

**Producing International Commitments and Compliance
without Legalization:
G7/8 Performance from 1975 to 2002**

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Abstract

The most recent expression of the liberal-institutionalist paradigm suggests that highly legalized international institutions with formal charters and organizations are most likely to generate the precision, obligation and delegation needed to generate clear collective commitments and reliable compliance by members. In contrast, the Group of Seven (now Eight) major market democracies is at the bottom of the legalization hierarchy, as a highly informal institution hypothesized to have few such governance effects. This paper tests this claim, in the issue area of international trade, by reporting the results of the first ever comprehensive, systematic survey of the specific, measurable, future-oriented, publicly recorded commitments made by G7/8 leaders from their first annual Summit in 1975 to their most recent in 2002. It further analyzes, along with other dimensions of G7/8 trade governance, compliance with these commitments by the G7/8's members — the United States, Japan, Germany, France, Britain, Italy, Canada, Russia and the European Union.

The results indicate that, as a trade institution, the G7/8 has generally generated a solid performance in its aggregate achievements and in its component deliberative, direction-setting, decision-making, delivery and institutional development roles. As the G7/8 was deliberately founded as, and has remained, a highly non-legalized institution, these results casts doubt on the core claims of legalized liberal internationalism. More specifically, the G7/8's trade performance has, as Nicholas Bayne argues, generally followed a six-stage cadence: high achievement in 1977–78, much lower in 1981–82, non-existent in 1983–1989, mixed in 1990–1993, non-existent again in 1994–2000, and high again in 2001–02. This cadence becomes less empirically clear, particularly in more recent years, as the analysis moves in turn through the deliberative, directional, decision-making, delivery and institutional development dimensions of Summit performance. These patterns show that Summit performance can be seen as a five-layered “funnel,” with a large deliberative contribution at the top winnowed down to little institutional development at the bottom. They further show that Summit performance is best considered a multidimensional dependent variable, with a separate configuration of causal factors at work in each case. A correlation of aggregate and component trade performance with the major causal variables specified by the “flexible concert” school and underlying concert equality model of G7/8 governance confirms this multidimensional nature of Summit performance. However, it also points to a core group of generally generative, comprehensively relevant causes that are identified, usually operating as specified, by the concert equality model. Together they portray the G7/8 as a continuing collective hegemon, functioning in a comprehensive, flexible Summit-level institution with an interlinked agenda, benignly offering effective global trade governance when its members' overall capabilities become more equal, creating commitments when left alone, complying when outsiders come to watch, and doing best when the members' closed economies become more equally dependant on each other and their leaders bring a shared political purpose and more experience to their annual encounter. And even as the GATT/WTO becomes more legalized, multilaterally inclusive and democratic, there remains a demand for, and supply of, the Summit's global trade governance work.

Introduction

Multilateral trade provides a particularly significant test of the informal, minilateral Group of Seven/Group of Eight's (G7/8) effectiveness as a centre of global governance, in contrast to that of the formal, multilateral General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and World Trade Organization (WTO) that scholars of legalization emphasize (Grieco and Ikenberry 2003, Abbott et al. 2000). Trade, along with macroeconomic policy and north-south development, has been one of the three issue areas dealt with by every G7/8 Summit since the start in 1975. In trade the Summit has secured some of its most striking successes — resisting protectionism, concluding the stalled Tokyo Round in 1979, and, most recently, launching the Doha development round at Genoa in 2001. Yet in the trade field the Summit has also seen some of its most spectacular failures — its neglect in the early 1980s, its failure to launch a new round at the bitter Bonn Summit in 1985, its unfulfilled promises in 1990, 1991 and 1992 to complete the Uruguay Round within a year, and the rejection of U.S. president Bill Clinton's call for a new millennium round at Naples in 1994. As the deepening integration brought by globalization drives the Summit into difficult, once domestic issues, as the 1997–98 global financial crisis erodes the neo-liberal consensus on the benefits of freer trade, and as outside countries and civil society actors demand more inclusive, transparent, democratic decision making in global governance, the G7/8's historic role as the ultimate guardian against protectionism, as the catalyst for further liberalization, and as the global trade governor of last resort, has come under mounting challenge. This challenge will be clear at the forthcoming G7/8 Summit at Evian-les-Bains, France on June 1–3, 2003, where the G8 leaders and their many developing country guests will be called on to make multilateral trade work for the benefit of all, by bringing the WTO's Doha development round to a successful conclusion by its ambitious deadline of 2005.

The questions of how well the Summit governs global trade, and why it succeeds and fails, have long been debated by scholars of the G7/8 and of multilateral trade. Some see the G7/8 as an ineffective centre of global trade governance, although they disagree over why it is so. Here the first, “legalization” school suggests that the G7/8 is bound to be irrelevant, or at best a deliberative ginger group, as it lacks the obligation, precision and delegation that charter-bound, organized international institutions require for effectiveness and legitimacy (Abbot et al. 2000, Baker 2000, Goldstein 2000). By this legalization logic, any G7 effectiveness should have disappeared in 1995 after the new, highly legalized WTO was born to replace the more loosely organized GATT. A second, “false new consensus” school ascribes G7 ineffectiveness in the 1990s not to such external, institutional factors, but to internal cognitive and capability ones, namely G7 governors' inaccurate belief that they cannot control globalization in an era of U.S. decline and the resulting rise of traditional differences among members (Bergsten and Henning 1996).

In contrast, many see the G7 as an effective centre of global trade governance, for ill or for good, as it addresses new issues, sets normative directions, takes key collective decisions, reliably implements them and even develops its own trade institutions. Here a third, “neo-liberal leadership” school argues that the G7, as the club of capitalist powers

and state agents from capitalist classes, enforces a destructive, disciplinary neo-liberalism (Helleiner 2001, Gill 2000, 1999), makes superficial adjustments to sustain the ideological framework in the face of crisis and contestation (Dallaire 2001) or properly defends its core values of openness (Sally 2001, Freytag 2001, Donges and Tillman 2001, Theuringer 2001, Dluhosch 2001). Yet a fourth, “social change” school, suggests that the G7/8 defends and expands the embedded liberalism of the 1945 order by ensuring that trade liberalization promotes employment, social welfare and, now, ecological values, especially in the face of the crises that globalization brings. It does this due to its institutional ability to embrace and integrate a full range of subjects and values, in a forum dedicated to open democracy, individual liberty and social advancement, and one directly controlled by popularly elected democratic leaders (Kirton 2002, Kirton, Daniels and Freytag 2001). The G7/8’s failures in setting new socially sensitive normative directions arise primarily when it defers to the heavily legalized organizations of the 1945 creation and, above all, to the new WTO.

This debate deepens when the G7/8 Summit’s performance in collective trade decision making and compliance, or *de facto* rule making and implementation, is put in the primary place. Here, a fifth, “democratic institutionalist” school argues that the Summit has had a highly variable trade performance, doing “well” from 1975 to 1978, “not very highly” from 1979 to 1986, “mixed” from 1987 to 1993, and “low” from 1994 to 2000 (Bayne 2001, Ullrich 2001). It does best when the leaders commit themselves to “defending the open multilateral trade system,” remain personally engaged, involve outside countries and civil society, and set consistent policies in related areas such as development and debt relief. In keeping with the legalization logic, it does best when it has a trade ministers forum or presence at the Summit to connect it more closely with the GATT/WTO (Winham 1986, Wolfe 1998), when it works in support of established, especially G7/8 guided multilateral organizations, assisted by powerful trade bureaucracies within members’ national governments (Kokotsis 1999, Ikenberry 1993).

A sixth, “flexible concert,” school also points to a generally successful trade performance by the G7/8, but one based on its character as a flexible concert of equals and the hard law limitations of its competitor, the legalized GATT/WTO (Cohn 2001, 2002, esp. ch. 7–9; Kirton 2002, 1999a, 1999b). Consistent with the larger concert equality model of G8 governance, this school argues that “the G7/G8, the Quad and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have occupied important positions at the upper levels of the trade decision-making pyramid,” as a result of “the dominance of developed countries in the North over developing countries in the South, the decline of U.S. economic hegemony, the growing interaction of trade with other issues as a result of globalisation, and the unique characteristics of the GATT/WTO as an international organisation” (Cohn 2002, 278–289). These characteristics are the GATT/WTO’s lack of decision-making procedures for G7/8 or anyone’s executive leadership, and its narrow, legally entrenched trade mandate that prevents it from forming the broader, more balanced linkages a globalizing world demands. Thus the WTO, imprisoned in its own legalized straightjacket, helps make the G7/8 the effective centre of global governance on trade.

None of these schools offers a fully convincing account of the G7/8's performance in global trade governance. Those who see the G7/8 as ineffective, in its deliberative, direction-setting, decisional, delivery or institutional development roles, have difficulty describing its recent success at its 2001 and 2002 Summits, in launching a new round of WTO multilateral trade negotiations (MTN), making it a development round, and giving developing countries in Africa an early down-payment in the form of preferential access to the markets of the G8. Those looking to legalization as the core cause of effective global trade governance have difficulty explaining why the new WTO failed so spectacularly just before at its 1999 Seattle ministerial, and indeed since its 1994 birth, in launching a new round. Indeed, as this pattern of GATT/WTO failure and G7/8 success in launching and closing MTN rounds reaches back a quarter of a century, to the era of the less legalized GATT, it appears that the advent of the legalized WTO has made little difference at all. Yet the G7/8 Summit too has had a highly variable record, failing for many years after it created its own trade ministers' Quadrilateral institution in 1981, failing with strong American leadership in 1995, yet succeeding in the post-September 11 world.

In order to test these competing schools of thought, and assess more carefully the courses and causes of G7/8 global trade governance, this paper presents a systematic conceptualization and measurement of the components and causes of the G7/8's trade performance and a preliminary analysis of such cause-effect relationships as can be established at this stage. In doing so, it refines, renders more reliable, and arbitrates among those variables at the centre of the G7/8 governance debate, while reaching out to embrace in the analysis those factors central to the legalization literature and the activity of the GATT/WTO. While still a study of G7/8 global trade governance, this paper thus contributes to the broader field of global trade governance, and to understanding the role of the informal, soft law G7/8 and formal, hard law GATT/WTO as colleagues, complements or competitors in this task.

This analysis sustains Bayne's aggregate assessment of a six-stage cadence of G7/8 trade governance, as follows: high trade achievements in 1977-78 (with the closing of the Tokyo Round), much lower in 1981-82, non-existent in 1983-1989, mixed in 1990-1993 (with the ultimately successful effort to close the Uruguay Round), non-existent again in 1994-2000, and high again in 2001 (with the launch due to Genoa of the Doha development round). Yet the pattern becomes less clear, particularly in recent years, as the analysis moves in turn through the deliberative, directional, decision-making, delivery and institutional development components of Summit performance. The patterns show that Summit performance can be seen as a five-layered funnel, in which large deliberative contributions at the top are winnowed down to little institutional development at the bottom. Furthermore, they show that Summit performance is best considered a multidimensional dependent variable, with considerable independent variance for each component, suggesting a separate array of causal factors at work in each case. A correlation of aggregate and component trade performance with the major causal variables specified by the "flexible concert" school and underlying concert equality model, along with those forwarded by the larger legalization school, confirms the multidimensional nature of Summit performance and the need for a specific cluster of factors to explain each

component of that performance. However, it also points to the presence of a core group of generally generative, comprehensively relevant causes. These causes are those identified, and usually operating as specified, by the concert equality model. Together they portray the G7/8 as a continuing collective hegemon, operating in a comprehensive, flexible Summit-level institution with an interlinked agenda, benignly offering effective global trade governance when its members' overall capabilities become more equal, creating commitments when left alone, complying when outsiders come to watch, and doing best when the members' closed economies become more equally dependant on each other and their leaders bring a shared political purpose and more experience to their annual encounter. And even as the GATT/WTO becomes more legalized, multilaterally inclusive, and democratic, there remains a demand for, and supply of, the Summit's global trade governance work.

1. The G7/8 Trade Performance, 1975–2002

A. Assessing G7/8 Trade Performance

Assessments of the G7/8 performance and effectiveness as an institution of global governance typically focus on the results each of the 28 annual Summits from 1975 to 2002. They offer an integrated judgement of each Summit's performance, based on varying selections from, and weightings of, five component governance contributions the G7/8, as any international institution, makes. These components are 1) the deliberative, consultative role of agenda setting and attention getting; 2) the directional role of setting principles and norms; 3) the decisional role of making clear, concrete, future-oriented collective commitments; 4) the delivery role of complying with and implementing these commitments in the following year; and 5) the institutional development role of creating G7/8-centred institutions to reinforce and expand the work.

These five components can be considered an inverted five-layer funnel, in which the Summit most easily, frequently and voluminously produces a deliberative trade agenda at the top, followed in turn, with ever diminishing frequency and productivity, by the lower layers and subsequent stages of direction setting, decision making, delivery, and institutional development. In this framework, each layer is a strongly generative, almost necessary, condition for performance at lower level layers, recognizing only that decisions need not depend on prior direction setting, and that ministerial, official level, and more inclusive G7/8 or G7/8-centred institutions can emerge from sources other than specific Summit decisions.

These judgements about performance can be made in regard to the Summit as a whole and in regard to the individual issue areas it addresses. In the former case, assessments of the G7/8 as a flexible, informal, leaders-driven institution do, and should, take into account the demand for governance presented by the international system at the moment (including crises and the availability of and action from alternative institutionalized governance centres) and the particular themes or issues the Summit leaders choose to

supply. In addition, in regard to individual issues areas, assessments involve judgements about the G7/8's ongoing governance of the issues in the "core" issue area and issues in "related" issue areas that the G7/8, exercising their informal flexibility, reaches out to integrate, create or redefine.

In the case of international trade, each Summit has dealt with a core trade issue area. It contains activities that have as their primary welfare target influencing trading patterns across international borders, including endorsing or seeking to alter international (multilateral, plurilateral, regional or bilateral) trade agreements, unilateral trade actions, tariffs, quotas, voluntary export restraints, export credits and non-tariff barriers, and the physical and legal infrastructure required to facilitate trade, such as secure international transportation networks and a legally enforceable dispute settlement mechanism. In addition, the Summit as a flexible integrating institution, deals with trade-related issues in other issues areas. These trade-related issues are defined as trade policies or flows as means to achieve a primary welfare objective in another issue area, such as protecting the environment, securing energy supplies, affecting regional relations, assisting developing countries or securing foreign exchange rates.

B. Aggregate Achievement

There exists a wealth of qualitative Summit-specific judgements about the G7/8's overall and trade performance. But systematic multi-year assessments of the G7/8 Summit's overall performance, based on defined methods, come from two primary sources. The first, following a method first introduced by Putnam and Bayne (1987), is Nicholas Bayne's achievement grades. Here each Summit is assigned an overall grade for its specified achievements, based, as Bayne has recently elaborated, on the criteria of leadership, effectiveness, durability, acceptability and consistency (Bayne 2000, 195; 2001). As Appendix A indicates, Bayne sees the Summit as, inter alia, a trade institution and particularly values its work in launching and closing the GATT/WTO's MTN rounds (Bayne 2000: 195, 2002a, 2002b). He thus sees six stages of trade achievements: high in 1977-78 (due to the closing of the Tokyo Round), much lower in 1981-1982, non-existent in 1983-1989 (despite the 1986 launch of the Uruguay Round), mixed in 1990-1993 (due to the persistent and ultimately successful effort to close the Uruguay Round), non-existent again from 1994 to 2000, and high again in 2001 (due to the Doha development round).

A second systematic assessment of the annual Summit achievements offers a more favourable view of the Summit's performance during its most recent cycle from 1996 to 2002 (G8 Research Group 2002). Each year, about a month before the Summit, G8 Research Group analysts establish the objectives the Summit should reach both overall and in key issue areas, and then assess its delivered performance against these objectives at Summit's end. Compared to the Bayne method, this assessment directly examines trade each year, offers clear prior referents for evaluation, and focuses more broadly on MTNs. But it sets a somewhat lower overall standard, omits compliance (durability) altogether

and is produced by different analysts each year. As Appendix B indicates, for the G8 Research Group, the Summit's trade performance matches its overall performance from 1996 to 2002, outperforming the Summit as a whole in 1996, 1999, 2001 and 2002 but falling behind in other years. The rather consistently high Summit's trade performance since 1996 stands in contrast to the judgement of Bayne. However in the single year that both directly measure — 2001 — they do agree on a grade of B+.

C. Deliberation: Consultation, Agenda Setting and Attention Getting

In moving beyond aggregate assessments to evaluations of the individual components of G7/8 Summit trade performance, the first dimension is that of deliberation — the consultative agenda-setting and attention-getting role. It can be easily measured by examining the issues included in documents the leaders publicly release in their names at their annual Summits, as the only authoritative record of what they have done. Although Summit documents measure imperfectly what the leaders actually discuss at the Summit (on the formal agenda, during the informal dinners or breaks, or otherwise), they do capture most of the discussions (including last minute matters of “spontaneous combustion”), include issues dealt with at lower levels and closed before the Summit during the leaders' driven and directed preparatory process, are issued in the leaders' name, are the only collective authoritative record of what was discussed and decided, and can be monitored and “enforced” by the publicity they are given (Hajnal 1989).

As Appendix C confirms, trade has been a continuous and often substantial part of the G7/8 Summit agenda. It serves along with macroeconomics and north-south development as one of the three core areas discussed at every Summit (Kirton 1989). However, as Appendix C also indicates, the absolute amount and portion of attention given to trade at the annual Summits, as measured by the paragraphs devoted to the subject in the documents released in the leaders' name at each Summit, has varied widely. Whether measured by the number of paragraphs, or the portion of paragraphs, a six-stage sequence emerges: high from 1975 to 1982 (21% of the total documentation), low from 1983 to 1985 (9%), high from 1986 to 1996 (18%), low in 1997 to 1998 (6%), medium in 1999–2001 (14%) and low again in 2002 (8%).

This cadence is generally consistent with that identified by Bayne, although it also reflects the G8 Research Group's more favourable assessments for the period since 1996. It further shows a long term trend (over all peaks and valleys) toward declining trade attention, but a considerable capacity to bounce back to very high peaks — 29% in 1978, 20% in the 1986–1988 mini-cycle, 25% in 1993 and 17% in 2001 — the years when MTN rounds were closed and launched. It also highlights two great troughs of inattention: 1983–1985 (the early years of the Reagan-Thatcher revolution), and 1997–1998 (the years when non-WTO member Russia was admitted to a new G8).

As Appendix C further shows, there have been notable trends within the trade agenda. The concern with the MTN has been the only continuous component. North-south trade has been a close second, despite its absence from 1981 to 1984. The concern

with protectionist backsliding, so central from 1975 to 1990, virtually disappeared once the globalizing 1990s began. Also notable, as the social change school argues, has been the emergence of the socially sensitive trade agenda, starting with the environment in 1991, biotechnology and labour in 1999, civil society in 2002 and intellectual property in 2001. Such agenda broadening could permit a increase in directional performance, through the flexible creation of new principles and norms. It could also cause a decline in decisional and delivery performance, as Summit political resources are diluted beyond the classic at-the-border trade agenda into the more difficult, domestically intrusive domains.

D. Direction Setting: Principles and Norms

The second component of G7/8 performance is direction setting — establishing, confirming and changing principles and norms, both within an issue area and by linking the values in one area to those in another in old or new ways. Although principles and norms pervade the Summit documentation and activity, attention can usefully focus on priority principles — those statements of fact, causation or rectitude given central significance by being placed in the Summit documents' opening introductory passages or “chapeau.” Indeed, it was here that the first, Rambouillet Summit opened by declaring the values at the core of the G7/8's mission — the protection within the G7 and promotion globally of “open democracy, individual liberty and social advancement.” It is worth noting that trade, including trade liberalization or even anti-protectionism were absent as defining priority principles at the Summit's birth.

As Appendix D indicates, whether measured by the number of trade references or the number of direct, discrete linkages of these trade references to other values, a six-stage sequence in the G7/8's trade direction setting appears: peaks in 1977–1978, 1983–1991 and 1997–2000, and troughs in between. This cadence is consistent with that of Bayne's aggregate achievements for the entire period, and with that of the Summit's deliberative agenda-setting performance from 1975 through to 1991. This suggests that deliberation was followed by direction setting until 1991, after which high attention came with no direction setting from 1992 to 1996, low attention co-existed with high direction setting in 1997–1978, and high attention came with low direction setting in 2000–2001.

A more detailed examination of the content of the values to which trade was linked confirms the social change school arguments, by showing four major periods of normative change (Kirton 2002). In 1977, consistent with embedded liberalism, trade was identified as instrumentally useful instrument for achieving the overriding goals of employment, low inflation and social welfare. From 1983 to 1986, in neo-liberal fashion, trade became an essential instrument of growth for developing countries and for developing country debt servicing. In 1989–1990 embedded liberalism made a brief return, with social justice, sustainable prosperity and freedom joining growth and low inflation as the ends that trade instrumentally served. Finally, from 1996 to 1999, trade became instrumentally useful to a wide range of values, including Russia's inclusion and poverty reduction, but was also

recognized as a cause of dislocation and uncertainty for people, families and communities around the world.

E. Decision Making: Collective Commitments

The third component of Summit performance is decision making — the production of discrete specific, future-oriented, measurable, publicly encoded commitments, often with specified instruments, outcome targets, and timetable or deadlines attached. This component embraces the classic functions (beyond the deliberative “mutual enlightenment”) of reinforcement through to concession and adjustment against which Summits have traditionally been assessed (Putnam and Bayne 1987, Grieco and Ikenberry 2003).

As Table E indicates, the annual Summit has been a regularly consistent producer of trade commitments, both in the numbers produced and as a portion of the overall commitments created each year. It has averaged six trade commitments or 10% of the total each year. However, a four-stage sequence stands out: high from 1975 to 1983 (with a peak at the London Summit of 1997), low in 1984–1985, high again from 1986–1996 (with a peak at Toronto 1988, and valley at Munich 1992), and low again from 1997 to 2002 (although with a burst at Kananaskis 2002). Again this pattern generally matches Bayne’s achievements to 2001, and the agenda-setting cadence through to 1998, but the direction-setting performance for only 1977–1978 and 1986–1991. It suggests that directions and decisions flow independently from Summit deliberations, with a consistent full package coming only rarely, as in 1997–1998 and 1986–1991. A selected assessment of the overall and trade commitments according to their ambition and significance provides no obvious explanation of the discrepancies — it does not suggest that with fewer but more important commitments coming in the decisionally lean years when very few commitments are produced (Kirton, Kokotsis and Juricevic 2002).

The trade commitments can be further scored according to their relationship with other international organizations (almost always the GATT/WTO), and in particular whether the content of the commitment is leading/shaping, following/supporting, or independent of the activity of these legalized multilateral international organizations (IOs). As Table E further indicates, in regard to such leadership and direction, G7/8 commitments have on balance led rather than followed the IOs, but with great variation over the 28 years. The G7/8 lead the GATT/WTO in 1978–1980, 1982–1985, 1989–1991 and in 1998, but followed it in other years. Indeed it did so to an unprecedented degree in 2001–2002. Since the establishment of the WTO in 1994, the G7/8 has led (and weakly) in only one year (1998) and on balance followed as never before. This pattern of deference to the WTO corresponds roughly to the phases of weak Summit performance in achievement (save for 1991–1992 and 2001).

F. Delivery: Compliance

The fourth component of Summit performance is delivery through compliance — the extent to which “commitments made” are also “commitments kept” as the G7/8 institution constrains its members to keep their collectively made promises through faithful implementing action in the subsequent year, that is, before next year’s Summit and new occasion for fresh commitment making (or revision) comes. The use of three different but comparable data sets provides a composite portrait of the Summit’s overall and trade compliance record over its 28 years.

As Appendix F indicates, during the first two Summit cycles from 1975 to 1989, Joseph Daniels and George von Furstenberg’s data show that compliance by members with the G7 Summit’s seven trade commitments was an exceptionally high +73% (Kokotsis and Daniels 1999, Daniels 1993). This made trade the highest of the nine issue areas assessed and well above the overall Summit average (over all 209 commitments) of +31%. Britain and Canada were the highest compliers overall, while the United States and especially France complied the least.

During the third Summit cycle from 1988 to 1995, using a compliance monitoring method developed by Ella Kokotsis, the average level of trade compliance was only –30% (Kokotsis and Daniels 1999, Kokotsis 1999). This stands in sharp contrast to the average score of +43% for compliance by the U.S. and Canada with all commitments in the four issues areas of climate change, biodiversity, debt relief of the poorest and financial assistance to former Soviet Union. Indeed, trade has the lowest score of the five issue areas for which data is available. Yet in trade compliance was complete (+100) with the 1992 and 1993 commitments, and high again (at +50%) in 1994. As these were years in which few trade commitments were made, the pattern suggests that a more concentrated or limited trade agenda and ensuing commitments leads to greater compliance. Across countries, the highest compliance with trade commitments came from Canada and the United States, a finding consistent with the Kokotsis portrait of a United States that had moved to higher compliance with G7/8 commitments from 1988 to 1995 (Kokotsis 1999).

For the 1988–1995 period, the G7/8 commitments that led the GATT/WTO-centred international organizations secured a negative compliance rate of –16%. In sharp contrast, G7/8 commitments supporting the established hard law trade organizations secured a compliance score of +37. Commitments to act independently came in at 0%. This pattern shows, consistent with the legalization literature and the democratic institutionalist model of G7/8 Summit performance, that it is much easier for the informal soft law G7/8 reliably to follow the formal hard law firmament than to lead or go it alone. Compliance comes more readily when hard law organizations are already ready or helping to deliver.

During the fourth Summit cycle from 1996 to 2002, assessments by the G8 Research Group show that compliance with selected, priority trade commitments rose somewhat to +20%. But this was still a level well below the overall average of +42% for the period. One a yearly basis, trade compliance varied widely: 1996–1997 at +29% (compared to +36% for the Summit overall that year), 1997–1998 at –86% (+13%), 1998–1999 at +33% (+32%), 1999–2000 at –57% (+38%), 2000–2001 at +100% (+81%), and

2001–2002 at +88% (+50%). Okinawa and Genoa thus saw the Summit return to high trade compliance performance, along with the Summit as a whole.

Together the compliance data show, in keeping with Bayne’s overall assessment, high G7/8 compliance in 1997–1998, much lower in 1981–1982, non-existent from 1983 to 1986, mixed from 1987 to 1993, low to negative from 1994 to 2000, and high again in 2001. However, there is notably higher compliance (+100%) than Bayne’s aggregate assessment suggests, in 1987, 1992, 1993 and 2000. Beyond the 1997–1998 peak there is less consistency with the patterns of Summit deliberation, direction setting and decision making, although a focused agenda yielding few commitments does appear to lead to higher compliance. The average compliance record throughout the period is often consistent with the Grieco-Ikenberry observation that “the ability of large and open democratic countries to implement sweeping economic changes in accord with broad international agreements is more problematic” (Grieco and Ikenberry 2003, 314). Yet there are several great exceptions — 1978, 1987, 1992, 1993, 2000 and 2001. And while globalization may have made compliance more difficult from 1994 to 2001, in contrast to the Bergsten and Henning’s false new consensus argument, G7/8 leaders did try to govern with a large number of trade commitments, and managed to comply with them almost completely in 2000 and 2001.

G. Institutionalization

The fifth component of Summit performance is institutional development — the emergence from the Summit of ministerial or official-level institutions to deal with particular issues areas such as trade. At the ministerial level, the trade ministers Quadrilateral, created in 1981, was the first of the dozen stand-alone ministerial institutions the Summit created from 1975 to 2002. Yet no known real official level trade institutions have emerged during this time. In addition, trade ministers were brought to the Summit on an ad hoc basis to help successfully close MTN rounds in 1978 and 1993.

As Appendix G shows, the number of trade ministers meeting at the Summit or on a stand-alone basis has varied considerably. There were virtually none during the first cycle from 1975 to 1981, many from 1982 to 1993 and few (indeed half relative to the earlier periods) from 1994 to 1999. This pattern confirms Bayne’s judgement of low trade performance from 1994 to 1999. It is also consistent with the argument that after the birth of the WTO in 1994, the G7/8 decided to defer to the new legalized organization in the global trade governance field (Kirton 2002).

H. Summit Performance Combined

Taken together, this analysis of G7/8 Summit trade performance from 1975 to 2002 confirms in the first instance a five-level “funnel” conception of the Summit’s performance and roles, under which a deliberative agenda yields in turn directional

principles, decision-making commitments, delivery of compliance and institutional development. From 1975 to 2002, the Summit produced 169 paragraphs of core trade discussions in its leaders-level documents or an average of six a year. In addition, its opening chapeau passages generated 34 references to trade (the priority trade principles) and 20 trade linkages (direct, discrete connections between these trade references and other values). This was an average of about one a year in each case. (The Summit documents' actual trade paragraphs produced far more in each case.) However, its 169 trade paragraphs did produce 167 trade commitments, for an average of six per year, and 10% of the Summit's 1,649 overall commitments during its 28 years. The best evidence available on compliance suggests these trade commitments were delivered on 32% of the time. And the Summit brought the full set of trade ministers to it on only two occasions, developed only one ministerial institution that met on 33 occasions (or almost twice a year from 1981 to 1999) and created no official level trade institutions of its own.

The sequence suggests that in informal institutions such as the G7/8 Summit, deliberation, direction setting and even decision making are relatively easy, but delivery and the development of institutions are more difficult to produce. It also suggests that the G7/8 Summit has remained true to its founding anti-bureaucratic conviction that institutionalization, especially in any legalized form, would cripple the capacity of democratic leaders to offer effective global governance in a rapidly changing, crisis-ridden world.

As Appendix H indicates, an intercorrelation of the Bayne aggregate achievement scores and each of the five components of Summit performance, shows only selective covariation. Bayne's achievement grades, when scored according to the presence or absence of trade in his annual grading, correlates well with Summit deliberation, measured by both the portion and number of trade paragraphs. But a more refined scoring of Bayne's achievement grades produces no such results. This tends to confirm the Bayne grades' status as a required aggregate, based on a comprehensive view of Summit performance, rather than as a measure driven and thus substitutable by any single privileged performance part.

Yet it does point to the deliberative Summit standing out as a potential platform from which other components of Summit performance might flow. The intercorrelational evidence sustains this view. The number of trade paragraphs correlates adequately not only with the Bayne's notation of trade in his achievement grades, but even more with the decisional Summit's number of trade commitments as well. The deliberative Summit's portion of trade paragraphs correlates well not only with Bayne's notations but also with the decisional Summit's portion of trade commitments. Greater deliberation thus "yields" greater decision making. In the deliberative, norm-setting domain, the number of trade references correlates well with the number of trade linkages, as one might expect. But neither correlate well with anything else. Summit direction setting seems to stand alone and apart from the Summit's other work.

2. Causes of G7/8 Trade Performance

The task of explaining the G7/8's performance in global trade governance, and assessing the competing schools of thought as alternative explanations of that performance, can usefully start by correlating the components of trade performance with the major causal variables specified by the flexible concert school and the underlying concert equality model. These can be considered alongside the variables forwarded from the larger legalization school. Appendices I and J report the results of the most striking finding from such an analysis.

A. Predominant Equal Capability

The collective predominance of the G7/8 in the international system, both overall (as measured by the G7/8's share of global GDP) and in the issue area of trade (as measured by the G7/8's share of world trade), helps "explain" both the Summit's directional performance (number of trade references) and its delivery performance (level of compliance with trade commitments). This paints a portrait of the G7 as a benign group or collective hegemon, setting directions and delivering public trade goods for the world as a whole (Bailin 2001).

Even more productive in "explaining" the G7/8's deliberative and decisional performance is the internal equality of overall capability among members within the G7. However, the internal equality of specific trade capability within the G7 has no effect on any performance dimension. This points to the Summit's special character as a comprehensive, leader-controlled institution with an interlinked agenda that yields large package deals. Here, it is overall capability that yields deliberation and decision in specific issue areas, rather than issue-specific capability producing issue-specific performance, as segmented, single-issue, charter-confined international organizations, as conceived in the classic liberal-institutional regime framework, are more likely to do. This interpretation is supported by a separate analysis by Nikolai Roudev, which shows that overall Summit performance (as measured by Bayn'e aggregate achievement grades converted into numbers through the use of GPA equivalents) correleates heavily negatively with US GDP relative to that of the rest of the G7.. here the G7 works best when the US is weak.

B. Constricted Participation

The constricted participation of the G7/8 Summit also correlates with decisional and delivery performance, but in opposite ways. The fewer the members and participants at the annual Summit, the higher the portion of trade commitments it generates, as the concert equality model, following instrumental liberal internationalist K-group logic, suggests. Yet, in contrast, more members and participants correlate more strongly and positively with compliance by G7/8 members with their commitments. In the first

instance, this points — as the democratic institutionalist model suggests — to a process of multilateral implementation nesting, where the presence of the heads of relevant international organizations (as in 1996, 2001 and 2002) facilitates their understanding, “buy-in,” and legitimation of the G7 commitments and leads them to help implement these commitments more reliably than they otherwise would. Conversely, their presence may make the G7 more amenable to producing commitments more likely to be implemented by these IOs. The pattern also points to the possibility of a form of external binding, in which the presence of developing country leaders at the Summit (as in 1989, 2001 and 2002) adds an external group of leaders who will monitor and help produce effective implementation. This could be especially the case when the trade commitments deal with north-south development and are conditional (as at Kananaskis 2002) on developing country actions for G7 compliance to take place.

C. Common Principles

The common principles that generate G7 performance can be assessed at two levels. The first, “thin” level, is the common political or ideological orientation of the leaders at the Summit, whether left or right, as measured by where their political party lies on a national left-right spectrum. In contrast to earlier analyses (Kirton 1989) such a variable correlates consistently positively across a broad spectrum of performance: deliberation (number of paragraphs), direction setting (number of references) and decision making (number of commitments). Shared political, if not social, purpose, as understood by democratically elected politicians, thus seems to breed Summit success.

The second or “deep” level of common principles is that driven by the increasing interdependence and vulnerability of the G7 members economies, as they become more open, more open to and concentrated on each other, and more equally open to and concentrated on each G7 member. Here the data suggest, unexpectedly, that it is the collective closure rather than openness of G7 economies that breed both deliberation (number of paragraphs) and decision making (portion of commitments that are trade commitments). This suggests that the G7, with predominantly liberalizing deliberations and decisions, acted successfully to open their relatively closed economies, but then turned to other issues when a large measure of openness had been achieved. Only very recently, as globalization has gained force and bred the crises of the late 1990s have G7/8 Summits turned toward acting in the direction of closure — to cope with the dark side of globalization and produce socially sensitive and safeguarded globalization as well.

Furthermore, as G7 members increase trade with their other G7 partners, their G7/8 trade deliberations and direction setting increase. And as they become more equally open to each of their G7 partners, they deliberate and decide more about trade as well. While increasing openness breeds low performance, trade concentration on G7 partners as a whole, and on each one of them more equally, does produce a vulnerability that generates greater G7 trade governance in the deliberative, directional and decisional domains.

D. Political Control

In contrast to the concert equality model's prediction, political control by popularly elected democratic leaders does not stand out as a plausible cause of G7 performance in trade. Political control is measured here by the average number of years of G7 leaders since their last election, on the grounds that leaders with a fresh mandate and long political future, and thus maximum political capital, will generate Summit success, despite the domestic pressures and impediments they may face. This conjecture works as predicted in regard to decision making (portion of commitments), but rather weakly and nowhere else. A separate analysis suggests that the average years since last election works somewhat better, implying that experience in global governance at the Summit and in national governance back home, helps produce desired results.

E. Outside International Organization

Finally, the legalization literature points to how powerful international organizations may not facilitate compliance with G7 commitments (as the democratic institutionalist model specifies), but rather "crowd out" the G7/8's incentive for deliberation, direction setting and decision making, and its effectiveness in delivery and institutional development. Combining the insights of both instrumental and social liberal institutionalism, the number of GATT/WTO members and the portion of them that are democracies can be expected to lead to low G7/8 trade performance, as the GATT/WTO comes to share the G7/8's democratic purpose while excelling in the large numbers and thus legitimacy that the G7/8 lacks. Yet the data show that the democratization of the GATT/WTO only weakly correlates with G7/8 trade direction setting (number of linkages), and with no other components of G7/8 performance.

F. Assessment

This exploratory exercise confirms the multidimensional nature of Summit performance and the need for a specific cluster of factors to largely explain each component of that performance. It also points to the presence of a core group of generally generative causes, in particular the ones identified by the concert equality model and operating in the specified way. It thus portrays the G7/8 as a continuing collective hegemon, operating in a comprehensive, flexible Summit-level institution with an interlinked agenda, benignly offering effective global trade governance when its members' overall capabilities become more equal, creating commitments when left alone, complying when outsiders come to watch, and doing best when the members' closed economies become more equally dependant on each other and their leaders' bring a shared political purpose and more experience to their annual encounter. It finally shows that even as the GATT/WTO

becomes more legalized, multilaterally inclusive, and democratic there is still a demand for, and supply of, the Summit's global trade governance work.

G. Multiple Regressions

The next stage in identifying the causes of Summit trade performance is to conduct a multiple regression of the full set of sixteen independent variables against each dependent variable. Such an exercise suggests that the set of hypothesized causes can adequately explain two components of Summit performance – the deliberative Summit's portion of trade paragraphs and the delivery Summit's standardized compliance. They cannot, however, easily explain the other components or the Summit's aggregate trade achievement.

As Appendix K indicates, the most robust results of the multiple regression arise in regard to the deliberative Summit's portion of trade commitments. Here the independent variables together explain 98.5% of the variance (R-squared), with an F-ratio of 12.27 and a P-value of 0.03. Among the independent variables, the most promisingly powerful are ideological consensus (-6.89, P-value = 0.006), followed by years since last election (-5.48, 0.01) and Summit participants (-4.09, 0.02). This suggests that the Summit leaders allocate their scarce time together to discussing trade topics when they come from different parties in power, when they have been newly elected, and when they are left alone. Conversely, they tend to turn away from trade when they are ideologically similar, veterans drawing closer to their next election, and meet with more members and outside guests.

As Appendix L indicates, the second promising suggestion from the multiple regression analysis comes in explaining standardized compliance. Here the candidate causes explain 97% of the variance. Within this, compliance comes when the G7 has a larger portion of world trade, exports and imports (issue predominance without), when Summit members are less equally dependent on exports to one another, when the number of Summit members and guests is greater, when G7 countries are more closed, and when GATT/WTO members are more numerous and democratic.

Appendix A: The G7/8's Trade Achievements

1977	B-	Trade, growth, nuclear power
1978	A	Growth, energy and trade
1981	C	Trade Ministers Quadrilateral
1982	C	East-west trade, surveillance
1990	D	Trade — no net advance
1993	C+	Trade
2001*	B+	Trade

Source: Bayne (2000, 2001, 2002a, 2002b)

Method 1: If trade noted, assign 1; if not, assign 0.

Method 2: If trade noted, assign the overall Summit achievement grade; if trade not noted, assign overall achievement grade (minus two full grades).

Appendix B: The G7/8's Trade Performance Assessment, 1996–2002

Year	Trade	Overall	Trade: Overall
1996	A+	B+	+3
1997	B+	A-	-1
1998	B-	B+	-2
1999	A	A-	+1
2000	B	B+	-1
2001	B+	C	+4
2002	B+	B	+1
1996–2001	B+	B+	+5

Appendix C: The G7/8 Trade Agenda

Year	OTL	TTL	%TR	PRO	MTN	MTA	EWT	EXC	NST	ENV	BIO	LAB	CIV	TIP
1975	15	02	13%	01	01	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1976	25	06	24%	02	01	01	01	01	-	-	-	-	-	-
1977	38	08	21%	02	02	01	-	01	02	-	-	-	-	-
1978	31	09	29%	01	02	02	-	-	03	-	-	-	-	-
1979	12	03	25%	-	01	01	-	-	01	-	-	-	-	-
1980	51	05	10%	01	01	01	-	01	01	-	-	-	-	-
1981	38	08	21%	03	02	01	01	01	-	-	-	-	-	-
1982	14	03	21%	-	01	01	01	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1983	14	01	07%	01	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1984	25	02	08%	01	01	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1985	19	02	11%	01	-	-	-	-	01	-	-	-	-	-
1986	17	03	18%	01	01	-	-	-	01	-	-	-	-	-
1987	35	08	23%	02	05	-	-	-	01	-	-	-	-	-
1988	44	09	20%	02	03	03	-	-	01	-	-	-	-	-
1989	56	07	13%	01	01	03	-	01	-	-	-	-	-	-
1990	84	15	18%	01	10	01	01	01	01	-	-	-	-	-
1991	64	09	14%	-	05	01	01	01	-	01	-	-	-	-
1992	50	05	10%	-	01	-	02	-	02	-	-	-	-	-
1993	16	04	25%	-	02	-	02	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1994	36	07	19%	-	02	01	02	-	01	01	-	-	-	-
1995	51	08	16%	02	02	03	-	-	01	-	-	-	-	-
1996	55	10	18%	-	03	03	-	-	03	01	-	-	-	-
1997	128	05	04%	-	03	-	-	-	02	-	-	-	-	-
1998	26	02	08%	01	01	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
1999	49	07	14%	01	02	-	-	-	02	02	01	01	-	-
2000	82	08	10%	-	01	01	-	01	02	-	01	01	01	-
2001	54	09	17%	-	03	01	-	01	03	-	-	-	-	01
2002	51	04	08%	-	02	01	-	-	01	-	-	-	-	-

Notes:

1. Trade refers to the G7/8's core trade agenda, defined as...
2. By Number of Paragraphs in All Leaders' Summit Documents devoted in whole or in part to trade
3. Coded and compiled by Bob Papanikoloau, February 14, 2003.
4. Legend: OTL: Overall Total of paragraphs in leaders' documents; TTL: Trade Total, paragraphs devoted in whole or in large part to; %TR: Percentage of TTL in OTL; PRO: Anti-Protectionism Pledge; MTN: Launch, Close, Pace, Progress and Framework of GATT/WTO MTN Rounds; MTA: Strengthen relationships among major trade areas; EWT: East-West Trade; EXC: Export Credits; NST: North-South Trade; ENV: Environment and Trade; BIO: Biotechnology and Trade; LAB: Labour and Trade; CIV: Civil Society and Trade; TIP: Trade and Intellectual Property.

Appendix D: G7/8 Summit Priority Principles on Trade

Year	Trade References	Trade Linkages	
1975	0	0	
1976	0	0	
1977	3	3	jobs, inflation, welfare
1978	2	0	
1979	0	0	
1980	0	0	
1981	0	0	
1982	0	0	
1983	1	1	growth, finance, all developed/developing countries
1984	1	1	recovery, developing country debt, finance
1985	3	1	prosperity
1986	5	4	oil prices, imbalances, growth
1987	1	0	
1988	2	0	
1989	2	4	growth, inflation, jobs, social justice
1990	1	1	sustainable prosperity and freedom,
1991	0	0	
1992	1	0	
1993	2	0	
1994	1	0	
1995	0	0	
1996	5	1	rising living standards
1997	1	1	Russia admitted into WTO
1998	2	2	sustainable global economic growth/development
1999	1	1	togetherness, living standards, poverty reduction, jobs, opportunity, efficiency, growth, dislocation, financial uncertainty
2000	0	0	
2001	0	0	
2002	0	0	

Notes:

1. Principles of trade expressed in the opening, introductory section of the major G7/8 communiqué(s) released in the name of leaders at each annual G7/8 Summit.
2. Principles are statements of fact, causation or rectitude.

Appendix E: G7/8 Trade Commitments

Year	Trade	Overall	Ratio	Lead IO	Follow	Independent
1975	02	014	14%	2	0	0
1976	02	007	14%	1	0	1
1977	06	029	21%	4	1	1
1978	04	035	11%	2	0	1
1979	03	034	09%	1	1	1
1980	04	055	07%	1	3	0
1981	06	040	15%	1	4	1
1982	09	065	14%	6	0	3
1983	04	038	11%	2	1	1
1984	04	031	13%	3	0	1
1985	01	024	04%	1	0	0
1986	04	039	10%	2	1	1
1987	09	054	17%	2	5	2
1988	06	027	22%	3	2	1
1989	07	061	10%	2	2	3
1990	10	078	13%	7	2	1
1991	10	053	19%	7	2	1
1992	02	040	06%	0	0	2
1993	05	029	17%	2	1	2
1994	05	053	10%	2	2	1
1995	12	076	16%	8	4	0
1996	12	128	09%	5	4	3
1997	05	111	05%	3	0	2
1998	05	073	07%	3	1	1
1999	04	046	09%	2	2	0
2000	11	163	07%	4	4	2
2001	02	058	03%	0	2	0
2002	13	188	07%	0	6	7
Total	167	1,649	10% (average)	78	49	40

Notes:

1. Ratio = Trade/Overall.
2. Data on commitments comes from commitments data compiled by Ella Kokotsis.
3. Trade is defined as core trade.

Appendix F: Trade Compliance

	CMT	COM	DCMT	DCOM
1975	02 (1)	0	1	0
1976	02	?	2	+23.9
1977	06	?	2	+50.2
1978	04	?	3	+97.9
1979	03	?	3	+33.3
1980	04	?	1	0
1981	06	?	-	-
1982	09 (1)	-71%	-	-
1983	04	?	-	-
1984	04 (1)	-14.3%	-	-
1985	01	?	-	-
1986	04 (1)	-42.9%	-	-
1987	09	?	1	+100%
1988	06 (6)	+010%	0	-
1989	07 (5)	+020%	1	+79.3%
1990	10 (10)	-050%		
1991	10 (9)	+013%		
1992	02 (2)	+100%		
1993	05 (5)	+100%		
1994	05 (4)	+050%		
1995	12 (12)	+033%		
1996	12 (P)	+029%		
1997	05 (P)	-086%		
1998	05 (P)	+033%		
1999	04 (P)	-057%		
2000	11 (P)	+100%		
2001	02 (P)	+088%		
2002	12			

Notes:

1. Legend: CMT: Commitments on Trade by Kokotsis (number of commitments on trade assessed if less than all); COM: compliance with trade commitments by Kokotsis method; DCMT: commitments by trade by Daniels; DCOM: compliance with Daniels trade commitments by Daniels.
2. Daniels had 209 commitments overall, of which seven were identified by Daniels as trade. (Malleon identified 14 of the 209 were identified as core trade commitments.)
3. 1998–2002 is G8 Research Group Priority Commitment Compliance Measurement using commitments and compliance data from Kokotsis, with various individuals doing coring for each country each year, and 1997 added retroactively.
4. 2002 is -25% for interim score at six-month mark.

Appendix G: G7/8 Trade Institutionalization

Year	Total	Apart	At Summit
1975	0	0	0
1976	0	0	0
1977	0	0	0
1978	1	0	1
1979	0	0	0
1980	0	0	0
1981	0	0	0
1982	2	2	0
1983	4	4	0
1984	2	2	0
1985	2	2	0
1986	2	2	0
1987	1	1	0
1988	2	2	0
1989	2	2	0
1990	2	2	0
1991	1	1	0
1992	2	2	0
1993	3	2	1
1994	1	1	0
1995	2	2	*
1996	2	2	0
1997	1	1	0
1998	1	1	0
1999	1	1	0

*In addition, individual trade ministers attended the Summit in a few years.

Appendix H: Intercorrelation of Dependent Variables

	Trade Linkages	Trade References	Proportion of Trade Paragraphs	Number of Trade Paragraphs	Bayne Discusses Trade (Yes/No)	Bayne's Trade-Adjusted Number Grade	Total Trade Commitments	Proportion of Trade Commitments	Standardized Compliance Scores
Trade Linkages	1								
Trade References	0.654127	1							
Proportion of Trade Paragraphs	0.115057	-0.16865	1						
Number of Trade Paragraphs	0.014351	-0.10372	0.36936	1					
Bayne Discusses Trade (Yes/No)	-0.0295	-0.07107	0.528439	0.356744	1				
Bayne's Trade-Adjusted Number Grade	0.054317	0.193893	-0.33155	-0.30638	-0.65199	1			
Total Trade Commitments	-0.036	-0.06601	-0.02498	0.459921	0.006071	0.089631	1		
Proportion of Trade Commitments	-0.05468	-0.07045	0.548772	0.222993	0.165046	-0.25993	0.108335	1	
Standardized Compliance Scores	0.209681	-0.02093	0.289285	-0.02496	0.214205	-0.03829	0.063387	-0.09674	1

Appendix I: Key Correlations Coefficients

Number of Trade Paragraphs

Inequality of intra-G7 GDP distribution (sigma)	-0.44
Ideological consensus	+0.39
Inequality of GDP Distribution within G7 (gini)	-0.33
Intra-G7 trade as % total exports	+0.29

Portion of Trade Paragraphs

G7 imports as % of GDP	-0.50
G7 exports as % of GDP	-0.47
Inequality of GDP distribution within the G7 (gini)	-0.41
Equality of distribution imports as % of GDP	-0.33
Equality of distribution exports as % GDP	-0.33

Number of Trade References

G7 trade as % of world total	+0.36
G7 imports as % of world total	+0.35
G7 exports as % of world total	+0.34
Intra-G7 trade as % of total exports	+0.30
Ideological consensus	+0.29

Number of Trade Linkages

Freedom House democratization index	+0.34
Inequality of distribution of intra-G7 exports	+0.37
Intra-G7 trade as % of total exports	+0.30

Number of Trade Commitments

Inequality of intra-G7 GDP distribution (sigma squared)	-0.34
Ideological consensus	+0.33
Equality of distribution exports as % GDP (sigma)	+0.33

Portion of Trade Commitments

G7 exports as % of GDP	-0.52
G7 imports as % of GDP	-0.49
Inequality of distribution of intra-G7 exports	+0.41
Inequality of GDP distribution within G7 (gini)	-0.38
Additional Summit participants	-0.33

Compliance (Standardized)

Additional Summit participants	+0.42
G7 GDP as % of world total	+0.41
G7 exports as % of world total	+0.30

Appendix J: The Concert Equality Model Causes Correlated

Overall Predominance without Compliance +0.41

Trade Predominance Without (G7 Exports as % of World Total)

References number +0.34

Compliance +0.30

Overall Inequality Within (Inequality of Intra-G7 GDP Distribution)

Paragraph numbers -0.44 (sigma)

Paragraph portion -0.41 (gini)

Commitments number -0.34 (sigma squared)

Commitments portion -0.38 (gini)

Trade Equality Within Constricted Participation

Commitments portion -0.33

Compliance standardized +0.42

Common Principles 1 (Ideological Consensus)

Paragraphs number +0.39

Commitments number +0.33

References number +0.29

Common Principles 2 (Collective Vulnerability/Responsibility/Openness)

(G7 Imports as % GDP, G7 Exports as % GDP)

Paragraphs portion -0.50 M -0.47 X

Commitments portion -0.49 M -0.52 X

Common Principles 3 (Openness to One Another)

(Intra-G7 Trade/Exports/Imports as % Total Trade/Exports/Imports)

Paragraphs number +0.29

References number +0.30

Linkages number +0.30

Common Principles 4 (Inequality of Openness to One Another)

Commitment portion -0.38

Paragraphs portion -0.41

Political Control (Years Since Last Election)

Commitments portion -0.30

Outside International Organization (Freedom House Democratization)

Linkages number +0.34

Appendix K: Multiple Regression — Proportion of Trade Paragraphs

 Dependent variable: **ProportionofTradeParagrphs**

Parameter	Estimate	Standard Error	T Statistic	P-Value
CONSTANT	10.4954	5.02685	2.08787	0.1280
G7GDPas%ofworldto	-15.8893	6.71583	-2.36596	0.0989
InequalityofIntra	1.4017	0.666029	2.10457	0.1260
InequalityofGDPdi	-5.00493	2.20004	-2.27493	0.1074
G7exportsas%ofwor	1139.46	483.331	2.35752	0.0996
G7exportsas%ofGDP	-0.362033	0.155434	-2.32918	0.1022
G7importsas%ofwor	1128.57	490.528	2.30072	0.1049
G7importsas%ofGDP	0.154953	0.0727648	2.1295	0.1231
Intra_G7Tradeas%	13.7037	5.45916	2.51022	0.0869
Inequalityofdistr	-2.02756	1.70137	-1.19172	0.3191
Summit participan	-0.0108591	0.00265187	-4.0949	0.0263
Ideologicalconsen	-1.16592	0.169155	-6.89258	0.0063
Yearssincelastele	-0.16456	0.0299771	-5.48952	0.0119
FreedomHouseDemoc	-0.10434	0.123935	-0.84189	0.4617
G7tradeas%ofworld	-2269.77	972.544	-2.33385	0.1018
Equalityofdistr_:	0.185571	0.0742557	2.49909	0.0878
Equalityofdistr_:	0.131707	0.0938766	1.40298	0.2552

Analysis of Variance

Source	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F-Ratio	P-Value
Model	0.0649866	16	0.00406166	12.27	0.0309
Residual	0.000993408	3	0.000331136		
Total (Corr.)	0.06598	19			

R-squared = 98.4944 percent
 R-squared (adjusted for d.f.) = 90.4644 percent
 Standard Error of Est. = 0.0181971
 Mean absolute error = 0.00538407
 Durbin-Watson statistic = 2.478 (P=0.0000)
 Lag 1 residual autocorrelation = -0.247128

Appendix L: Multiple Regression – Standardized Compliance Scores

Multiple Regression Analysis

Dependent variable: **StandardizedComplianceScores**

Parameter	Estimate	Standard Error	T Statistic	P-Value
CONSTANT	-166.297	105.546	-1.57559	0.2132
G7GDPas%ofworldto	144.134	141.009	1.02216	0.3819
InequalityofIntra	34.7176	13.9843	2.48262	0.0891
InequalityofGDPdi	-122.257	46.1932	-2.64664	0.0772
G7exportsas%ofwor	50452.6	10148.3	4.97155	0.0156
G7exportsas%ofGDP	8.49194	3.26356	2.60205	0.0802
G7importsas%ofwor	51163.0	10299.4	4.96758	0.0157
G7importsas%ofGDP	-5.19482	1.52781	-3.40018	0.0425
Intra_G7Tradeas%	-73.0965	114.623	-0.637711	0.5690
Inequalityofdistr	33.0679	35.7228	0.925681	0.4229
Summit participan	0.226917	0.05568	4.07537	0.0267
Ideologicalconsen	-1.43891	3.55167	-0.405136	0.7125
Yearssincelastele	0.122835	0.629414	0.195157	0.8577
FreedomHouseDemoc	8.91155	2.6022	3.42461	0.0417
G7tradeas%ofworld	-101565.0	20420.0	-4.9738	0.0156
Equalityofdistr_:	-7.14843	1.55911	-4.58495	0.0195
Equalityofdistr_:	2.14064	1.97108	1.08602	0.3569

Analysis of Variance

Source	Sum of Squares	Df	Mean Square	F-Ratio	P-Value
Model	14.1614	16	0.885088	6.06	0.0816
Residual	0.437947	3	0.145982		
Total (Corr.)	14.5993	19			

R-squared = 97.0002 percent
R-squared (adjusted for d.f.) = 81.0015 percent
Standard Error of Est. = 0.382076
Mean absolute error = 0.119084
Durbin-Watson statistic = 3.14527 (P=0.0000)
Lag 1 residual autocorrelation = -0.577551

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