

Explaining G7/8 Success with Sanctions and Military Force: The Role of Space and Place in Informal Security Arrangements

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Abstract

Why does the Group of Eight endorse its members’ military interventions in some regional conflicts but only approve material sanctions in others? As an informal security institution composed of major democratic powers from North America, Europe and Asia, the G8 has increasingly endorsed military intervention (Iraq 1990, Kosovo 1999, Afghanistan 2001, Libya 2011, Mali 2013) and sanctions (Iran 1980, Sudan 2004, North Korea 2006, Syria 2011). Yet the G8’s choice of conflicts to address and its effectiveness in securing its members’ compliance and the desired result have varied substantially, with Asian conflicts seldom involving the use of force. To explain these patterns, this study examines the relative salience of six key causes: the geographic proximity of the closest initiating, complying and participating G8 member to the target country; the connectivity arising from the colonial relationship between the two; support for the G8 from proximate regional organizations; the support from global multilateral organizations, notably the globally connected United Nations Security Council [UNSC]); the relative capability ratio between the G8 and the target country; and the deadly threat from the target country to G8 members.

This study finds that proximity produces the G8’s collective approval of force and compliance with the relevant commitments by G8 members, notably Italy, which is often the closest country to the target. The connectivity coming from the former colonial relationship between G8 members and the target country only weakly causes the G8’s approval of force. Support from the most relevant regional organization — the North Atlantic Treaty Organization — has a strong, positive effect on G8 members’ use of force. Support from the UN in the form of an authorizing UNSC resolution coming in advance or afterwards has a strong, positive effect on the G8’s approval of force. A high relative-capability ratio between members and the target state also strongly predicts the G8’s use of force. In contrast, a high, direct, deadly threat from the target state to G8 countries does not.

Introduction

Significance

Why do the Group of Eight (G8) major market democracies collectively approve, individually implement and together succeed in military intervention in some regional conflicts but limit

themselves to material sanctions in others? The G8 is an informal plurilateral summit institution (PSI), with five country members from Europe (Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Russia), two from North America (the United States and Canada) and one from Asia (Japan). It has increasingly approved military intervention in the post–Cold War years (notably, in Iraq in 1991, Kosovo in 1999, Afghanistan in 2001, Libya in 2011 and Mali in 2013) and involved sanctions only in other cases (notably Iran, Sudan, North Korea and Syria). The G8’s choice of where to approve military force has varied substantially, with conflicts close to Europe high on the list and those in distant Asia rare (Afghanistan in 2001 being the only one).

In intervening with force or sanctions in regional conflicts, the G8 has been fulfilling its foundational missions in a coercive form. In the 1975 Rambouillet Summit Declaration, G7 leaders stated: “We came together because of shared beliefs and shared responsibilities. We are each responsible for the government of an open, democratic society, dedicated to individual liberty and social advancement. Our success will strengthen, indeed is essential to, democratic societies everywhere” (G7 1975). With this statement, the G7 affirmed one of its central principles, the promotion and protection of democracy everywhere in the world. It made clear its concern with the internal political character of its own member states and its willingness to interfere in the internal affairs of those beyond. This interventionist dedication to democracy has been maintained for 40 years. Unlike the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), G8 members are united by common political principles of democracy, human rights, the rule of law and social advance. This relationship was reinforced by the G7’s addition of the newly democratically committed and democratizing Russia in 1998, thus making the former G7 more powerful and geographically global (Kirton 2002).

In the name of these shared principles, the G7 dealt with Spain in 1975, Italy in 1976, the transformation of the Soviet Union into Russia, the campaign against apartheid in South Africa and the response to the massacres in Tiananmen Square in June 1989. G8 action has also gone beyond deliberative statements or general consensus to include firm commitments that members have complied with in a concerted way. After the end of the Cold War there had been hope that deadly regional conflicts would diminish along with the superpower rivalry that had fuelled them and that the UN could work effectively as its founders had designed. However, those hopes were soon dashed by the harsh reality of new conflicts in Iraq in 1990, the Balkans in 1992 and genocide in Rwanda in 1994. Since September 11, 2001, more conflicts erupted in Afghanistan in 2001, on Israel’s borders in 2006, in Georgia in 2008 and in Libya in 2011. Thus, since 1990 the G8 has been called to act on several occasions to end these deadly conflicts, through sanctions or through military force.

Schools of Thought

How and why the G8 has governed regional security more generally is debated among several competing schools of thought.

The first sees the G8 as an illegitimate substitute in governing international peace and security (Kühne 2000, Félix-Paganon 2000). This school credits the G8’s prominent role in ending the crisis in Kosovo. However, it does not view the G8 as having the kind of unrivalled legitimate authority that the UN has. Serious weakness within the UN system has made room for other players to act and the G8 has become more willing to play a role in international security, which

poses a serious threat to the credibility of the UNSC. This school sees the G8's action in Kosovo as a one-off and believes that very little should be expected from it in the future.

The second school views the G8 not as a front-line actor but as global security director (Penttilä 2005, Fowler 2004). This school argues that the G8 is not and should not become a conflict manager or conflict preventer. The G8 works best as an institution that directs the work of other international organizations by mobilizing political will and resources and contributing to setting the agenda of the broader international community. Risto Penttilä (2005) argues that the G8's future role in global security will depend on the willingness of its members, namely the United States, to use the forum for policy coordination and crisis management.

The third school views the G8 as a potentially positive alternative. Gunter Pleuger (2000) argues that the G8 has grasped the opportunity to take action in international peace and security when the UNSC has been unable or unwilling to act. He also notes that compared to the UNSC, the G8 has more flexibility due to the absence of a fixed structure or rules of procedures and is thus able to work with greater effectiveness. He views the G8 as having a more modern concept of conflict resolution than the UN and as adapting better to the changing nature of international security threats. While Pleuger states that the German government will do everything possible to prevent the decrease in authority of the UN, a lack of necessary change and reform will inevitably lead to its insignificance.

The fourth and final school of thought views the G8 as an effective global security governor (Kirtton 2000, 2002, 2011). This is due to the G8's fundamental structure as a modern international concert and the massive failures of the UN-centred system. This school also argues that the G8 has been successful in its use of sanctions, achieving the desired outcomes that the leaders sought. The intense and successful use of sanctions by the G8 is in part due to the shared shock-activated vulnerability among members and the structure of the compact, cohesive group itself.

Puzzles

Yet this last school in particular does not explain when and why the G8 endorses, implements and succeeds in approving force in some cases and states with sanctions alone in many more. This study is the first to address this basic question, by developing and applying a model to all cases where the G8 has endorsed its members' use of military force in contrast to the major cases where it has stayed with sanctions alone.

The Argument

In explaining the choice of members' compliance with G8-approved security interventions in the form of military force or sanctions only, and the effectiveness of those interventions, this study examines the relative salience of six key causes: the geographic proximity of the closest initiating, complying and participating G8 member to the target country; the connectivity arising from the colonial relationship between the two; support for the G8 from proximate regional organizations; the support from global multilateral organizations, notably the globally connected UNSC); the relative capability ratio between the G8 and the target country; and the deadly threat from the target country to G8 members.

This study finds that proximity produces the use of force and compliance with the relevant commitments by G8 members, above all Italy, which is often the closest country to the target against which force is used. It further finds that the connectivity coming from the former colonial relationship between G8 members and the target country only weakly causes the G8's use of force. Support from the most relevant regional organization — the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) — had a strong, positive effect on G8 members' use of force. Support from the UN in the form of a UNSC resolution coming in advance or afterwards of the use of force had a strong, positive effect on the G8's use of force. A high relative-capability ratio between members and the target state also strongly predicts the G8's use of force. In contrast, a high, direct, deadly threat from the target state to G8 countries does not cause the G8 to choose force rather than rely solely on sanctions.

Taken together, these results suggest that the degree of threat from the target country does not explain why the G8 moves from sanctions to force. Proximity and connectivity through former colonial relationships have a modest, positive effect on the G8's use of force. Above all, when G8 members are collectively much more powerful than the target and have the support of both the relevant regional organization — NATO — and the relevant multilateral one — UN — then the G8 is far more likely to use force and to secure the results it wants.

The Analytic Model

The model created to conduct this study hypothesizes first that proximity produces the G8's faithful and effective use of force (see Appendix A). The role of place and space, defined as geographic proximity of G8 members to the target country, is greater in cases where the G8 used military force, with high compliance from its members and with a successful result. Although the G8 members are all global powers, the effective use of force is more likely if the target is geographically closer to the member using force. This is due to the potential threat coming from the country in conflict in generating a demand for G8 action and the likelihood of existing military infrastructure there, such as military bases used to sustain a military campaign. It further hypothesizes that the particular G8 members pressing for the use of force will be those geographically closest to the conflict.

The second hypothesis is that global connectivity flowing from a former colonial relationship between G8 members and the target country is more likely to produce the G8's use of sanctions only. In such cases, the economic and functional global connectivity of countries, intensified by globalization, should make such sanctions effective in producing the G8-intended results, without the need to escalate to the use of deadly military force. This connectivity flows from higher rates of trade and investment, stronger diasporic communities with linguistic and cultural ties, and more similar political and legal structures. The greatest connectivity with the target state, wherever it may geographically lie, is more likely to generate the use of sanctions.

The third hypothesis is that support from the most relevant regional organization, namely NATO, is more likely to produce the G8's faithful and effective use of force. This assumes that the use of force is more likely if a regional organization, to which many or most G8 members belong, exists with the capacity to coordinate such force. It also assumes that the regional organization is

close to the target country, making it more likely that military infrastructure is in place to help coordinate the response.

The fourth hypothesis is that support from the dominant multilateral organization, namely the UN, increases the probability that the G8 will use force. UN support in the form of a Security Council resolution either before or after the use of force indicates that the use of force is within the limits of either codified hard-law legality or normative soft-law legitimacy.

The fifth hypothesis is that a high predominance of relative capability of G8 members over the target country is more likely to produce use of force by the G8. This assumes that states are more likely to use force when they have high degree of power over the target country.

The sixth hypothesis is that a high degree of threat, defined as an attack by the target country on a G8 member's territory resulting in the loss of life, is more likely to result in the use of force by the G8.

These hypotheses are empirically assessed against nine critical cases of G7/8 governance of regional security from 1980 to 2013. Five cases involved the approval of force: Iraq 1990, Kosovo 1999, Afghanistan 2001, Libya 2011 and Mali 2013. The other four stopped at the approval of sanctions only: Iran 1980, Sudan 2004, North Korea 2006 and Syria 2011. These cases are particularly relevant since, in the communiqué sections on counter-terrorism and foreign policy released at the most recent G8 summit at Lough Erne in June 2013, the G8 referred by name to seven of those nine cases: Mali, Syria, Libya, Afghanistan, Iran, Sudan and North Korea (in addition to Somalia, Tunisia, Palestine and Israel). The analysis selectively draws on the much larger number of cases involving G7/8 sanctions from 1976 to 2009 analyzed by John Kirton (2011).

Dependent Variables: Effects

G8 Instrument

Military Force

Iraq 1991. After the invasion and annexation of Kuwait by Iraq in August 1990, the UNSC imposed an embargo and sanctions on Iraq. Subsequently, on November 29, 1990, the UNSC (1990) issued Resolution 678, which authorized member states to “use all necessary means” to bring Iraq into compliance with all previous resolutions. On January 16, 1991, coalition forces led by the United States began an air campaign followed by a ground campaign to liberate Kuwait. G8 members Canada, France and the United Kingdom joined the US in using military force to ensure regional security.

Kosovo 1999. In 1998, after years of instability in the Balkan region, war erupted in Kosovo between the Kosovo Liberation Army and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. After a series of mass killings, forced expulsions and major human rights abuses led by Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic, the UNSC passed Resolution 1199 in September 1998. It recognized the war in Kosovo as “a threat to international peace and security,” but it failed to recommend the

use of force (UNSC 1998). Lack of UN authorized support, widespread media coverage of the conflict and the massacre of 45 Kosovo Albanian civilians in the village of Račak prompted NATO to activate Operation Allied Force on March 24, 1999. Under the umbrella of NATO, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the UK and the US used military force to bomb the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, leading to the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo (Manulak 2011).

Afghanistan 2001. Following the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, NATO and its allied members declared war on Taliban-led Afghanistan. Canadian prime minister Jean Chrétien suggested invoking Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty (Kirtton 2007, 170). That article reads: “the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them ... will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking ... such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area” (NATO 1949). On September 12, 2001, Chrétien along with Italian prime minister Silvio Berlusconi and Russian president Vladimir Putin looked to the G8 to define the American and allied response. G8 members Canada, France, Germany, Italy, France, the US and the UK exercised military force in its invasion of Afghanistan to remove the Taliban from power (Kirtton 2007).

Libya 2011. After the uprisings of civilians in Libya against the oppressive regime of Muammar al-Qaddafi in February 2011, the international community responded to protect those citizens and allow local forces to overthrow Qaddafi. After a violent crackdown by the Qaddafi government and massive civilian casualties, the UNSC imposed sanctions, an arms embargo and an asset freeze on Libya and on March 17, 2011, Resolution 1973 authorized member states to “take all necessary measures ... to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack” (UNSC 2011). On March 19, NATO forces, including those of Canada, France, Italy, the UK and the US, began a military intervention in Libya.

Mali 2013. In January 2013, French troops intervened in Northern Mali against armed groups with links to al-Qaeda, which had taken control of Northern Mali in April 2012. The intervention was quickly supported by NATO and by the UNSC (2012) through Resolution 2085. The US, Canada, Britain and Germany supported the French intervention. Within months, the rebels were defeated and on June 18, 2013, at the subsequent Lough Erne Summit the G8 leaders declared: “we support efforts to dismantle the terrorist safe haven in northern Mali. We welcome France’s important contribution in this regard ... we support the swift deployment of a UN stabilisation force in Mali, and encourage the Government of Mali energetically to pursue a political process which can build long-term stability” (G8 2013).

Sanctions

Iran 1980. On November 4, 1979, 52 American diplomats and citizens were seized from the US embassy in Tehran and taken hostage by a group of Iranian students. The US immediately banned oil imports from Iran. On November 6, the Canadian House of Commons condemned Iran’s actions and on November 14, the US froze all Iranian assets in the US and those controlled by US banks, companies and individuals abroad. Then, on December 12, 1979, 183 Iranian diplomats were expelled from the US. It was also in December 1979 that the G7 was first

mobilized, as high-level US officials visited the UK, France, Germany, Italy and Japan to discuss their possible use of sanctions. On January 13, 1980, the UNSC prepared to vote for sanctions but was stopped by a veto by the Soviet Union. On January 28, Canada suspended the operations of its embassy in Iran to facilitate the escape of six US diplomats who had taken shelter there. On April 7, the US suspended diplomatic relations with Iran and imposed trade sanctions, and on April 17 it imposed additional sanctions and threatened military action. On April 23, Canada announced mild initial sanctions with a promise to consider further trade sanctions if the crisis was not resolved by May 17. The US then carried out a unilateral but unsuccessful rescue mission on April 25. On May 22, during its promised second stage of sanctions, Canada placed controls on the export of goods to Iran, making exemptions only for food, medical supplies and other humanitarian products. The other major allies of the US introduced sanctions just days before the American rescue mission was launched. On June 22, during the Venice Summit, the G7 (1980) issued the “Statement on the Taking of Diplomatic Hostages,” which expressed grave concern about the recent incidents of terrorism and encouraged heads of state and government to “take appropriate measures to deny terrorists any benefits from such criminal acts.

Sudan 2004. The Sudan case began in early 2003 with reports by non-governmental organizations of widespread ethnic cleansing. At the 2004 Sea Island Summit, G8 leaders issued the statement calling for the government of Sudan to respect UNSC Resolution 1593. By then G8 members were supporting the African Union (AU) peacekeeping mission in Sudan, by working together through the European Union and NATO, providing \$370 million and promising \$2.5 billion in humanitarian relief over the following three years. The G8 (2005) leaders did not authorize the use of force, nor did they participate in the UN-approved AU peacekeeping force. The UN followed with UNSC Resolution 1564, invoking Chapter 7, on September 18, 2004. On March 29, 2005, the UN (2005) passed Resolution 1591, which imposed a travel ban and asset freeze on individuals “impeding the peace process” in Darfur. In February 2010 a ceasefire agreement was signed between the warring factions, after an estimated several hundred thousand people had died.

North Korea 2006. The G7 leaders first dealt with North Korea in 1990 and have addressed it themselves or through their foreign ministers continually since that time. They first authorized or approved sanctions directly in 2006 when they expressed support for UNSC Resolution 1695 of 15 July 2006, which condemns North Korea’s launches of ballistic missiles on July 5 (G8 2006). That resolution represented a compromise between the US, Japan and France, which sought stronger sanctions, and the Peoples’ Republic of China and Russia, which stood opposed. The resolution banned all UN members from selling material or technology for missiles or weapons of mass destruction to North Korea or receiving from North Korea any missiles, banned weapons or technology (UNSC 2006). However, in deference to China and Russia, the resolution did not invoke Chapter 11 of the UN Charter, which authorizes the use of force.

Syria 2011. The G8 first addressed Syria at its Halifax summit in 1995, when it encouraged the conclusion of peace treaties among Israel, Lebanon and Syria. The topic of Syria stayed there until the end of the 20th century. It reappeared following the events of the Arab Spring of 2011. At its summit in Deauville, France, the G8 called on Syrian leadership to stop using force and intimidation against its own people, to respect their demands freedom of expression and universal rights and to release all political prisoners. The G8 (2011) went on to say, “should the

Syrian authorities not heed this call, we will consider further measures.” The UN has been unable to pass a resolution on Syria due to vetoes by both China and Russia. However, Canada, Japan, the US, the UK and the EU have imposed sanctions on Syria.

G8 Compliance

Commitments are measured using a three-point scale where each member is awarded -1, 0 or +1 for each commitment. A score of -1 indicates a failure to comply or actions taken that are opposite to the commitment’s stated goal. A score of 0 indicates partial compliance or a work in progress. A score of +1 indicates full compliance with the commitment’s stated goal.

In the field of regional security, G8 members have an average compliance of +0.57 on the 16 assessed commitments from 1996 to 2011 (see Appendix B). Overall, compliance on regional security has been led by the US at +0.81 followed in turn by Italy at +0.64, Canada and Japan at +0.63 each, the EU at +0.62, the UK at +0.56, Germany at +0.44 and Russia at +0.29. What is notable is the high compliance of the United States but also Italy, whose compliance with G8 commitments in all issue areas is very low.

In the case of Iraq, the first assessed commitment was taken from the 1996 Lyon Summit: “we reaffirm our determination to enforce full implementation of all UN Security Council resolutions concerning Iraq and Libya only full compliance with which could result in the lifting of sanctions” (G7 1996a). It had an overall G8 compliance average of -0.50 with full compliance from the US alone, partial compliance from Japan, and no compliance from Germany, UK, France, and Canada (with the other members not assessed). The second commitment had an overall compliance score of +0.89, with all G7 members fully complying and Russia complying partially.

In the case of Libya, the one assessed commitment was and shared with Iraq. It had average compliance score of -0.50.

In the case of Afghanistan, the first commitment had an overall compliance score of 0, with full compliance by the US, UK and Canada, partial compliance by Germany, France and Russia, and no compliance by Japan, Italy and the EU. The second commitment had average compliance of +0.89, with full compliance by all G7 members and partial compliance by Russia. The third commitment had complete compliance overall and by all members. Across the three Afghanistan commitments, the overall compliance was +0.63, led by the US, the UK and Canada, which fully complied.

In the case of Kosovo, the one assessed commitment from the cognate area of conflict prevention focused on Bosnia and Herzegovina and received complete compliance. The commitment stated: “We support the High Representative in his work of preparation with the Parties of the establishment of the new institutions: the collective Presidency, the Council of Ministers, the Parliament, the Constitutional Court and the Central Bank. We shall provide the future authorities with the necessary constitutional and legal assistance” (G7 1996b).

In the cognate issue area of terrorism, all of the 16 assessed commitments from 1996 to 2011 dealt with counter-terrorism in general with no specific country or region singled out in the

commitment itself. Average compliance for the 16 commitments was +0.64. It was led by the US at +0.88. Tied for second place were Italy and Russia, each with +0.79 — the two countries with the lowest compliance with G8 commitments across all issue areas. They were followed in turn by Canada at +0.75, the EU at +0.64, Germany at +0.60, the UK at +0.56, France at +0.44 and Japan with +0.38 in last place.

Across the issue areas of regional security and terrorism, the unusually high compliance of proximate Italy and the unusually low compliance of distant Japan are particularly notable.

In the six specific commitments on cases where force was used, the G8's average compliance was +0.54. The distant but highly capable US achieved a score of +1.00 and the score of the proximate but less powerful Italy was +0.60.

In the 46 commitments from 1996 to 2008 relating to cases where sanctions were used (including the few that ended up using force) G8 average compliance was +0.51. That of the US was +0.62 and that of Italy was +0.35 (Kirton 2011). Somewhat surprisingly, G8 members on average comply a little more with commitments relating to force than with those relating to sanctions only. This difference is much more magnified for the geographically distant, most powerful and colony-free US. It is also true for the less powerful, generally more proximate and colony-containing Italy. However, Italy's compliance scores on commitments relating to force are almost twice as high as on commitments relating only to sanctions.

In terms of the US, it is power rather than proximity or colonial connections that creates high compliance. For Italy, it is proximity rather than power, with a little help from its colonial connection to Libya.

G8 Effectiveness

The G8's effectiveness in using military force or sanctions is determined by whether it has secured its desired result as outlined in its official documents (see Appendix B).

Iraq 1990. From 1990 to 1991, G7 members successfully secured their desired result with regard to Iraq. Saddam Hussein's armed forces were completely removed from Kuwait, which was thus restored as a sovereign independent state that has not been invaded again to this day. Some observers had hoped that the G7-led coalition would continue its military offensive into Iraq to remove Hussein's armed forces and perhaps even replace his regime in Baghdad. Others had hoped that liberated Kuwait might, as the post-Cold War years unfolded, become a more open, democratic state. Neither of these two results were realized, but neither were they ever among the goals for which the G7 members authorized, approved and employed the use of military force to liberate Kuwait.

Kosovo 1999. G8 members' use of force was met with great success in Kosovo. A looming genocide was prevented. Slobodan Milosevic removed his troops and his own people subsequently removed him from power and sent him to The Hague to put him on trial for war crimes. Since that time, Kosovo has remained a peaceful polity. In 2008, it declared itself to be a sovereign state and was recognized by all G8 members except Russia. All of these results, save the very one, were part or a consequence of the G8's ambitious aims in initiating military force.

Afghanistan 2001. In the case of Afghanistan, the G8 members' use of force is decidedly mixed. The invasion of Afghanistan led to the crippling of the al-Qaeda organization. It was successful in preventing any further attacks on American or allied territory originating from Afghanistan and in overthrowing the Taliban and installing a democratic government. However, it has not been successful in bringing peace and stability to the region, which were among the initial goals of intervention.

Libya 2011. G8 members' use of force in Libya was considered highly successful and argued to be a model of intervention (Daalder and Stavridis 2012). It was quick to fulfill its first two tasks of policing the arms embargo and patrolling the no-fly zone. While it took longer to secure the protection of the Libyan people, by August it had successfully attacked Qaddafi strongholds in Tripoli and Sirte. In a matter of months, without any allied casualties, it had enabled the rebels to overthrow Qaddafi.

Mali 2013. In the case of Mali, the UN- and NATO-supported intervention was successful in halting the rebels from advancing in Northern Mali and in dismantling the terrorist safe haven. However, rebel forces backed out of the peace agreement and there has been a renewal of conflict.

G8 intervention was thus successful in four of the five cases. In contrast, in the four major sanctions only cases, the G8 was clearly successful in only one.

Independent Variables: Causes

What causes the G8's faithful and effective use of force as opposed to its reliance on sanctions alone? In particular, what causal role is played by the six key factors of geographic proximity, political connectivity, regional organizational support, multilateral organizational support, relative capability and threat?

Geographic Proximity

This study hypothesizes that the role of place matters in determining whether G8 countries decide to use force and militarily intervene in conflicts to maintain regional and global security. It assumes that if the target is geographically closer to the G8 members the G8 will intervene because first the target represents a higher degree of threat due to regional instability and second the G8 is more likely to have established military infrastructure in place (see Appendix C). Proximity is measured by the number of miles between G8 capital cities and the capital city of the conflict-initiating country. In the case of Iraq, the closest capital city to Baghdad is Rome at 1,835 miles. In the case of Kosovo, the closest capital city to Belgrade is again Rome at 448 miles. In the case of Afghanistan, the closest capital city to Kabul is Moscow at 2,096 miles. In the case of Libya, the closest capital city to Tripoli is Rome at 624 miles. And finally, in the case of Mali, the closest capital city to Bamako is Rome at 2,368 miles.

To facilitate a comparison, the miles between capital cities in the use of sanctions cases were calculated. In the case of Iran, the closest capital city to Tehran is once again Rome at 2,124 miles. In the case of Sudan, the closest capital city to Khartoum is Rome at 2,178 miles. In the

case of North Korea, the closest capital city to Pyongyang is Tokyo at 799 miles. In the case of Syria, the closest capital city to Damascus is Rome at 1,420 miles.

Therefore, in the five cases of G8 members using military force the closest G8 capital is on average 1,474 miles away from the target. In the four cases of G8 members using sanctions, the closest G8 capital is on average 2,221 miles away. These findings lead to the conclusion that proximity matters to some degree. Italy, the highest complier with G8 commitments regarding military force, is the closest member to the target four out of five times.

Political Connectivity

The second hypothesis is that a high degree of global connectivity flowing from a former colonial relationship between G8 members and the target country is more likely to produce the G8's effective use of sanctions only. Among the cases in which only sanctions were used, two targets had a former colonial relationship: Iran, a former colony of the UK, and Syria, a former colony of France. Among the cases in which the use of force was needed after or along with sanctions, three had a former colonial relationship: Iraq, a former colony of the UK, Libya, a former colony of Italy, and Mali, a former colony of France. Thus, political connectivity is not a salient cause of the use of sanctions only, but does have a positive effect on the G8's use of force.

Regional Organizational Support

The third hypothesis is that support from the most relevant regional organization — NATO — is more likely to produce the G8's effective use of force. In four out of the five cases in which the G8 uses military force, NATO support is present. Only in the case of the Iraq was there the absence of support from NATO. This suggests that the support of the most relevant regional organization has a high, positive effect on the G8's use of force.

Multilateral Organizational Support

The fourth hypothesis is that support from the dominant multilateral organization, in the form of a UNSC resolution, is more likely to result in the G8 using force. In all five cases, the UNSC has passed a resolution authorizing its members to use such force, either before or after the G8's action. This suggests that support from the UN through a Security Council resolution has a very high, positive effect on the G8's use of force.

Relative Capability

The fifth hypothesis is that a high predominance of relative capability of G8 members over the target country makes it more likely for the G8 to use force. Relative capability is determined by comparing the total gross domestic product (GDP) of all G8 members and the GDP of the target country at the time of the conflict (see Appendices D-1 and D-2). In the case of Iraq, the relative capability ratio is 2,140:1. In the case of Kosovo, the relative capability ratio is 469:1. In the case of Afghanistan, the relative capability ratio is 6,398:1. In the case of Libya, the relative capability ratio is 898:1. In the case of Mali, the relative capability ratio is 3,633:1.

For comparative purposes, the relative capability ratios in cases of the G8 using only sanctions were also calculated. In the case of Iran, the relative capability ratio is 80:1. In the case of Sudan, the relative capability ratio is 1,229:1. In the case of North Korea, the relative capability ratio was 2,162:1. And in the case of Syria, the relative capability ratio is 537:1.

Therefore, in the five cases of G8 military force, the G8 is on average 2,528 more capable than its target. In the four cases of G8 sanctions, the G8 is on average 1,002 times more capable than its target. Predominant relative capability thus has a positive effect on the G8's use of force.

Threat

The sixth hypothesis is that a high degree of threat, defined as an attack by the target country on G8 member territory resulting in the loss of life, is more likely to result in the use of force by the G8. With regard to Iraq and Kosovo, the threat level was low as there were no attacks by Iraq on G8 member territory. In the case of Afghanistan, the threat level was high due to the al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, which originated from Afghanistan and killed almost 3,000 people. In the cases of Libya and Mali, the threat level was low due to the absence of attacks from the target country on G8 member territory.

In the case of Iran, the threat was medium as there was an attack on the US embassy in Tehran in which 52 hostages were taken; however, no deaths resulted. In the case of Sudan, the threat level was low, as there were no attacks on G8 territory. In the case of North Korea, the threat level was medium due to the kidnapping of Japanese citizens; the official count was 13 but the actual number is unknown. In the case of Syria, the threat level was low.

Thus, the G8's use of force does not require a high level of threat to a G8 member country's territory.

Conclusion

Since the first G7 summit in Rambouillet, the G7/8 has established itself as an institution dedicated to governing global security based on its members' shared principles and beliefs of open democracy and the rule of law. While the manner in which they choose to address regional conflict has varied, on numerous occasions the G7/8 has used force or sanctions. This study examined six key causes to explain the choice of such interventions, members' compliance with relevant commitments and the effectiveness of G8 security interventions. Those six causes are the following; the proximity of the closest, initiating, complying and participating G8 members to the target country; the connectivity arising from the colonial relationship between the two; support from proximate regional organizations; support from global multilateral organizations, notably the globally connected UNSC; the relative capability ratio between the G8 and the target country; and the deadly threat from the target country to G8 members.

This study found that proximity produces the use of force and compliance with the relevant commitments made by G8 members, the most compliant member being Italy, which is often closest to the target country. It found that connectivity through former colonial relationships between G8 members and the target country is a weak cause. Support from the most relevant

regional organization — NATO — had a strong, positive effect. Support from the UN in the form of a UNSC resolution coming before or after the G8's use of force had a strong, positive effect. A high relative-capability ratio between members and the target state also strongly predicted the G8's use of force. In contrast, a high, direct deadly threat from the target state to G8 countries did not cause the G8 to choose force rather than rely solely on sanctions.

The results from the nine assessed cases suggest that the degree of threat from the target country does not explain why the G8 moves from sanctions to force. Physical proximity and connectivity through former colonial relationships have a modest, positive effect on the G8. Above all, when G8 members are collectively much more powerful than the target and have the support of both the relevant regional organization — NATO — and the relevant multilateral one — UN — the G8 is far more likely to use force and to secure the results it wants.

Planned Future Research

This study will be further developed in several ways. All other sanction-only cases used in the Kirton (2011) study and all sanction-only cases since then will be added. Next, an assessment will be made to determine whether the G8 authorized or approved the use of force before or after the UN, with an examination of the relationship between the two. More use-of-force cases will be added, including those of the G8's authorization and approval at the ministerial level. The level of support from surrounding summits such as the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting and the Organisation Internationale de la Francophonie will be considered. Existing international relations literature on force versus sanctions only will be reviewed. Detailed process tracing will permit an assessment of which G8 member initiated, supported, opposed initially G8 authorization or approval of the use of force. And lastly, an attempt will be made to determine how much force was used, how many members used it, and for how long.

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Appendix A: The Analytical Model

Dependent Variable (Effects)

1. Instrument used: G8 authorizes or approves
 - a. sanction only, or
 - b. military force
2. Effectiveness: G8 secures desired result with
 - a. success, or
 - b. failure
3. G8 compliance with the relevant sanctions or force commitment(s) is
 - a. high, or
 - b. low
4. G8 initiative is taken by which countries

Independent Variable (Causes)

1. Geographic proximity of targets country to closest G8 member, initiator, complier
2. Colonial relationship between target and G8 member (political connectivity)
3. Multilateral organizational support (global institutional connectivity)
4. Regional organizational support (geographic place)
5. Power: Relative capability ratio between target country and G8
6. Threat: Deadly threat posed by target country

Appendix B: G8 Member Compliance

		United States	Japan	Germany	United Kingdom	France	Italy	Canada	Russia	European Union	Total
Regional Security N=16		0.81	0.63	0.44	0.56	0.50	0.64	0.63	0.29	0.62	0.57
1996-xx	“We urge the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to develop the dialogue and cooperation with the Republic of Korea (ROK), this being the only means of achieving permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula and ensuring a more stable and more secure future for the Korean People.”	1	0	-1	-1	-1		-1			-0.50
1996-114	“We reaffirm our determination to enforce full implementation of all UN Security Council resolutions concerning Iraq and Libya only full compliance with which could result in the lifting of all sanctions.”	1	0	-1	-1	-1		-1			-0.50
2002-15	We support the Transitional Authority of Afghanistan. We will fulfil our Tokyo Conference commitments and will work to eradicate opium production and trafficking.	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0.25	0.25
2004-C2	“We pledge to provide support and assistance for the electoral process leading to national elections for the Transitional National Authority [of Iraq] no later than January 31, 2005.”	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0.89
2004-G1	“We pledge our countries’ assistance in ending the conflicts in Sudan and in providing humanitarian aid to those in need.”	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0.89
2005-G1	“We support Mr Wolfensohn’s intention to stimulate a global financial contribution of up to \$3bn per year over the coming three years. Domestic and international investors should be full partners to this process. We are mobilising practical support for Mr	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00

		United States	Japan	Germany	United Kingdom	France	Italy	Canada	Russia	European Union	Total
	Wolfensohn's efforts and look forward to further development of his plans and their presentation to the Quartet and the international community in September."										
2005-C2	"We commend and will continue to support the African Union's Mission in Sudan (Darfur), just as we are contributing to UNMIS's operation in southern Sudan."	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0.89
2006-288	"In order to facilitate the UN's rapid and efficient response to crises, G8 states commit to pursuing reforms in the United Nations to ensure that resources are available in advance to the UN as it works to establish new peacekeeping and peace support operations: pre-positioning equipment in Brindisi, an increase in pre-authorization funds to support DPKO's planning, and the authority to identify personnel in advance of a UNSC resolution mandating a new PKO;"	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
2006-307	"We will support the economic and humanitarian needs of the Lebanese people, including the convening at the right time of a donors conference."	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00
2007-295	"We reiterate our commitment to continue to provide humanitarian assistance and will undertake, in coordination with the African Union and the United Nations, to identify options for improving humanitarian access."	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0	1	0.78
2008-203	"[We will, in particular] build capacity for peace support operations including providing quality training to and equipping troops by 2010, with focus on Africa, as well as enhance logistics and	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	0.67

		United States	Japan	Germany	United Kingdom	France	Italy	Canada	Russia	European Union	Total
	transportation support for deployment”										
2008-248	“We reaffirm the importance of economic and social development along with counter-terrorism measures in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region, which can play a critical role in bringing lasting peace, stability and security to this region. To this end, we are committed to further strengthening the coordination of our efforts in the border region in cooperation with the respective countries, international organizations, and other donors.”	1	-1	0	1	0	-1	1	0	-1	0
2009-186	“We reaffirm our commitment to promoting stability and development in both countries and the wider region, also by strengthening their capacity to counter terrorism, illicit trafficking and crime.”	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1	0.89
2010-51	“we fully support the transition strategy adopted by International Security Assistance Force contributors in April, as well as the on-going efforts to establish an Afghan-led national reconciliation and reintegration process.”	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00
2010-59	“To this end, we commit to strengthening: the international availability of civilian experts to support rule of law and security institutions; the capacities of key littoral states and regional organizations for maritime security; and international peace operations.”	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.89
2011-120	“For our part, we stand ready to offer additional support through, inter alia, improved mutual market access	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0.22

		United States	Japan	Germany	United Kingdom	France	Italy	Canada	Russia	European Union	Total
	opportunities to encourage integration into the global economy through increased trade and inward investment in the region, for countries undertaking reforms to open their economies and create competitive conditions.”										
Conflict Prevention N=8		0.88	0	0.75	0.63	0.88	0	0.88	-0.29	0.80	0.51
1996-120	“We support the High Representative in his work of preparation with the Parties of the establishment of the new institutions: the collective Presidency, the Council of Ministers, the Parliament, the Constitutional Court and the Central Bank. We shall provide the future authorities with the necessary constitutional and legal assistance.”	1	1	1	1	1		1			1.00
Terrorism N=16		0.88	0.38	0.60	0.56	0.44	0.79	0.75	0.79	0.64	0.64
1996-63	“We rededicate ourselves and invite others to associate our efforts in order to thwart the activities of terrorists and their supporters, including fund-raising, the planning of terrorist acts, procurement of weapons, calling for violence, and incitement to commit terrorist acts.”	1	1	1	0	1		1			0.83
2000-103	“We call for all states to become parties to the twelve international counter-terrorism conventions to enhance international cooperation against terrorism.”	1	0		1	0		0			0.40
2001-xx	We have asked our foreign, finance, justice, and other relevant ministers, as appropriate, to draw up a list of specific measures to enhance our counter terrorism cooperation, including: Expanded use of financial measures and sanctions to stop the flow of	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		1.00

		United States	Japan	Germany	United Kingdom	France	Italy	Canada	Russia	European Union	Total
	funds to terrorists, aviation security, the control of arms exports, security and other services cooperation, the denial of all means of support to terrorism and the identification and removal of terrorist threats.										
2002-4	We are committed to sustained and comprehensive actions to deny support or sanctuary to terrorists, to bring terrorists to justice, and to reduce the threat of terrorist attacks.	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		1.00
2003-150	“the G8 will create a Counter-Terrorism Action Group (CTAG), to focus on building political will, co-ordinating capacity building assistance when necessary. CTAG will provide funding, expertise or training facilities.”	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00
2003-168	“Given the increasing number of MANPADS (Man-Portable Air Defense Systems) in world-wide circulation, we commit ourselves to reducing their proliferation and call upon all countries to strengthen control of their MANPADS stockpiles”.	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	1		0.63
2004-F10	“Accelerate development of international standards for the interoperability of government-issued smart chip passports and other government-issued identity documents. We will work for implementation by the 2005 Summit.”	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0.00
2005-N1	“We have carried forward initiatives to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction to terrorists and other criminals, reinforce international political will to combat terrorism, secure radioactive sources and — as announced at Sea Island — ensure secure and facilitated	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1.00

		United States	Japan	Germany	United Kingdom	France	Italy	Canada	Russia	European Union	Total
	travel. Today we commit ourselves to new joint efforts. We will work to improve the sharing of information on the movement of terrorists across international borders.”										
2007-314	“Furthermore, we aim to improve passenger screening programs and techniques, port facility security audits, security management systems and transportation security clearance programs.”	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0.22
2007-318	“We commend the efforts of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and reaffirm our commitment to implement and promote internationally its 40 Recommendations on Money Laundering and nine Special Recommendations on Terror Finance.”	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	0.78
2008-246	“We stress the urgent need for full implementation of existing standards, including Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Special Recommendations VIII and IX, and ask our experts to take steps to share information, evaluate threats, assess new trends and promote implementation and review these efforts next year.”	1	-1	-1	-1	-1	1	0	-1	1	-0.22
2009-202	“We will intensify our efforts in tackling the widest variety of threats, such as chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear terrorism (CBRN), and attacks on critical infrastructure (including critical information infrastructure), sensitive sites, and transportation systems.”	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	0.78
2010-65	“We are committed to further enhancing international cooperation, by strengthening old partnerships and building new ones with governments, multilateral organizations and	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	1	1	0.67

		United States	Japan	Germany	United Kingdom	France	Italy	Canada	Russia	European Union	Total
	the private sector.”										
2010-68	“We underscore our determination to work cooperatively on key challenges, including transportation security, border security and identity integrity, preventing chemical, biological, nuclear and radiological terrorism, combating terrorism financing, countering violent extremism, radicalization leading to violence, and recruitment.”	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	1	1	0.89
2010-70	“We will seek to build closer cooperation among relevant G8 partner programs to make our effort to address terrorism and related security threats more coherent and effective.”	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0.78
2011-145	“We stand ready to assist the countries affected by this scourge in building their own capacities to fight terrorism and terrorist groups.”	1	0	0	1	0	1	1	1	0	0.56

Appendix C: Summary of Results

Dependent Variable: Effects

Case	Force	G8 Initiator	Success
FORCE			
Iraq 1991	Yes	United Kingdom	Yes
Kosovo 1999	Yes	United Kingdom, France, Canada	Yes
Afghanistan 2001	Yes	Canada, France, United Kingdom, United States	Mixed
Libya 2011	Yes	France, United Kingdom, Canada	Yes
Mali 2013	Yes	France	Yes
SANCTIONS ONLY			
Iran 1980	No	United States	Mixed
Sudan 2004	No		Yes
North Korea 2006	No	Japan	No
Syria 2011	No		Mixed

Independent Variable: Causes

Case	Proximity	Colony	Regional	United Nations	Capability	Threat
FORCE						
Iraq 1991	1,835	Yes (United Kingdom)	No	Yes (678)	2,410	Low
Kosovo 1999	448	No	Yes (NATO)	Yes (1244)	469	Low
Afghanistan 2001	2,096	No	Yes (NATO)	Yes (1510)	6,398	High
Libya 2011	624	Yes (Italy)	Yes (NATO)	Yes (1973)	898	Low
Mali 2013	2,368	Yes (France)	Yes (NATO)	Yes (2085)	3,633	Low
SANCTIONS ONLY						
Iran 1980	2,124	Yes (United Kingdom)		No	80	Medium
Sudan 2004	2,178	Yes (United Kingdom)		Yes (1591)	1,229	Low
North Korea 2006	799	No		Yes (1718)	2,162	Medium
Syria 2011	1,420	Yes (France)		No	537	Low

Note: NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Appendix C: Proximity to G8 Members

	Ottawa, Canada	Washington, United States	Rome, Italy	Paris, France	Berlin, Germany	Tokyo, Japan	Moscow, Russia	London, United Kingdom
<i>Baghdad, Iraq</i>	5,840	6,202	1,835	2,402	2,029	5,190	1,585	2,546
<i>Belgrade, Serbia</i>	4,374	4,712	448	898	620	5,700	1,063	1,049
<i>Kabul, Afghanistan</i>	6,500	6,930	3,067	3,473	2,972	3,902	2,096	3,549
<i>Tripoli, Libya</i>	4,601	4,856	624	1,238	2,184	10,588	3,166	1,451
<i>Bamako, Mali</i>	4,525	4,554	2,368	2,573	3,002	8,495	3,845	2,723
<i>Tehran, Iran</i>	5,942	6,331	2,124	2,620	2,182	4,768	1,534	2,736
<i>Khartoum, Sudan</i>	6,306	6,553	2,178	2,865	2,763	6,520	2,794	3,070
<i>Pyongyang, North Korea</i>	6,458	6,869	5,459	5,456	4,934	799	3,989	5,388
<i>Damascus, Syria</i>	5,532	5,869	1,420	2,037	1,737	5,570	1,540	2,201

Notes: Distance is calculated by the number of miles between capital cities. The cases involving military force are in bold and italics. The G8 member closest to the conflict are in bold.

Appendix D-1: Capability of G8 Members

	Canada	France	Germany	Italy	Japan	United Kingdom	United States	Russia	Total
1980	278,368	526,685	777,221	524,846	1,004,592	467,306	2,862,500	940,000	7,381,518
1990	552,217	1,002,531	1,472,120	1,001,122	2,377,973	919,323	5,979,600	568,900	13,878,786
1991	559,117	1,046,643	1,598,785	1,050,335	2,538,749	937,624	6,174,000	559,600	14,464,853
1999	841,313	1,424,154	2,051,700	1,385,611	3,115,999	1,437,816	9,665,700	869,766	20,792,059
2001	932,845	1,629,631	2,201,804	1,556,071	3,377,139	1,637,784	10,625,300	1,074,407	23,034,981
2004	1,076,117	1,760,498	2,447,878	1,600,738	3,753,389	1,916,836	12,277,000	1,474,055	26,306,511
2006	1,233,200	1,993,970	2,765,956	1,793,350	4,064,908	2,155,593	13,857,900	2,133,935	29,845,087
2011	1,419,474	2,369,589	3,352,099	2,056,688	4,386,151	2,201,439	15,533,800	3,216,934	34,536,174
2013	1,800,000	2,734,000	3,635,000	2,100,000	4,900,000	2,476,000	17,100,000	2,014,000	36,700,000

Note: All figures from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development database on gross domestic product. Figures are listed US dollars, current prices, current purchasing power parity, millions. Source: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2014).

Appendix D-2: Capability of Target Countries

Case	Gross Domestic Product (US dollars)
FORCE	
Iraq 1991	\$6 billion
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 1999*	\$44.3 billion
Afghanistan 2001	\$3.6 billion
Libya 2011	\$38.4 billion
Mali 2013	\$10.1 billion
SANCTIONS ONLY	
Iran 1980	\$92 billion
Sudan 2004	\$21.4 billion
North Korea 2006	\$13.8 billion
Syria 2011	\$64.3 billion

Note: * indicates an estimated figure. Source: World Bank (2014).