

# The Bottom Line: Has the G8 Achieved Its Goals?

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*Paper prepared for a workshop on "The Future of the G8: Global Economic Governance and the Potential for a Revision of Institutional Arrangements," Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Berlin, Germany, June 6, 2007. Version of May 29.*

## Introduction

At the start of the communiqué released at the end of their first G7 summit in November 1975, the six leaders present proclaimed the central mission of their new international institution with the following words. "We came together because of shared beliefs and shared responsibilities. We are each responsible for the government of an open, democratic society, dedicated to individual liberty and social advancement. Our success will strengthen, indeed is essential to, democratic societies everywhere." They proceeded to identify the results of their discussions on a wide range of economic, energy, environmental and east-west issues, and to record the 14 specific, future-oriented measurable commitments they collectively made.

In their subsequent 32 summits, as their club expanded to embrace as full members Canada in 1976, the European Union in 1977 and a democratizing Russia in 1998, the G8 leaders returned regularly and expansively to their seminal agenda and core purpose of protecting within their own countries and promoting globally the values of openness, democracy, liberty and social advance. They made a steadily increasing and broadening array of often ambitious commitments, reaching a new high of 317 commitments at the first regular summit hosted by Russia at St. Petersburg on July 15-17, 2006. Over these years the annual summit has always attracted the presence of the G8 leaders, not one of whom has ever missed a meeting no matter how pressing his or her other responsibilities at home or abroad have been. They have similarly attracted the attention of other countries and international organizations, which overwhelmingly seek to join or participate, as well as the world's media, who come to cover the summit in numbers up to 10,000 strong, and civil society activists, who come to directly express their views to and at this emerging centre of democratic global governance, in numbers up to 300,000 at a time. And behind the headlines the G8 summit has proliferated downward to institutionalize its work in G8 meetings that now embrace a majority of ministers in its members' governments and more than three dozen official level bodies, some of which function to this day.

There is thus much *prima facie* evidence that this annual summit of the most powerful leaders of the world's most powerful countries matters, both for themselves and for the global community as a whole. But there is also much value in asking of the G8 the fundamental question faced by all international institutions — has it achieved its goals?

Thus far the answers to this question have given rise to a great debate among several competing schools of thought. The first set of schools proclaims failure, or at least a limited and declining performance since the early days (Bergsten and Henning 1996). A second set of schools sees success, but for the malevolent purposes of promoting G8 hegemony, neo-liberal values and

inequality and poverty throughout the world (Bailin 2005; Gill 1999). A third set of schools sees success, in assisting the more legitimate, legalized multilateral organizations, in preventing disaster in the face of crisis, or in producing desirable public goods on its own.

The evidence suggests that the third argument has the better case. Amidst the many disappointments and a few spectacular failures, the G8 summit has often been a body of substantial benefit and sometimes a striking success. Most importantly, it has done much to meet its foundational purpose of globally promoting democracy and liberty, most decisively through its role in delivering the democratic second Russian revolution in 1989 and in liberating Kosovo from a major genocide in 1999. It has put new issues on the global agenda, set defining new directions for how they should be addressed, made many meaningful commitments to realize them, kept those commitments to an increasingly high degree and developed new G8-centred institutions to render more durable, detailed and effectively delivered the G8's work. In the process, it has included more members and participants to reinforce its democratic power and reach. However, it has yet to reliably include in its own governance the judicial, legislative and civil society actors that all its members consider an essential part of democratic governance back home.

## **Delivering the Democratic Revolution**

In the broadest terms, the G8 has succeeded in its seminal, core, foundational purpose and *raison d'être* of promoting openness, democracy, individual liberty and social advance throughout the world.

In the mid 1970s, when the G7 was founded, democratic polities and principles were in defeat and retreat around the world, with the new cold war beginning, America vanquished in its longest war in Vietnam and Euro-communism sweeping southern Europe and infecting Italy itself — an ally of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The G7 summit's first success in defending open democracy was at Puerto Rico in 1976, in keeping communists out of a fragile Italian government needing G7 financial support, and in moving to ensure that western banks lending to the Soviet Union would not render G7 countries vulnerable to Soviet designs.

By the late 1980s, the G7 went on the offence as a promoter of global democracy, starting in Venezuela and South Africa in 1987 and continuing with Indonesia in 1997 and sub-Saharan African from 2001 on. But the biggest breakthrough came in 1989, when Mikhail Gorbachev sent his *de facto* surrender letter on behalf of the Soviet system — not to any single superpower rival or multilateral organization but to the G7 leaders meeting on the 200th anniversary of the invention of *les droits de l'homme* at the Paris Summit of the Arch of July 14-17. Through the judicious, incremental conditional doling out of increased financial assistance and inclusion in the G7 and then G8, the G7/8 produced the second Russian revolution — the surprisingly peaceful destruction of the Soviet Union, Soviet Bloc, Soviet Empire and Soviet model, and its replacement by recognizably democratic alternatives in most of the once Soviet space. This includes a re-united Germany in whose east the 2007 Heiligendamm summit is being held. The benefits for the world of this defining event of the second half of the 20th century remains to this day as virtually no-one has irreparably slid back out of the democratic sphere. And despite recent setbacks to democracy in Russia, Russia as G8 host in 2006 set a new record in having global society participate in the preparation of the first G8 summit it designed and produced.

In the field of individual liberty and human rights, beyond South Africa the G7 moved firmly with sanctions against communist China in 1989 for its military's mass murder of unarmed

students in Tiananmen Square. It pledged in 1997 to keep a watchful eye on Hong Kong as it reverted to Chinese control that year.

The G8's most decisive achievement was in preventing a major genocide in Kosovo, by agreeing on military action in 1999. With Russia and China as veto-wielding permanent members, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) refused to act as Slobodan Milosevic's ethnic cleansing massacres mounted. In the lead-up to the 1999 Cologne Summit, the G8 agreed to initiate military action, first through an air war starting on March 24 and then through a ground invasion to finish the job. Russia then abandoned its traditional identity as a defender of the Slavs and Serbs and joined the G7 consensus, leading Slobodan Milosevic to pull his troops out of Kosovo and the UNSC to retroactively adopt and legally legitimize G8 action by passing Resolution 1244. In doing so the G8 established through action the antithesis of the Westphalian principle, encoded in Article 2(7) of the UN charter, which prohibits interference from outside in the internal affairs of sovereign states. At its World Summit in New York in September 2005, the UN again adopted and legitimized the G8's new direction by affirming the principle of an international responsibility to protect.

To be sure, there is much left to do in globally promoting open democracy and human rights. The next stage of the Kosovo settlement, the democratization of the Broader Middle East and North Africa (BMENA), the continuing ethnic cleansing in Darfur and defending democracy in Russia are cases that stand out. But the G8 from 2004 to the present has taken them up and stayed with them. And they will be an important part of the Heiligendamm discussions in 2007 under the German presidency as well.

## **Setting the Global Agenda: Deliberation**

More specifically, over its 32 years, the G8 has done much to set the global agenda across a much broader array of issues, especially by taking up issues that the UN-centred multilateral system did or could not (see Appendix A). At its first summit in 1975 it dealt with energy conservation, at a time when the UN — as today — lacked any dedicated functional organization or even reference in the UN charter to deal with the energy and the environment fields. In 1978 the G7 took up terrorism, in the specific form of skyjacking, as angry young men seized large commercial airliners to kill innocent civilians for the terrorists' political goals. Several other subjects largely ungoverned by the UN have been matters of recurrent concern, from foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 1970s to hedge funds today.

To be sure, there are issues that the UN system has taken up much faster and more fully than the G8. Gender and the role of women in development and conflict prevention is the clearest case. Yet, since 2002, the G8 has moved quickly here, and on the challenges of multiculturalism and diversity that all G8 and many other societies face. The leaders discussed this latter topic at the St. Petersburg summit in 2006.

## **Defining the New Global Order: Direction Setting**

G8 initiative and innovation in deliberating on new issues has extended into setting directions for the global community by agreeing on new principles and norms. In 1977 the G7 declared that inflation was a cause of — not a cure for — unemployment, reversing the prevailing political and economic consensus at that time. On the environment, in 1979 the G7 leaders stated that “we

need to expand alternative sources of energy, especially those which help to prevent further pollution, particularly increases of carbon dioxide and sulphur oxides in the atmosphere” (G7 1979). In doing so they stated that stabilizing concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere at 1979 levels was their goal, and a reliance on alternative energy sources their chosen means. In 1990, it broadened its arsenal by agreeing to control climate change by using “all sources and sinks.”

To be sure, these directions at times are slow to be set, and sometimes seem to be misguided soon after they are. One case was at the 1977 and 1978 summits, where the G7 approved a much greater reliance on carbon-creating coal. But as a flexible forum where the many diverse political forces within its members are brought together through their leaders in an equal dialogue, the G7 can listen, learn and self-correct quite quickly. The G8 soon said that coal must be used in an environmentally friendly way and then dropped it from its list of approved sources for good.

### **Taking the Tough Decisions: Commitment**

The summit’s bold new directions have often been converted into decisions — collective commitments to act in specific concrete, measurable ways in the time ahead, encoded publicly in the summit’s communiqués. The first few summits generated a small number of such commitments, in the range of 7 to 14 each. But the total soon and steadily rose, and the 2006 St. Petersburg Summit produced a new high of 317.

To be sure, these commitments vary widely in their level of ambition. And some commit to doing what outside critics regard as the wrong thing to do. But the sheer numbers show that this small informal group of former adversaries-turned-like-minded democracies can come to consensus on many things that no single member can veto. Moreover, their commitments include and integrate all issues, goals and instruments that the global community has. And few doubt that the commitments at Gleneagles in 2005 to provide full debt relief for the deserving poorest countries, and double official development assistance (ODA) to democratically and developmentally deserving states by 2010 was not a major and desirable step.

### **Keeping Its Promises: Compliance**

On the whole, the G8 generates the commitments that count. G8 summits are indeed worth the time and trouble, for they tend to constrain the ensuing behaviour of their member states, including those that are the most powerful and unilaterally inclined in the world.

A careful count of all members’ compliance within a year with all G7 commitments made at the summits from 1975 to 1989 shows that compliance was clearly positive, at +31% on a scale that runs from –100% to +100%. Since 1989, as the Cold War departed and globalization arrived, the level of compliance rose. The most rapid rise came from the G8’s most powerful member, the United States. It stood second lowest during the summits between 1975 and 1989 but soared to the top tier for the 21st-century ones.

On the critical issue of climate change, central for the 2007 Heiligendamm Summit, the G8 has complied with its priority commitments from 1989 to 2006 at an average level of +52%. There was a great surge in climate change compliance from 1992 to 1998, with complete compliance coming in 1994, 1995 and 1998. There was a second surge from 2003 to 2006, with the 2004 Sea

Island Summit hosted by U.S. president George W. Bush securing +89% and British prime minister Tony Blair's 2005 Gleneagles gathering generating +95%.

From 1989 to 2006, climate change compliance was led by the European Union at +85%, followed by Japan at +79%, Germany at +74% and Britain at +68%. The U.S., at +44%, ranks second last, ahead of only Italy. However, during George Bush's time as president, U.S. climate compliance has been a lofty +75%.

To be sure, compliance can sometimes be driven lower by extraneous political divisions. One case was the dispute over the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in spring 2003, which pulled down compliance with the G8's 2002 commitments. And the G8 has no secretariat of its own that it can rely on to put its commitments into effect. But its leaders can craft their commitments in ways that improve the chances of compliance (Kirton 2006, Kirton, Roudev and Sunderland 2007). And they can use their own powerful national governments and the international organizations they control to implement the promises they have made.

## **Generating G8-Centred Global Governance**

A more enduring and detailed legacy of G8 governance comes from the new G8-centred institutions that the G8 summit fosters or creates. At the ministerial level, a majority of the portfolios in national governments now have a G8 gathering of their own. The process started with finance in 1973, trade in 1981, and foreign affairs in 1984. It leapt forward, under the impact of post-Cold War globalization, with the environment in 1992, labour in 1994, and terrorism and information technology in 1995.

At the official level, as Appendix B shows, the G8 has generated over three dozen bodies since 1975. The most frequent focus for them, especially from 1975 to 1980 and at Sea Island in 2004, has been energy, an area where to this day the UN has not created a dedicated, area-wide multilateral organization. Other major areas of G8 governance have been the environment and terrorism, where the UN system has again been absent in a comprehensive, coherent way.

To be sure, some ministerial bodies meet infrequently. Many of the official level ones have had a deliberately short shelf-life, such as the Renewable Energy Task Force from 2000 to 2001. Moreover, there remain notable areas ungoverned at the ministerial level, notably defence, despite the G8's move into conflict prevention and war fighting since 1999. However, as a flexible, leaders-driven system, the G8 summit or its host can easily create such bodies, combine them or cast them off to govern on their own, as it did, respectively, for education in 2000, development in 2002 and health in 2006, for energy and environment ministers in 2005, and for finance and foreign affairs, which were separated from the leaders summit in 1998.

## **Challenges to Confront: Inclusiveness**

Taken together, this record shows that the G8 has generated increasingly effective and legitimate global governance. But there remain two major challenges that the G8 must confront. Both concern inclusiveness, first for the world's other rapidly rising powers and international organizations and second for the world's civil society as a whole. Germany's year as 2007 host is taking an important step forward on the first, but a step backward on the second.

On the first dimension of outreach, the G8 since its start has moved to include others as full members and partial participants, unlike the UN system whose Security Council remains frozen with the same five permanent veto powers its began with in 1945. The six leaders at Rambouillet in 1975 added as full members Canada in 1976, an ever expanding EU (sometimes with two seats) in 1977 and Russia in 1998. As partial participants, it added the four leading African democracies of South Africa, Nigeria, Senegal and Algeria from 2000 on, and about a dozen countries from 2003 to 2005, including regularly from 2005 the “Plus Five” powers of democratic India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa and Communist China as well (see Appendix C). This year the Plus Five are increasing their institutionalized involvement in the summit, and should be for the next two years, in somewhat the same way Russia moved from being a guest invited by the host in 1991 to a full member hosting the summit in 2006.

The G8 has also been increasingly including as participants the whole global community through its universal multilateral organizations (see Appendix D). Apart from the presence of the Non-Aligned Movement leaders on the margins of the summits in 1989 and 1993, this process began in 1996 when the executive heads of the UN, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the World Trade Organization (WTO) came for a post-summit meeting with the G7. The UN returned in 2001 and has been at every summit since, apart from 2004 when no heads of international organizations came. Reciprocally the UN has been much slower to involve the G8 as an institution in its inner governance core.

While the G8 has done increasingly well in reaching out to other countries and international organizations, it has done less well in reaching down to involve its own citizens and those of the global community in its governance. Despite its core mission to promote democracy domestically and globally, the G8 remains largely a governance system driven by the executive, with no institutions for G8 judiciaries, and a fragile one for G8 legislators emerging only in 2002.

Over the years the G8 has increasingly involved civil society in the preparation of and even at the summit. It has done so with a significant step forward at Okinawa in 2000 and some interruptions, notably the virtual absence of civil society for Sea Island in 2004. In 2006 the Russians set a new high, sending the host sherpa to consult civil society in the G8 partners, and creating a well-resourced Civil 8 process that invited 700 global civil society representatives for an open dialogue with President Vladimir Putin on the summit’s eve. However, in 2007, the Germans kept their sherpa at home, and had their host leader hold only a closed meeting with a few select special interest groups of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). It remains to be seen if the Japanese as hosts in 2008 will live up to the high Russian standard of democratizing the summit process or down to the lower German one.

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## Appendix A: G8 Summit Performance, 1975-2005

Year	Bayne grade	Domestic political management		Deliberative			Directional	Decisional	Delivery	Dev't of global gov
		% member	Average # references	# of days	# of statements	# of words				
1975	A-			3	1	1,129	5	14	+57.1	0/1
1976	D			2	1	1,624	0	7	+08.9	0/0
1977	B-			2	6	2,669	0	29	+08.4	0/1
1978	A			2	2	2,999	0	35	+36.3	0/0
1979	B+			2	2	2,102	0	34	+82.3	0/2
1980	C+			2	5	3,996	3	55	+07.6	0/1
1981	C			2	3	3,165	0	40	+26.6	1/0
1982	C			3	2	1,796	0	23	+84.0	0/3
1983	B			3	2	2,156	7	38	-10.9	0/0
1984	C-			3	5	3,261	0	31	+48.8	1/0
1985	E			3	2	3,127	1	24	+01.0	0/2
1986	B+			3	4	3,582	1	39	+58.3	1/1
1987	D			3	6	5,064	0	53	+93.3	0/2
1988	C-			3	2	4,872	0	27	-47.8	0/0
1989	B+			3	11	7,125	1	61	+07.8	0/1
1990	D			3	3	7,601	10	78	-14.0	0/3
1991	B-			3	3	8,099	8	53	00.0	0/0
1992	D			3	4	7,528	5	41	+64.0	1/1
1993	C+			3	2	3,398	2	29	+75.0	0/2
1994	C			3	2	4,123	5	53	+100.0	1/0
1995	B+			3	3	7,250	0	78	+100.0	2/2
1996	B	40%	1	3	5	15,289	6	128	+36.2	0/3
1997	C-	40%	1	3	4	12,994	6	145	+12.8	1/3
1998	B+	25%	1	3	4	6,092	5	73	+31.8	0/0
1999	B+	80%	1.7	3	4	10,019	4	46	+38.2	1/5
2000	B	40%	6.5	3	5	13,596	6	105	+81.4	0/4
2001	B	33%	1.5	3	7	6,214	3	58	+49.5	1/2
2002	B+	17%	1	2	18	11,959	10	187	+35.0	1/8
2003	C	40%	2.5	3	14	16,889	17	206	+65.8	0/5
2004	C+	33%	1	3	16	38,517	11	245+	+54.0	0/15
2005	A-	40%	1	3	16	22,286	29	212	+65.0	0/5
Av. All	B-	38.8%	1.8	2.9	5.5	8,017	4.8	75	+41.9	0.37/2.4
Av. Cycle 1	B-			2.1	2.9	2,526	1.1	29	+32.5	0.14/0.71
Av. Cycle 2	C-			3	3.3	3,408	1.3	34	+32.4	0.29/1.14
Av. Cycle 3	C+			3	4	6,446	4.4	56	+47.5	0.58/1.29
Av. Cycle 4	B	29.3%	2	2.9	6.7	10,880	5.7	106	+40.7	0.58/3.57
Av. Cycle 5	B-	37.7%	1.5	3	15.3	25,897	19	221	+61.6	0.00/8.33

**Notes:**

Bayne grade: the 2005 grade of A- is a preliminary grade.

Domestic political management: % mem is the percentage of G8 countries that made a policy speech referring to the G8 that year.

Ave # refs = the average number of references for those who did mention the G8 that year.

Location: Ldg = Lodge on outskirts of capital city; Res = remote resort; Cap = inside capital city; Prv = provincial (not capital) city.

Compliance scores from 1990 to 1995 measure compliance with commitments selected by Ella Kokotsis. Compliance scores from 1996 to 2005 measure compliance with G8 Research Group's selected commitments.



## **Appendix B: G7/8 Official Level Bodies**

### **First Cycle (8)**

- 1975 London Nuclear Suppliers Group
- 1977 International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Group
- 1979 High Level Group on Energy Conservation and Alternative Energy
- 1979 International Energy Technology Group
- 1979 High Level Group to Review Oil Import Reduction Progress
- 1980 International Team to Promote Collaboration on Specific Projects on Energy Technology
- 1980 High Level Group to Review Result on Energy
- 1981 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)

### **Second Cycle (9)**

- 1982 Working Group on Technology, Growth and Employment
- 1982 Consultations and Coordination on East-West Relations
- 1982 Representatives to control exports of strategic goods
- 1982 Procedures for multilateral surveillance of economic performance
- 1985 Expert Group for Foreign Ministers
- 1985 Expert Group on Desertification and Dry Zone Grains
- 1985 Expert Group on Environmental Measurement
- 1986 Group of Experts on Terrorism
- 1987 International Ethics Committee on AIDS.

### **Third Cycle (14)**

- 1989 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) (with others, secretariat from OECD)
- 1989 International Ethics Committee on AIDS
- 1990 Chemical Action Task Force, 1990-1992 (with others)
- 1990 Task Force to Study the State of the Soviet Economy
- (1990 Permanent Working Group on Assistance to Russia)
- 1990 Gulf Crisis Financial Coordination Group
- 1992 Nuclear Safety Working Group
- 1992 Group of Experts on the Prevention and Treatment of AIDS
- 1993 Support Implementation Group (SIG)
- 1993 G8 Non-Proliferation Experts Group
- 1995 Counterterrorism Experts Group
- 1995 G7/P8 Senior Experts Group on Transnational Organized Crime (Lyon Group)
- 1995 GIP National Co-ordinators
- 1995 Development Committee Task Force on Multilateral Development Banks

### **Fourth Cycle (16)**

- 1996 Nuclear Safety Working Group
- 1996 Lyon Group
- 1997 Expert Group on Financial Crime
- 1997 Subgroup on High Tech Crime (of the Lyon Group)
- 1997 Officials Group on Forests
- 2000 Conflict Prevention Officials Meeting (CPOM)
- 2000 Renewable Energy Task Force
- 2000 Digital Opportunities Task Force (Dot-Force)
- 2000 Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis
- 2001 G8 Task Force on Education
- 2001 Personal Representatives for Africa (APR)
- 2002 Energy Officials Follow-up Process
- 2002 G8 Global Partnership Review Mechanism
- 2002 G8 Nuclear Safety and Security Group
- 2002 G8 Experts on Transport Security
- 2002 Global Health Security Laboratory Network

### **Fifth Cycle**

- 2003 High Level Working Group on Biometrics
- 2003 Counter-Terrorism Action Group
- 2003 Radioactive Sources Working Group
- 2003 Senior Officials for Science and Technology for Sustainable Development
- 2003 G8 Enlarged Dialogue Meeting
- 2003 Forum for the Partnership with Africa, November 10, 2003
- 2003 Global Health Security Action Group (GHSAG) Laboratory Network
- 2003 Technical Working Group on Pandemic Influenza Preparedness
- 2004 Global Partnership Senior Officials Group (GPSOG), January 2004
- 2004 Global Partnership Working Group (GPWG)
- 2004 Global HIV Vaccine Enterprise
- 2004 Microfinance Consultative Group
- 2004 Best Practises Microfinance Training Centre
- 2004 Democracy Assistance Dialogue
- 2004 Task Force on Investment
- 2004 G8 Expert-Level Meetings on Peace Support in Africa
- 2004 Friends of the Convention on Corruption
- 2004 G8 Accelerated Response Teams on Corruption
- 2004 International Partnership for a Hydrogen Economy (IPHE)
- 2004 IPHE Implementation-Liaison Committee
- 2004 Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum (CSLF)
- 2004 Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership ((REEEP)
- 2004 Generation IV International Forum (GIF)
- 2004 Global Earth Observation System of Systems (GEOSS)
- 2005 Dialogue on Sustainable Energy
- 2005 Working Group on Innovative Financing Mechanisms
- 2005 Experts on IPR Piracy and Counterfeiting
- 2005 Global Bioenergy Partnership
- 2005 African Dialogue Follow-up Mechanism (Africa, paragraph 33)
- 2006 G8 expert group to develop criteria and procedures for evaluating educational outcomes and qualifications
- 2006 G8 expert group on the possibilities of strengthening the international legal framework pertaining to IPR enforcement
- 2006 G8 expert, UN and other international organization group on the feasibility of implementing stabilization and reconstruction measures
- 2006 G8 expert group on securing energy infrastructure

Note: Excludes one-off meeting or conferences

## **Appendix C: Outside Leaders at the G8 Summit**

### **Okinawa 2000 (4):**

Thabo Mbeki, President of the Republic of South Africa  
Olusegun Obasanjo, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria  
Abdoulaye Wade, President of the Republic of Senegal  
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria

### **Genoa 2001 (4):**

Thabo Mbeki, President of the Republic of South Africa  
Olusegun Obasanjo, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria  
Abdoulaye Wade, President of the Republic of Senegal  
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria

### **Kananaskis 2002 (4):**

Thabo Mbeki, President of the Republic of South Africa  
Olusegun Obasanjo, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria  
Abdoulaye Wade, President of the Republic of Senegal  
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria

### **Evian 2003 (13):**

Mohamed Hosni Mubarak, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt  
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria  
Olusegun Obasanjo, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria  
Thabo Mbeki, President of the Republic of South Africa  
H.M. King Mohammed VI, King of Morocco, Chair of the Group of 77  
Abdoulaye Wade, President of the Republic of Senegal  
Vicente Fox Quesada, President of the United Mexican States  
Pascal Couchepin, President of the Swiss Confederation  
Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil  
Hu Jintao, President of the People's Republic of China  
Prince Abdullah Ibn Abdul Aziz Al Saud, Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia  
Dr Mahathir Bin Mohamad, Prime Minister of Malaysia  
Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Prime Minister of the Republic of India

### **Sea Island 2004 (12):**

Hamid Karzai, President of Afghanistan  
Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of Algeria  
Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa, King of Bahrain  
Ghazi Mashal Ajil al-Yawer, President of Iraq  
Abdallah II, King of Jordan  
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Prime Minister of Turkey  
Ali Abdallah Salih, President of Yemen  
John Agyekum Kufuor, President of Ghana  
Olusegun Obasanjo, President of Nigeria  
Abdoulaye Wade, President of Senegal  
Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki, President of South Africa  
Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of Uganda

**Gleneagles 2005 (11):**

Abdelaziz Bouteflika, President of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria  
Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil  
Hu Jintao, President of the People's Republic of China  
Meles Zenawi, Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia  
John Agyekum Kufour, President of the Republic of Ghana  
Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of the Republic of India  
Vicente Fox Quesadal, President of the United Mexican States  
Olusegun Obasanjo GCB, President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria  
Abdoulaye Wade, President of the Republic of Senegal  
Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki GCB GCMB, President of the Republic of South Africa  
Benjamin William Mpkapa, President of the United Republic of Tanzania

**St. Petersburg 2006 (5):**

Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, President of the Federative Republic of Brazil  
Hu Jintao, President of the People's Republic of China  
Vicente Fox Quesadal, President of the United Mexican States  
Thabo Mvuyelwa Mbeki GCB GCMB, President of the Republic of South Africa  
Manmohan Singh, Prime Minister of the Republic of India

## **Appendix D: International Organizations at the G8 Summit**

### **1989 Paris (4)**

Non-Aligned Movement: Presidents Abdou Diouf, Mohamed Hosni Mubarak, Carlos Andres Perez and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi

### **1993 Tokyo (1)**

Non-Aligned Movement: President Soeharto of the Republic of Indonesia, Chairman

### **1996 Lyon (4)**

United Nations: Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Secretary-General  
International Monetary Fund: Michel Camdessus, Managing Director  
World Bank: James Wolfensohn, President  
World Trade Organization: Renato Ruggiero, Director-General

### **2001 Genoa (4)**

United Nations: Kofi Annan, Secretary-General  
World Bank: James Wolfensohn, President  
World Trade Organization: Renato Ruggiero, Director-General  
World Health Organization: Gro Harlem Brundtland, Director-General

### **2002 Kananaskis (1)**

United Nations: Kofi Annan, Secretary-General

### **2003 Evian (4)**

United Nations: Kofi Annan, Secretary-General  
World Bank: James Wolfensohn, President  
International Monetary Fund: Horst Köhler, Managing Director  
World Trade Organization: Supachai Panitchpakdi, Director-General

### **2005 Gleneagles (6)**

Commission of the African Union: Alpha Oumar Konare, Chair  
International Energy Agency: Claude Mandil, Executive Director  
International Monetary Fund: Rodrigo de Rato y Figaredo, Managing Director  
United Nations: Kofi Annan, Secretary-General  
World Bank: Paul Wolfowitz, President  
World Trade Organization: Supachai Panitchpakdi, Director-General

### **2006 St. Petersburg (7)**

Commission of the African Union: Alpha Oumar Konare, Chair  
CIS: Nursultan Nazarbayev, Chairman-in-office  
International Energy Agency: Claude Mandil, Executive Director  
International Atomic Energy Agency: Mohammed ElBaradei, Director-General  
UNESCO: Koichiro Matsuura, Director-General  
World Health Organization: Dr. Anders Nordström, Acting Director-General  
United Nations: Kofi Annan, Secretary-General