

The Efficacy of the G7/8 in Global Human Rights Governance: Explaining How It Works

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I. Introduction

1. Why Human Rights and the G7/8?

The principle of *Pacta Sunt Servanda* – treaties are to be obeyed – has long been a central question for international relations scholars and practitioners alike. In the absence of a global leviathan (*cf.* Hobbes and Gaskin 1996), states have incentives to breach an agreement when the utility of doing so is higher than that of compliance. The efficacy of human rights treaties has been repeatedly questioned precisely because of this lack of enforcement mechanisms (Keith 1999, Neumayer 2005, Hafner-Burton 2005, Hollyer and Rosendorff 2011). Compared to international treaties and other mechanisms that are designed to protect human rights (*e.g.* Hafner-Burton 2009 for preferential trade agreements [PTAs], Sikkink 2011 for the International Criminal Court, Hendrix and Wong 2012 for international nongovernmental organizations [INGOs]), the G7/8 has gathered much less attention in terms of human rights protection. Yet, the focus on human rights is ever more important for the G7/8's *raison d'être*, as increasing attention is paid to the G20 for more effective global economic governance (Bradford and Linn 2004, Penttilä 2009, Kirton 2013). In this paper, I will investigate the efficacy of the G7/8 governance on human rights. In particular, I will explore how and to what extent the G7/8 has been effective in protecting human rights at the regional and global levels.

2. Competing Schools of Thought

In the literature of human rights politics, competing schools of thought have been divided along methodological lines (Hafner-Burton and Ron 2005). Qualitative researchers, often being constructivists, argue that states internalize international human rights norms (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Once states internalize the norms through learning and/or socialization, *the logic of appropriateness*, as opposed to *the logic of consequences*, dictates their behaviour; therefore, normative pressures such as 'naming and shaming' is considered to be effective whilst in the long run (Keck and Sikkink 1998).


On the contrary, quantitative researchers, often being rationalists, contend that hard law mechanisms (*cf.* Abbot *et al.* 2000, Abbot and Snidal 2000) are necessary, although not always sufficient, to enforce the human rights norms effectively. Hafner-Burton (2005) argues that PTAs with *hard* standards are more effective than *soft* standards because the former brings *coercive* mechanisms and the latter does not. Unlike qualitative researchers, quantitative researchers generally do not assume state internalization of the norms. Both autocratic and democratic leaders are motivated to violate the human rights norms whenever possible; democratic leaders are less likely to do so, simply because citizens can incur prohibitive costs on their leaders. As qualitative and quantitative researchers assume different nature of preferences (dynamic *vs.* static), their approaches are often irreconcilable.

The literature of the G7/8 also offers rich insights on human rights politics. For the neoliberal consensus model, the G7/8 prioritizes the neoliberal agenda such as privatization and deregulation over human rights concerns (Gill 1997). For the direction-setting desire model, democracy and human rights are useful connectors between the economic and political realms of G7/8 governance (Dobson 2007: 5). For the American leadership model, the focus on human rights hinges on whether US interests, or more specifically the President's interests, coincide with the promotion of human rights (Putnam and Bayne 1987). Finally, for the concert equality model, the G7/8 takes action that they think is appropriate for a democratic concert of the powerful countries (Kirton and Daniels 1999, Kirton 1989). While the concert equality model implicitly assumes responsiveness of the G7/8 to the international norms, especially in its direction-setting capacity, the other models presume that self-interests of states prevail over the normative concerns. Therefore, while the former incorporates *the logic of appropriateness* in its explanation about the G7/8's behaviour, the latter group of models implicitly maintains the predominance of *the logic of consequences*.

3. How to Explain the G7/8 Governance on Human Rights

As indicated in Figure 1, G7/8 governance on human rights provides an interesting mix of the two different logics of state behaviour: *the logic of appropriateness* and *the logic of consequences*. In contrast to human rights treaties and PTAs, in which members alone are obligated to comply with the human rights norms, the G7/8 governance on human rights sets two separate stages for the 'internal' members and the 'external' targets. At the first stage, like human rights treaties and PTAs, the G7/8 members may or may not comply with their commitments. Their compliance is chiefly dictated by *the logic of appropriateness*, as the G7/8 is one of the least legalized institutions that only provide "normative prescriptions" (Abbot *et al.* 2000). The prevalence of *the logic of appropriateness* in intra-G7/8 governance is in line with the democratic concert model in that the G7/8 members respect the principles of democracy and take 'appropriate' actions accordingly. Further, as the G7/8 members share effectively and increasingly equal capabilities (Kirton 1989), the members should not be able to coerce other members into compliance unless intra-group factions are created against a single member.

Figure 1



Yet, compliance at the first stage does not tell us everything about the efficacy of G7/8 human rights governance, especially because the target of a human rights commitment is often located outside the G7/8 jurisdictions. Therefore, I must also look at the second stage, at which members take action *towards* targets, that is, non-G7/8 countries and regions. Because the targets tend to have much less capabilities than the G7/8 as a whole, *coercive* mechanisms – *the logic of consequences* – may

apply to the relationship between the two groups of actors.¹ Indeed, scholars have theorized the G7/8 as a democratic concert of the powerful (Kirton and Daniels 1989) as well as a representation of American hegemony (Putnam and Bayne 1987), which suggests that *coercion* is indeed possible. However, the increasing importance of civil society in recent years also reminds us that the G7/8 may choose to work with INGOs in addressing human rights issues. As INGOs rely on their *persuasive* engagement to stop human rights violations, *the logic of appropriateness* should govern state behaviour in such a case. At the second stage, therefore, I expect the governing logic shifts overtime from *the logic of consequences* to *the logic of appropriateness*, as the importance of INGOs' persuasive engagement increases.

4. Research Plan

Accordingly, I will investigate the G7/8 performance at each stage. At the first stage, I will look at the number of words in paragraphs that referred to democratization and human rights in each communiqué (deliberation), the number of human rights commitments in each Summit (direction setting and decision making), and the overall compliance cadence from 1975 to 2008 (delivery). While the first two indicators show the extent to which the G7/8 has paid attention to human rights issues, the compliance cadence, if improving, suggests the development of cooperative norms within the G7/8, given the intra-group relative capability ratio remains more or less constant. To infer the compliance cadence in human rights commitments, I will refer to the G8 Research Group compliance scores in qualitatively similar issue areas – where *the logic of appropriateness* governs state behavior. I will then explore the specific cases in which compliance assessment has been done by the G8 Research Group. As the G7/8 governance on human rights has so far gathered little scrutiny, only three compliance assessments are available: 1996 Lyon, 1997 Denver, and 2012 Camp David.

At the second stage, I will explore the effect of G7/8 human rights governance. It is extremely difficult to measure the extent to which the G7/8 has been effective under the *ceteris paribus* assumption, as many other factors affect human rights conditions in the target countries and regions. To cope with this methodological problem, I will simply refer to the Freedom House scores and observe changes in human rights conditions of the targets from 1973 to 2012.

Finally, I will examine the possible causes of performance. I will focus on the relative institutional capacity of the G7/8 along with the socio-psychological aspects of cooperation within the group. I will also look at the evolution of the international human rights norms and international events such as Rwandan and Bosnian Genocides, which brought 'shocks' to the G7/8 as well as the world at large.

I argue that the G7/8 is a powerful endorser to the existing norms, guided by *the logic of appropriateness* and international shocks. As such, the G7/8 has been an important venue to encourage target states to comply with human rights norms. I find interesting transition overtime as to how the G7/8 members attempt to enforce human rights norms in the target countries and regions. In the 1990s, they have relied on *the logic of consequences* to trigger the behavioural change of the targets. As INGOs play an increasingly important role in human rights politics, they have begun to work with INGOs and resorted to *the logic of appropriateness* to change the behaviour of the targets through persuasive mechanisms.

5. Defining Human Rights

Before I begin my analysis, the concept of human rights must be clarified. A human right is defined as "a right that a moral or legal code, such as the UN Universal Charter of Human rights, bestows on all human beings, alive or to be born. [...] human rights are the same as basic rights. These are the rights a person must exercise to survive and help live in her society" (Bunge 2003: 131). Accordingly, in my analysis on G7/8 human rights commitments, I have included ones on the freedom and security of people, even when the term, human rights, was not mentioned. On the other hand, I have excluded commitments on the rights of countries, property rights, economic freedom, and

¹ China and the Soviet Union are notable exceptions.


humanitarian assistance unless they are stated along with human rights. While humanitarianism may seem to be part of broader human rights, it is widely recognized in the literature of human rights politics that humanitarianism and human rights are mutually exclusive concepts: whereas promotion of human rights necessarily involves political position-taking, humanitarianism normally avoids it in order to impartially deliver aid to people under humanitarian crises (Barnett 2008).

II. The First Stage: Internal Dynamics of G7/8 Human Rights Governance

1. References to Democratization and Human Rights


Democratization and human rights are two separate concepts, yet closely related. As such, they have been studied to date in conjunction at the G8 Research Group. Figure 2 indicates the number of words in paragraphs that referred to democratization and human rights. It is important to note that they are different from ‘commitments’; this is to measure how much attention democratization and human rights gathered in the public presentation of discussions at each Summit meeting. The larger the number of words is, the more discussions have been done on this particular subject. As Figure 2 shows, democratization and human rights have been discussed with a generally increasing frequency.

Figure 2



(Shaw 2010)

Figure 3




(Shaw 2010)

Figure 3 shows the ratio of the number of paragraphs that referred to democratization and human rights against the total number of paragraphs in the communiqués. In contrast to Figure 2, which demonstrated the G7/8's attention to democratization and human rights in *absolute* terms, Figure 3 illuminates their *relative* importance to other issue areas. As both graphs indicate, democratization and human rights have been increasingly important for the G7/8 in both absolute and relative terms.

2. Human Rights Commitments

As attention to democratization and human rights increases, the number of human rights commitments should also increase. Figure 4 indicates that this prediction is largely accurate. The correlation between human rights commitments and words on DHR in 1975-2009 is 0.711. The criteria that I have employed to filter human rights commitments have been explained at the end of the previous section; they differ from Shaw (2010) in that I have focused exclusively on human rights, not on democratization. The number of human rights commitments is in fact small, though there is generally an increasing trend. The complete list of commitments is in the Appendix.

Figure 4




3. Compliance: Overall Trend

In the previous two subsections, we have looked at upward trends in the number of references to democratization and human rights as well as the number of commitments on human rights. These trends suggest that the G7/8 is, at least, increasingly aware of and acting on international human rights discourses. However, if the G7/8 members do not comply with the commitments, G7/8 governance on human rights is, after all, ineffective. In other words, it is possible for human rights commitments to simply be 'lip service' to their constituencies who expect the G7/8 to do something about ongoing human rights violations. Such 'lip service' would frequently occur if we assumed *the logic of consequences* to be dictating the behaviour of the G7/8 members. Li (2001), for example, argues that G7 compliance on economic commitments results from a game-theoretic *shadow of the future*. As the members can retaliate against those who seek to free-ride, they tend to honour economic commitments (Kokotsis 1999). In human rights commitments, however, what kind of benefits would free-riders gain? There is almost no benefit because such commitments are often aimed at non-G7/8 countries and regions, in which any progress of human rights conditions does not necessarily benefit the G7/8 members. Their compliance is therefore based on *the logic of appropriateness*: it is normative obligations for the members of a democratic concert to take action to uphold the international human rights norms.

If the G7/8 is truly willing to include human rights commitments in the communiqués, I should expect high compliance rates in these commitments. Yet, the G7/8 leaders might be doing so, simply because they are aware of their own prestige as democratic leaders of the world. In this scenario, the G7/8 does not necessarily comply with its commitments because showing the “effort” may be enough to maintain the prestige. After all, the best approach is to look at each commitment and see if it is complied. However, such process tracing would require a tremendous amount of (wo)manpower, as only three compliance assessments have been done on human rights commitments so far. As an alternative approach, I will examine the overall compliance score of each Summit. Figure 5 indicates the G7/8 compliance cadence from 1975 to 2008. The compliance assessment gives each member the score of -1, 0, or 1 for every commitment assessed. The average score of all members then becomes the commitment’s compliance score. Finally, the average of all commitments assessed indicates the overall compliance score of the Summit. While no upward trend in compliance is confirmed in the first decade (Von Furstenberg and Daniels 1991), the compliance scores have been consistently high since 1992, which coincides with the period when Russia had joined the G7/8 meetings.

Figure 5




(Kirton *et al.* 2010: 289)

4. Compliance: Selected Issue Areas

To see if such a general trend exists in human rights commitments, I will examine recent compliance cadence by issue area. In particular, I will focus on non-economic, non-security issue areas because that is where *the logic of appropriateness* tends to dictate state behaviour. On the contrary, in the economic and security issues, the self-interest of states tends to prevail over normative concerns; *the logic of consequences* thus governs state behaviour. Therefore, I have selected Development, Education, Water, Health, and Cultural Diversity to see whether compliance in such issue areas shows an upward trend. Figure 6 shows the compliance scores on the selected categories from 1996 to 2008. As commitments made and assessed vary every year, the scores of each category are not thoroughly available. Nevertheless, while it is not easy to infer a compliance cadence in human rights issues from this data, there seems to be no obvious upward trend for the specified issue areas. On the other hand, the available scores have been generally positive except for Development in 2004. I therefore expect the compliance cadence in human rights commitments to be similar: generally positive, yet not significantly so.

Figure 6



(Kirton *et al.* 2010: 292-95)

5. Case Study (1996 Lyon)

Next, I will examine the cases on which compliance assessments have been done by the G8 Research Group. In particular, I will look at three compliance assessments on human rights commitments: 1996 Lyon, 1997 Denver, and 2012 Camp David. Figure 7 shows the compliance scores by country and region. As we predicted in the previous subsection, the overall scores are generally positive, yet not significantly so. In the following analysis, I will focus on state actions *vis-à-vis* countries and regions outside the G7/8 to see if *coercion* mechanisms were present.

Figure 7

Year	Canada	France	Germany	Italy	Japan	Russia	UK	USA	EU	Ave.
1996	1	1	1	N/A	0	N/A	0.5 ²	0.5 ³	N/A	67%
1997	-1	-1	1	-1	0	N/A	1	1	N/A	0%
2012	1	-1	1	-1	-1	-1	1	1	1	11%

(G8 Research Group)

In the 1996 Lyon Summit, the G7 had responded to international human rights discourses and the 1995 Beijing Conference in particular. As the Conference was mainly about the affirmation of the rights of women and children, the commitment in question emphasized gender equality as well as children’s rights. Canada had fully complied with the commitment by providing support in developing countries via the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). In January 1997, Canada provided CD\$ 1.8 million to the Indian Human Rights Commission to support human rights education programs in India. On 26 March 1997, the CIDA announced a four-year project in China with the budget of CD\$ 6 million to protect the health and welfare of pregnant women and infant children. On 23 April 1997, Foreign Minister Axworthy established a governmental fund to support Canadian private sector initiatives up to CD\$ 200,000 in combating international child labour issues. Canada also provided non-monetary support to its targets. It pledged to support the process of refugee reintegration in Rwanda through the CIDA, and Canadian officials held bilateral talks with

² The evaluation was divided into two categories: general and children’s rights. This is the average of the two scores.

³ The evaluation was divided into two categories: women’s rights and children’s rights. This is the average of the two scores.

Eduardo Stein, Foreign Minister of Guatemala, to assist the country's peaceful transition to open society.

The United Kingdom had partially complied with the commitment, providing considerable financial assistance to the Yugoslav Tribunal. To cope with sex tourism, the United Kingdom strengthened bilateral police cooperation with the Philippines. The United States too had partially complied by enacting a bill that allowed the government to monitor and sanction foreign-based US companies that abuses child labour. While France and Germany had fully complied with its commitment, their actions were mostly domestically oriented. Germany, for instance, spent DEM 100,000 to cope with the domestic child abuse problems. Japan received the partial compliance score, but the details are not available at the G8 Research Group. Italy has never been assessed for this commitment.

Overall, the G7 had demonstrated strong performance. While some members focused on domestic human rights issues, others used financial resources to promote human rights abroad. The observation of financial assistance by G7 members is particularly important for my analysis because it should have triggered the trade-off between the financial benefit of assistance and the utility of incompliance, *i.e. the logic of consequences*, in the target countries. Also, the Canadian effort in Guatemala has provided an interesting case. While its action was not directly finance-related, Canada explicitly pressured the Guatemalan government to complete the peaceful transition by holding bilateral talks. Such 'engagement' should have brought *coercive* effect when the power disparity between the G7 and the non-G7 countries was large enough.

6. Case Study (1997 Denver)

In the 1997 Denver Summit, the G7 members made a commitment to support democratic governance and human rights in African countries. However, as the commitment was placed in the context of developmental assistance, its implications for human rights are not straightforward. In particular, the efficacy of official development assistance (ODA) is a much-contested issue. While human rights conditions seem to affect ODA providers' decision making (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985), its effect has been challenged and perhaps been detrimental (Moyo 2009). Theoretically speaking, however, ODA provides monetary incentives for the receivers to comply with its conditionality. I will therefore expect that *the logic of consequences* applies to African countries.

Canada had received the non-compliance score, as it reduced the International Assistance Envelope (IAE), the primary funding source for Canada's foreign aid, to Africa by CD\$ 70 million, while the Canadian government justified its reduction of the IAE as a result of increased efficacy in its aid delivery. France and Italy had received non-compliance scores for similar reasons. France, which had been one of the largest donors to African countries, reduced the proportion of its total ODA for Africa from 49% to 44%. Likewise, Italy reduced its ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa by US\$ 40 million. Japan had received a partial compliance score; along with the UN and the World Bank, Japan co-hosted a two-day developmental conference in Tokyo, inviting representatives from 47 African countries, 14 donor countries, six international and regional donor organizations, and 11 non-donor Asian countries to discuss Sub-Saharan development. On the other hand, it reduced its ODA to Africa by 10% in order to constrain its fiscal deficit.

The United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany had received full compliance scores. The United States increased the budget for African developmental assistance by US\$ 30 million for the fiscal year of 1999. Germany too experienced an increase in ODA to Africa in 1997. The United Kingdom took a step further, establishing the Department for International Development. The United Kingdom launched an aid program in South Africa, which amounted to UK£ 22 million in 1997. The DFID also contributed UK£ 10.5 million to Uganda for debt relief.

While some members reduced their aid to Africa, all members allocated a substantial budget for developmental assistance to African countries. Such financial assistance should have triggered behavioural change in African countries based on *the logic of consequences*. However, it is possible that even if the leaders of target countries were willing to conform to the human rights norms, because of

the lack of enforcement capacity, human rights record may have remained poor (Ropp and Risse 2013).

7. Case Study (2012 Camp David)

In the 2012 Camp David Summit, the G8 members were concerned about the situation in the Middle East, including violence resulting from the Arab Spring and Iran's nuclear enrichment program. Reflecting on political upheavals and subsequent violent religious conflicts in the region, the G8 had promised to promote the freedom of religion, particularly of women.

Canada had received the full compliance score, as it established a new office to support religious freedom overseas, the Office of Religious Freedom (ORF) under the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade. The ORF, with the budget of CD\$ 5 million, financed projects operated in foreign countries where religious intolerance and persecution were present. The United States too complied with the commitment through its own agencies: the Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) and the Office of International Religious Freedom (OIRF) under the Department of State. The primary role of the USCIRF is to 'name and shame' countries that unjustly restrict the freedom of religion; in 2013, the USCIRF covered 23 countries. The OIRF, on the other hand, covers 195 countries throughout the world and reports on the status of religious freedom in each country. It also provided financial assistance to projects aimed at improving religious freedom. The European Union (EU) allocated EUR 1.1 billion to support projects and organizations promoting human rights and democracy in non-EU countries for the period of 2007-2013. On 19 October 2012, the EU hosted a conference with civil society in accordance with the European Council's resolution on human rights and democracy in June 2012. Germany had financed 96% of the *Konrad-Adenauer Stiftung*, an NGO that advocates human rights and democracy.

On the other hand, France, Italy, Japan, and Russia did not take independent action to advance human rights overseas; their actions remained at the UN or EU levels, which tend to be reproduction of routine behaviour at the international stage. Nevertheless, none of them significantly infringed on the freedom of religion⁴ or openly defied the basic human rights principles. *The logic of appropriateness* therefore seems to be governing their behaviour.

Interestingly, compared to the previous compliance assessments in 1997 and 1998, the G8 members took a quite different approach to improve human rights abroad. In particular, they have focused on assisting and financing human rights NGOs instead of directly financing the government of a target country. Even when state action was involved, as in the case of the OIRF of the United States, the budget was allocated mainly for naming and shaming activities and assisting INGOs.

Then, why did the G8 resort to INGOs? One may argue that the difference in 'types' of human rights may have resulted in different types of human rights commitments: while the rights of women and children are considered 'positive' rights, the freedom of religion is 'negative.' This traditional typology reflects the idea that the government must *take* action to protect the former whereas it must *refrain* from certain action – repression – to improve the latter (Langois 2013). Yet, scholars have recently argued that even to protect 'negative' rights, state action becomes necessary if the country in question does not have a modern constitution or an independent judicial system (*Ibid.*). Thus, what kind of action is best-suited to improve human rights conditions depends on each country's socio-political context.

Rather, cooperation between the G8 members and INGOs is better explained by the increasing importance of civil society in human rights politics. Since 1996, the number of internationally operating (I)NGOs has significantly increased (Turner 2010). Qualitatively, too, INGOs as a whole became an important actor in international relations. In the 2000 Okinawa Summit, the prime minister of Japan hosted NGOs in the pre-summit meetings and provided substantial support for their involvement in the summit process (Hajnal 2002). Increasing cooperation with INGOs implies

⁴ The French ban on facial veils in the public space and Russia's anti-same sex marriage law are possible exceptions.


that *the logic of consequences* may not apply at the second stage as much as before. As INGOs have no coercive capacity, their primary tactic is *persuasive* engagement with human rights perpetrators. *The logic of appropriateness* therefore may have begun to dictate state behaviour at the second stage as well.

III. The Second Stage: the Efficacy of the G8 in Protecting Human Rights

1. Empirical Analysis of the World Regions


As the G7/8 members do not always comply with human rights commitments, we cannot translate the number of the commitments directly into the magnitude of G8 influence in the target countries and regions. Therefore, I will simply refer to the Freedom House scores to observe the trend in human rights conditions of the target countries and regions.

Figure 8



(Freedom House 2014)

The Freedom House evaluates political rights and civil liberties of each country with a 7-point scale; the score 7 indicates the worst level of human rights conditions and 1 the best. To have a single score for each country, I have added the scores of political rights and civil liberties then divided by two. Figure 8 shows the scores in China as well as in the Middle East and North Africa. The left vertical axis indicates the Freedom House score and the right the number of human rights commitment. There is no trend toward better human rights conditions overtime.

Figure 9**Human Rights in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Former Yugoslav region
(1973-2012)**

(Freedom House 2014)

On the contrary, Figure 9 shows that human rights in Sub-Saharan Africa and former Yugoslavia have overtime experienced varying degrees of improvement. Whether the G7/8 has brought a significant impact on the human rights record in these regions is not at all clear. Yet, the global and domestic calls for human rights protection after the two Genocides in Rwanda and Bosnia seems to have entrenched the human rights norms, especially in the Former Yugoslav region. The G7/8 certainly fueled – either willingly or unwillingly – such normative discourses, although the impact of forceful intervention also cannot be ignored. Further, the G7’s support for the Helsinki process seems to have encouraged the democratization of the Former Yugoslav region, as there is a steep decline right before 1990.⁵ Lastly, the peace settlement with Russia for Kosovo at the 1999 G8 foreign ministers meeting seems to have brought significant improvement in human rights conditions in the following years.

IV. Causes of Performance in G7/8 Human Rights Governance

1. Democratic Concert


Since its inception, the G7/8’s *raison d’être* was first and foremost to cope with and act on economic problems. The Library Group, which later evolved into the G8, was formed in 1973 primarily to manage economic situations under the Oil Crisis (Penttilä 2003). To be a member of the G7/8, however, countries had to be not only economically powerful, but also democratically governed (Kirtton 1989). This democratic identity of the G7/8 explains the upward trend of its attention to democratization and human rights (Figure 2 and Figure 3). The principles of democracy and free market were particularly important for the G7 during the Cold War, though the G7 members used the UN rather than the G7 as a forum promote such agenda. As the path dependency theory predicts (*Cf.* Ikenberry 2001: 16 for path dependency), its identity as a democratic concert has been entrenched overtime and continued in the post-Cold War period. Such a group identity in fact did not allow Russia’s immediate entry into the G7 after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and while its full-member status was granted in 2006, it has never been a formal member of the finance ministers meeting.

At the same time, the relative, collective capability of the G7/8 has declined. Figure 10, the ratio of the G8 and the G20 to global GDP from 1999 to 2010, suggests that the G7/8 is increasingly

⁵ The Former Yugoslav region is not Eastern Europe *per se*, but the trend of thier scores is quite similar.

ineffective in managing global economic crises. Indeed, many have argued that the G20 should supplant the G8 for better global economic governance (Bradford and Linn 2004, Penttilä 2009). As a result, democratic aspects of the G8 have become ever more important. The increasing attention to human rights issues within the G7/8 (Figure 4) may have resulted from this division of labour between the two Gs.

Figure 10



(Kirton 2013: 456)

Lastly, the socio-psychological aspects of the group should have contributed to the overall compliance cadence. Since 1999, the overall compliance scores have been constantly above 0.4 or 70% (Figure 5). Although the G7 started with no institutional legitimacy conferred from international organizations or the UN, the G7/8 overtime gained intersubjective authority through repeated cooperation. As Wendt (1994) argues, repeated acts of cooperation translate into ‘we-ness’ and help the group reproduce cooperation.

2. Growing International Norms

Another cause of the increasing attention to human rights is linked to the evolution of the international human rights norms. While Figure 4 does not indicate how well these human rights commitments were complied, it shows that the leaders of the G7/8 are, at least, aware of international normative discourses. In fact, significant progress in codification of human rights norms had been made before the G7 first featured human rights issues in 1981. Particularly, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESC) – what is commonly referred as the International Bill of Human Rights together with the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights – came into force in 1976. Since then, many international and regional human rights treaties went into effect such as the American Convention on Human Rights (1978), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1981), and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1987) to name a few (*Cf.* Human Rights Library at the University of Minnesota for more human rights treaties).

The G7/8 supports such human rights normative discourses because it believes doing so appropriate for the group of democratic powers. Yet, whether the G7/8 can produce as much momentum as the UN in promoting human rights is highly questionable. Partly because the G7/8 is an exclusive club and partly because the G7/8 has no bureaucratic institutions, the G7/8 lacks authority and legitimacy to tell other states what is right and what is wrong. As a result, the G7/8 can only endorse human rights norms that have already been established and codified at the UN. While the G8 was successful in intervening the Kosovo War, it was not under the name of ‘responsibility to

protect (R2P)' per se, but more or less a conventional intervention. The idea of R2P was framed in Canada and established at the UN Security Council via Resolution 1674 on April 28, 2006.

On the other hand, the UN alone cannot protect human rights at the global level. Perhaps it is too naïve to say that the UN is failing to protect human rights, but without the support of other international actors such as the G7/8, the IMF, and the World Bank, the implementations of the codified human rights norms is extremely difficult. It is important to note that the G7/8's endorsement on the human rights norms is essential to effectively promote human rights at the UN level.

3. International Shocks

A series of international events had also contributed the upward trend in human rights commitments (Figure 4). The first upward fluctuation came right before 1990, the end of the Cold War. Interestingly, the G7 seems to have been well-aware of increasing pressure on communist regimes in Eastern Europe. In 1988, for instance, the G7 explicitly reaffirmed the 1975 Helsinki Accord and encouraged East European countries "to open up their economies and societies, and to improve respect for human rights" (G8 Research Group). The confirmation of human rights principles, stated apart from the context of military threats, was in fact unprecedented at the time.

The next fluctuation came in 1995-97, right after the Rwandan and Bosnian Genocides in 1994 and 1995 respectively. In 1997, the G7 explicitly states, "The authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina must uphold fully the right of refugees and displaced persons [...]." Furthermore, the commitment continues, "Those who fail to do so will lose access to economic assistance." Here, the G7 clearly intends to *coerce* the officials of Bosnia and Herzegovina to conform to international human rights norms through sanctions. The target country, Bosnia and Herzegovina, is no longer expected to behave based on *the logic of appropriateness*, as it faces the threat of economic sanction upon incompliance. Rather, its compliance hinges on the trade-off between the officials' collective utility resulting from noncompliance and the utility of economic assistance, that is, how *the logic of consequences* operates.

The last, largest jump occurred in 2011, the following year of the Arab Spring. As the Internet played a crucial role in organizing anti-government demonstrations (MacKinnon 2012), the Internet freedom alone was affirmed three times in total in relation to human rights. At the same Summit, the G8 declared the Deauville Partnership to assist democratic transitions in North Africa.

The Tiananmen Massacre and the Iraq War do not seem to be salient in terms of human rights commitments, given that the number of commitment was not significantly high in 1990 and 2004 compared to surrounding years. However, the references to democratization and human rights show outstanding numbers in both 1990 and 2004. This trend suggests that the Tiananmen Massacre and the Iraq War were seen to be the issue of democratization rather than human rights within the G7/8. Or, human rights deliberation did not extend to human rights decision making for the G7/8 feared relatively powerful targets, namely China and the United States.

4. Other Factors

Additionally, I have looked at whether host countries correlate with the number of human rights commitments or references, but I did not find any such linkage between them. Further, as human rights issues are often contested in the realm of jurisprudence, one might expect that the number of human rights commitments would increase when the G7/8 convened a justice ministers meeting. Since 2001, the G7/8 has been holding justice and interior ministers meetings every year, except for 2010. However, such a trend cannot be confirmed from the observation of commitments as well as references.

V. Conclusion

1. Summary of Findings

First of all, I have shown increasing attention paid to democratization and human rights in Figures 2 and 3. I have also coded the number of human rights commitments and illustrated an upward trend in Figure 4. Yet, the increase of human rights commitments does not tell us about whether the G7/8 is effective in protecting human rights globally. I have used the two-stage model of the G7/8 governance on human rights, inspired by both human rights and G7/8 literatures (Figure 1). At the first stage, *the logic of appropriateness* governs the behaviour of the G7/8, largely because improvement in human rights conditions of non-G7/8 countries does not necessarily benefit the G7/8. The G7/8 produces human rights commitments out of normative obligations and self-esteem as a democratic concert. On the other hand, when G7/8 members comply with the commitments, they have *coercive* capacity to enforce human rights norms in the target countries and regions. At the second stage, with the power disparity and financial incentives provided by G7/8 members, *the logic of consequences* tends to dictate the behaviour of the targets. In extreme scenarios, the G7/8 has mobilized international forces as seen through the case of Yugoslavia (Kulik 2014). However, the growing importance of civil society in international relations may have lessened the need for the direct involvement of the G7/8. Instead of resorting to coercion or providing incentives, G8 members may have chosen to work with NGOs to protect human rights, although commitments do not specify to work with them. Therefore, I have expected that *logic of appropriateness* would gradually overtake *the logic of consequences* at the second stage.

Accordingly, I have explored the performance of the G7/8 in human rights governance. My model was proved to be generally correct. In the long term, the G7/8 has paid increasing attention to human rights and has improved the compliance rate. Yet, the overall compliance cadence cannot be directly translated into the compliance on human rights commitment, as *the logic of consequences* governs in certain issue areas such as economy and security. I have then looked at the compliance scores of Development, Education, Water, Health, and Cultural Diversity. Such issue areas are comparable to human rights, as *the logic of appropriateness* tends to determine state behaviour. I have found that the G8 compliance in these issue areas is positive yet not significantly so. Therefore, I have expected the compliance cadence in human rights commitments to be similar.

I have also examined specific cases of which the G7/8 made human rights commitments: 1996 Lyon, 1997 Denver, and 2012 Camp David. The G7/8 was certainly responsive to global normative discourses; for instance, it endorsed the Beijing Conference in the 1996 Lyon Summit. Interestingly, while the G7 actively provided financial incentives to the target countries and regions in 1996-1998, the G8 tended to work with INGOs in 2012-13. Therefore, *the logic of appropriateness* is increasingly important at the second stage as well.

Then, I have examined how human rights conditions in the target countries and regions have changed overtime. In China as well as the Middle East and North Africa, there was no trend toward better human rights conditions. On the other hand, human rights conditions improved in Sub-Saharan Africa and the Former Yugoslav region. While it is unclear how much impact the G7/8 has brought on these regions, the G8 had indeed supported normative discourses for human rights protection.

Finally, I have examined the causes of performance. The democratic aspects of the G8 have become ever more important, as the G20 garners increasing expectation about global economic governance and the relative capability of the G8 declines. As a result, I have argued, the identity of the G7/8 as a democratic concert has been entrenched; therefore, it gradually increased the number of human rights commitments at each Summit. Also, international human rights norms have begun to grow rather rapidly since the 1970s. The codification of the ICCPR and the ICESCR are, for instance, representation of such normative progress. The G7/8, recognizing itself as a prestigious forum, needed to conform to such normative discourses. Lastly, international events have pushed the G7/8 to include human rights commitments on certain issues. The G7/8 was, at least, responsive to

growing pressure of democratization in East Europe, Rwandan and Bosnian genocides, and the Arab Spring.

2. Policy Implications

The efficacy of the G7/8 in global human rights governance hinges on how much of the international human rights norms the G7/8 can support through and in the annual Summit. Given the increasing trend toward normative engagement at *both* stages of the G7/8 governance on human rights, it is important for the G7/8 members to be well-aware of international human rights discourses. The G7/8 has been inclusive about civil society in its decision-making processes compared to the G20. Such inclusiveness should be maintained in order to effectively respond to and keep up with the progress of the global norms.

At the same time, the G8 needs to be careful about the ways in which the members cooperate with INGOs. While some large INGOs can and in fact do limit the funding from governmental actors to maintain its political neutrality, others struggle to find funding sources. In such circumstances, governmental funding may trigger fierce competition among INGOs (Cooley and Ron 2002). As a result, INGOs may end up more or less reflecting the government's perspective. This is perhaps good for the government, but not necessarily for global human rights protection. To prevent interfering with the principles of INGOs, existing and forthcoming financial assistance programs in the G7/8 countries should respect the autonomy of INGOs. In particular, financial assistance should be provided with a long-term basis instead of a yearly or quarter basis.

Lastly, G7/8 members should embark on the intra-group *persuasion*. Among the G8, Russia has been constantly criticized for its human rights record. The United States and Japan are the only countries in the G7/8 that still practice the death penalty. France too has been criticized for its ban on facial veils in the public space. Members with relatively strong human rights record such as Germany, Canada, and the United Kingdom should take an active role to implement a 'peer review' process within the G7/8. For the G7/8 to be *persuasive* to the rest of the world, the G8 itself needs to stay at the forefront of international human rights norms.

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Appendix: G7/8 human rights commitments, 1975-2012 (N=65)

1. 1981-35. Emphasizing that all countries are threatened by acts of terrorism in disregard of fundamental human rights, they resolve to strengthen and broaden action within the international community to prevent and punish such acts.
2. 1983-34. As leaders of our seven countries, it is our first duty to defend the freedom and justice on which our democracies are based. To this end, we shall maintain sufficient military strength to deter any attack, to counter any threat, and to ensure the peace. Our arms will never be used except in response to aggression.
3. 1987-35. Within existing alliances, each of us is resolved to maintain a strong and credible defense which threatens the security of no one, protects freedom, deters aggression and maintains peace.
4. 1987-39. Thus, we each seek to stabilize military competition between East and West at lower levels of arms; to encourage stable political solutions to regional conflicts; to secure lasting improvements in human rights; and to build contacts, confidence and trust between governments and peoples in a more humane world.
5. 1988-20. We pay special attention to the countries in Eastern Europe. We encourage them to open up their economies and societies, and to improve respect for human rights. In this context we support the continuation and strengthening of the Helsinki process.
6. 1989-50. We reaffirm our commitment to freedom, democratic principles and human rights.
7. 1989-51. We reaffirm our belief in the rule of law which respects and protects without fear or favor the rights and liberties of every citizen, and provides the setting in which the human spirit can develop in freedom and diversity.
8. 1989-52. Human rights are a matter of legitimate international concern. We commit ourselves again to encouraging and promoting universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
9. 1990-58. We acknowledge some of the recent developments in China, but believe that the prospects for closer cooperation will be enhanced by renewed political and economic reform, particularly in the field of human rights. We agree to maintain the measures put into place at last year's Summit, as modified over the course of this year.
10. 1990-63. assist in the drafting of laws, including bills of rights and civil, criminal, and economic framework laws;
11. 1991-40. It is for the peoples of Yugoslavia themselves to decide upon their future. We will do whatever we can, with others in the international community, to encourage and support the process of dialogue and negotiation in accordance with the principles enshrined in the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter for a new Europe, in particular respect for human rights, including rights of minorities and the right of peoples to self-determination in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of states. The normalisation of the present situation will allow us to contribute to the indispensable economic recovery of the country.
12. 1994-2. What framework of institutions will be required to meet these challenges in the 21st century? How can we adapt existing institutions and build new institutions to ensure the future prosperity and security of our people?

13. 1995-26. the UN Secretary-General to explore means to improve the analysis and utilization of disaster and conflict-related early warning information, particularly through the High Commissioners on Human Rights and Refugees;
14. 1995-60. We reaffirm our commitment to the UN, whose Charter lays down the fundamental principles for an international order based on peace and security, sustainable development, and respect for human rights.
15. 1995-69. We will work to promote good governance and democratic accountability, which are the surest guarantees of respect for universal human rights and fundamental freedoms.
16. 1995-70. We reaffirm our support for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights and his coordinating role on human rights throughout the UN system.
17. 1996-71. We reaffirm our support for the High Commissioner for Human Rights as coordinator of human rights within the United Nations system and commend his contribution in the fields of early warning, conflict prevention and peacebuilding.
18. 1996-72. We will take care to ensure that women as well as men benefit fully and equally from the recognition of human rights and fundamental freedoms, which were reiterated on the occasion of the Beijing Conference, and that the rights of children be respected.
19. 1996-73. We support fully the efforts of the International Tribunals aimed at the prosecution and trial of persons indicted for serious violations of human rights in the Former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda and commit ourselves to making available to the Tribunals adequate resources for the fulfillment of their mandates.
20. 1996-74. All over the world, we actively support the process of democratization, which is an essential guarantee of respect for human rights. We will provide assistance in the organization of free and impartial elections and in strengthening democratic institutions and standards.
21. 1997-6. We discussed the progress that has been made since the 1992 Rio Earth Summit in defining and promoting sustainable development, and we commit ourselves to taking action in areas critical to advancing this agenda. Sustainable development demands the full integration of environment, economic and social policies; should be based upon democratic governance and respect for human rights; and should have poverty eradication as one of its ultimate objectives.
22. 1997-55. We will work with African countries to ensure adequate and well-targeted assistance for those countries which have the greatest need and carry out the necessary broad-based reforms. This assistance will include support for democratic governance, respect for human rights, sound public administration, efficient legal and judicial systems, infrastructure development, rural development, food security, environmental protection and human resource development, including health and education of their people.
23. 1997-61. We will continue to give full support to the International Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and work to ensure that the international community and States concerned bring to justice through due process persons responsible for violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.
24. 1997-144. The authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina must uphold fully the right of refugees and displaced persons to return to their homes in a peaceful and orderly manner. We will support those communities that work cooperatively to support returns. Those who fail to do so will lose access to economic assistance.
25. 1999-23. We will continue to provide substantial support and assistance to developing and transition economies in support of their own efforts to open and diversify their economies, to democratize and improve governance, and to protect human rights.

26. 1999-46. The G8 warmly welcomes Nigeria's return to civilian rule and democracy. The G8 will assist positive change in Nigeria by continued support for democracy and human rights, good governance, transparency and accountability and the reduction of poverty.
27. 2002-52. Supporting human rights activities and national, regional and sub-regional human rights institutions in Africa;
28. 2002-53. Supporting African efforts to implement human rights obligations undertaken by African governments; and,
29. 2002-54. Supporting African efforts to promote reconciliation and to ensure accountability for violations of human rights and humanitarian law, including genocide, crimes against humanity and other war crimes.
30. 2002-134. Supporting the main-streaming of gender issues into all agricultural and related policy together with targeted measures to ensure the rights of women for equal access to technology, technical support, land rights and credits;
31. 2004-1. We commit ourselves today to a Partnership for Progress and a Common Future with the governments and peoples of the Broader Middle East and North Africa. This partnership will be based on genuine cooperation with the region's governments, as well as business and civil society representatives to strengthen freedom, democracy, and prosperity for all.
32. 2004-12. Developing a common doctrine and common operational standards for employing carabinieri/gendarme-like forces in peace support operations, specifically with regard to crowd control, combating organized crime, high risk arrests, prison security, protection of sensitive facilities, election security, VIP security and border control;
33. 2004-14. Interacting with academic and research institutions in related areas, such as humanitarian law, human rights, criminal law, prison management, and civil-military cooperation.
34. 2006-273: ensuring and promoting respect for international law, including international human rights law, refugee law and humanitarian law in all our counter-terrorism efforts
35. 2006-276: We reiterate our continued resolve to work together to reduce the terrorist threat while protecting fundamental rights and liberties that we have struggled so long to establish.
36. 2007-106: [It is important that all stakeholders be involved in a process to build consensus around a set of recognised principles and guidelines in the mining sector. In order to encourage such a consensus among key stakeholders we] will support the work of the UN Special Representative of the Secretary General for Business and Human Rights.
37. 2007-164: Promoting good governance: In implementing development assistance we are committed to promoting universal values of: Respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms, peace, democracy, good governance, gender equality, the rule of law, solidarity and justice as well as sustainable management of natural resources.
38. 2007-235: The G8 will emphasize the importance of programs to promote and protect human rights of women and girls as well as the prevention of sexual violence and coercion especially in the context of preventing HIV/AIDS infections.
39. 2007-299: We remain resolute in our shared commitment to counter terrorism while promoting freedom, democracy, human rights, and economic growth and opportunity.
40. 2007-325: We reaffirm that the promotion and protection of human rights for all and the rule of law is essential to all counterterrorism efforts, and we recognize that effective counter-terrorism measures and the protection of human rights are not conflicting goals, but complementary and mutually reinforcing.

41. 2008-103: We will also work to improve human security through protection and empowerment of individuals and communities.
42. 2008-191: We reaffirm our commitment to preventing and combating transnational organized crime using all means at our disposal, while ensuring the rule of law and respect for human rights.
43. 2008-199: We will also maximize our efforts to ensure the security of civilians.
44. 2008-237: Today in Hokkaido Toyako, we reaffirm our commitment to countering terrorism with every means at our disposal, while ensuring the rule of law and respect for human rights and international law.
45. 2008-250: We recommend the appointment of a special envoy of the UN Secretary-General to report on the political, humanitarian, human rights and security situation and to support regional efforts to take forward mediation between political parties. We will take further steps, inter alia introducing financial and other measures against those individuals responsible for violence.
46. 2009-30: We commit to promote employment and social protection on a global level and the observance of internationally recognised labour rights as reflected in the ILO declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights and its follow-up.
47. 2009-154: We commit to counter any form of stigma, discrimination and human rights violation and to promote the rights of persons with disabilities and the elimination of travel restrictions on people living with HIV/AIDS.
48. 2009-190: We are committed to further support the Pakistani government in its endeavours to strengthen its democratic institutions, human rights and civil society and we urge the government to further combat corruption and to protect and promote the human rights of all persons.
49. 2010-8: Action is required on all factors that affect the health of women and children. This includes addressing gender inequality, ensuring women's and children's rights and improving education for women and girls.
50. 2010-16: We commit to promote integration of HIV and sexual and reproductive health, rights and services within the broader context of strengthening health systems. (health)
51. 2010-61: We deplore the upsurge in hostage-takings perpetrated by terrorists, as such abductions are repugnant to our fundamental notions of freedom, and we commit to work together to prevent their proliferation and bring those responsible to justice. (terrorism)
52. 2011-2: [we renewed our commitment] to respond to the aspirations for freedom, including freedom of religion, and empowerment, particularly for women and youth.
53. 2011-19: We commit to encourage the use of the Internet as a tool to advance human rights and democratic participation throughout the world. (information and communication)
54. 2011-23: [We will work towards developing an environment in which children can safely use the Internet by] encouraging adequate parental controls consistent with the freedom of expression. (information and communication)
55. 2011-59: We will continue to support developing countries to work towards achieving and sustaining the MDGs by 2015 and encourage all stakeholders to do the same, focusing on the protection and empowerment of individuals and communities to improve human security.
56. 2011-122: We will help the countries of the region to create the political space for democracy and freedom to flourish. (good governance)

57. 2011-130: We commit to give further support to the promotion of freedom of expression, including the critical role of media in contributing to the democratization of societies. (human rights)
58. 2011-131: [We commit to give further support to the promotion of freedom of expression, including the critical role of] the Internet [in contributing to the democratization of societies]. (human rights)
59. 2011-132: We also commit to supporting the right to practice religious faith in safety and security, without fear of violence and repression. (human rights)
60. 2011-139: To reach our objectives, we are determined to further promote together shared values, notably peace and human rights, democratic governance and sustainable development. (development)
61. 2011-142: [We commit] to support international efforts for the establishment of a peaceful and secure environment [in Somalia] in which human rights and democratic institutions can develop at all levels. (good governance)
62. 2012-49. We will also continue to support the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in its efforts to meet its obligation to protect and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms, including in the rights of women and girls and the freedom to practice religion. (Human Rights)
63. 2012-66. We reaffirm our commitment to advance human rights of and opportunities for women, leading to more development, poverty reduction, conflict prevention and resolution, and improved maternal health and reduced child mortality. (human rights)
64. 2012-67. We also commit to supporting the right of all people, including women, to freedom of religion in safety and security. (human rights)
65. 2012-68. We recognize the need to secure lasting and irreversible reform, and pledge our support to existing initiatives, particularly those which focus on peace in ethnic area, national reconciliation, and entrenching democracy. (human rights)