end interference with the media, arbitrary executions, torture, and other restrictions placed on rights and freedoms." And in deference to Japan, the G8 stated its concern "about human rights violations in the [Democratic People's Republic of Korea], including the situation of political prisoners and the abductions issue."

Afghanistan's Economic Transition

On the Afghanistan's economic transition, the G8 leaders again showed the distinctive value of the G8 summit as a forum that comprehensively covers, and coherently and synergistically integrated issues, initiatives and values across the economic, development and security domains. They promised their continuing support for "the transition process with close coordination of our security, political and economic strategies."

The military mission, force and money for Afghanistan were left for the NATO summit the next day to define and mobilize. Camp David took ownership of the civilian economic and political dimensions, which would be equally expensive and complex. G8 leaders privately began to mobilize the money needed to "support the development of a sustainable Afghan economy," once its war economy ended when the foreign fighting forces left. They thus generated the critical mass and momentum to fuel the success of the Tokyo conference in July, when "G8 members and other donors" would generate "further long-term support for civilian assistance," and agree to a strategy for its use.

Camp David importantly added a focus, commitment and mechanism on mutual accountability, to ensure that the promised money was delivered, used as intended and accomplished the desired result. The money thus came with "mutual commitments and benchmarks between Afghanistan and the international community" and a "mechanism for biennial reviews of progress being made

against those benchmarks through the transformation decade.”

Most impressively, the G8’s approach to the new non-militarized Afghanistan was focused on and guided by the G8’s foundational values of promoting open democracy and individual liberty around the world. Whereas the NATO summit in Chicago would reduce the goal of the military mission from full-scale nation building to merely preventing al Qaeda’s return, the G8 summit at Camp David sought to create a civilian country that met “its obligation to protect and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms, including in the rights of women and girls and the freedom to practice religion.”

Women and Gender

A very strong success came on women and gender, which appeared almost everywhere (Kulik and Kirton 2012). Moreover, women appeared not only as mothers, as in the 2010 Muskoka Initiative on MNCH, but in a much broader array of identities and roles. It recognized the role of women in agriculture, the rights of women in Afghanistan and their fundamental role in political stability, democratic governance and economic growth. They highlighted the importance of the rights of women and girls, especially in regards to the political transitions going on in Afghanistan and MENA.

Dimensions of G8 Governance at Camp David

Camp David’s significant success, coming more in private than in public, was also evident through a systematic application of the framework of six key dimensions of performance that has been developed to measure summit success (see Appendix A).

The first dimension of domestic political management is measured by the number of references in the summit’s official documents that include a positive statement about a member’s actions or that portray a member in a positive light. Here Camp David had a solid performance. In its two documents there were seven communiqué compliments, for 67 percent or six out of the nine members. This was a decrease from the 2011 Deauville summit’s 14 communiqué compliments in its five documents, but similar to the average of 7.1 from the previous cycle of summits from 2003 to 2010, and above the 37-year norm.

The second dimension of deliberation in its private and public components is measured by the number of days the leaders meet and the number of official documents and total words issued in the leaders’ name. Camp David, as intended, produced a strong private but small public performance. The change from the original location in Chicago to Camp David allowed leaders to meet and converse in a highly secluded setting with a limited media presence. They met for about 24 hours, over two days, the same as in the previous two years but less than the average in the last cycle. To publicly record its deliberations, the two official documents issued at the summit totalling 3,640 words were a substantial decrease from the 19,071 words in the five documents released at Deauville in 2011 and from the average of the last summit cycle of 23,677.

The third dimension of direction setting is measured by the number of references to the G8’s core values of open democracy and individual liberty in the leader’s documents. There were 42

in Camp David's two documents, a sharp decline from the 172 in Deauville's five documents and slightly below the average of 66 references in the last summit cycle.

The fourth dimension of decision making is measured by the total collective, measurable commitments that the leaders make. Camp David produced 81 commitments, a sharp decline from Deauville's 196 commitments and an even sharper decline from the average of 238 from the previous summit cycle, but close to the 38-year average of 99.

The fifth dimension of delivery is measured by the members' compliance in the following year with the leaders' commitments. The strong emphasis on accountability at Camp David suggested a strong performance is likely here.

The sixth dimension of developing global governance is measured by the number of new G8 institutions created at both the ministerial and official levels. Camp David created no new ministerial institutions or even meetings but one official institution — the multi-stakeholder New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition. This was similar to Deauville's creation of one ministerial but no official-level institutions, but below the previous summit cycle, which had averaged 0.37 ministerial bodies and 5.87 official level bodies.

In all, Camp David's performance lived up to its design as a highly private, focused, ambitious, synergistic summit – the Rambouillet model adapted for the twenty-first century world.

Causes of Camp David's Performance

The significant success at Camp David's leaders came critically from their recognition of the severe, interconnected shocks they and the world faced, the need of the G20, NATO and the multilateral organizations of the UN family for G8 leadership, and how the G8's core mission and common purpose were directly at stake in the critical economic, development and security priorities it had chosen to address. Less potent but still positive propellers of performance were the stable or slightly improving collectively predominant and internally equal relative capabilities of G8 members and the modest political control, capital, continuity, competence and commitment of their leaders at home. A powerful thrust came from the highly constricted, controlled participation in the leaders' compact interpersonal club that now stood at the hub of what had become a densely summit-network-governed world, especially with the NATO, G20 and UN summits coming immediately after Camp David.

Shock-Activated Vulnerability

First, a strong success flowed from the severity, scope and spiraling synergy of the shocks at hand. They started with a new instalment of the Euro-crisis, a potential energy shock to drive oil prices well above their already elevated level, a similar prospect for food price spikes, and the cluster of continuing security crises in Syria, nuclear-devoted Iran and nuclear-armed North Korea. The G8 leaders, led by their American host, recognized how food was integrally connected to nuclear proliferation on the North Korean front, and how energy was on the Iranian one. Similarly, they saw how a financial and economic crisis in Europe could cripple the G8 effort in the Middle East and North Africa under the Deauville Partnership and in Afghanistan in the transformation decade ahead.

International Institutional Failure

Second, a substantial success flowed from by the failure of the other major international institutions to cope with these current, interconnected crises on their own and the consequent need for the G8 to guide and reinforce them in their response. In the economic domain, the G20, which in 2009 had proclaimed itself to be the primary forum for its members' international economic cooperation, had been unable at the G20 Cannes Summit on November 3-4, 2011, to solve — or even convincingly stave off until its next summit — the euro-crisis. On food security, where the G20 along with the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Fund for Agriculture and Development and the World Food Programme had long been active, the G8's new energy and approach were needed once again to advance agriculture and development in Africa. In security, NATO also needed the G8 to generate the strategy and resources for the civilian dimension that would dominate in the decade ahead. The G20's Seoul Development Consensus had not extended into the key domains that Afghanistan or the reforming Middle East and North Africa faced full on.

Democratic Convergence

Third, a strong success flowed from the direct connection between, on the one hand, the G8's approach to its key agenda priorities and, on the other, the common democratic purposes of its members and its foundational core mission of promoting open democracy and individual liberty throughout the world. The clearest connection came on North Africa and the Middle East, where the Deauville Partnership was designed to promote democratic reform after the dictators' demises and where one of the three pillars focused fully on governance with democratic values at its core. Democracy was similarly directly at stake in Afghanistan where, as in North Africa and the Middle East, it would need a generation to take root. Even in economically afflicted Europe, democracy was a clear concern, especially as far right-wing parties increased their electoral strength in France and Greece and many remembered that Greece and Spain had only moved from dictatorship to democracy around the time of the G8's birth. Syria was on the agenda largely because of its government's massive deadly assault on its citizens' individual liberties. Within the G8, even Russia showed signs of possibly becoming more politically open than it has been for some time. Democratic renewal was also strengthened by one of the four new G8 leaders arriving at the summit with fresh democratic mandates from popular elections just held.

Predominant Equalizing Capabilities

Fourth, a small success flowed from the changing relative capabilities within the G8 and in the world. The G8's globally predominant capabilities were sustained by the "flight to safety" strength of the U.S. dollar, the historic high value of the Japanese yen against the U.S. dollar, the appreciation of the Canadian dollar against the U.S. one and the stability of the British pound, even when the euro and ruble declined a bit. Similarly, the return of the United States to steady mini-locomotive growth of its gross domestic product at 2-3% a year and the slowing growth rate of China, India and above all Brazil stabilized the G8's still substantial share of the global economy over the past year. Internal equality was also largely stable, with growth among G8 members led by the largest U.S. and the smallest Canada and then energy-rich Russia, with the others lying in between.

Domestic Political Control, Capital, Continuity, Competence and Commitment

Fifth, a small success flowed from the modest levels of domestic political control, capital, continuity, competence and commitment of the leaders who assembled at Camp David. Continuity was mixed, with France's François Hollande, Japan's Yoshihiko Noda and Italy's Mario Monti attending their first summit, Russia's Dmitry Medvedev, who represented Vladimir Putin attending his fifth, Britain's David Cameron attending his third, American host Barack Obama his fourth, Germany's Angela Merkel her sixth and Canada's Stephen Harper was the dean at his seventh in a row. Still, the three country newcomers (excluding Putin) and four country veterans took little time to get to know one another and to bond. The leaders of France, Russia, Canada and Germany had a secure majority mandate and control of both their legislative houses, while the others were constrained by the potential loss of power through elections or coalition reshuffles within the year. Few of the leaders beyond Harper had professional competence in macroeconomic management, and none had it in development or security. But Obama's personal commitment to food security and using the G8 to help stop Iran from getting the nuclear weapons drove the strong performance here.

Controlled Participation in a Compact Personal Club

Sixth, a very strong success flowed from Camp David's constricted controlled participation in the compact personal club that now stood at the hub of what has become a densely summit-network-governed world. Here the change to the Camp David format had an important effect. With each country leader having only one small cabin, most summit sessions took place in the dining room, and spontaneous encounters sprung up from the abundant opportunities for walks in the woods. Leaders thus forged and enriched the interpersonal bonds that inspired them to pull together for the greater G8 and global good (Fauver 2012). Harper had met Putin at the St. Petersburg Summit the latter had hosted in 2006 and Merkel and Obama had met Hollande before they arrived at Camp David. The limited number of invited leaders and the limited time they were there, in sharp contrast to the 40 heads at L'Aquila on that summit's final day, allowed the eight leaders and their two EU colleagues the maximum chance to bond.

They did so knowing that they had to get their act together if the larger summits coming immediately after were to succeed. Most G8 leaders went on to Chicago for the NATO Summit. These countries were the core founders and current leaders of a NATO that just forcefully protected innocent civilians in Libya from death at the hands of its now dead dictator in 2011. All G8 leaders were due to attend the G20 summit in Los Cabos a month later, and all were invited to Rio+20 immediately afterward. Thus Camp David was thus the personal club at the hub of an expanding network of global summit governance in a very direct and timely way.

Conclusion

The G8's Camp David Summit had been importantly modelled after the original G7 summit at Rambouillet in 1975. But Rambouillet took place in a world where plurilateral summit institutions were rare, where NATO — one of the earliest such institutions — was not at war at the time or in the recent past, and where financial crises were unlikely to erupt at any moment in an intensely globalized, market-driven world. Camp David was also similar to the G8's Muskoka Summit in 2010, followed on the same day by the G20's summit in Toronto that confronted and

contained the euro-crisis at hand but did not do high, hard security, either by assisting Afghanistan or a North Africa and Middle East about to explode into reform. These were central and compelling security subjects that the G20 summit still did not do, even in regard to the key economic components that were integrally involved. Nor did NATO usually do economics, even when, as in Afghanistan, this was vital to how the military campaign would be conducted in the years ahead. Only the G8 did both security and economics and development. Only the G8 thus offered comprehensive, combined, coherent global summit governance. This was the unique contribution of the G8, as the Camp David Summit strongly showed.

Camp David brought the G8 back as a broad, big, bold centre of effective global governance. It comprehensively and coherently covered and combined the biggest challenges and crises of the day — the newest installments of the continuing euro-crisis, the ongoing slaughter of civilians in Syria and the food crisis in Africa, as well as advancing democracy and development in post-war Afghanistan and in a reforming Middle East and North Africa. It shaped the larger summits that came in its immediate wake — NATO for security in its classic military sense, the G20 for economics and finance in a market-driven world, and the UN for development in an ecologically and socially sustainable way. In doing all these things together in one place at one time, the Camp David Summit showed that the G8 was, more than ever, the personal club at the hub of effective global governance in a plurilateral summit-networked world.

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Appendix A: G8 Performance from 1975 to 2012

Julia Kulik, July 5, 2012 11h40

Year	Grade ^a	Domestic political management ^b		Deliberative			Directional ^c	Decisional	Delivery	Development of global governance ^e	Attendees ^f	
		Communique compliments		# days	# State-ments	# of words	# refs to core values	# commitments	Compliance	# G8 bodies created min/off	Mem	# par C/IO
		#	Spread									
1975	A-	2	29%	3	1	1,129	5	14	0.571	0/1	6	0/0
1976	D	0	0%	2	1	1,624	0	7	0.089	0/0	7	0/0
1977	B-	1	13%	2	6	2,669	0	29	0.084	0/1	8	0/0
1978	A	1	13%	2	2	2,999	0	35	0.363	0/0	8	0/0
1979	B+	0	0%	2	2	2,102	0	34	0.823	1/2	8	0/0
1980	C+	0	0%	2	5	3,996	3	55	0.076	0/1	8	0/0
1981	C	1	13%	2	3	3,165	0	40	0.266	1/0	8	0/0
1982	C	0	0%	3	2	1,796	0	23	0.84	0/3	9	0/0
1983	B	0	0%	3	2	2,156	7	38	-0.109	0/0	8	0/0
1984	C-	1	13%	3	5	3,261	0	31	0.488	1/0	8	0/0
1985	E	4	50%	3	2	3,127	1	24	0.01	0/2	8	0/0
1986	B+	3	25%	3	4	3,582	1	39	0.583	1/1	9	0/0
1987	D	2	13%	3	7	5,064	0	53	0.933	0/2	9	0/0
1988	C-	3	25%	3	3	4,872	0	27	-0.478	0/0	8	0/0
1989	B+	3	38%	3	11	7,125	1	61	0.078	0/1	8	0/0
1990	D	3	38%	3	3	7,601	10	78	-0.14	0/3	8	0/0
1991	B-	1	13%	3	3	8,099	8	53	0.000	0/0	9	1/0
1992	D	1	13%	3	4	7,528	5	41	0.64	1/1	8	0/0
1993	C+	0	0%	3	2	3,398	2	29	0.75	0/2	8	1/0
1994	C	1	13%	3	2	4,123	5	53	1.0	1/0	8	1/0
1995	B+	3	25%	3	3	7,250	0	78	1.0	2/2	8	1/0
1996	B	1	13%	3	5	15,289	6	128	0.41	0/3	8	¼
1997	C-	16	88%	3	4	12,994	6	145	0.128	1/3	9	1/0
1998	B+	0	0%	3	4	6,092	5	73	0.318	0/0	9	0/0
1999	B+	4	22%	3	4	10,019	4	46	0.382	1/5	9	0/0
2000	B	1	11%	3	5	13,596	6	105	0.814	0/4	9	4/3
2001	B	1	11%	3	7	6,214	3	58	0.55	1/2	9	0
2002	B+	0	0%	2	18	11,959	10	187	0.35	1/8	10	0
2003	C	0	0%	3	14	16,889	17	206	0.658	0/5	10	12/5
2004	C+	0	0%	3	16	38,517	11	245	0.54	0/15	10	12/0
2005	A-	8	67%	3	16	22,286	29	212	0.65	0/5	9	11/6
2006		6	44%	3	15	30,695	256	317	0.47	0/4	10	5/9
2007		12	100%	3	8	25,857	86	329	0.51	0/4	9	9/9
2008	B+	8	78%	3	6	16,842	33	296	0.48	1/4	9	15/6
2009	B	13	67%	3	10	31,167	62	254	0.53	2/9	10	28/10
2010	C	10	89%	2	2	7,161	32	44	0.46	0/1	10	9/0
2011	NA	14	67%	2	5	19,071	172	196	0.54	1/0	10	7/4
2012	NA	7	67%	2	2	3,640	42	81	NA	0/1	10	4/1
Total	NA	131	NA	104	214	374,954	828	3,764	15.657	15/101	329	115/53
Ave. all	B-	1.74	44%	2.7	5.63	9,867	21.79	99	0.423	0.42/2.81	8.65	3.03/1.40
Av. cycle 1	B-	1.94	47%	2.1	2.9	2,526	1.1	29	0.3246	0.14/0.71	7.43	0/0
Av. cycle 2	C-	2.45	46%	3	3.3	3,408	1.3	34	0.3239	0.29/1.14	8.43	0/0
Av. cycle 3	C+	1.26	33%	3	4	6,446	4.4	56	0.4754	0.58/1.29	8.14	0.57/0
Av. cycle 4	B	2.04	43%	2.9	6.7	10,880	5.7	106	0.4217	0.58/3.57	9.00	0.86/1.00
Av. cycle 5	B-	0.88	52%	2.9	10.88	23,677	65.75	237.88	0.5197	0.37/5.87	8.75	12.63/5.63

Notes:

N/A=Not Available.

a. Grades up to and including 2005 are given by Nicholas Bayne; from 2006 on are given by John Kirton and the G8RG and are generated according to a different framework and method.

b. Domestic Political Management (National Policy Addresses): % Mem is the percentage of measured G8 countries that referred to the G7/8 at least once that year in their national policy addresses. Ave # refs = the average number of references for the measured countries.

c. Directional: number of references in the communiqué's chapeau or chair's summary to the G8's core values of democracy, social advance and individual liberty.

d. Delivery: Compliance scores from 1990 to 1995 measure compliance with commitments selected by Ella Kokotsis. Compliance scores from 1996 to 2008 measure compliance with G8 Research Group's selected commitments.

e. Development of Global Governance: Bodies Min/Off is the number of new G7/8-countries institutions created at the ministerial (min) and official (off) level at or by the summit, or during the hosting year, at least in the form of having one meeting take place. The first number represents ministerials created. The second number represents official level bodies created.

f. Attendees refers to the number of leaders of full members, including those representing the European Community from the start, and the number of invited participants of countries and/or of international organizations at the G8 leaders' session. Russia started as a participant in 1991 and became a full member in 1998. In 1975, the G4 met without Japan and Italy; later that year the G6 met. C=Countries; IO=International Organizations. The first number represents non-G8 countries who participated. The second number represents International Organizations who participated.

g. The number of commitments listed under 2010 is the count by Jenilee Guebert.

h. The number of commitments in 2012 are those according to Caroline Bracht pending reconciliation with HSE