The Harper Years: Global Democratic Leadership
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Introduction
On January 23, 2006, Canadians elected Stephen Harper’s Conservatives with a minority government of 124 seats, compared to 103 for Paul Martin’s Liberals, 51 for the separatist Bloc Québécois, and 29 for the New Democratic Party (NDP). The 46-year-old Torontonian-turned-Albertan was formally sworn in as Canada’s 22nd prime minister on February 6, 2006. He won a second, stronger minority government of 143 seats on October 14, 2008, and a majority government of 166 seats on May 8, 2011, but lost the election on October 19, 2015, to the Liberal’s Justin Trudeau.

The Debate
From the start a debate arose about Stephen Harper’s foreign policy, among eight schools of thought (Kirton 2006, 2007).

The first school pointed immediately, in authentic peripheral dependent (PD) fashion, to restrained Americanism. It saw Harper seeking a cooperative relationship with the U.S. on the Middle East, UN, ballistic missile defence and Canada-U.S. relations limited only by his minority and isolated ideological position in Parliament (McCarthy 2006, Koring 2006, Crosby 2006).

A second, similarly PD school saw ignorant isolationism. It predicted little involvement or influence abroad, due to Harper and his cabinet’s lack of knowledge or interest in international affairs, his party's small foreign affairs platform, and Canadians’ failure to make Harper address foreign policy during the election campaign (Simpson 2006, the Economist 2009).

A third PD school saw global incompetence on Arctic sovereignty, the Group of Eight (G8) summit, Europe, AIDS, a missing foreign policy review, China's human rights and on Guantanamo Bay, all due to Harper's desire to win votes at home (Ibbitson 2006, Martin 2006, Maclean’s 2007, the Economist 2009).

A fourth school, with the liberal internationalist (LI) claim of continuity, saw nothing different even on defence, as Harper sought domestic votes and trusted no one (Granatstein 2007, Simpson 2007).

A fifth, still LI school, saw competent pragmatic compromise. Harper, like John Diefenbaker, came from the opposition and was driven by values,
but compromised once in office, giving Canadian forces in Afghanistan the needed equipment and moral support, reaching the softwood lumber deal with the U.S., and keeping immigration levels high, but failing on climate change in 2006 (Ibbitson 2007).

A sixth, complex neo-realist (CNR) school, gathering force as Harper's first year unfolded, saw principled **decisiveness**, from Harper’s rational policy analysis, minority government constraint, and his concern with the next election (Martin 2006; Campbell 2006; McDougall 2006; *Globe and Mail* 2006, Galloway, 2006; Corcoran, 2006, Coyne 2006, Martin 2006). Adherents highlighted his fast, firm declaration of Canada’s Arctic sovereignty, keeping Canada in the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, visiting Afghanistan, withdrawing funding from Hamas, designating the Tamil Tigers a terrorist group, reaching a softwood lumber deal, supporting Israel, supporting human rights in China and rearming the military.

A seventh school, dominating as the Harper years ended, saw **incomplete change**, driven by the government's dogmatic ideology and electoral strategy, but ultimately constrained by societal and external forces. David Morin and Stephane Roussel (2014), saw a poorly explained, non-participatory change from internationalism to moral clarity, support for the U.S., UK, Israel, the military and the oil industry, and distance from ecology and the UN, due to the government’s ideology and electoral strategy, but no substantive rupture given societal and external constraints. David Carment and Joe Landry (2014) saw a variant of **inconsistent implementation** in some areas, and reversed or changed course in others, endangering Canada’s credibility and effectiveness abroad, due to an increasingly competitive world. In a **late stage reversal and decline** variant, Gerald Schmitz (2014) argued that Harper switched from a prevailing multilateralist LI to a principled foreign policy due to his ideology and partisan electoral calculations, but his early interest in promoting democracy disappeared, making Canada do less abroad.

An eighth school saw **consistent comprehensive change**, due to Harper's dogmatic ideology and electoral position. Peter Stoett and Mark Stefan Kersten (2014) concluded that Harper eroded Canada’s respect as a global leader with an outsized influence on ecological and equity issues, due to his dogmatic policymaking and desire to appease domestic audiences. Roland Paris (2014) argued that Harper changed the symbols and practices of Canadian foreign policy from LI peacemaker to warrior, even though old
and new Canadians largely continued to see Canada’s role as an LI one. Several other leading scholars agreed (Smith and Soljander 2013).

**Puzzles**

The initial doubts about Harper partly flowed from the very internationally oriented and experienced Paul Martin he followed. The 2006 election brought a replay of Joe Clark in 1979 — a young Albertan prime minister with little apparent interest or involvement in international affairs, no ministerial record, a new Conservative party, minority government, and cabinet lacking foreign policy experience. Yet most schools downplayed the major systemic changes underway, or assumed that Canada would continue to be a middle power in this rapidly changing world. They thus could not account for the many changes that Harper brought.

**Global Democratic Leadership**

During almost ten years in office, Harper’s foreign policy featured global democratic leadership, emphasizing interest and value based initiatives in global democratization, defence and development (Kirton 2006, 2007).\(^1\) Despite his initial inexperience and minority government, he increasingly promoted Canada’s national interests and distinctive national values (DNVs) and exerted effective global leadership to shape world order as a whole.

This heavily CNR performance was caused, at the individual and governmental levels, by a prime minister that took policy analysis seriously and tightly controlled foreign policy decision making. It was driven at the societal level by a prime minister and party that had fully absorbed the Progressive Conservative tradition they needed to govern. It was driven at the external level by Canada’s emergence as a full strength principal power and energy superpower, facing an increasingly shocked, vulnerable and potentially vanquished America, unable to cope on its own with a more dangerous, diffuse world.

\(^1\) Harper had certainly outperformed Clark, who had lasted only nine months before defeat in the House and on the hustings due to his decision to implement a G7 energy and climate security strategy through a tax on carbon-producing gas (Kirton and Kokotsis 2015). Harper also showed no signs of having any secret agenda to put Canadian troops into Iraq, immediately remove Canada’s ratification of the Kyoto protocol or in joining George Bush’s Ballistic Missile Defense system.
The Meta-Theory Applied

The meta-theory of hegemonic transition helps explains this CNR rise into the established principal power ranks. During the Harper decade the U.S. dollar initially declined against the rising currencies of Japan, Europe, Britain and the surging economies of China, India and Brazil. World oil prices doubled from US$68.10 a barrel when Harper began, to a new high above US$140.00 in 2008. Then came the shock of the American–turned-global financial crisis in September 2008, a deep U.S. recession, an unusually slow and low recovery and American military difficulties in Iraq and Afghanistan. Bush’s approval rating plunged to a new low, his Republican party lost control of Congress on November 7, 2006, and the Presidency and Congress to Barack Obama’s Democrats in November 2008. America’s decline continued as China, India, Brazil, Russia and other emerging economies’ growth led the world.

Amidst America’s acute decline, possible defeat and diffusing capabilities into emerging economies, Canada rose. Its dollar spiked from US$0.87 when Harper started, to US$1.10 by late 2007. In an increasingly resource-short world, Canada was the only first-tier, full-strength surplus energy power and commodity supplier (Kirton 2006c). It was the only G7 country before the financial crisis with a fiscal surplus and rapidly declining national debt. It was projected to lead the G8 in economic growth in 2010 as recovery returned. Amidst this growing global power, Harper's parliamentary control steadily improved.

So strong were these external forces that Harper, as a rational calculator and quick learner, was quickly pulled into global leadership, notably in the new G20 summit starting in 2008 and by increasingly shaping world order in the social, security and economic spheres (Kirton 2011, 2013, Kirton et al. 2014).

Then a big change came in 2014 as the U.S. dollar and growth surged, those of most other systemically significant states dropped after Russia invaded Ukraine, and capability became more concentrated in the U.S. By November 4, Canada’s dollar bought only $US0.88 and WTI crude oil plunged from its $US100.87 peak in June to $US77.30 a barrel. Canada’s vulnerability rose when home grown terrorists killed two Canadian soldiers in Quebec and Ottawa in October. Yet Canada’s global leadership continued, as it invoked sanctions against Russia for its invasion and annexation in Ukraine, went to
war in Iraq and Syria against the terrorist Islamic State, offered an ambitious 30% by 2030 reduction on climate change and negotiated the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) by autumn 2015. These decisions showed the growing salience of determinants at the societal, governmental and individual levels, notably a majority government, supportive public opinion and above all a highly experienced and determined prime minister.

**Doctrine**

In its foreign policy doctrine Harper’s global democratic leadership appeared from the start.

**The Campaign Platform and Promises**

Harper’s immediate promise as a new prime minister to “deliver on our commitments” affirmed the many pledges on international affairs from his election platform and in his campaign (Conservative Party 2005) (See Appendix A-2). The platform “Stand Up for Canada” had opened with the central CNR national interest imperative to “strengthen national unity and advance our interests on the world stage.” It recognized “increased competition from around the world” and the need to protect Canada against the many assaults from the U.S., notably on softwood lumber, imported crime, the Canadian Wheat Board, and the Byrd Amendment giving the U.S. government’s antidumping and countervailing duties to complaining American firms.

However, four countries, all democracies, were identified in positive terms: major power Britain, India and Japan, and middle power Australia. International institutions were led by the entirely democratic, plurilateral G8, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), followed by the politically mixed La Francophonie, the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Liberal internationalist bodies were largely absent here.

During the election campaign starting on November 29, 2005, Harper issued 23 news releases on international affairs. Over half, or 13, were devoted to security, three to development, three to immigration and multiculturalism, and only one to trade. They covered all global regions beyond the United
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States, North America and the Americas. They highlighted greater resources for both defence and development, including the use of force.

The Victory Address, January 23, 2006

In Harper’s election night victory address on January 23, 2006, he sent two messages on international affairs and the value of democracy, highlighting Canadian soldiers serving in Afghanistan, and immigrants. Operationally, He pledged to “work cooperatively with our friends and allies, and constructively with all nations of the world.”

There was no reference to the U.S., let alone any PD imperial focus on it. Dominating were the LI themes of continuity, the shared value of democracy, and constructive cooperation with friends and allies. Yet prominent were the CNR DNVs of multiculturalism, openness and globalism, and the willingness to use force in Afghanistan.

The Throne Speeches

Harper’s first Speech from the Throne, delivered on April 4, 2006, gave foreign policy a robust one third of the speech and one fourth of its priorities (Government of Canada 2006). The speech opened with the theme of “Building a Stronger Canada” with foreign policy as an integral part. It ended with a foreign policy section entitled “Canada — Strong, United, Independent, Free.”

The speech offered an exceptionally ambitious conception of Canada’s international cadence, relative capability, leadership and capacity to influence. This ambitious vision was driven by both material reality and the DNVs of demographic openness, multiculturalism and globalism. National unity also mattered. The speech embraced most major regions, with a focus on Afghanistan and the world as a whole. Most other regions and countries were dealt with equally. The U.S. had one positive and one negative reference.

Over seven years later, Harper’s fifth Speech from the Throne, delivered on October 16, 2013, was titled “Seizing Canada’s Moment: Prosperity and Opportunity in an Uncertain World.” It began by noting Canada’s use of military power and its rare opportunity “to lead the world in security and prosperity.” One of its three sections dealt entirely with foreign policy, a subject which arose in the other two. The first section started with the global
financial crisis and noted “our Government is leading the world by example in fiscal sustainability, leads the G-7 – in job creation; in income growth; and in keeping debt levels low.” The second section noted that Canadians “are among the most digitally connected in the world” and that Harper’s was “the first government to achieve an absolute reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by working with provinces to reduce emissions from the oil and gas sectors.” The third section, “Putting Canada First,” defined Canadian defence priorities as 1. defending Canada and its borders; 2. maintaining sovereignty over Northern lands and waters; 3. fighting alongside allies to defend our interests; and 4. responding to emergencies in Canada and around the world. It added: “Canada has taken a leadership role in addressing the health challenges facing women, infants and children in the world’s poorest countries.”

The Foreign Policy Speeches

In his first few years, Harper gave several speeches at home and abroad to set principles to substitute for the formal policy review that he chose not to conduct. These were democracy, freedom, human rights and the rule of law – all LI values shared with the likeminded.

Yet he increasingly emphasized Canada’s global leadership and position as an emerging energy superpower (Kirton 2006c). In 2006, in London on July 14 and in New York on September 30, he introduced the novel concept of Canada as an emerging energy superpower. In 2007 in Australia and in May 2008 in London he added to the specialized capability of energy to the DNV of environmentalism, proclaiming Canada to be a clean energy superpower in the world.

On September 25, 2009, at the G20 Summit’s conclusion in Pittsburgh, Harper spoke of Canada being one of the world’s oldest democracies uninterrupted by revolution, occupation or civil war. He offered the concept of “enlightened sovereignty” as a guide to Canada and other countries’ in the 21st century world.

In 2007, a clear set of three geographic priorities had emerged. The first was Afghanistan. The second was North America and the Americas. The third were emerging powers around the world. Absent was America alone.
Resource Distributions
This doctrine was largely reinforced by Harpers’ resource distributions.

Budgets
In the budgetary allocation of Harper’s substantial fiscal surplus in 2006 and 2007, the initiated big winner was defence, then development, then diplomacy far behind.\footnote{His first budget on May 2, 2006, saw defence spending rise from CDN$14.6 billion in 2005-6 to CDN$16.5 billion in 2007-8. Development spending was CDN$3.8 billion in 2006-7 and rose to CDN$4.1 billion in 2007-8. Another CDN$320 million was likely for global health.}

In the second budget, on March 19, 2007, finance minister Jim Flaherty called Canada an “emerging energy superpower” and, importantly, the “only member of the G7 with both ongoing budget surpluses and a falling debt burden.” The big winner was now the environment, led by CDN$1.5 billion for the Canada ecoTrust for Clean Air and Climate Change. Development followed that autumn.

The third budget, in the spring of 2008, added a new Arctic icebreaker, to be controlled by the civilian Coast Guard.

The fourth budget, on January 27, 2009, was the first following the global financial crisis erupting in the U.S. in September 2008. Harper, as a sound Keynesian economist, produced major fiscal stimulus through deliberate deficit spending. In 2010 Harper shifted to fiscal consolidation, finally returning to a balanced budget in his last year.

Diplomatic Posts and Programs
In diplomatic programs and posts, however, frugality reigned. Harper slashed public diplomacy and academic relations programs, closed all Canada’s consulates general in the G8 powers of Japan, Italy and Russia, and sold the ambassadors’ residences in Britain and Ireland. These cuts came amidst soaring fiscal surplus (Johnson 2006). After four years, Harper had added only one net post abroad.

Bilateral Institutions
Bilateral institution building saw global involvement, as Canada participated in, revived and initiated a broad array of such bodies with partners around
the world. One was the new Canada-China Joint Committee on Health, launched in late November 2007.

**Summitry**

In summitry, expansive, global involvement arose from the start (See Appendices A-1, A-2, A-3). Harper took his first visit abroad in mid-March 2006, only five weeks after being sworn in, to distant Afghanistan, making him the second Canadian prime minister to visit there.

His second visit was again not to the United States for a bilateral meeting, but to Mexico for a trilateral one. On March 30-31 Harper was in Cancún, Mexico, following in Paul Martin’s 2005 footsteps, to institutionalize the new SPP.

After almost four full years, Harper’s intense, global summitry featured as favorite partners the U.S. first with 25 visits; France and Mexico second with 18 each; and then Japan, Britain, China, Germany, Russia, Italy, Australia and the EU close behind. Institutionally, Harper’s favourites were the G8, the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the now renamed trilateral North American Leaders Summit (NALS) with four encounters each, followed by the new G20 summit with three. The top 15 country spots were all occupied by Canada’s G20 partners. The UN was far behind.

During Harper’s final four years, France came first along with the U.S. They were followed in turn by the UK, UN, Mexico, Colombia, Ukraine and several G20 partners. With France first this was predominantly a CNR pattern, but with the PD U.S. and the LI UN still in a prominent place.

**Military Deployments**

Military deployments increased, as Harper mounted three combat missions and one support mission in nine years (Appendix B). He first quadrupled Canada’s troops in Afghanistan in 2006. He went to war in the air in Libya in 2011, mounted a military support mission in Mali in 2013 and attacked in the air Islamic State in Iraq in October 2014, adding Syria later on. In all

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3 When Mexico’s prime minister Vicente Fox extended the invitation for the second annual Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) summit, it was unclear whether President Bush would accept. When he did, Harper felt it might be too soon for his new government to go, especially to deal with a Liberal designed agenda with few deliverables.
four cases Canada fought alongside France. The U.S. did so in a combat role in only two. In CNR fashion, France came first.

**Free Trade Agreements**

Canada’s expanding free trade agreements featured CNR’s global involvement and now autonomous bilateral involvement, diversification and unilateralism arose (Kirton 2011b) (Appendix C). Harper pursued his promised free trade agreements with Japan and secured one with South Korean in 2014. By early 2008 he had completed deals with Peru and with the European Free Trade Agreement partners of Norway, Switzerland, Iceland and Lichtenstein. He added Colombia in 2011. In 2009, he opened the Canada-European Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) negotiations with the EU, the largest market in the world and secured it on October 18, 2013.

In November 2010 Harper began negotiations with India for a free trade agreement. In November 2011 he joined the negotiations for the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with the U.S., Japan, Mexico, Australia and others, including non-democratic Vietnam. No deeper integration with the U.S. alone arose, despite finance minister Jim Flaherty’s desire for free trade in securities. And amidst the global financial crisis of 2008-09, Harper unilaterally liberalized trade by slashing import duties in his budget of January 27, 2009, then in the summer and later for a third time. Multilaterally, he did little to get the LI WTO’s badly overdue Doha Development Agenda done, beyond supporting the Trade Facilitation Agreement at the G20’s Brisbane Summit in November 2014.

**Decisions: The First Year**

Harper’s decisions largely showed this CNR thrust toward global democratic leadership, quickly bringing Canada to a level where it became an established principal power in the world.

**1. Afghanistan, January 23, 2006—**

The first major decision came on distant, demanding Afghanistan, where Canada was now fighting a full-scale war (Piggott, 2007; Lang and Stein, 2007; Kirton 2007, Holland and Kirkey 2013). On January 23, 2006, his first evening as prime minister-elect, Harper promised strong support for the mission. When sworn in on February 6, he doubled Canada’s aid to a billion
dollars over ten years and later raised it again. By March 2006, Harper raised Canada’s troop commitment from 700 to the long scheduled level of 2,200 and had Canada take command of the allied forces in dangerous Kandahar. On March 11, he visited Afghanistan. On May 15, his minority government introduced a motion in the House of Commons extending the mission to February 2009, which passed on May 17 in a very close 149-145 vote. In September he sent tanks.

That autumn he joined the Dutch, with support from the U.S., to get Canada’s NATO allies to relax the caveats so their troops could come to Canada’s aid. He encouraged them to provide the additional 2,500 troops required, which Poland, and later France, did, with the latter moving its Mirage fighter jets to Canada’s base at Kandahar to support the Canadian forces there.

On October 17, 2007, Harper extended the mission for two years.\(^4\) On March 13, 2008, the House of Commons extended it to 2011, shifted it to training the Afghan army, and said it would end it then if other allies produced the needed forces. Harper maintained the 2011 pullout pledge ever since.

These decisions on Afghanistan featured promoting LI’s global democracy, and Canada’s CNR willingness to lead in defence, development and diplomacy in distant, dangerous theatres overseas. Poland and France followed Canada’s lead, even if Europe’s principal powers of Germany and Italy remained reluctant to fight.

2. Arctic Sovereignty, January 26, 2006–

Harper’s second decision was on Arctic sovereignty (Riddell-Dixon 2014). On December 22, 2005, a campaigning Harper had declared that foreign naval vessels needed Canadian consent to transit the Arctic and promised an increase in Canada’s military presence there. Soon after his election, on January 26, 2006, Harper sternly repudiated the public comments of David Wilkins, U.S. ambassador to Canada, that the U.S. did not recognize Canada’s claim to sovereignty over the Northwest Passage and that Canada should not build new arctic icebreakers. In February, Harper mounted the largest ever military exercise in the Arctic and soon followed it with more.

\(^4\) After hinting next summer that he might pull back militarily beyond 2009.
In 2007, on October 16, he announced new Arctic Patrol Ships, a training centre and port, and a polar research program. On December 14, Canada’s surveillance satellite Radarsat-2 was launched. In the spring 2008 budget, Harper promised a new Arctic icebreaker, under civilian Coast Guard command.

On August 27, 2008, Harper extended Canada’s Arctic territory by doubling, from 100 to 200 nautical miles, Canada’s claimed jurisdiction for environmental and shipping purposes. In this highly CNR unilateral move, environmental custodianship was the basis for the territorial claim, advancing a key DNV and national interest of sovereignty and territory together. The PD preoccupation of good relations with the United States was always absent. Expensive investments in the Arctic slowly started to flow, among competing claims of Afghanistan and elsewhere.

3. Hamas Funding, March 29, 2006

Harper’s third decision was ending Hamas funding and contact when this terrorist group took control of the Palestinian Authority through an election on January 25, 2006. As prime minister designate, Harper signaled that he would not recognize the new Hamas government as long as it supported terrorism and called for the destruction of Israel. He promised to withhold CDN$50 million in aid for Palestine.

On March 29, 2006, when Hamas formally took control of the Palestinian government, Canada immediately ended Canada’s direct contact with and aid to the Palestinian Authority, becoming the first country after Israel to do so. Other consequential countries followed Canada’s lead. Here Canada supported American-affiliated Israel in PD fashion, due to LI shared values of anti-terrorism, but did so in a CNR, unilateral lead.


Harper’s fourth decision was solving the softwood lumber dispute with the U.S. (Zhang 2007). On April 28, 2006, Harper announced that the U.S. had agreed to Canada's key conditions. On July 1, 2006, Canada and the U.S. finalized the legal text. On September 12, they signed the Softwood Lumber Agreement. On September 13 trade minister David Emerson threatened to impose a 19% tax on Canadian producers not signing the deal. The industry gave in. There was no “bias to business” here.
Harper thus finally succeeded in solving this long running, costly continental dispute. The final settlement let the Americans keep one fifth of the money they had already collected in import duties from Canadian companies. Canada thus largely won in its CNR negotiated approach to the U.S., bypassing LI’s WTO arbitration.

5. UNESCO Participation, May 5, 2006

Harper’s fifth major decision gave the province of Quebec a greater role in UNESCO (Michaud, 2006). On December 19, 2005, a Harper campaigning in Quebec City said he would invite Quebec to participate at UNESCO. On March 8, 2006, Harper and Quebec premier Jean Charest met in Quebec City to mandate their ministers to arrange a formal agreement, along the lines of the Mulroney-Johnson formula for participation in. On May 5, Canada and Quebec agreed that Quebec would be represented as part of the Permanent Delegation of Canada to UNESCO, rather than directly at UNESCO itself, as UNESCO would not change its rule that only sovereign states could be represented in their own right.

In this largely CNR initiative, Harper was motivated by the national interest of survival through national unity, and the DNV of multiculturalism through strengthening the French language in the world. Canada secured the support of principal power France. Yet unlike over Paul Martin’s R2P (Responsibility to Protect), the Westphalian UN would not budge. Canada secured its national unity and multiculturalism objectives, but only marginal modification of world order here.


The sixth decision, at the G8 St. Petersburg Summit in Russia in July 2006 showed Canada’s global leadership in modifying world order. This was Harper’s first outing on the big world stage and his first encounter with Russian president Vladimir Putin.5

5 A newly elected Harper had immediately sent his ministers to G8 preparatory meetings for finance, energy, health, public safety and foreign affairs. Harper met with U.S. president George Bush and Mexican prime minister Vicente Fox in Cancun on March 30-31, with Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi in Ottawa on July 6, with President Bush again in Washington on July 13-14 and with the UK’s prime minister Tony Blair in Britain on July 15 on the way to St. Petersburg. At St. Petersburg Harper met bilaterally with Russian president Vladimir Putin, Finnish prime minister Matti Vanhanen and the European Commission’s president José Barroso.
In the summit deliberations, Harper intervened on several issues. He helped the summit set new directions on energy security in market-friendly ways, with support from the U.S. and UK. Russia’s acceptance helped to deepen democracy there and reflected Canada’s DNV of openness. On education, under provincial jurisdiction at home, Canada’s effort to reframe the priority as human capital and innovation succeeded in avoiding any separatist blowback in Quebec and maintain the national interest of national unity at home.

On the Middle East, Harper’s team drafted and secured summit approval for a text, alternative to that of the Russian host, that highlighted the current crisis starting with attacks by Hamas and Hezbollah on Israel. In the outreach session the next day, UN secretary-general Kofi Annan said he would ask for a UN resolution based on the G8 text, which appeared on August 12, 2006, as UN Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1701. This new approach was also accepted, thanks to Harper’s leadership, by the Francophonie Summit in the fall.

Canada thus led the G8, and the G8 led the UN and the world, on a new approach to world order for security in the Middle East. This success flowed from Harper’s personal commitment to LI democracy, anti-terrorism and the partially PD partner of Israel, and summit support from the U.S. Harper’s largely CNR performance abroad was approved at home, by a public that might face a general election at any time.

7. The Lebanon Rescue, June 2006

Harper’s seventh major decision was the Lebanon rescue of 15,000 Canadian citizens fleeing a new conflict there in June 2006. On July 16, 2006, after seven Canadians had been killed, Canada announced plans to evacuate Canadian citizens. These Lebanese “boat people” refugees were among the estimated 30,000 Canadian citizens living in Lebanon, one of the largest groups of dual nationals trapped by the war. Despite its minimal military capability in the region, Canada swiftly evacuated almost 15,000 at Canadian government expense in under a month from July 19 to August 15. Harper diverted his plane, returning from the G8 St. Petersburg Summit, to Cyprus to take some of the evacuated Canadians safely home.6

6 A few Canadians complained about the slowness and austere conditions of their rescue, and others about the cost to the Canadian taxpayers and the ease with which Canada granted dual citizenship to what they called “Canadians of convenience” living abroad.
Harper’s heavily CNR unilateral actions showed Canada’s considerable non-military deployment capabilities and its Dunkirk-like adaptive resilience, the prime minister’s personal attachment to ensuring the safety of fellow Canadians, his respect for the DNVs of demographic openness and multiculturalism that were embedded in these dual citizens, and perhaps his desire to promote national unity by rescuing Canadians who might speak French.

8. Climate Change

Harper’s eighth decision was controlling climate change (Simpson et al. 2007). His campaign platform had promised to find a solution in concert with the advanced industrial states, a category that included a U.S. unbound by the UN’s Kyoto Protocol.

Canada’s environment minister Rona Ambrose assumed the presidency of the UN’s Conference of the Parties and promised a “made-in-Canada” policy to reduce greenhouse gases. She increasingly hinted at investing in clean technology in Canada, regulating its large final emitters, creating a domestic emissions trading regime and joining the Asia Pacific Partnership (APP) pioneered by the U.S. and Australia. The plan arrived in the autumn.

On April 26, 2007, the new Minister of the Environment John Baird produced a much stronger plan with more money. It forced industry for the first time to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions through a mandatory reduction of 150 megatonnes by 2020, to regulate the fuel efficiency of cars and light trucks in 2011 and to improve energy efficiency in products such as light bulbs.

At the 2007 G8 Summit, Canada advanced the “50% reduction by 2050” target and timetable and the consensus to negotiate a “beyond Kyoto” regime through the UN. At the following APEC leaders meeting and Commonwealth Heads of Governance Meeting (CHOGM) Canada sought to get developing countries to agree. Canada then joined the APP, where the unconstrained U.S., China, India and Australia, as well as incoming G8 host Japan, were present to advance the cause.

7 “Turning the Corner: An Action Plan to Reduce Greenhouse Gases and Air Pollution”
In March 2008 Harper outlawed new dirty coal-fired electricity plants after 2012, the first G20 member to do so. He also promised to set up a carbon emissions trading market and a price for carbon. On December 11, 2011, Canada formally withdrew from the clearly ineffective Kyoto Protocol. Yet in 2015, as the UN's December Paris Summit approached, Harper set Canada's voluntary reduction target at a stringent 30% below 2005 levels by 2030.

Harper thus started with and ultimately secured a CNR approach, relying on plurilateralism and unilateral regulation, and largely abandoning the failed LI UN approach.


Harper’s ninth decision dealt with la Francophonie. At its summit in Europe in September 2006 Harper skillfully used Canada’s position as the co-founder, second ranked power and second largest contributor, to reinforce the G8’s and UN’s new approach to peace in Lebanon. He also supported protecting the French language and culture against American-led globalization. Harper secured the next Francophone summit to host in 2008, the third time Canada would host the 49 member body, this time at Quebec City on the 400th anniversary of the founding of Canada. It could again promote Canada’s national interest of national unity at home, and the DNV of multiculturalism and bilingualism abroad.

10. Anti-Genocide

The tenth set of decisions countered collective genocide, as distinct from the LI attachment to general individual human rights, through principled, unilateral CNR moves in several global locales.

For Asia, on April 8, 2006, Canada declared Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tigers a terrorist organization. For the Middle East, Harper labelled Turkey’s 1915 Armenian massacre a genocide, leading NATO ally Turkey to withdraw its ambassador. In Darfur, Africa in mid-May 2006, Harper, as LI and PD predicted, signaled Canada’s willingness, in response to a request from the U.S. and UN, to contribute militarily to a ceasefire to stop the ongoing genocide there. For the U.S., Harper vigorously defended Canadian citizen Maher Arar against an American government claiming he was a terrorist. For China, Canada induced Thailand to release a Chinese human rights activist in April.
In the autumn of 2007, Canada sanctioned Myanmar for its massacre of dissenting monks. In November 2007 at the CHOGM, Harper supported the suspension of Pakistan from the Commonwealth for its repression of human rights. In November 2013 Harper boycotted Sri Lanka’s CHOGM to protest the host’s human rights abuses, with India following Canada’s lead.


The eleventh decision, in August 2007, was to host at Quebec City the third trilateral North American Summit. He thus creating a permanent regional institution with a defined frequency and hosting order, where the three North American leaders equally governed their growing trilateral cooperation. This U.S. PD initiative thus became a new CNR plurilateral institution.

12. Advancing Maternal Newborn & Child Health, 2010

The twelfth decision, in 2010, was Canada’s G8 and UN initiative on maternal, newborn and child health (MNCH) (Kirton and Koch 2010, Kirton 2012, Kirton, Guebert and Kulik 2014). On January 26, 2010, as the new G8 summit host, Harper announced he would feature MNCH — the two UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that were furthest behind their 2015 targets. On June 26, at the Muskoka Summit, Harper, made a CDN$1 billion contribution, mobilized CDN$7.3 billion in new money for MNCH. In September, at a UN summit in New York, Harper helped raise the total to CDN$40 billion and created a Commission on Information and Accountability for Women’s and Children’s Health which he co-chaired. Harper thus combined complex neo-realist unilateralism in the G8 concert, with the liberal internationalist UN MDGs, to successfully strengthen world order in a gender and generationally equalizing way.

13. Preventing Financial Crisis at the Toronto G20 Summit, June 2010

The thirteenth decision, on June 26-27, 2010, was to have the G20 Toronto Summit set hard targets and timetables for deficit and debt reduction (Kirton 2012, 2013). In the autumn of 2008 Canada helped the new G20 summit address the erupting global financial crisis. At the G20 summits in Washington in November 2008, London in April 2009 and Pittsburgh in September 2009, Canada secured its priorities of having the G20 fix the banks first, build exit strategies into members’ fiscal stimulus, choose the G20 as the permanent premier forum for members’ international economic
cooperation and select Canada as host of the fourth summit in June 2010, the first country beyond the U.S. and the UK to lead the group

In the spring of 2010 as a new financial crisis erupted in Europe, due to the escalating sovereign debt of Greece. Harper called for the summit to endorse fiscal consolidation with precise targets and timetables for deficit and debt reduction. At Toronto, over president Obama’s reluctance, the G20 agreed and the Euro-crisis was regionally contained. Harper used the CNR concert-like G20 to stabilize world order assaulted by an unprecedented crisis.

14. Liberating Libya through NATO and the UN, March 21, 2011

The fourteenth decision, on March 21, 2011, was forcefully liberating Libya’s civilians from an anticipated genocide from their longtime dictator, Muammar Ghadaffi (Kirton 2012).

In late February 2011 Canada evacuated its citizens from Libya and imposed sanctions beyond those authorized by the UNSC. In March, Ottawa planned to participate in an international effort to airlift aid to opposition-held areas of Libya, promised CDN$5 million in humanitarian aid. Canada sent a frigate and special forces for evacuation, aid insertions into rebel held areas, or even a blockade, and supported a no-fly zone over Libya. On March 17, after the UNSC imposed a no-fly zone over Libya and approved all necessary measures to enforce it, Canada immediately prepared to send six fighter jets to enforce the zone.

On March 21 four CF-18 fighters and two CC-150 Polaris air-to-air refueling tankers began strikes over Libya. On March 25, Peter MacKay, now Minister of National Defence, announced that Canada’s Lt.-Gen. Charles Bouchard would assume command of the NATO mission. On June 15 the House of Commons voted to extend Canada's participation to the end of September.

As CNR predicts, Canada thus led along with France and Britain as the first ranking NATO allies to call for diplomatic sanctions, to seek an authorizing UN Security Council Resolution to invoke the international responsibility to protect, and to deploy and employ air forces in combat to protect endangered Libyan civilians in Benghazi and elsewhere. Canada fought in combat roles with France and Britain but without a politically constrained, inherently isolationist U.S. that could not politically fly manned air combat missions
over Libya, but that did provide the critical specialized intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance resources needed to win. It also provided the critical diplomatic initiative at the UN to authorize the use of all necessary means to implement R2P. This was a role reversal from the distant days when Canada had concentrated on the diplomacy of constraint and left front line military combat to the U.S. It advanced militarily and politically the doctrine of “enlightened sovereignty” in R2P form.

15. Combating Terrorism in Mali, January 13, 2013

The fifteenth decision, in January 2013, was to combat terrorism in Mali by providing non-combat military support to France to fight Al Qaeda linked insurgents seizing control there. On January 13, immediately after France launched its surprise offensive, Canada supplied a C-17 military transport aircraft and 40 CAF personnel for one week. Harper refused a combat role. On January 14, 2013, Canadian special forces landed in neighbouring Niger to train its soldiers fighting Mali’s rebels. On January 24, 2014, Canada extended its military mission for 30 days to February 15. On March 14, 2013, Harper again refused to send troops to Mali, even as France tried to replace its mission with a UN peacekeeping force. Even the liberal internationalist UN could not lure Canadian troops in. In CNR fashion, Canada in the theatre used military force with France, but without the U.S.

16. Securing CETA with the EU, October 18, 2013

The sixteenth decision, on October 18, 2013, was concluding the Canada-EU Economic and Trade Agreement. CETA would take formal force once ratified by all legislatures in Europe and in Canada. Among Canada’s privileged trade and economic partnerships, this marked a major move toward CNR diversification, if to LI democratic states. The EU was the largest marketplace in the world. Canada secured its deal with the EU before the Americans, who were still negotiating with the EU according to the Canadian model as 2014 ended. In autumn 2014, Canada also concluded a free trade agreement with G20 colleague, democratic South Korea, and negotiated bilaterally and plurilaterally for one with globally third ranked G7 colleague, democratic Japan.

17. Defending Ukraine, March 1, 2014

The seventeenth decision, on March 1, 2014, was defending Ukraine from Russia's invasion and annexation (Kirton and Kulik 2014). Diplomatically,
on March 1, 2014, Harper suspended Canada’s preparations for the G8 Sochi Summit, recalled Canada’s ambassador to Russia, supported the deployment of UN and Organization for Security and Co-operation (OSCE) monitors, and discussed a financial package for Ukraine. A day later Canada and the G7 condemned Russia and suspended their G7 participation. On March 3 Harper cancelled government participation at the Paralympic games and soon suspended all planned bilateral military activity with Russia, froze the assets of members of the departed Ukrainian regime, suspended the Canada-Russia Intergovernmental Economic Commission, and sent two military observers to an OSCE military observer mission to Ukraine.

Economically, on March 13, Harper gave more than $220 million and technical support to help Ukraine stabilize its economy, conditional on International Monetary Fund support. Harper later gave CDN$775,000 to an OSCE-led mission to Ukraine. In March Canada announced further economic sanctions under the Special Economic Measures (Ukraine) Act and more travel bans against Ukrainian and Russian officials. More sanctions came on April 28, May 4 and July 11.

Militarily, on April 29, Canada sent six CF-18s to Europe and 20 personnel to NATO headquarters, and then to Romania, bordering Ukraine. They went with one heavy lift plane, two Airbus transports and about 250 military personnel. Canada also deployed the HMCS Regina to the NATO Standing Maritime Forces in NATO’s reassurance package. CAF members took command of an OSCE observation team in Ukraine. On May 2 Canada sent 50 soldiers for NATO training manoeuvres in Poland. Canada later sent its troops to Ukraine to train Ukrainian ones.

On June 4-5 at the G7 Brussels Summit, Canada agreed on comprehensive measures against Russia. On November 15, at the G20 Brisbane Summit, Harper said to the approaching Putin: “I guess I’ll shake your hand but I have only one thing to say to you – get out of Ukraine.”

Canada, in CNR fashion, thus led the G7 concert in defending Ukraine against Russia, stopping short of military force in combat roles. Yet it did so, in more LI ways, in support of democratic NATO and the multilateral UN.
18. Combating ISIL in Iraq and Syria, October 2, 2014

The eighteenth major decision, on October 2, 2014, was using force in combat against ISIL or the Islamic State in Iraq. On September 5 Canada decided to send up to 70 special forces under Canadian command to train Kurdish forces against ISIL in Iraq for 30 days. On October 2, Harper decided to send six CF-18’s into combat there, along with one C-150 refueling tanker and two CP-140 Aurora surveillance aircraft. On October 7 the House of Commons approved this decision by a 157 to 134 vote. On October 30 the CF-18’s made their first strike. Harper later expanded Canada's air strikes to Syria. In CNR fashion, Canada thus used military force in combat, against a terrorist non-state security threat, along with France and Britain, but this time with and following the U.S. and with the endorsement of the UN.

Conclusion

Together, Harper’s foreign policy doctrines, distribution of resources and major decisions lead to six conclusions.

First, all three theories are needed, as CNR patterns predominated, but LI ones were present and PD ones occasionally arose. CNR captures the central thrust of global leadership. LI accounts for its core substantive content of promoting freedom, democracy, human rights and the rule of law. PD points to the support for Israel in several key decisions. Theoretically, the case raises the puzzle of which theory best claims LI’s traditional UN now dominated by non-likeminded, non-democratic states, and the G8, G7 replacement, and G20 dominated by likeminded democratic ones. Moreover, on this defining question of the approach to world order, do Keohane’s institutions or Ruggie's ideals prevail?

Second, Canada increasingly expressed and effectively advanced its national interests and distinctive national values. Harper focused first on survival through national unity in his doctrine, focused on France in his summit diplomacy, gave Quebec a role in UNESCO, rescued francophone Canadian citizens from Lebanon, confirmed his commitment to remain a ratified party to Kyoto at the behest of Quebec premier Jean Charest and fought alongside France in Afghanistan, Libya, Mali and Iraq. Territory was promoted by Harper’s firm policy on Arctic sovereignty and fisheries jurisdiction off the Atlantic coast.
The enduring emphasis was strongly on those LI values shared in common with the likeminded. But also central was the distinctive national value of multiculturalism, as seen in his victory speech, recognition of the Armenian genocide, defence of Canada’s dual citizenship policy and highlighting the slaughter in Darfur. Openness arose in speeding up the recognition of immigrant’s professional credentials, choosing high immigration levels, rescuing Canadian citizens from Lebanon, apologizing for the Chinese head tax and emphasizing open energy markets at the St. Petersburg G8. Environmentalism, while weaker, appeared in his decisions to remain within Kyoto before 2011, growing concern with the Arctic's fragile ecosystem and setting 2050 as a key referent for the beyond Kyoto climate regime and 30% by 2030 as Canada's emissions reduction goal.

Third, Canada won much of what it sought, from expanding Canada’s Arctic territorial jurisdiction, economic partnership with the EU and an inclusive, bottom-up climate change control regime, if not its Keystone pipeline through the U.S., a terrorist-free, democratic Afghanistan, Libya, Mali and Syria, and a Crimea returned to Ukraine (See Appendices G-1, G-2).

Fourth, Canada successfully shaped global order in both ideational and institutional ways. Ideationally it forcefully made R2P a regular practice, in Libya in 2011 and Syria in 2014. Institutionally, it helped create, institutionalize and render effective the G20 Summit, and restored an effective G7 Summit without Russia in 2014.

Fifth, Canada became an established principal power in an ever changing world. Harper's global leadership through defence of open democracy helped shape outcomes at the G8 and Francophonie summits. Harper’s hosting of the SPP summit in 2007 helped create a promising plurilateral summit institution. His heavy first-tier military investment in Afghanistan helped make America and its allies freer from deadly terrorism of global reach. But Harper’s wars in Libya, Mali, and in Iraq and Syria brought mixed results, and Crimea was still annexed as Harper passed Canada’s prime ministership to Liberal Justin Trudeau on November 4, 2015.

Sixth, the meta-theory of hegemonic transition accounts well for Canada’s growing global leadership from 2006 to 2013. But its continuation amidst a revived U.S. in 2014 requires a closer look at the external, societal, governmental and individual determinants, notably how Harpers’ majority
government, experience and determination propelled Canada into global democratic leadership amidst this more difficult and dangerous world.

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Appendix A-1: Harper’s Summit Diplomacy to October 23, 2006

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<td>3</td>
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<td></td>
<td>1G8, B</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2G8</td>
</tr>
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<td>Other Francophonie</td>
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<td>Franc</td>
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</table>

*Unless otherwise noted, the occasion is a leader’s visit to another leader’s country; the number indicates the total of meetings on that occasion. SPP = Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America; G8 = Group of Eight Summit.

- 060314: Harper visits Karzai (Afghanistan) in Kabul
- 060314: Harper visits Aziz (Pakistan) in Islamabad
- 060330-31: Harper meets Bush (USA) and Fox (Mexico) in Cancun
- 060518: Howard (Australia) visits Harper in Ottawa
- 060628: Koizumi (Japan) visits Harper in Ottawa
- 060706: Harper visits Bush (USA) in Washington
- 060713-14: Harper visits Blair (UK) in Britain
- 060715-17: Harper at G8 Summit (bilateral with Putin (Russia) Trilateral with Vanhanen (Finland) and Barroso (EC))
- 060718-19: Harper visits Chirac (France) in Paris
- 060921: Harper at Opening of UN General Assembly in New York (bilateral with Annan (UN Secretary General))
- 060921-22: President Karzai (Afghanistan) visits Harper in Ottawa
- 060925: President Vīķe-Freiberga (Latvia) visits Harper in Ottawa
- 060928: Harper attends Francophone Summit in Bucharest
### Appendix A-2: Harper’s Summit Diplomacy 2006-2009

Totals by country and multilateral organization of top 25 partners (up to November 23, 2009)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Given</th>
<th>Received</th>
<th>Occasion</th>
</tr>
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<td>SPP-4, G8-4, G20-3, APEC-4, NATO-4, B-4 SPPB-1, UNSS-1</td>
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<td>2. Mexico</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>SPP-4 G8-4, G20-3 B-1, APEC-4, APECB-1, C-1</td>
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<td>2. France</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>G8-4, G20-3, B-4, FS-2, NATO-4, EU-1</td>
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<td>4. Japan</td>
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<td>5. Britain</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>6. China</td>
<td>14</td>
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<td>G8-3, G20-3, APEC-4, APECB-1 G8B-2, UNSS-1</td>
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<td>6. Germany</td>
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<td>8. Russia</td>
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<td>11. European Union</td>
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Notes: APEC = APEC Leaders’ Summit; APECB=bilateral at APEC Leaders’ Summit; B = bilateral; C = ceremonial event; CARICOM=Caribbean Community; CHOGM = Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting; EU = Canada-EU Summit; FS = Francophonie Summit; G8 = Group of Eight Summit; G8B = bilateral at G8 Summit; NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization Leaders’ Summit; SPP = Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America; UNGA = United Nations General Assembly; UNSS = United Nations Special Summit.

* Unless otherwise noted, the occasion is a leader’s visit to another leader’s country; the number indicates the total of meetings on that occasion. Includes leaders elect but not constitutional monarchs. All bilateral or multilateral meetings at a summit are counted as “given.”

During his second summer Harper took his first discretionary tour, with the Americas as his choice. As the two year anniversary of his election approached, his summit diplomacy was replete with visits reaching across the globe (See Appendix C). His most frequent partners were Mexico in first, the U.S. in second, and France, Japan, Russia, and China tied in third. Then came Australia in fourth, followed by Britain, Germany Chile and Vietnam tied for fifth. The configuration showed Canada’s relevance and reach. The U.S. was not alone in first. Between Canada’s mother countries France stood ahead of Britain. The pattern revealed the pull of geography drawing Harper to Canada’s neighbours of the U.S., Russia and France. It also showed the institutional summit ties of the G8, la Francophonie, APEC and North America’s new SPP. At the top, the rational geopolitical pull of global relative capability was clear, with a declining number one America now in second and a rebounding number two Japan and rapidly...
rising Russia and China in third.

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<td>36 Countries</td>
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Note: By Destination Country, Countries include UN New York as a separate entity
Compiled by: John Kirton, April 30, 2015
## Appendix B: Canada’s Use of Force since 1898

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>War</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Form</th>
<th>Allies</th>
<th>International organization</th>
<th>Outcome</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1899–1902</td>
<td>Boer War</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914–18</td>
<td>World War I</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Air, Land, Sea</td>
<td>United Kingdom, France, United States (1917)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1939–45</td>
<td>World War II</td>
<td>Europe, Asia</td>
<td>Air, Land Sea</td>
<td>United Kingdom, France, United States (1941)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950–53</td>
<td>Korean War</td>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>Air, Land Sea</td>
<td>United Kingdom, France, United States</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>Truce</td>
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<tr>
<td>1990–01</td>
<td>Persian Gulf</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Air, Sea</td>
<td>United Kingdom, France, United States</td>
<td>United Nations, G7</td>
<td>Victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Medak Pocket</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>United Nations, G7</td>
<td>Victory</td>
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<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>Haiti</td>
<td>Americas</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>Victory</td>
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<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>Turbot War</td>
<td>Atlantic</td>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>None</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Victory</td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>Zaire</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>United States, United Kingdom, France</td>
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<td>Victory</td>
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<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>United States, United Kingdom, France</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>Victory</td>
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<td>2001–14</td>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Land</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>United Nations, NATO</td>
<td>Victory</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Libya</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Air, Sea</td>
<td>France, United Kingdom</td>
<td>United Nations, NATO</td>
<td>Victory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012–14</td>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>France</td>
<td>United Nations, ECOWAS</td>
<td>Victory</td>
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<td>2014</td>
<td>Iraq</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Air, Land</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>Middle East</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>United States</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
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</table>
Notes:
ECOWAS = Economic Community of West African States; NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

*Use of force* is defined as missions involving combat operations or direct military support for them. Cases exclude: East Timor; 2003 Iraq with Canada’s exchange staff personnel already embedded in United States operations; and the 2015 Ukraine military training mission.

*War* is identified by its primary geographic location and commonly used name.

*Region* is a major geographic area or continent, except for the Turbot War, which was not land based.

*Victory* is defined as having accomplished goals by the time Canada left.

*Form* is the combat arm or service of the Canadian Armed Forces involved in the combat zone: land, air and/or sea (Navy and Coast Guard).

*Allies* is defined as the country or countries engaged in combat operations on Canada’s side, listed in order of a. before b. at the time of, c. after Canada’s entry.

*International Organization* is the international institution authorizing or endorsing the combat operation, with a focus on the United Nations Security Council (or General Assembly), NATO and/or the G7.

*Outcome* is defined as whether Canada obtained its initial war aims at the time of its combat entry by the time it ended its combat involvement (victory or defeat or stalemate or ongoing).

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*a* Haiti Outcome: As stated on the Government of Canada webpage, the goal of the United Nations Security Council mission to which Canada contributed was to restore “democratic leadership,” end “human rights violations in the country,” allow President Jean Bertrand Aristide to return to power, and “create a stable environment in the country.” The main military mission ended in 1997. However, as officially stated, “unfortunately, Haiti has largely remained an impoverished country battered by violence and unrest.” See “The Canadian Armed Forces in Haiti” at http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/history/canadian-armed-forces/Haiti.

*b* Turbot War Allies: Britain and Ireland expressed strong verbal public support for Canada.

*c* Allies also included: Belgium, Cameroon (which held the presidency of Organization of African Unity), Ireland (which held the presidency of European Union), Italy, Japan, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden and Uganda.

*d* Afghanistan Outcome: As stated by NATO, the mission in Afghanistan aimed to provide “security across the country and ensure that it would never again be a safe haven for terrorists.” The mission came to a close by the end of 2014. Security responsibility was transitioned from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) troops to the Afghan army and police forces. However, the goal of preventing Afghanistan from becoming a terrorist safe haven again has not been achieved. See “NATO and Afghanistan” at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_8189.htm and “Operations and Missions: Past and Present” at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52060.htm.

*e* Libya Outcome: As stated by the official NATO Statement on Libya, the goal of the mission in Libya is to “bring about a speedy resolution to the crisis, to put an end to the violence, and to allow the Libyan people to freely determine their own future,” and also to “protect civilians and civilian populated areas.” The official NATO website states that
“the UN mandate was carried out to the letter and the operation was terminated on 31 October 2011 after having fulfilled its objectives.” However, NATO air strikes hit large numbers of residential areas and killed many civilians, thus not fully fulfilling the objectives of bringing an end to violence and protecting civilians. See “Statement on Libya” at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_75177.htm and “Operations and Missions: Past and Present – Terminated Missions” at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_52060.htm.

Mali Outcome: Operation Serval (the original French military operation from 2012 to 2014) ended on July 15, 2014. It was replaced by Operation Barkhane, which is still ongoing. Canada is not involved in Operation Barkhane. There is therefore no final outcome for Canada’s involvement in the military operation.
### Appendix C: Canada’s Free Trade Agreements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Partner</th>
<th>Canadian Decision</th>
<th>Negotiations Start</th>
<th>Negotiations End</th>
<th>Ratified</th>
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<td>USA</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>1986</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>1989</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mexico (NAFTA)</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>1994</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Chrétien Years</strong></td>
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<td>Israel</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>1997</td>
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<td>September 28, 2000</td>
<td>2001</td>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2014</td>
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<td>Singapore</td>
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<td>2001</td>
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<td><strong>Martin Years</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Harper Years:</strong></td>
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<td>Caribbean</td>
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<td>Trans-Pacific Partnership</td>
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<td>Ukraine</td>
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**Notes**
- Includes comprehensive bilateral and plurilateral agreements
- Excludes multilateral agreements under the GATT/WTO, sectoral agreements with US for agricultural machinery, defence production, and automotives.
- Excludes decisions to start exploring the analytical basis for such an agreement, as with China in 2016.
- Ratified means by both sides/came into force (final, legal)