Summits > Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit
Nuclear Material Accounting and Control and Physical Protection
Background Document, 20 April 1996
At the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit, the importance of IAEA safeguards and of
effective nuclear material accounting and control and physical protection in ensuring the security
of nuclear material and preventing its diversion was reaffirmed. This constitutes a useful
contribution to advancing the nuclear non-proliferation agenda. The work already accomplished
in the area of improving nuclear material accounting and control and physical protection was
stressed, further effort and cooperation where required were encouraged, and certain principles
for nuclear material accounting and control and physical protection and their relation to global
nuclear non-proliferation objectives reaffirmed.
The Summit reached a common understanding on the following:
- reaffirmation of support for the IAEA safeguards regime, which plays a critical role in
providing assurance against the diversion of nuclear material going undetected, for an increased
capacity to detect undeclared nuclear activities, and for appropriately strengthening the regime
where required;
- recognition of the importance of effective nuclear material accounting and control and physical
protection, of the fundamental responsibility of nations to ensure the security of all nuclear
material in their possession and, to this end, of the necessity for effective national — including,
where appropriate for this purpose, EURATOM — systems of nuclear material accounting and
control and physical protection, including regulations, licensing, inspection, and state systems of
accounting and control;
- the need for adherence to clearly established standards and recommendations for nuclear
material accounting and control and physical protection and for nations to ensure the
effectiveness of national and facility-level accounting and control and physical protection
procedures in relation to these standards and recommendations.
- urgent ratification by all States of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material.
To date, only 52 States and the European Community have ratified the Convention. To
make the instrument truly effective, universal adherence is necessary;
- encouragement to State Parties to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear
Material to ensure that Convention Points of Contact are able to provide information promptly,
and that response plans are prepared for incidents of loss or recovery of nuclear material;
- reaffirmationon of support for a strengthened and cost-effective safeguards
system through the IAEA's Program 93 plus 2 and recognition of the need to implement
comprehensive safeguards agreements designed to provide credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear materials from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared activities
in accordance with obligations contained in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
- encouragement for the application of the IAEA recommendations on the
Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.
These recommendations provide useful guidance on measures for the physical protection
of nuclear material in use, transit, and storage. The application of these
recommendations, adapted as appropriate to national circumstances, would ensure a
consistent and high level of security for both nuclear facilities and nuclear materials;
- encouragement to all States to apply the recommendations concerning physical protection
in the Nuclear Suppliers Guidelines (Infcirc 254/Rev. 2/Part II Annex C);
- support for the efforts to ensure that all sensitive nuclear material (separated plutonium
and highly enriched uranium) designated as no longer required for defence purposes is safely and
effectively stored and protected and placed under IAEA safeguards (in the Nuclear Weapon
States, under the relevant voluntary offer IAEA safeguards agreements) as soon as it is
practicable to do so;
- encouragement to additional international cooperation to help ensure effective
material accounting and control and physical protection of all nuclear material including:
- international seminars to share appropriate expertise and foster technical contact;
- bilateral exchanges involving expert collaboration in the development of
systems of nuclear material accounting and control and physical protection for
nuclear facilities;
- training, when requested, to assist countries to improve their procedures and
expertise;
- exchanges of information to maximize the effectiveness of technical assistance
and other collaborative programs to avoid needless duplication of effort.
It welcomed the work that has already been accomplished in this field by the IAEA, through
bilateral assistance projects, and by the International Science and Technology Centres (ISTC) in
Moscow and Kiev.
Source: Released at the Moscow Nuclear Safety and Security Summit, April 20, 1996.
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