Report on the G8 Global Partnership

1. The Global Partnership against the spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction, set up in Kananaskis in 2002 with a total financial commitment of up to 20 billion dollars over 10 years, has become a large-scale initiative for the enhancement of international security and stability. The Global Partnership has evolved and consolidated over subsequent years on the basis of the principles and guidelines set out at Kananaskis, and subsequent GP documents. It has undertaken complex and challenging projects, initially in Russia and as of 2004 also in Ukraine, whose impact has been significant. Nevertheless, further progress is needed to complete turning initial pledges into projects and activities.

We agreed in 2008 that the Global Partnership would address worldwide risks of spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction through implementing projects according to the GP common principles. The G8 and other GP countries also agreed in 2008 on the need to expand the activities of the Partnership beyond Russia and Ukraine through the inclusion, on a case-by-case basis, of new participants accepting the GP principles and guidelines.

2. Activities are in progress in the areas identified in Kananaskis as key priorities: “the destruction of chemical weapons, the dismantlement of decommissioned nuclear submarines, the disposition of fissile materials and the employment of former weapons scientists”. Efforts are also being made in other areas of cooperation, including physical protection of nuclear materials, in accordance with the Kananaskis principles.

3. We have continued to address the progress of projects in Russia and Ukraine, concentrating on the destruction of chemical weapons and dismantling of nuclear submarines, the two programmes which Russia considers to be of primary importance.
We reaffirm our commitments to completing priority projects in Russia and Ukraine.

4. We are addressing issues regarding the geographical expansion of the Global Partnership, the participation of new donor countries and the expansion of the initiative’s scope into other priority areas as envisaged in Kananaskis. To that end, specific attention has been placed this year on human resources and, in particular, on scientists engagement for which recommendations have been developed.

Chemical Weapons Destruction

5. International assistance in the construction of chemical weapons destruction facilities was recognized at Kananaskis as a key requirement to help Russia eliminate its stockpiles of chemical weapons, pursuant to its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Substantial progress has been made since 2002 through funding primarily from Russia and also from other GP members.

6. Chemical weapons destruction has been completed both at the Gorny facility, built with assistance from the EU, Finland, Germany and the Netherlands, and at the Kambarka facility, built with assistance from the EU, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and Switzerland. Two other facilities have been built and are currently operational, the facilities at Maradykovsky and Leonidovka, funded for the most part by Russia, with the assistance of Switzerland for the construction of electrical power supply lines. Destruction work is under way at both facilities.

7. Three additional facilities are under construction: the facility at Shchuchye, with assistance from Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, the EU, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, the UK and the US; the facility at Pochep, with assistance from Germany and Switzerland; and the facility at Kizner, with assistance from Canada. The first destruction line at the Shchuchye facility has been completed and is operational, and the second one is being completed. At Pochep, the construction of the first destruction line is scheduled for completion by the end of 2009.
The Kizner facility is in the initial stage of construction, with completion of its first destruction line scheduled for late 2010. International assistance is especially needed at present when Russia is to construct and make operational the facilities, in particular those in Pochep and Kizner, necessary to complete the destruction of its chemical weapons stockpiles.

8. The total destruction process for all the facilities is scheduled for completion by April 29, 2012.

Dismantling of decommissioned Nuclear Submarines and Related Work

9. Dismantling of decommissioned nuclear submarines withdrawn from the Russian Navy is another priority area identified at Kananaskis. This is a complex activity that includes: their transport to shipyards; the removal of spent nuclear fuel (SNF); their dismantlement; the safe, long-term storage of their reactor compartments; management of the removed SNF, including transportation for reprocessing; the treatment and conditioning of liquid and solid radioactive waste (RW) and the interim storage of conditioned RW.

10. Substantial progress has been made in dismantling decommissioned submarines in various sites both in North West Russia and the Russian Far East. Russia has allocated substantial funding of its own with significant support from Australia, Canada, the EU, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Sweden, the UK and the US. In the North West region, 108 out of 120 submarines withdrawn from Navy service have been dismantled, while the remaining 12 submarines are undergoing or awaiting dismantlement. In the Far East region, where additional work remains to be done, the corresponding figures are 65 out of 78, with 13 submarines remaining.

11. In addition to submarine dismantling, essential complex works are to be carried out in the fields of RW and SNF management, transportation and disposal, along with the creation of related infrastructures and the rehabilitation of former on-shore technical bases.

➢ At Sayda Bay, a long-term storage facility for submarine reactor compartments and other nuclear sections is already partly operational.
The entire facility will be completed by the end of 2009. The second part of the Sayda Bay project, the construction of a processing and storage facility for radioactive waste, is also currently under way. These projects are being carried out with financial support from Germany.

- At **Andreeva Bay**, a solid and liquid RW treatment facility and a temporary storage installation for conditioned waste are planned. A SNF management facility is under construction with a view to SNF transportation to the Atomflot site in Murmansk. Assistance for all these activities is provided by Italy, Norway, Sweden and the UK.
- At the **Gremikha** former naval base, a site rehabilitation program has been launched with French funds. Preparatory work for SNF removal and its transfer to the Atomflot site at the Murmansk plant started in 2008.
- At the **Zvezdochka** shipyard, the upgrading of the nuclear waste incinerator is being completed with funding provided by France.
- The SNF removal from the 090 Heavy Nuclear Cruiser is planned in view of its future dismantling, with the assistance of Italy.
- Construction is under way on a multi-purpose naval vessel for the transport of spent nuclear fuel and conditioned waste, with funding provided by Italy. Shielded containers for SNF and high-level waste transportation are at the design stage.
- At Razboynik Bay, construction has begun on a long-term storage facility for reactor compartments; an arrangement of Japan’s provision of equipment for this facility was signed in May 2009.
- Physical protection and environmental improvements, along with the supply of new equipment at the Nerpa and Zvezdochka shipyards, are in progress with assistance from Canada and Italy.
- Construction of a SNF storage facility has been completed at the Atomflot site in Murmansk with financial support from the UK.

12. The Northern Dimension Environmental Partnership (NDEP) "Nuclear Window", managed by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), is financing a number of multilateral nuclear projects concerning the sites at Andreeva Bay and Gremikha, as well as SNF unloading from the Lepse vessel. A Strategic Master Plan for all nuclear-related activities in the North West of Russia has been prepared under the NDEP “Nuclear Window”, with funding coming from GP members.
Disposition of Fissile Material

13. A Joint Statement concerning a disposition plan for 34 tonnes of surplus plutonium from Russia weapons programme was signed by Russia and the United States in 2007; negotiations on Protocol to 2000 US-Russia Plutonium disposition Agreement are under way. The statement issued on July 6 by the Russian Federation and the United States reaffirms their commitments to execute their agreement for the disposition of plutonium designated as no longer required for defense purposes.

Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials

14. A number of projects are being implemented in Russia to upgrade the physical protection of and accounting for nuclear materials, with the assistance of Canada, the EU, Germany, Italy, Norway, Sweden, the Republic of Korea, the UK, and the US. Improving nuclear security remains a worldwide priority, and the U.S. and Russia continue to work bilaterally to implement and sustain security upgrades.

15. The recovery and disposal of several hundred highly radioactive Radioisotopic Thermoelectric Generators (RTGs) from the Northern Sea Route, the Baltic Sea and in the Far East lighthouses is also in an advanced stage, with the assistance of Canada, Finland, France, Norway and the US.

Other areas of cooperation

16. US-Russia co-operation on the construction of fossil-fuel power plants, with contributions from other countries, will permit the permanent closure of the last remaining Russian reactor that is producing weapons-grade plutonium, in Zheleznogorsk, the other two reactors in Seversk having been successfully shut down in 2008. The US and Russia have partnered to place radiation detection equipment at border crossings to prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear and radiological materials.
Projects in Ukraine

17. A number of projects are under way in Ukraine aimed at strengthening national capabilities to face challenges in the area of nuclear smuggling, nuclear safety and security, and bio-security: three GP projects have been fully completed with support provided by Canada, Sweden and the US; eight projects are fully funded for realization; and potential donors are being consulted on four other projects. Two of these concern the rehabilitation of – and provision of some equipment for – the “Kharkov Institute of Physics and Technology” planned by Japan. Germany will fund projects on Physical Protection of radioactive sources and their handling facility. The US, supported by contributions from Canada, New Zealand and the Republic of Korea, is currently working in Ukraine to equip 76 points of exit/entry with radiation detection systems.

18. In the field of nuclear safety, joint efforts will continue with Ukraine to convert the Chernobyl site to a stable and environmentally safe state. Modernisation activities and safety reviews of Nuclear Power Plants operating in Ukraine are also in progress. The UK is leading on plans for the design and construction of a centralised store for highly radioactive sources within the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone.

Employment of Former Weapons Scientists

19. Under the umbrella of the Global Partnership, projects addressing the human dimension of proliferation have thus far focused on engaging former WMD scientists in the development of sustainable civilian R&D and commercial activities.

The Science and Technology Centres in Moscow and Kiev have played an important role since their inception carrying out scientist-redirection programmes. More than 4000 research projects have been funded through those two centres by Canada, the EU, Japan, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Russia, Sweden, the US, and Switzerland.

Members of the ISTC have recognized the success of the Moscow Centre in accomplishing its initial mission of providing economic support for the scientific community during the transition period. The future of the ISTC and the STCU is currently under review and various options are being discussed. Several donors are engaged in projects outside Russia and Ukraine.
Recommendations for a coordinated approach in the field of Global WMD knowledge proliferation and scientist engagement

20. There is continuous concern that WMD expertise, or any sensitive knowledge in the chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) areas, could become accessible for illicit use. An increasing focus is being placed on engaging scientists around the world and on raising awareness and responsibility among them, so as to prevent their knowledge in legitimate scientific disciplines from being diverted for WMD proliferation and terrorist purposes. The issue of oversight mechanisms to prevent WMD knowledge diversion is being addressed in several countries.

A co-ordinated approach in the field of Global WMD knowledge proliferation and scientist engagement would enhance international collaboration and enable it to take place in an effective and more comprehensive manner.

To that end, recommendations have been prepared by the presidency, discussed and welcomed by the GPWG and are attached to this Report for consideration by partners concerned, with a view to implementing projects outside the G8 countries.

Expansion of Global Partnership

21. The spread of weapons and materials of mass destruction is a global risk. We agreed in 2008 that the Global Partnership would address such risks through implementing projects according to the GP common principles. The projects, listed by GP partners at annex A to this Report, currently carried out by them, confirm that chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons proliferation threats and re-direction of former WMD scientists, need to be addressed in every region of the world.

The G8 and other GP countries also agreed in 2008 on the need to expand the activities of the Partnership beyond Russia and Ukraine through the inclusion, on a case-by-case basis, of new participants accepting the GP principles and guidelines.

22. The GP confirms the goal of geographic expansion. A number of Partners already have projects under way outside Russia and Ukraine, in accordance with the Kananaskis principles. Interested G8
partners are communicating with specific countries, as discussed by the GPWG, to gauge their interest in joining the Global Partnership. The GPWG will coordinate efforts on engagement with potential new participants.

23. It also appears appropriate to identify areas where additional efforts by an expanded GP would be relevant. Chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear issues, including dual-use applications, should be considered from the point of view of global knowledge proliferation prevention. In this respect, scientists engagement and awareness raising could be used as effective risk-reduction tools.

24. At the same time, GP members are determined to meet their commitments to accomplish ongoing projects in Russia, especially in the areas of chemical weapons destruction, nuclear submarines dismantling and related work.

25. The GP welcomes the close cooperation with the IAEA, the OPCW and the BTWC in the exchange of information and expertise. The IAEA Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism have been confirmed as areas where GP Partners might seek to engage.

26. At Heiligendamm, leaders agreed to discuss in due course the future of the GP. Within the competences of the GPWG, we look forward to discussing the best ways of addressing the global WMD related proliferation concerns.

Public Information

27. Appropriate public information activities about the G8 Global Partnership initiative and related projects may promote international efforts to reduce WMD risks. Information on this issue is already available through modern communication technologies, and additional efforts and contributions on a national basis will be continued.