

External Determinants

Lecture 15

POL 312Y Canadian Foreign Policy

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Introduction: How External Determinants Shape Foreign Policy

The External Determinants That Matter

How much, and how, do what forces from the external world determine Canadian foreign policy? This central question has long given rise to several specific debates. They revolve around what features of the external environment most matter, what condition they are in, and how they are logically and empirically connected to the international behaviour that Canada mounts.

The first debate concerns relative capability, and the resulting configuration of **power** in the world. Here the focus is on the transition from imperial Britain to imperial America, and the changing place of a once hegemonic America since. Some claim that since its “after victory” peak in 1945, the U.S. moved into an “after hegemony” phase by 1975, allowing principal powers such as Canada to rise and act more autonomously in the world (Kirton 1986; Ikenberry 2001; Keohane 1984). Many others, however, argue that the post-1989 disappearance of the Soviet Union left the unchecked U.S. as the world’s sole superpower or even unique “hyperhegemon” with an even heavier constraining influence on a Canada more deeply, dependent than ever before. Still others see an expanding European Union (EU) as an embryonic superstate or a rapidly rising China creating a new bi-powerness, if not necessarily bipolarity in the world. Others nominate a reviving Russia and India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa in the rising BRICs or BRICSAM bunch (Cooper and Rowlands 2005). In all cases, a key threshold and multiplier of relative capability decline or rise is defeat or victory in war. The debate over the US defeat in Vietnam, victory in the cold war and possible defeat in Iraq and Afghanistan are critical here. The dominant view is that decline and defeat lead to a retreat from global involvement as it would for Canada should its longest war in Afghanistan not go well.

A second debate arises over **polarity** or alignment, whether this flows directly from the configuration of relative capability or not. Some have asserted that the tight bipolarity of the long Cold War forced Canada to be a “loyal ally” of America as was evident in the cases of Cuba in 1962, nuclear weapons in 1963, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. If so, the end of the Cold War set Canada free. Yet others such as Allan Gotlieb (1991) argue that the Cold War had made Canada’s real estate and military contribution valuable or even necessary to America in its confrontation with the Soviet Union across the Arctic and the Atlantic. America’s Cold war victory ended its need for allies, and thus Canada’s influence in the United States. Others wonder whether the Cold War really ever ended with a now rising, still communist China in Asia, or whether it may be returning with a democratically recidivist and energy-rich Russia across the Atlantic and Arctic as

well. But Russia and China may be partners on Canada's side in the new confrontation with common enemies such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation and climate change.

A third debate focuses on the **processes** of **globalization** that send societal flows across national borders with much greater speed, scope, scale, simultaneity, strength and domestic penetrative impact than ever before. Many feel that contemporary globalization makes small, open, already penetrated states such as Canada more deeply driven by determinants from abroad. But others, such as Stephen McBride (2001), argue that domestic societies and states still matter a great deal in a globalized world.. They claim that external determinants still have low salience, while state and societal actors have greater salience, if reduced scope, in making Canadian foreign policy. Indeed an open multicultural Canada with first mover advantage can now guide globalization to generate the world order it wants. For this far-reaching, deeply penetrative globalization may even be rendering the most powerful countries in the world vulnerable in the ways that the weak have long been.

A fourth debate arises among those who think that globalization has generated a new **vulnerability**, whose most dramatic manifestation in the terrorist attacks on America on September 11, 2001 changed everything in the world. Some conclude that September 11 has made a traumatized, insecure inward-looking America, preoccupied with homeland security close its borders, forcing a trade-dependent Canada to give up much of freedom and sovereignty to maintain the economic access to the U.S. markets that Canada needs to survive (Clarkson 2001). Yet this bolt out of the blue attack on America at home—even more that on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the Korean War in 1950, Afghanistan in 1979, or the Gulf War in 1990—may have made America, not Canada, more vulnerable and more dependant on trusted allies, and thus given Canada greater relevance, freedom of action, and influence in the world. It has certainly helped make war a permanent feature of Canadian foreign policy, a process that began in the Gulf in 1990 and that continues in Afghanistan as the 21st century unfolds. In the Afghanistan case, the new vulnerability came home to Canada directly, in the form of the 25 Canadians killed by al Qaeda terrorists in its consciously targeted attacks.

A fifth debate unfolds over **international institutions** and the dominant **international laws** or informal regimes they embed (Ikenberry 2001, 2003; Clarkson 2002, Krasner 1983). With classic liberal-internationalist (LI) logic, some see the great growth of constitutionalized, hard law international organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) making Canada less dependent on powerful countries that could otherwise do what they want in a world where the “law of the jungle” rather than the “rule of law” prevailed (Hart 2000). Yet others, led by Stephen Clarkson (2002), claim that the two leading new highly legalized, hard law, international organizations born in the 1990s—the WTO and North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have imposed on Canada an American designed “external constitution” that reduces Canada's ability to act autonomously at home and abroad. Within this school lie those who argue that a United Nations (UN) grounded international law is increasingly forcing the Canadian government to respect the human rights, led by the new International Criminal Court at home and abroad (Keating 2007) Still others point to the rise of flexible, informal, soft

law institutions, and the advantages for a rising, well-connected Canada that they bring (Kirton and Trebilcock 2004; Kirton and Holmes 1988). Indeed they see Canada moving away from accepting and abiding by the old, established UN-based “rule of law” that Louis St. Laurent proclaimed as the third principle of Canadian foreign policy in his historic Gray Lecture of January 13, 1947. Instead Canada has increasingly been implementing the new international law that Canada has invented in its own interests and image, based on its national interests and distinctive national values, to this day (Kirton 2007, Keating 2007).

Finally, a sixth debate comes from those who emphasize the dominant **ideas**, images or principles governing the international system and their compatibility with prevailing Canadian values and practices at home. Some think that Canada has such an attractive image among elites, the media and mass publics around the world that can just sit back and serve as a “model power” in the world that needs and wants Canada’s ideals (Welsh 2004). They see the emergence of new Canadian-pioneered principles such as environmental custodianship, human security, the responsibility to protect (R2P) proving and reinforcing the point. Others think that the new norms enable Canada to rely more on its abundant soft power, and less on its declining hard power, to exert influence abroad. But many others think that Canada still needs hard power in new forms to take advantage of the new norms, as well as the old hard military and diplomatic power to survive and thrive in a still Westphalian world.

The Debate

These debates over power, polarity, processes of globalization and vulnerability, institutions and ideas rage on. But all rest on a consensus that external determinants in general, and the U.S. in particular, affect Canadian foreign policy to some degree, in some way. Within this broad consensus, however, there is much disagreement about how much the world outside Canada matters, how much of it matters, and just how it matters to Canada back home. The familiar questions of salience, scope, sensitivity, and actor relevance arise once again.

The answers cluster within three broad, now familiar schools of thought. The first, long dominant school is the “**fate not will**” approach, pioneered by James Eayrs and continued by Kim Nossal (Eayrs 1963, 1972, 1975; Nossal 1989, 1997). In the 1989 edition of *The Politics of Canadian Foreign Policy*, Nossal writes: “Canada’s foreign policy objectives, and the means used to attain these goals, will **inexorably** be shaped by the **unyielding** constraints and **imperatives** imposed by geography, economic structure, **alignment**, and the capabilities of the country. Such conditions set **stringent limits** on what the government can do in foreign policy; they will frequently **define** what it **must** do; and more often than not they **dictate how** it may or **must** be done” (p. 38).¹ The

¹ Concretely, Nossal cites five relatively constant, external determinants. These are, first, Canada’s location between the U.S. and USSR in the nuclear missile–Cold War age; second, Canada’s “neighbourhood” with the U.S. next door; third, Canada’s

combined result is a heavily externally constrained foreign policy, in which at least LI and probably peripheral dependence (PD) policies prevail. Similarly, Roy Rempel (2006: 3) writes “Canada’s international position must always be considered in the context of its geo-strategic position, namely that it is a North American power situated next to the United States.”

A second school argues for **post–Cold War liberation** (Cooper 1997). As Andrew Cooper put it, the end of the Cold War, the ensuing “absence of solid and attractive **ideas** emanating from the top of the global hierarchy,” and the premium placed by the new world order on **diplomatic flexibility and speed** give Canada “an opportunity to be more than simply an idea taker” from others. To be sure, “Canada will have to continue to be reactive and responsive” to the shifts in thinking about globalization. But “no longer hemmed in by the rigid contours of the Cold War, many of the fundamental aspects of Canada’s foreign policy have opened up” (281–82).

A third school sees a **world made for Canada**. It claims that the decline of American power, of tight international bipolarity, and of the politically and economically closed polities that predominated prior to post–Cold War globalization have given Canada greater freedom in a more friendly, “made for Canada” world (Pettigrew 1999; McBride 2001; Welsh 2004). Here a demographically, economically and politically open, multi-cultural Canada has a first-mover advantage in a rapidly globalizing, democratizing, integrating, post–Cold War world, where the hard power of military force now counts for far less than the soft power of attractive values and ideas.²

Despite their differences, all of these schools share the common flaw of being too attached to continuity. They fail to see the many core complex cumulative **changes** that have been at work in the international system since 1945. On the fundamental factor of power, America’s decline from its 1945 position of hegemony has been a profound change underway for over 60 years. Arriving more recently has been the end of the Cold

dependence on foreign trade and overwhelmingly on U.S. markets; fourth Canada’s alignment with the West and membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); and fifth, the relative weakness of Canada’s capabilities. This list focuses on many of the right components of the external environment—capabilities, alignment, and economic interdependence. But Nossal treats them as invariants, rather than the fast and far-changing variables that they have proven to be. Some factors such as geography may be far slower to change. However, a country’s territorial expansion can bring it new and different geographical components (for example, should the Turks and Caicos Islands form a political community with Canada). Moreover, global warming is changing the geography of both Canada and the U.S., especially in the Arctic region and perhaps also of America in New Orleans.

² [After the 2007-2009 American-turned-global financial crisis, some might add deficit and debt control, prudent domestic financial regulation and soft power to the list of Canada’s attributes admired and needed by the world.](#)

War, the advent of contemporary globalization, the rapid rise of the BRICs, the rise of the new vulnerability, the shocks of 9/11 in America and 7/7 in Britain, the start of the global war on terrorism, the advent of principles such as the “responsibility to protect” (R2P) and the creation of informal global summit institutions such as the G8 and G20. These profound changes show that not just power, but also polarity, process, threat, war, ideas and institutions are variables that can and do change a great deal. Indeed, the post–World War II process of decolonization, the emergence and expansion of the EU, and the post–Cold War move from a Soviet Union to a remnant Russia and the division of Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia show that not even geography nor the states in the system are fixed. This is especially true for Canada, where geographic assumptions has changed since 1945 in ways that have increased its Atlantic and Arctic reach. With new international law declaring ice to be land, Canada now has land equivalent borders with two and even three countries. But the global environment force of climate change—along with nuclear war was the ultimate existential new vulnerability—could change this again. These changes flourish even if the territorial state remains relevant as the major actor in world politics, amidst the many non-state and even non human actors on the rise (Kirton and Hajnal 2006).

Scholars must thus look beyond the unchanging continuity of a UN-constrained Canada as highlighted by LI, and beyond the stark picture of Canada’s inevitably heavy external dependence on an always hegemonic, geographically proximate America, as PD prefers. They must ask just how much and how the major transformations in the international system matter in the making, content implementation and effectiveness of Canada’s international behaviour in a changing world.

Systemic Transformation and Canadian Rise

The many basic changes in the international system since 1945 have in fact reduced the -salience, heightened the sensitivity, broadened and balanced the scope, and altered the composition of the effective external determinants of Canadian foreign policy. These changes have produced a world that is more diffuse, less polarized, more globalized, more inter-vulnerable, more war-driven, and more dominated by post-Westphalian institutions and ideas. Such a system has encouraged Canada to act more as a principal power, especially in the 21st-century world.

More specifically, the decline and disappearance and decline in turn of the three “superpowers” (Fox 1944)—the United Kingdom, the USSR, and the United States—have created a diffuse system with multiple, accessible power centres, including the rising BRICSAMS, where Canada is freer to act, associate, and approach world order in new ways. The post–Cold War arrival of deep, durable détente, across both the old East–West and North–South divides, has lessened the constraints of alignment with the West and the North and enabled Canada freely to forge partnerships with democratizing emerging powers long on the other side of the wall. They are now Canada’s partners in the G8 and “plus five”, the G20, North American environmental and labour bodies, the Arctic Council, the North American Leader’s Summit, the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Summit of the Americas (SOA), and many other new international institutions.

The Cold War victory has led to the genuine globalization (rather than the Americanization of a diversifying Canada) and to the “Canadianization” of other countries, including the U.S., by making them more subject to transnational flows of goods and services, money, investment, people, energy, ecological resources, pollution, and ideas that Canada has long learned to live with and use for a soft power, first-mover advantage abroad and at home (Doran 1984b; Kirton 1999b, 2000c; Pettigrew 1999). At the same time globalization has brought a new vulnerability that has equalized threat and power among the strong and the weak, and connected all from both categories into a common community of fate. In the war-drenched world since 1945, Canada has moved from helping America fight its Asian war in Korea 1950–54—which America didn’t win— through sitting out America’s Asian war in Vietnam 1954–75 —which America lost—to going to war together after 1990 alongside or without (but never against) America to fight and win several times.

These new powers, polarities, processes of globalization, and wartime victories, have given rise to a new generation of important international institutions. They accord Canada, its interests and distinctive national values a more prominent first-tier place and equip Canada with more effective instruments to shape world order as a whole. The old hard law Westphalian United Nations and Cold War NATO have become less central, less U.S.-dominated, and less constraining for Canada. In their stead have risen the more informal soft law, Canadian-constructed, -compatible, -constant and -controlled bodies of the new internationalism (Holmes and Kirton 1988). This new internationalism, based mainly on informal, plurilateral summit institutions (PSIs), was led from the early 1970s to 1990s by the G7 and Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and followed by the Francophone Summit in 1986. The early 1990s brought the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Rio environmental secretariats for biodiversity and climate change in 1992, and the WTO in 1995. Since the late 1990s have been added the G8 and its “plus five”, the G20, the Arctic Council, the International Criminal Court, the human security network, the cultural diversity network, the Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) Summit and perhaps even an emerging L20, all of which enhance Canada’s ability to constrain powerful countries abroad (see Appendix 14).

These new institutions have entrenched several new defining ideas at the core of the global order. These are, most notably, open democracy and individual liberty, the responsibility to create socially and environmentally protective globalization, and intervention in the internal affairs of sovereign states in support of a common responsibility to protect.

Theory

The Key Questions

In examining the external determinants of Canadian foreign policy, the key questions concern the salience, scope, and sensitivity of the outside world on Canada and the relevance of particular actors or forces that operate out there.

The first question is about the **salience** or relative importance of stimuli or flows from the outside world upon Canada and its foreign policy. In Canada's decisions to go to war, were external determinants more important in September 1939, when it was Hitler's invasion of Poland, Britain's declaration of war, and the expectation of Commonwealth solidarity, or in June 1950, when it was North Korea and South Korea, the United States and the UN, or on September 11, 2001, when it was the al Qaeda and the U.S. and NATO and the G8? In none of these cases (where there was never a direct attack on Canadian territory) was the outcome uncontested or foreordained. In all the difficult societal process of mobilizing domestic consent had to be successfully performed for Canada to go to war. Here complex neo-realism (CNR) looks for the ways in which the constraints on Canada of the international system and its imperial power centres of first Britain then America are lessening over time.

The second question is that of **scope**, or how much of the world outside Canada matters. Is it the full global system and all its major powers, far-flung regions, non state actors and issue areas, or only the local continent, the U.S. and its government, and the imperatives of economic integration? Does Canada react only to the world due to and through the neighbouring U.S.? Or does Canada react to the world the way Canada's global vision, values, interests, and affiliations inspire it to, at times even as though the U.S. did not even exist?

The third question is that of **sensitivity**—how long did it take Canada to decide to go to war in 1939, 1950, 1990 and 2001, and how much did that time shape the way in which it went to war? Here CNR looks at how much proactive and preventive behaviour Canada exhibits, rather than just responding right away with an “aye ready aye” or instinctive “no way” and sending a “blank cheque.”

The fourth question is that of **actor relevance**, now broadened to include non state actors and human or natural forces in the international system as a whole. Does Canada respond to the U.S. alone, to its anticipated behaviour as well as actual international, and, even more deeply, to America's domestic political process as well? Or does Canada respond directly to its adversaries, to its allies, to all other major powers, distant middle and minor ones, and to the international institutions of the UN, the G8 and other newer, plurilateral bodies and new emerging ideas that challenge the principles of old? How has Canada responded to globalization, and the world at war that defines the post-Cold War and post-September 11 years?

The question of actor relevance raises the issue of whether Canada depends so much on a particularly large and hegemonic America that it is affected not only by the international

behaviour of the U.S. but also by its domestic political process. The question also points to the value of simple stimulus-response models in explaining Canada's foreign policy—showing Canada's international behaviour as a straight response to the international behaviour directed at Canada by other, consequential countries outside. And it leads to the question of whether, even in an era of globalization, the power and geographic distance between Canada and foreign countries exerts a magnetic pull on Canada's international behaviour, as a “**geopolitical gravity model**” of Canadian foreign policy might predict, and whether powerful processes institutions and ideas in the international system can affect or overcome this pull.

The Predictions of the Three Perspectives

Each of the **three theoretical perspectives** offers quite different answers to these questions. The PD perspective predicts that Canada will heavily, directly, reactively or in anticipation, and narrowly respond to the U.S. (and Britain before it), to the ideas defined by it, and to international institutions dominated by it, starting with the joint continental bodies of the North American Aerospace Defence command (NORAD) and the International Joint Commission (IJC). The LI perspective, in contrast, argues that Canada will respond primarily, but with convoy-like mutuality, to the world's Atlantic and anglo-centric middle powers and the multilateral UN and its secretary general. The CNR perspective claims that external determinants increasingly will have low salience, but wide scope and high sensitivity, so that it takes a fuller set of global major powers and other actors and the new processes institutions and ideas to inspire Canada to act and go to war abroad.

The Meta-Theory Applied

The meta-theory of Canadian foreign policy started with America's sustained, significant, and probably irreversible decline as a dominant power in a more mutually vulnerable world. With the end of the Cold War came the decline, then disappearance, of the world's second-ranked post-1945 superpower as well. Power—both as capability and invulnerability—diffused to many key actors. There was no longer any tight polarity to keep Canada confined within any one camp. The decline and disappearance of Soviet power and Cold War polarity created many more democratic polities with open societies and market economies, producing many more available and appropriate partners to govern, in concert, a globalization that more equally affected and benefited all. New democratically based international institutions arose to do this, starting with the G7 in 1975 but moving, since 1989, to embrace Russia and become the G8. While this new post-Cold War, globalized, institutionalized world of democratic partnership does make soft power more relevant, it has produced a democratic concert that more regularly and intrusively goes to war.

What did this changing world do for Canada? The post-Cold War diffusion of power, the end of the old East-West and North-South polarities, the advent of democratic globalization, the emergence of new ideas and institutions, and the new need to go to war together reduced the salience and broadened and balanced the scope of external determinants. Before, Canada often responded largely to a hegemonic actor as a loyal ally in support of system stability and balance. Now it more often works with all democratic

major powers and lesser powers in concert-based and other plurilateral informal international institutions to shape a new global order, including through the regular use of military force.

Imperial America: Deep Dependence on the Domestic United States

PD scholars argue that Canadian foreign policy is heavily constrained by a single centre of pre-eminent power in the world—the United States. So heavy is its relative capability, and so dependent is Canada upon it, they claim, that Canada is often forced to react and adjust not only to the actual actions or demands of the U.S. government's executive branch in its policy toward the outside world, but even to its anticipated desires and the changing forces within the U.S. domestic political system. Moreover, this heavy U.S. influence is thought to bear not only on Canada's relations with the U.S. itself, but also on Canadian policy toward other countries, issues, and institutions around the world. Thus Canada's dependence on the U.S. is very deep and broad.

Does Canada really depend on the cycles and vicissitudes of U.S. domestic politics? An answer comes by examining the U.S. Congress, its interest groups, and its electoral cycle.

Congress

The U.S. Congress has long been a potentially important external determinant of Canadian foreign policy. As early as May 29, 1775, in an "Address of the Continental Congress to the Oppressed Inhabitants of Canada," it declared: "As our concern for your welfare entitles us to your friendship, we presume you will not, by doing us injury, reduce us to the disagreeable necessity of treating you as enemies."

Since World War II, the U.S. Congress has intruded into Canada and its foreign policy in several basic ways. The first is through isolationism—by preventing the U.S. administration from signing or ratifying international treaties, undertaking interventions, or funding activities desired by Canada abroad. The cadence started in the late 1940s with the failure of the U.S. to accept the International Trade Organization (ITO), leaving Canada and the world with only the much weaker General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).² Canada was thus induced, in key sectors such as agricultural machinery and defence products, to look to bilateral free trade agreements with the U.S. alone. A second way is through internal intrusion—imposing its domestic concerns extraterritorially into Canada. The McCarthyism of the 1950s deterred Canada from diplomatically recognizing the People's Republic of China (PRC) and led to the death of Canadian diplomat Herbert Norman. A third form is protectionism, starting with restrictions on Canadian oil exports and American agricultural subsidies on world markets under U.S. Public Law 480. It is important to recall this early post-World War II record, as an anchor for assessing the trends, and Canada's current complaints over such issues as the ICC, Kyoto, post-September 11 security intrusions, and the softwood - lumber dispute.

Interest Groups

A second dimension of Canada's alleged deep domestic dependence on America flows from the fragmentation of the U.S. political process and power, making it difficult for the U.S. to move coherently even when Congress might agree. The legalized access of interest groups to executive branch action, as in U.S. trade remedy law, as well as the rise of political action committees and the autonomous role of the judicial branch, has increasingly fragmented power within the U.S., in a system where the division of powers and checks and balances allow such forces to flourish (Gotlieb 1991). Even since Vietnam and then the end of the Cold War, the old, unifying bipartisan foreign policy consensus as an offsetting force has been in decline. The prospective defeat of the U.S. in the 2003 Iraq war may send this decline of bipartisanship to new depths, even after the unifying force of the 9/11 attacks on the U.S.

The Electoral Cycle

A third dimension is the U.S. election cycle. Nossal (1980–1) has asked whether the U.S. electoral cycle affects relations with Canada. He finds that on the whole it does not. It does, however, affect how conflicts are processed and generates cyclical swings in the “mood” of the relationship. But it does not affect the outcomes of those conflicts—who wins and who loses. During U.S. presidential election years negotiations stall, Canada's protests are ignored, the frequency of summit visits diminishes, a frustrated Canada keeps pressing, irritants mount, and the atmosphere worsens. But after the election is over, normalcy rapidly returns and the pattern of outcomes remains the same. In short, Canada is largely immune from the cadence of domestic U.S. politics. There is no deep PD here.

Power and Polarity in the Major Power System

The United States

If the U.S. is thus largely the billiard ball–like actor that realist theory assumes it to be, how does it, as the biggest ball on the billiard table, bump into Canada? What is the state-to-state cadence of interaction and external determination like? Some claim that a much smaller, more dependent Canada deals with the U.S. through “anticipated reaction,” giving in to what it imagines the U.S. wants, and not raising its own preferences for fear the U.S. response will be negative and that harsh punishment will come (Clarkson 1968). This claim can be tested by examining the record of 50 years of high-level politicized Canada-U.S. bargaining between 1920 and 1970. Here the studies of Joseph Nye (1974) and David Leyton Brown (1974) show that Canada, far from being self-deterred in advance, often takes the first intergovernmental action from which conflicts flow or makes the first intergovernmental request that leads to the resolution of such conflicts on balanced terms.

Studies using the technique of “events data analysis” also explore the overall pattern of interactive stimulus and response. Don Munton (1978), employing this technique in a 1978 study, found five trends. First, the U.S. was highly salient, as Canadian foreign policy behaviour toward the U.S. was highly responsive to that of the U.S. in general terms. Almost three quarters (73 percent) of Canada-to-U.S. actions involved previous

actions from the U.S. as a stimulus. This was higher than the figure for Canada's relationship with the world as a whole, which at 55 percent suggested that Canada was only marginally a reactive policy taker, rather than proactive policymaker. The Canada-U.S. figure was also higher than that in Canada's bilateral relationship with the other superpower of the day, for the Canada-USSR figure was only 62 percent. It was also higher than the level of reactivity of many other countries, for the average for all 35 countries in the data set was 40 percent. This was a "very tentative conclusion," as it depended heavily on the particular data set. But it does suggest that Canadian foreign policy was on balance attentive and reactive to the stimuli of external powers, above all the U.S., and the second superpower—the USSR—right below.

Second, just how did Canada react? Not with very great sensitivity. Only to a limited extent (41 percent) did it adjust the intensity—that is, the activity or passivity—of its action toward the United States. Nor did Canada remain stuck in the old policy, as its past behaviour also had little effect (0.19 percent). Indeed, Canada was more sensitive when it dealt with the rest of the world (48 percent) and with the USSR (63 percent). In short, Canada did not mobilize its resources to respond with intensity whenever the U.S. showered it with activity and attention.

Third, Canada did not respond as a saint or victim to nasty U.S. behaviour by compliantly giving the U.S. what it wanted. Rather, Canada followed a tit-for-tat strategy of fairly strict reciprocity, by adjusting the level of conflict (or hostility) of its behaviour reasonably closely to the level of hostility sent from the U.S. (53 percent). It was not locked into a fixed course of deference—always be nice to the big neighbour—as its past behaviour was relevant only 23 percent of the time. However, Canada was even stricter with the rest of the world (57 percent) and the USSR (68 percent). So Canada did give the U.S. some margin of goodwill, some allowance for mistakes, some benefit of the doubt, even if it was fairly ready to respond in kind when the U.S. became unpleasant.

Fourth, there are a few notable periods of non-correspondence—times when the U.S. was nasty and Canada was nice. The first is 1957–58, indicating that the early Diefenbaker government was by no means anti-American. The second is 1965–66, suggesting the pro-American Pearson received little reward for taking U.S. nuclear weapons once Lyndon B. Johnson's America became embroiled in Vietnam.

Fifth, the long-term structural trend in the relationship was toward greater conflict. Until 1967, Canada was consistently friendlier to the U.S. than the U.S. was to it. But in 1967 this changed fairly strongly—no more "Mr. Nice Guy Canada," said the government in effect, even if Canadian firms remained free to export defence, automotive, and other products to fuel the American war machine in Vietnam. Moreover, over the entire period there was an overall rise in the level of conflict. The sudden shift in Canada's centennial year suggests that Canada (the year before Trudeau came to power) moved to defend its separate interests more vigorously, as the U.S. reached the height of its involvement in Vietnam. This shows the impact of both the rise in Canada's power relative to the U.S., the diminishing effect of the solidarity bred by World War II, Korea, and the early Cold War, and the emergence of détente.

Western Europe

Even if Canada can hold its own with the U.S. in its home continent, do the global pre-eminence of the U.S. (the power factor) and the ties of alliance in a bipolar world (an institutional and polarity factor) constrain Canada's freedom in dealing with other countries in the world? Is there a broader dependence? Stated differently, does Canada's continental relationship with the U.S. determine Canadian foreign policy in the world at large? Does the U.S. alone constrain Canadian foreign policy on the wider world stage or is there a broader scope of countries in the external environment that are relevant?

An answer comes from Canadian foreign policy toward western Europe, the historical centre of world politics, the home of Canada's two parent countries, and the standard Canadian counterweight or diversification alternative to the United States. Michael Dolan (1978) examined the period of 1948–73 and uncovered three trends.

First, Canada focused on the world, not just the United States. The targets of Canadian foreign policy were as follows: the U.S. 30 percent, western Europe 23 percent, China-Japan 13 percent, South Asia 11 percent, eastern Europe 11 percent, and the Middle East 7 percent. The U.S. was in first place, but it was by no means dominant. Its share was not in excess of its average share of global capability during this time. This is not the imperial-focused interaction of PD.³ Europe and the Asia-Pacific region were in a reasonably close second spot. This measure of activity thus suggests that Canada pursued a broadly global approach—the “global involvement” that CNR predicts.

Second, “Canada loved Europe, not the United States.” Canada was far friendlier in the actions it directed at Europe (8.9/1) than it was to the U.S. (3.2/1) or the USSR (1.53/1). Canada treated Europe, not the U.S., as its best friend.⁴ Long before Mulroney placed Britain and France alongside the U.S. as Canada's best friends, Trudeau and his predecessors were behaving as if they and the other Europeans were.

Third, Canada had autonomous bilateral relationships abroad, as CNR predicts. The Canada-U.S. relationship did not cause Canada's foreign policy toward western Europe. Rather, Canada's foreign policy toward Europe was caused by what the Europeans did to Canada. Specifically, European behaviour toward Canada explained about three quarters of total and of cooperative Canadian behaviour toward Europe. Adding Canada-U.S. - behaviour as another cause improved the explanation only slightly. By itself it explained very little. Hence Canadian European relations were an autonomous sphere.

³ If all the western European states were in the data bank Dolan used, this region would probably replace the U.S. in the first position.

⁴ This measure of activity implies association.

The USSR

But what happened across the old East-West divide, in Canada's relationship with the USSR? Here the heavy weight of the U.S. and the bonds of alliance loyalty should have been most strongly felt, especially as the U.S. liked to jealously guard for itself the relationship with its superpower rival. So did the U.S. determine Canadian foreign policy toward the USSR? Gregory Raymond (1987, 232) compared "the impact U.S. actions (conformity) and Soviet actions (reciprocity) ... had on Canadian behaviour toward the USSR during the 1948–1972 period, when most assumed a high degree of conformity between Washington and Ottawa in their relations with Moscow."⁵

Raymond found, first, that Canada conducted its own, all-Canadian cold war. His central conclusion was that "reciprocity with Soviet initiatives better accounted for co-operative Canadian behaviour than conformity with U.S. actions." When the USSR was nice to Canada (*détente*), Canada was nice to it, regardless of what the U.S. was doing. That is, Canada focused on what the Soviets did, and not what Washington thought. Canada responded in kind, playing the game of "tit for tat." There was no PD here, but a broad scope of autonomous external determinants extending to Canadian foreign policy with the second superpower, as CNR predicts.⁶

Second, Raymond found that Canada moved first on *détente*. Third, he concluded that "neither reciprocity nor conformity could account very well for Canada's conflictual behaviour." What did then, if the Soviets themselves or the U.S. did not? Perhaps the answer lies in a broader array of external factors, or those within Canada itself, in the domestic polity, in highly salient societal determinants, as CNR predicts.⁷

The Post–Cold War Transformations

If Canada responded to the wider world well beyond the U.S. even during the frigid, rigid Cold War years, what changes have come since the Cold War's end? There are three basic answers to this broad and complex question.

⁵ Raymond's method was to conduct a time series regression of the volume and affective intensity of Canadian behaviour. He controlled for level of tension between the superpowers and for the degree of bipolarization.

⁶ Raymond (1987) offers the following LI explanation for this pattern: "Canada's tendency to respond in kind to Soviet co-operation, regardless of U.S. policy, is understandable in the light of its tradition of bridge-building and its long-standing desire to protect Western security without threatening Soviet interests.

⁷ The views of Joe Clark or Brian Mulroney on the USSR in the 1980s, and the electoral strength of the Ukrainians in Conservative Party electoral fortunes, suggest how this could well be true.

Democratic Russian Partnership and Power

First, the Soviet threat was replaced by a partnership with the Russians and one that was much more deep and durable than the temporary Hitler-inspired alliance from 1941 to 1945. The Soviet threat diminished and disappeared due to its capability downsizing, democratization, and revision of longstanding conceptions of interests and identity, culminating in its abandonment of Serbian Slobodan Milosevic in the 1999 war to liberate Kosovo. Russia's relative capabilities then recovered and rose. But it remained largely on Canada's side, as the response to September 11 showed, even if several of Russia's domestic and foreign policy decisions were cause for serious concern. Remnant Russia arose as a democratic polity and foreign policy partner, with growing relative capabilities in the world.

America's New Security Dependence on Canada

Second, Canada no longer needed the unique U.S. security blanket, with its nuclear weaponry, offensive systems, and organizations such as NORAD for a now non-existent aircraft or missile threat from Canada's neighbour across the North Pole. It was this Cold War threat, backed by Cold War-bred crises from Sputnik to Cuba, that had brought American nuclear weapons into Canada by 1963. The end of the Cold War brought a substantial decline in Canadians security dependence on the U.S., especially for those assets the U.S. could uniquely provide. At the same time, there was a substantial decline in the traditional U.S. security dependence on Canada—its need for Canadian geography and specialized capability and cooperation to defend the deterrent.

September 11 did not bring back Canada's dependence on the U.S. (Cody et al. 2003). Unlike its fellow G8 members, Canada has had no deaths from international terrorism on or over its soil since 1975. As September 11 showed, al Qaeda could attack the U.S. without attacking Canada, in a way the nuclear armed Cold War Soviets could not. - Indeed, Canada publicly got on bin Laden's target list specifically after Canada chose to go to war in Afghanistan, alongside the United States. At the same time, September 11 created an important new American dependence on Canada, once the U.S. realized that it could not control its vast borders all by itself in the style of the Maginot Line, Iron Curtain, or Berlin Wall. In the wake of September 11, a suddenly strained America rushed to rely on Canada's civilian aircraft and surveillance capabilities. And while Canada's external imperial dependence on first British and then American intelligence for global information continued, Canada's Radarsat program promised to generate a greater balance of dependence in this regard. And America's intelligence capabilities proved not to be compelling when Canada chose not to go to war against Iraq in 2003 more than it already was.

The New Front-Line States

Third, Japan and Germany, now ranked second and third among the world's powers and both Canada's allies, became the front-line states, right next to a still dangerous Asian landmass and southeastern Europe and Central Asia. With these immediate threats, neither was tempted to mount a bipolar challenge to the United States. The G8 was the only plurilateral institution that linked Canada to both of them. The same was true for Italy, which was now a front-line state with regard to the Balkans, Mediterranean, and the

Middle East. Nossal's first invariant—geography—thus changed fundamentally in its political, if not physical, impact. While Canada itself did not relocate, the global polarity-threat dimension did. In traditional national security terms Canada was again on the sidelines, back in its geographically and soft power-protected “fireproof house,” as it had been before World War II and the advent of the “air-atomic” age. Then came 9/11 to change things once again.

Process: Globalization, Vulnerability and War

The Great Globalization Debate

Has the advent of intense globalization in the 1990s given Canada new opportunities to project its influence outward? Or has it led to a new wave of inward “Americanization masquerading as globalization” in ways that have further constrained a weakened Canadian state and captured a constricting Canadian civil society mind? As noted above, this question has given rise to a rich debate.

One school argues that globalization has bred new international rules and institutions that have created supranational constitutions for Canada, based on alien, American rules enforced by processes well beyond the democratic control of the Canadian governments and its citizens. The NAFTA, with its Chapter 11 on investment, and the WTO are the primary examples cited to prove the case (Clarkson 2002).

A less pessimistic view comes from Stephen McBride (2001). He claims that “this does not mean that other nations such as Canada have been passive bystanders or victims in the globalization process. Canadian governments have played an active role in shaping the global economy. They have been pressured to do so primarily by business interests which have pushed hard for the new paradigm” (18).

By far the most optimistic response comes from Pierre Pettigrew (1999), Canada's former Minister of International Trade and Minister of Foreign Affairs. He argues that Canada, because of its historical openness, domestic diversity, and accommodation, is best positioned to succeed in a globalized world.

The Evidence on Canada's Globalization

The effort to evaluate these claims is just beginning. The intersection of globalization with the Canadian state and policymaking process is a complex one that varies considerably by issue area (Doern, Pal, and Tomlin 1996). Critical case studies of Canada's response to international financial crisis—thought to be the leading edge of globalization—suggest that Canada is more of a principal power provider of global public goods than a penetrated passive victim of uncontrollable forces emanating from abroad (Kirton 1999b, 2000c). At the same time, the ease with which severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) came in from China to kill Canadians and cripple the Canadian economy in 2003 shows the vulnerability that globalization brings.

The New Vulnerability

As the SARS case shows, however much governments may guide globalization, it has brought a new vulnerability that threatens even the most powerful countries, in the same ways it has long harmed the weaker ones. Indeed, the new vulnerability may expose the most powerful countries even more, by positioning them as the primary targets for those agents of the new vulnerability who wish to choose a specific target and control the destructiveness they unleash to that end.

As classically conceived by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye (1977), the old vulnerability, as distinct from mere sensitivity, arises when a country's core interests and values remain threatened, exposed, dependant, and diminished by directed flows from external country competitors, even after the recipient country unilaterally changes its national policy to defend itself against its rising sensitivity to the new threat. As 9/11, the 2003 SARS and the 2005 Hurricane Katrina attacks demonstrated, the new vulnerability can arise from non-state actors, uncontrollable human-created processes, or even natural forces; it can be unleashed and targeted with no intentionality and quickly spread anywhere and everywhere; it can overwhelm any homeland defences erected by unilateral, national policy change; and it can have a deadly impact equal to or exceeding that which any country competitor has been able to inflict (Kirton 1993d). Even the most highly capable Westphalian country is thus exposed in the same way as the least capable. It thus depends equally on international cooperation, operating at the outer defences, to protect all or pre-emptively destroy the vulnerability at its source (be it the al Qaeda network or the SARS virus or the marriage of the two through bioterrorism).

Several processes have already mutated from the old vulnerability of the 1970s to the new vulnerability of the 21st century, making America and all its major allies more equally vulnerable to the common enemies they face. The major ones, which have cumulated and become interconnected, are energy, nuclear weapons and explosions, terrorism, chemical and biological weapons (such as the sarin gas attacks in Japan and the anthrax attacks in America), infectious disease, and extreme weather events.

In most of these mutations, America has been heavily afflicted, while Canada has remained relatively unscathed. America's energy insecurity has mounted with terrorist attacks on the oil infrastructure in Iraq and Saudi Arabia, while Canada has become the country with the second largest oil reserves (after Saudi Arabia) in the world. Especially as a result of September 11, America has become a major target and victim of deadly terrorism of global reach, while Canada has largely escaped thus far. America's 1979 Three Mile Island nuclear explosion ended its plans for new nuclear power plants, while the 1996 Chernobyl nuclear explosion ended the actual construction of them. In contrast, Canada, with no similar shocks at home, has continued on its civilian nuclear path. The 2001 anthrax attacks and deaths in America from a still unknown source have no equivalent in Canada to date. Only in the case of the 2003 SARS scare was Canada a major victim and America largely untouched. Yet on the whole America the vulnerable and Canada the invulnerable have become the dominant trends in the 21st-century world.

The Advent of Ongoing Global War

Since 1990 war has become a regular feature of Canadian foreign policy life—both through the wars Canada has chosen to fight and those that it has chosen not to participate directly and actively in, in a major way. Never before had Canadians fought so continuously, for so long, and in so many global theatres as they have since the first Gulf War in 1990 through to the ongoing war in Afghanistan. Defined as Canada’s actual use of deadly force or its involvement in combat theatres with combat-capable armed forces, Canada’s wars include the first Gulf War in 1990–91, the Balkans since the spring of 1992 (including the Battle of Medac Pocket in September 1993), the Turbot War against Spain in 1995, Zaire in 1996, the war to liberate Kosovo in 1999, the war against terrorism in Afghanistan after 2001, and, almost invisibly, the second Gulf War since the spring of 2003. Together the cumulative experience of continuous, chronic, lower-level but globally expanding war has led to the routinization of war as a regular external determinant and a behavioural instrument of Canadian foreign policy. A close examination of who Canada goes to war with and for suggests that the primary powers acting as external determinants of Canadian foreign policy, after 1990, are France and Britain as well as the United States.

International Institutions

The New Internationalism

Particularly important has been the rise of a new generation of international institutions based on the new principles and the new powers. This new internationalism includes the G7/8 and its “plus five” since 2003, the CSCE, the Francophone Summit, the OSCE, APEC, the Rio environmental secretariats for biodiversity and climate change, the North American Secretariat for the Environment and Labour, the WTO and the SOA, and the G20, as well as the Arctic Council, the ICC, the International Network on Cultural Policy (INCP), and the Security and Prosperity Partnership Summit of North America (SPP). As some of these new institutions involve a wider array of civil society actors more directly as equals in their governance forums, they offer greater opportunities for Canada to penetrate the hard shell of Westphalian state sovereignty and directly influence transnational actors based in other countries for Canadian ends.

The transformation from the old to the new internationalism can be seen by briefly examining the impact on Canada, compared to other countries, of the two major institutions of global governance—the UN and G7/8.

The United Nations

At the heart of the LI perspective on Canadian foreign policy stands the claim that Canada has been particularly responsive, sensitive, and accommodating to the UN, in return for using it to practice the multilateral “diplomacy of constraint” effectively against the U.S. (Stairs 1974). Students of CNR, in contrast, tend to see the UN not as an autonomous set of principles, norms, rules, procedures, and personnel but merely as a - forum for the interplay—and only the very limited “modification”—of the interests of the

major powers. The PD perspective predicts, in contrast, that Canada merely follows the lead of the U.S. within the UN.

Does Canada choose the U.S. over the UN when it faces clear choices of war and peace, and did it follow the lead of the UN rather than the polarities produced by the dueling superpowers during the Cold War? More precisely, to what extent has Canada's UN behaviour responded to the shifts in polarity within the body, to alterations in the old East-West and newer North-South divides in world politics, and to the pull of alignment-alliance solidarity they bring? To find the answer, Brian Tomlin (1978) examined roll call votes in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) from 1946 to 1974.

He found that East-West and North-South polarization have changed markedly by year. There has also been a trend toward declining polarization, particularly after 1960. Tomlin then explores how this has affected Canada's voting on several types of issues: Cold War issues such as the Korean war and representation of China; self-determination of colonies; anti-intervention in places such as South Africa; supra-nationalism or the functioning of the UN itself in its creation of institutions, financing of peacekeeping forces, and matching its institutions to the interests of its members; and Palestine. He hypothesized that with more polarization, there would be less alignment with the U.S. from a mediatory, bridge-building, helpful fixing Canada. When the Cold War got colder, Canada would try to mediate through the Iron Curtain or over the frigid North Pole, rather than loyally go along with the U.S. ally. And when the world would divide into rich versus poor blocs, Canada would rush to bridge the North-South divide.

Tomlin found that the pattern varied according to the issue area at stake. First, on Cold War issues, Canada was a loyal ally. Tighter bipolarity produced greater alignment with the U.S. When the Cold War became colder, Canadian behaviour became more determined by the U.S. even within the UN. Thus, in the political-security sphere, PD prevails, even within the LI bastion of UNGA.

Second, on self-determination and anti-intervention questions, Canada was a bridge builder. Here increased polarization produced less Canada-U.S. alignment. On this classic defining issue of the North-South divide, Canada behaved as LI predicts. As the Cold War declined, to be replaced by North-South divisions as the defining polarity in world politics in the 1970s, Canada thus would likely move from a PD to a LI policy overall.

Third, on supra-nationalism and Palestine there was no relationship of any sort. The external determinant of polarity seems not to have affected Canadian behaviour where it might most be expected to—in Canada's relations toward the UN itself and in the Middle East. Here Canada was quite free to choose on other grounds (perhaps its distinctive national value of international institutionalism, or its societal process regarding the Middle East).

Fourth, Canada seemed to be more of a mediator overall after 1960, as the old East-West divide gave way to the new North-South one.

The G7/8 Compliance Record

After the early 1970s the central international institutions of global governance began to shift from the multilateral, hard law UN to the plurilateral, soft law G8. With the values of globally preserving and promoting open democracy, individual liberty, and social advance as its core principles, the G8 was ideationally much more compatible with Canada's distinctive national values than the UN, which had the traditional Westphalianism at its core. Yet with far fewer powers, virtually all of which were more powerful than Canada, and with none of the hard law and separate international secretariats to help Canada, the G8 seemed less likely than the UN to act as an instrument that would allow Canada's will to prevail. Just how much has the G8 constrained Canada, as opposed to the other major power members in the club? The available evidence on country's compliance with its G8 commitments suggests that the G8 has indeed constrained Canada heavily, but that it has also come to constrain Canada's other partners, including the initially unilateralist U.S. and France, to an equally high degree.

In the first phase, from 1975 to 1989, Canada was a high complier, second only to Britain, while the U.S. and especially France were the lowest compliers of all (von Furstenberg and Daniels 1991). In the second, post-Cold War, phase, from 1988 to 1995, Canada remained highly constrained, with a compliance record of +41 percent on a scale ranging from -100% to +100%. But the U.S. became more constrained, as its compliance rose from +25 percent to +34 percent (Kokotsis 1999).⁸ In the third phase—the era of rapid globalization since 1996—Canada's compliance soared to very high levels (save for a dip in 2002) (Kirton 2002b; G8 Research Group 2003). But so has that of the U.S., and virtually all other members, with some complying even more than Canada. Indeed in the six months following the 2005 Gleneagles Summit, which focused on African development and climate change, the U.S. emerged as the highest complier with the G8's priority commitments. In the full year following the 2005 Summit, Canada's compliance was +81%, with Britain at +95%, the EU at +89% and Germany at +88% having even higher scores (G8RG 2006). In the six months following the 2006 St. Petersburg Summit, the preliminary results (as of January 21, 2007) indicate Canada's compliance was +40%, exceeded by the US at +50%, the EU at +60% and Britain at +70%.

⁸ Kokotsis found, more specifically, that the G7 generated many commitments on big issues in this post-Cold War world and that Canada's compliance score with those commitments was still high and higher than that of the U.S., as von Furstenberg and Daniels first found. Indeed, she found that Canada's overall score remained essentially unchanged over the two periods and that the end of the Cold War—that great change in power and polarity—did not matter much to how important the G7 was for Canada. The constraints of this international institution were immune even to big changes in relative power and polarity. Kokotsis also found the U.S. score rose substantially from one-quarter (25 percent) to more than one-third (34 percent).

Thus post–Cold War globalization has made the G8 the international institution that really counts in constraining its member states. The most powerful members have now become the most compliant, institutionally bound partners, just as a long globalized, international institutionally committed Canada has been.

Ideas

The International Image of Canada

A further relevant feature of the external environment is the set of dominant ideas within it about Canada as a country and about the principles of global order as a whole (Cooper 1997). The first question should thus be what does the world think of Canada as a distinctive country in the international system, with its large or small capabilities in both hard and soft power forms. Here there are many assertions that Canada's old image, based as it was on hard power, gave it an acknowledged status as a middle power in the image of other countries' elites and mass publics. There are many more recent assertions that Canada's image as a country laden with soft power and as a "model power" has elevated Canada's influence in the post–Cold War world. The available evidence suggests that Canada's traditional hard power image gave it a greater rank and relevance among foreign elites than the conventional wisdom claims. It further suggests that the process of Canada's image penetrating further to influence foreign countries' societies and mass publics is growing, but still has a long way to go before it can do Canada and its foreign policy much Canadian-controlled good.

International Elite Images

To discover Canada's image among the world's foreign policy elite, in 1975–76, Peyton Lyon (Lyon and Tomlin 1979) interviewed 71 foreign officials and experts around the world (outside the communist bloc, Africa and Latin America) about their image of Canada. They found Canada was "generally perceived to be a sensible, responsible country, but not exceptionally influential in global affairs" (79). More precisely, more than half compared Canada to countries with decidedly less power. Canada still had an LI image abroad.

However, more foreigners than Canadians compared Canada to major powers. And more than half (53 percent) of the foreigners felt Canada's influence was increasing, while only third (33 percent) of the Canadian elite did. About half of those foreigners who saw an increase cited as a cause Canada's economic development or natural resources, while the other half cited its internationalism, independence, or sympathetic attitude toward the developing world. Three-fifths said Canadian diplomacy could "affect relations between the superpowers." A sensible, responsible country promoting internationalism, independence, and a sympathetic attitude toward the developing world was the socially constructed foundation on which Canada's soft power was built.⁸ Almost 30 years later, Robert Greenhill (2005) conducted a similar if less systematic study of what image of Canada well-placed foreigners held. He found that they thought little of Canada's power but much of Canada's potential, and concluded that the latter could be converted into the former if Canada invested in a well-equipped rapid reaction military force.

International Media Images

When one moves beyond the elite to the broader public in civil society, the image of Canada, as portrayed by the international mass media, suggests that Canada's soft power exists in fragile form. The classic study showed that Canada appeared in just over 2 percent of the stories on U.S. television network news—barely above the threshold of attention required for viewers to form an image of the country presented there (Larson 1984). A subsequent study of print media in Britain and France showed that Canada was barely reported at all (Keenleyside and Gatti 1992). Canada thus registered most in the deep domestic political process—the mind of the mass public—only in the world's most powerful and most proximate polity.

International Public Opinion

In international mass public opinion, Canada's image is **strongly positive** if also somewhat fragile. Canada probably had a strong and very positive image in a few countries immediately after World War II, notably in Britain as an ally that helped defend Britons from Hitler from the start, and in the Netherlands as an ally that did much to liberate them in the war. While these strong images may have eroded, Canada's more general, still positive, image has spread to a much wider world.

Public opinion surveys in the **United States** in the mid-1970s showed that Canada was the only foreign country that a vanquished, shaken, and isolationist America was willing to fight to defend. After the 2003 war in Iraq, Canada still ranked highly on the list of countries considered by Americans to be their best friend, but had dropped down, well behind Britain. In second-ranked **Japan**, Canada appears as a big, benign country, primarily due to its geography and rich natural resources rather than for its cultural or scientific prowess.

Globally, a February 2006 BBC poll of **33 nations** placed **Canada third** in its positive rating at +52%, behind only the EU and Japan (Butler 2007). More recently, a poll of 28,000 people in 27 countries from November 3, 2006 to January 16, 2007 found that among the twelve countries asked about, Canada was number one as having a net positive image in the world (Butler 2007). It tied with Japan as the most positive (54%) and stood alone as the least negative (14%, ahead of the EU at 19%). Its net score of +40% placed it ahead of G8 partners Japan and the EU at +34%, France at +29%, Britain at +17%, Russia at -12% and the USA at -21%. France stood number one as the country where Canada had the highest image of positive influence at 78%, followed by Australia, Germany, Britain and the US where two thirds or more agreed, and China at over 60%. (In Canada 84% felt it did). Of the twelve countries surveyed, only in Egypt was Canada ranked in the net negative range.

In late 2007 Angus Reid asked the citizens of eight countries (China, Britain, India, Israel, Italy, Turkey, Russia and the United States) and Canada what they thought of Canada (as it had the year before) (Maclean's 2007). In late 2007, a majority of Americans and Chinese said Canada has emerged as a bigger player in world affairs. In sharp contrast, 48% of Canadians said "Canada remains a small country with little influence in foreign affairs." Mentally Canada is a major power abroad but a modest one

at home. Only a quarter of Americans but half of Canadians (and 53% of Russians) believed that “in foreign affairs, Canada does pretty much what the United States wants it to.”

The world liked Canada and its ideals a lot, but Canadians had many misgivings about its lack of independence from America, compromised government integrity and limited influence in the world. Americans are number one at 68% among outsiders in believing that Canada is a global leader in **human rights and peace**, compared to only 35% of Canadians who fell that way. A majority of Americans in late 2007 thought they would have a better quality of life if they moved to Canada, (91% versus 85% for the rest of the world (ROW), that the **Arctic** Northwest Passage is a Canadian waterway (55% v. 31% ROW and 66% of Canadians), that Canada is a partner in the military or peacekeeping operations in **Afghanistan** (93% v. 23% ROW), and even in Iraq (51% v. 25% ROW).

For outsiders, Canada’s most appealing features is the natural **environment**, selected by 68% of Italians, 55% of Britains, and 40% of Chinese. **Quality of life** was chosen by 51% of Turks, 48% of Americans and 47% of Israelis. Canada’s **multi-ethnic diverse** society was selected by fewer than 10%, led by the Turks and Chinese. Stephen **Harper** himself was greatly admired by 30% of Americans, 27% of Canadians, 25% of Indians and Turks and 21% of Chinese. Interrogating dislike of Harper is minimal, by 36% of Canadians have no admiration for him at all. On the negative side, Canada being too U.S.-oriented was chosen by Many Russians, British, Indians, Turks and Chinese, and by 13% of Americans themselves.

When tested on their factual knowledge of Canada, only the Americans passed, while the British came in last place. A majority of citizens in every country save America said Canada was a leader in fighting **climate** change and cutting greenhouse gas emissions, led by Indians at 82%, Russians at 71%, Italians at 69% and Britons at 52%, while only 43% of Americans agreed. Fewer than a third of respondents knew that Canada does not have troops in **Darfur**.

There is thus growing evidence to suggest that Canada has acquired considerable soft power among the mass citizenry in consequential countries in the world, if not yet enough to be a model power or magnet that can forgo hard power instruments to achieve its ends. The data on the choice of destinations for migrants confirms this view that Canada’s power of attraction is sting indeed.

New Principles and Norms

Of greater importance than Canada’s hard or soft power image may be the new norms that are emerging to challenge and replace the core principles of the venerable Westphalian world of self-contained, sovereign, territorial states. The post–Cold War wars, the allied victories, and the onset of intense globalization have all hastened the development of three new defining ideas: open democracy and individual liberty, the responsibility to create socially and environmentally protective globalization, and the responsibility to protect. These three are closely connected with Canada’s core common

values of democracy and human rights, and with its distinctive national values of environmentalism, openness, and multiculturalism.

Conclusion

In all, the external environment of Canadian foreign policy has been transformed since 1945, with cascading, cumulative force in recent years. The world has become more diffuse, less polarized, more globalized, more inter-vulnerable, more war-driven, and more dominated by new ideas and institutions. These changes have reduced the salience, broadened the scope, heightened the sensitivity, and altered the core actors of the external determinants of Canadian foreign policy. In doing so, they have enabled Canada to act increasingly as a principal power, especially in the 21st-century world. To be sure, Canada's image as a principal power with valued power soft and hard remains fragile among the mass publics of other countries, suggesting Canada has much more to do to achieve the Chrétien government's third foreign policy objective of promoting Canadian culture and values in the world. But the new emerging norms of democracy, sustainable globalization, and a responsibility to protect, fused with the rising powers at the core of new international institutions such as the G8 and the G20 have allowed Canada to travel a substantial way toward shaping world order as a principal power in the world.

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